J. C. GUPTA, J. Through this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 6-6-80 passed by the District Inspector of Schools (in short to be referred to as Inspector) and the order dated 23-1-82 passed by the Deputy Director of Education (in short to be referred to as D. D. E.) passed in the appeal filed by the petitioner before that authority. 2. The relevant facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed on probation on 14-7-67 as Assistant Teacher in J. TC. grade. The Committee of Management by the decision dated 26-5-69 terminated petitioners services on the ground of un satisfactory service. The petitioner made a representation to the Inspector, who by the order dated 30-8-69 issued a show-cause notice to the Committee of Manage ment as to whether any prior approval of Inspector was obtained before terminat ing the services of the petitioner. Later on by the order dated 17-9-69 the Inspector set aside the order of termination on the ground that prior approval of the Inspec tor was necessary. It appears that the Com mittee of Management again decided through resolution dated 2-6-70 to ter minate the services of the petitioner and this time before serving the notice of ter mination on the petitioner, the Commit tee of Management approached the In spector and obtained his prior approval on 6-6-70 and thereafter sent notice of ter mination. dated 8 6-70, which was served on the petitioner. On 9-6-70 the Commit tee of Management sent another notice stating that the petitioners work was not found satisfactory. It further appears that the petitioners services stood terminated with effect from 1-7-70, 3. The petitioner under legal advice filed civil Suit No. 623 of 1970 challenging the order of termination issued by the Committee of Management. The Com mittee of Management contented the suit. However, the trial Court dismissed the said suit on merits. The first appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and allowed the appeal quashing the two notices referred to above sent by the Committee of Management to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of first appellate Court, the Committee of Management preferred second Appeal No. 2082 of 1974 before this Court. The said appeal was allowed by the order dated 27-2-81. Aggrieved by the order of first appellate Court, the Committee of Management preferred second Appeal No. 2082 of 1974 before this Court. The said appeal was allowed by the order dated 27-2-81. This Court did not prefer to enter into the controversy as to whether the plaintiff, present petitioner, was a probationer or a permanent employee on the date of the order made by the Inspec tor of because in its view under the relevant provisions the U. P. Intermediate Education Act the jurisdiction of civil court was ousted in such matter. The petitioner then immediately filed an ap peal before the D. D. E. on 4-3-81 praying for condonation of delay, but the said ap peal has been dismissed by the D. D. E. by the impugned order dated 23rd January, 1982, which is under challenge in this writ petition. The D. D. E. has also not gone into the merits of the case and has dis missed the appeal as beyond time. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. The only point involved in this petition is whether the D. D. E. has com mitted any manifest error of law in dis missing the appeal as beyond time. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a litigant, who had been prosecuting his remedy under a legal advice should not have made remedy less simply on mere technicalities. Accord ing to him the order of Inspector dated 6-6-70 was never communicated to the petitioner and consequently the period of limitation would not run from the date of the order and thus the appeal filed before the D. D. E. was within time. The other lee of argument of petitioners counsel is that in any view of the matter the Appellate Court of the D. D. E. should have con sidered this aspect of the case that issue regarding the jurisdiction and main tainability of suit was decided in favour of the petitioner by the lover Courts and it was only by the decision of this court dated 27th February, 1981 that it was held that the jurisdiction of civil Court was barred. This, on the face of it, proves that the petitioner had prosecuted the suit in good faith under a mistaken legal advice and for that, in law, the petitioner cannot be punished making him remedyless. 7. This, on the face of it, proves that the petitioner had prosecuted the suit in good faith under a mistaken legal advice and for that, in law, the petitioner cannot be punished making him remedyless. 7. Section 16-G (3) (c) of the U. P. In termediate Education Act, 1921, which makes a provision of appeal reads as under: - 16-G (3) (c ).