Honble JAIN, J. – The petitioners-defendants have filed this revision u/s. 115 C.P.C. against the order dated 22.4.1996 passed by Shri Kamal Raj Singhvi, Addl. Distt. Judge No. 1, Jodhpur in Civil Appeal No. 83/94 rejecting the application of the petitioners filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. The brief facts, necessary for the adjudication of this petition, may be stated as follows. The respondent plaintiffs filed a suit for ejectment of a shop situated inside Sojati Gate, inter alia, on the ground that the same was required by him reasonably and bonafide for the purpose of carrying on business by sons Shri Manohar and Ashok. After trial, the court decreed the suit of the plaintiff respondent recognising his reasonable and bonafide requirement of the suit shop for the purpose of business to be carried on by sons Manohar and Ashok on 24.10.94. Aggrieved by the above judgment and decree, the petitioner defendants filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, which was eventually transferred to the Court of Addl. Distt. Judge No. 1, Jodhpur. During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioners moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. read with Sec. 151 CPC on 24.11.95 wherein it was alleged that after passing of the judgment some subsequent events of vital importance, having a material bearing on the merits of the appeal, occurred and the same must be taken into account by the appellate court. Explaining the events, the petitioners stated that plaintiffs son Ashok has acquired a shop in Singhla House, Jodhpur and he has started independent business of repairing electrical equipments and appliances. The business has flourished and as such the bonafide or reasonable necessity qua Ashok came to an end. His another son Manohar has now shifted in another shop, adjacent to the disputed suit shop which was vacated by plaintiff Ghanshyam. Ghanshyam has shifted his business elsewhere. Manohar is also engaged in the sale of electrical equipments etc. Thus, the reasonable and bonafide necessity qua Manohar also ceased to exist now. The plaintiff in the above application made specific reference to these developments which occurred subsequent to the passing of the decree and sought appellant courts indulgence to adjudicate the same and allow the appellants to lead evidence to prove the facts. Thus, the reasonable and bonafide necessity qua Manohar also ceased to exist now. The plaintiff in the above application made specific reference to these developments which occurred subsequent to the passing of the decree and sought appellant courts indulgence to adjudicate the same and allow the appellants to lead evidence to prove the facts. The application was stoutly opposed by the plaintiff non-petitioner who made a catego- rical and specific denial of these alleged subsequent events and alleged that the petitioners are again resorting to tactics in order to prevent the plaintiff non-petitioner from reaping the long awaited fruits of his decree obtained against the petitioners. The learned appellate court considered the application of merits and found that the petitioners could not prove any of the events alleged by them and came to the conclusion that it is yet another attempt on the part of the petitioners to delay the execution of the decree which the plaintiff respondent obtained after many years of contest, therefore, by the impugned order dismissed the same. (2). I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the non-petitioners. (3). Learned counsel for the petitioners has very vehemently submitted that the learned appellate court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it to consider the application filed by the petitioners. From the impugned order it appears that the learned appellate Judge approached the merits of the case with the view that the petitioners again were trying to delay the execution of the decree glossing over the fact that these subsequent events did occur and proved by the affidavits filed by the petitioner in support of it. The petitioners filed affidavits. According to the learned counsel as soon as the petitioners brought to the notice of the appellant court the occurrence of these important subsequent events relating to the material point of bonafide and reasonable necessity in respect of the suit shop, it was the bounden duty of the learned appellate court to have given an opportunity to the petitioners to lead evidence to prove the same. Learned counsel derives support from two decisions rendered by this Court. In Rakesh Gupta vs. Ahmed Faruk (1), the facts were that non-petitioners obtained the decree for eviction against the petitioner Rakesh Gupta in respect of the suit shop on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. Learned counsel derives support from two decisions rendered by this Court. In Rakesh Gupta vs. Ahmed Faruk (1), the facts were that non-petitioners obtained the decree for eviction against the petitioner Rakesh Gupta in respect of the suit shop on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. The defendant appellant moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 which was allowed and the written statement was amended. The amendment related to the subsequent event which was alleged to have taken place during the pendency of the appeal. The subsequent event to which the proposed amendment preferred was that the plaintiff had, during the pendency of the appeal, acquired vacant possession of his another shop. It was alleged that the suit shop was kept vacant for about one year without letting the same. Therefore, it was let out. It was, therefore, alleged that the plaintiffs averment was belated that he required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide. It was held that the subsequent event was relevant factor to be considered even at the time of execution of the decree. It was observed `....it cannot be said, that the pleas sought to be raised by the defendant-appellant before the first appellate court were not relevant or germane to the decision of appeal. The enquiry into such facts could not be avoided, merely on the basis of a tentative or prima facie opinion formed on the basis of affidavits or counter allegations in the application and reply. The revision was, therefore, allowed and that appellate court was directed to permit the defendant to lead evidence by treating the appellants defendants application under Order 41 Rule 27 and an issue embodying the above subsequent events was also framed to facilitate the recording of evidence by the trial court. In another case Prakash and Ors. vs. Bhagwan Das (2), the plaintiff in a suit for eviction against Bhag- wan Das obtained a decree for eviction inter alia, on the ground that the suit shop was required reasonably and bonafide for the requirement of his son Harish to do business there. In another case Prakash and Ors. vs. Bhagwan Das (2), the plaintiff in a suit for eviction against Bhag- wan Das obtained a decree for eviction inter alia, on the ground that the suit shop was required reasonably and bonafide for the requirement of his son Harish to do business there. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant moved an application that Harish for whose reasonable and bonafide necessity the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining the decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit shop obtained a decree in law and enrolled himself as an advocate and started practice first at Pali and settled later on at Sojat. The defendant by moving the application sought to raise the matter of this important subsequent event for consideration of the appellate court which was very germane for deciding the important issue of reasonable and bonafide necessity. The Court allowed the same. The revision was dismissed upholding the order of the appellate court. (4). Learned counsel has, therefore, submitted that as soon as the petitioners defendants brought to the notice of the appellate court the happening of the above subsequent events, the enquiry into such facts could not be avoided on the basis of tentative or prima facie opinion formed on the basis of the affidavits or counter allegations made by the plaintiff. (5). Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has supported the order of the learned appellate court which is based on a very rational appreciation of the facts stated before the Court. Learned counsel has pointedly made a reference to the fact that previously also the defendant petitioners moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC before the trial court in which the petitioners stated after filing of the suit the plaintiff opened another shop in Pratap Nagar for the business of electrical goods and carried on the same with his sons Gopal and Manohar. He further stated that Ghanshyam had taken a shop in Ranaji ki Haveli situated in Ghoron ka Chowke, Jodhpur. This application was dismissed by the trial court and the above order was maintained upto the High-Court. Learned Counsel has stated that the application moved by the petitioner is ambiguous, malafide and moved with the sole intention of delaying the execution of the decree. The petitioners with a motive did not furnish particulars regarding these events. This application was dismissed by the trial court and the above order was maintained upto the High-Court. Learned Counsel has stated that the application moved by the petitioner is ambiguous, malafide and moved with the sole intention of delaying the execution of the decree. The petitioners with a motive did not furnish particulars regarding these events. On account of the vagueness the trial court did not find the application of the petitioners to be bonafide or containing any substance. He has drawn attention to the impugned order and submitted that the learned appellate court has given detailed reasons for arriving at the conclusion that the application filed by the petitioners was devoid of force. (6). I may at the very outset state that in Rakesh Gupta vs. Ahmed Faruk (supra) this Court while dealing with an application purporting to be under Order 41 Rule 27 event went to the extent that after the filing of the above application the enquiry into such facts could not be avoided merely on the basis of an affidavit or prima facie opinion formed on the basis of affidavits or counter allegations in the application and replies. Learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of these observations wanted to submit that the trial court was not justified in making any enquiry because the subsequent events pleaded by the petitioners were relevant or germane to the important issue of reasonable and bonafide necessity in respect of the suit shop. The learned appellant court, therefore, committed a jurisdictional error in not acceeding to the request of the petitioner and dismissed the same after examining the pros and cons of the averments made by the petitioners. (7). I am afraid if this view is taken it may lead to disastrous consequences and may open a floodgate for institution of malafide allegations containing such so called subsequent events and pressing the Court to order recording of evidence. The affidavits which are normally filed with interlocutory allegations are permissible under Order 9 (sic order 19) Rules 1 & 2 CPC. It cannot be gainsaid that affidavits are not muted in the definition of evidence in Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act but on the contrary they are expressly excluded by Sec. 1 of that Act. That means that affidavits cannot be used as evidence under any of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. It cannot be gainsaid that affidavits are not muted in the definition of evidence in Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act but on the contrary they are expressly excluded by Sec. 1 of that Act. That means that affidavits cannot be used as evidence under any of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Affidavits can, however, be used as evidence only under Order 19 CPC. Under Rule 1 Affidavit evidence cannot be entertained unless the Court passes an order for sufficient reason that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavits. An affidavit is merely initiated to satisfy the Court prima facie that the averments made in the application are true. Affidavits are normally filed as evidence of certain facts of formal character. In suits of temporary injunction or interlocutory matters, the affidavits form sheet- anchor and facts in connection therewith are proved by the affidavits. Hence, averments made in affidavits in support of interlocutory application may be taken as prima facie proof of facts stated in the application. If that is so, there is no reason why affidavits for the limited purpose in order to find out as to whether there is or has been prima facie proof (not final) of the fact should not be accepted. Rule 1 of Order 19 specifically stated that upon an application evidence may be given by affidavit. In the instant case both the parties filed affidavits, the petitioner in support of the averments made in the application and the non-petitioner defendant to controvert the same. It may further be noted that neither of the parties raised any objection regarding the consideration of the same by the Court. I am, therefore, disposed of that in an interlocutory application like the present one, the Court was bound to consider the averments made in the application with reference to the affidavits filed by the parties in support or denial of the same. This is not a correct view that as soon as the party puts in an application alleging the happening of certain subsequent events relevant for the disposal of the appeal, the Court should order enquiry of those facts without considering the prima facie aspect of the truthfulness of such averments with reference to the affidavits filed by the parties. (8). This is not a correct view that as soon as the party puts in an application alleging the happening of certain subsequent events relevant for the disposal of the appeal, the Court should order enquiry of those facts without considering the prima facie aspect of the truthfulness of such averments with reference to the affidavits filed by the parties. (8). Hence, the learned appellant court was justified in considering the application of the petitioners in order to ascertain prima facie the correctness of the facts stated therein. (9). Now on merits, the petitioners during the pendency of the suit also moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 on 7.5.1994 in which it was alleged that the plaintiff, during the pendency of the suit shifted the Shop No. 33 at Pratap Nagar, near the Police Station, Jodhpur and started the business of electrical goods along- with his two sons Gopal Das and Manohar. In para 4 it was further alleged that Ghanshyam has shifted to Ghoron ka Chowk, Jodhpur where which he was carrying on business of repair of electrical equipments etc. This application was rejected by the trial court on 1.8.1994. The petitioner challenged the above order by filing a revision petition before this Court and that too was dismissed on 22.8.94. In the pre- sent petition, the petitioner alleged that plaintiffs son Ashok has shifted in a shop situated in Singhla House, Ghoron ka Chowk, Jodhpur and started his business of repair of electrical equipments and appliances. Petitioner further alleged that they came to know of this incident only two months before filing the application though Shri Ashok has been doing the business at that. Similarly, Ghanshyam has vacated the shop situated near the suit shop and his another son Manohar has shifted into that shop. Thus, according to the petitioners the reasonable and bonafide necessity qua both the sons of the plaintiff no more exists. As I have already stated the non-petitioner totally denied the above amendment. It may be stated that in the previous application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 the petitioners alleged that Ghan- shyam had shifted to a shop situated in Ghoron Ka Chowk, Jodhpur. Now, the petitioners have re-shifted there and alleged that Ashok has shifted to a shop situated in Singhla House, Ghoron ka Chowk, Jodhpur. It may be stated that in the previous application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 the petitioners alleged that Ghan- shyam had shifted to a shop situated in Ghoron Ka Chowk, Jodhpur. Now, the petitioners have re-shifted there and alleged that Ashok has shifted to a shop situated in Singhla House, Ghoron ka Chowk, Jodhpur. It may be noted that according to the statement of the petitioners, Ashok has been doing this business for the just one year but no explanation has been furnished why this fact was brought to the notice of the Court so late. The petitioners have not given any essential particulars of the shop which has been occupied by Ashok. The petitioners have also not stated what Ghanshyam is doing after vacating the shop situated near the suit shop and installing his own brother Manohar therein. It appear that the petitioners were aware of this difficulty of explanation. That is why the petitioners in para of the application stated that Ghanshyam has gone somewhere to do his business. It was very essential for the petitioners to have given details as to whether Ghanshyam has started his business. The non-petitioners have filed the affidavit of Ummaid Kumari, the owner of Singhla House. She has stated in her affi- davit that she has not let out any portion of the above building on rent to Ashok s/o Gopal Das. (10). From the above I am disposed to hold that the learned appellate court has not committed any error in rejecting the application filed by the petitioners. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.