-Any party may prefer an appeal to the Regional Deputy Director Educa tion, against an order of the Inspector under clause (b) whether passed before or after the conimencement of the Uttar Pradesh Inter mediate Education (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1966 within one month from the date of com munication of the order to that party, and the Regional Deputy Director may, after such fur ther enquiry, if any, as the consider as necessary, confirm, set aside or modify the order, and the order passed by the Regional Deputy Director shall be final, in case the order under appeal was passed by the very person holding the office of Regional Deputy Director while acting as In spector, the appeal shall be transferred by the order of the Director to some other Regional Deputy Director for decision, and the provisions of this clause shall apply in relation to decision by that other Regional Director as if the appeal had been preferred to himself. " (Emphasis laid on under lined portion ). 8. A bare perusal of the above provision would show that any party ag grieved by an order of the Inspector under clause (b) has been given a right to prefer an appeal to the D. D. E. . The period of Limitation is one month which runs from the date of communication of the order of Inspector to that party meaning thereby to the person who files an appeal. In the instant case the petitioner has come with a definite case that the order dated 6-6-70 passed by the Inspector giving approval to the decision of the Committee of Manage ment dated 2-6-70 was never communicated to the petitioner. The two notices sent by the Committee of Management dated 8-6-70 and 9-6-70 also did not con tain any reference of the order of Inspector nor it is claimed by the respondents that copy of the order of Inspector was sent to the petitioner alongwith the said notices. The two notices sent by the Committee of Management dated 8-6-70 and 9-6-70 also did not con tain any reference of the order of Inspector nor it is claimed by the respondents that copy of the order of Inspector was sent to the petitioner alongwith the said notices. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that during the pendency of suit, while filing written statement, the respondents had placed on record of civil suit the aforesaid order of Inspector dated 6- 6-70 and had also made a mention of that in the written statement filed in the suit, as such it can very well be presumed that the petitioner had full knowledge of the existence of the order dated 6-6-70 long before during the pendency of the suit. According to him once the petitioner had knowledge, the period of limitation of one month would run from the date of knowledge. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that mere knowledge of the existence of the order would not be enough as the re quirement of Section 16-g (3) (c) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act is that the order is to be communicated and the period of limitation will run only from the date of communication of the order. On plain reading of Section 16-G (3) (c) the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner seems to be carrying weight, but in the present case it is not necessary to go into the controversy whether there had been any communication of the order in question to the petitioner as the delay caused in filing the appeal before the D. D. E. was liable to be condoned on the very existence of admitted facts. There is no dispute that the petitioner had filed civil suit challenging the order of the Com mittee of Management by which the ser vices of the petitioner were terminated and the issue of jurisdiction was decided in his favour by the lower courts. It was only by the judgment of this Court that the suit filed by the petitioner was held to be not entertainable on account of the statutory provision contained in U. P. Intermediate Education Act which ousted the jurisdic tion of the civil court in such matter. It was only by the judgment of this Court that the suit filed by the petitioner was held to be not entertainable on account of the statutory provision contained in U. P. Intermediate Education Act which ousted the jurisdic tion of the civil court in such matter. It is also not in the dispute that immediately after the dismissal of the suit in Second Appeal, the petitioner approached the I. E. . and placed before it all the above facts. It has been held in a number of decisions that a party cannot be denied hearing merely on technicalities vide Col lector Land Acquisition Anant Nag v. Kanti Ji, AIR 1987 SC1353. 9. In view of the fact that the order of the Inspector dated 6-6- 70 was never served on the petitioner by the Inspector or by the Committee of Management and having regard to the fact that the petitioner had unsuccessfully prosecuted the civil suit upto this court, the D. D. E. ought not to have dismissed the appeal merely on the ground of limitation. The justice and fairness required the D. D. E. to have decided the appeal on merits. 10. In the circumstances and for the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed. The order of the D. D. E. is set aside, the delay in filing the appeal, if any, is condoned and he is directed to decide the appeal on merits according to law within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. In the peculiar cir cumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .