Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. These four Letters patent Appeals were heard analogously as they were filed against one judgment and involve common questions of fact and law. 2. All these four Letters Patent appeals were filed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge delivered in c. W. J. C. No.7995 of 1990 on 23rd december, 1994 whereby His Lordship quashed the appointment of 285 persons made by the Speaker to the posts of Assistants, Typists, Hindi Research assistant, Hindi Expert, Security, durban, Daftari, Sweeper, Peon, all class III and Class IV Posts, as in the opinion of the learned Single Judge such appointments were in violation of the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 3. Out of those four appeals, L. P. A. No.20 of 1995 was filed by the Bihar legislative Assembly through its secretary Sri Yugal Kishore Prasad and the other three appeals, namely, L. P. A. Nos, 22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995 were filed by those persons whose appointments were quashed by the learned Single Judge by his judgment as aforesaid (hereinafter referred to as the judgment of the first Court ). 4. It appears that most of the appellants in L. P. A. Nos.22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995 were not parties before the learned Single Judge but as their appointments were set aside by the judgment of the first Court, they filed these appeals and those appeals were heard analogously by a Division Bench of this Court. 5. In the judgment that was delivered by the said Division Bench on 3.4.1996, there was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of the Division B ench. B. L. A Yadav, J. , (as His Lordship then was) was pleased to hold that the judgment of the first court cannot be maintained and allowed all these appeals for the reasons given in His Lordships judgment. The other Member of the Division Bench s. K. Singh, J. , by his separate judgment, however, upheld the judgment of the first Couit and dismissed the Letters patent Appeals for the reasons recorded separately in the judgment of His lordship. The other Member of the Division Bench s. K. Singh, J. , by his separate judgment, however, upheld the judgment of the first Couit and dismissed the Letters patent Appeals for the reasons recorded separately in the judgment of His lordship. In the concluding portion of judgment of the Division Bench in these letters Patent Appeals, the learned judges gave direction to the Office for placing the appeals before the Hohble the Chief Justice for nominating a third Hon ble Judge to hear and decide the matter. 6. Thereupon the matter was placed before the Hon ble the Chief justice and His Lordship referred the matter to by His Lordhsips order dated 25th June, 19%. Then on the prayer of the learned Counsel for the appellants, the appeals were placed for hearing. 7. On going through the judgment of the learned Judge of the first Court, it appears that the writ petitioners pleaded that they were duly qualified to fill up the posts at the relevant point of time but they could not apply for the posts of Assistants, Typist, Routine clerk, Peon, etc. In the Assembly as no application was invited from the prospective candidates through any employment exchange. Nor was any advertisement issued inviting applications for appointment to those posts. The grievance in the writ petition was that apart from respondent Nos.6 to 17, 234 persons were appointed to various posts of Assistants, Typists, Hindi Research assistants, Hindi Experts, Security guards, Darban, Daftari, Peon, Sweeper by the Speaker of the Assembly between 15th June, 1990 and 1st November, 1990 by issuing different appointment letters without any advertisement and without holding any competitive examination or selection test. It is further stated that the minimum academic qualification required for appointment to the posts of assistants in Assembly is Bachelor degree in Arts, Science or Commerce and for the post of Personal Assistants, bachelor degree in the same faculties having the knowledge of shorthand and typing with a minimum speed of 80 to 120 words per minute. For the post of typist, degree of Intermediate having a knowledge of typing with the minimum speed of 30 words per minute and for routine Clerk and Peon, Matriculation or Middle pass respectively is required. It is also stated that the age limit for the aforesaid posts is between 18 and 30 years. For the post of typist, degree of Intermediate having a knowledge of typing with the minimum speed of 30 words per minute and for routine Clerk and Peon, Matriculation or Middle pass respectively is required. It is also stated that the age limit for the aforesaid posts is between 18 and 30 years. It has been further alleged that most of 234 persons appointed are brothers, daughter-in-law or relations of the Officers and Employees of the assembly and as such in the matters of appointment large scale of nepotism and illegality has been practised. By way of comparison it has been stated that in similar cases of appointments to the bihar Legislative Council, proper advertisement was made but in respect of the appointments made to the Assembly by the said Speaker, the said procedure was not followed. In judgment of the first court ft has been recorded that in the counter-affidavit which has been filed by respondent Nos.2 to 5, the basic facts in the writ petition have not been denied. On behalf of the respondents it was alleged that the writ petition is not maintainable in the absence of 234 persons who have not been impleaded as party respondents and it was also alleged that as the petitioners applied but were not appointed in the Assembly, they cannot question the validity of appointment and that the Speaker has the authority to condone the age limit and that the appointments were made by the speaker after assessing the merits of the respective candidates through interview. It was also stated in the counter-affidavit that the Speaker is fully empowered to make such appointments under the provisions of the Bihar Vid-han Sabha (Recruitment and Condition of Service) Rule, 1964 (hereinafer called the said Rules ). 8. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners they have controverted that they ever applied for the post at any time or that they have joined the post at all. From those pleadings the questions which arose for consideration before the learned Judge of the first Court were summarised in paragraph 4 of the judgment which is repotted in 1995 (1) RL. J. R.254. 9. From those pleadings the questions which arose for consideration before the learned Judge of the first Court were summarised in paragraph 4 of the judgment which is repotted in 1995 (1) RL. J. R.254. 9. From the summary of the points made in paragraph 4 of the judgment it appears that the main thrust of the argument by the petitioners Counsel in the first Court was that the entire appointment process of 234 persons as also of respondent Nos.6 to 17 was in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the Rules and the notifications and that no advertisement of any kind or notice was ever issued inviting applications from the prospective candidates nor were the names called for from the employment exchange. No competitive test for selection under the rule was held. On these facts it was contended that the entire appointment was made on purely political considerations and some of the persons appointed on different posts were closely related to the politicians, officers and staff of the Assembly and as such the appointment cannot be held to be valid. 10. In paragraph 5 of the judgment the learned Judge of the first Court has recorded that the main case of the respondents was that the writ-petition was not maintainable in the absence of persons whose appointments were challenged. It was also contended by the respondents 2 to 5 before the learned judge of the first Court that the Speaker is fully competent under the Rules to make appointments and in making such appointments, advertisement and written tests are not necessary. It was also stated that the appointments were made in accordance with the rules and the same cannot be challenged in a Court of law. It was also contended that all the appointments were made to meet the emergent situation as the Speaker was going abroad and the session of the assembly was to commence and in these circumstances the Speaker was within his jurisdiction to relax the provisions made under the Rules. It was also contended that it was not possible for the speaker to conduct the Assembly session in the absence of sufficient number of Staff. Therefore, appointments were made by. the Speaker after scrutinising the applications received from various candidates and taking interview. It was also contended that it was not possible for the speaker to conduct the Assembly session in the absence of sufficient number of Staff. Therefore, appointments were made by. the Speaker after scrutinising the applications received from various candidates and taking interview. It was also contended by the respondents before the learned Judge of the first court that if in making appointments the authority adopts a mode which is by and large just and fair, in that case advertisement for filling up the vacancies is not necessary and the Court cannot interfere with the appointments merely on some hypertechnical infraction of the rule. 11. In reply to the aforesaid sub-mission made by the respondents, it was urged by the writ petitioners that the instant writ petition is maintainable in absence of 234 persons who were appointed by the Speaker in view of the fact that respondent Nos.6 to 17 have been made parties ir representative capacity and it is not necessary to implead all those persons who have been appointed by the Speaker as the address and other particulars of those persons were not readily available to the petitioners. It has also been argued that the petitioners sought relief not against any individual but sought intervention of the Court to declare the action of the speaker as illegal and without jurisdiction even though individual persons may be affected by the decision that may be passed in the writ petition. 12. On these submissions by the parties, the learned Judge of the First court came to the conclusion that for the purpose of appointment on different posts, proper notice must be issued and published in order to invite applications from the suitable candidates and in the instant case even though it has been alleged that the notice was published on the notice board of the Assembly, no copy of such notice inviting applications was ever produced before the learned Judge. The learned Judge of the first Court on consideration of the various provisions of the said Rules came to the conclusion that the Speaker made those appointments of 285 persons including of the respondent Nos.6 to 17 without complying with the requirement of law, namely, Rules and such appointments were made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. So the appointments made by the Speaker are abinitio void and as such cannot be sustained. So the appointments made by the Speaker are abinitio void and as such cannot be sustained. Thus, the learned Judge of the First Court quashed the orders of the appointment of 285 persons as contained in Annexure-2 series and gave opportunity to respondent Nos.2 to 5 to take steps to fill up the vacancies on various posts in accordance with law. 13. In the aforesaid Letters Patent appeals filed against the said judgment, the learned Judges of this Court, as noted above, differed in their views. B. L. Yadav, J. , (as His Lordship then was)dwelt elaborately on the question of impleading parties. In paragraph 11 of His lordships judgment, B. L. Yadav, J. , (as his Lordship then was) summarised the questions which fell for determination in those appeals. His Lordship also examined the question whether the writ petitioners have any legal or fundamental right to question the validity of appointments of the appellants in L. P. A. Nos.22, 23 and 25 of 1995 who were serving for more than five years. His lordships has also elaborately considered the provisions of Order I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the said code) and in paragraph 46 of the judgment His Lordships findings were summed up and His Lordship came to the conclusion that (i) the appointments of the appellants in Letters patent Appeal Nos.22, 23 and 25 of 1995 were quashed by the learned Judge of the first Court in violation of the principles of natural justice in the sense that they were not made parties and were not heard by the learned Judge; (ii) that the constitutional post and privilege occupied by the Speaker of the house is supreme and he has to maintain his secretariat under his supervision, (iii) Appointments which were challenged in. the writ petition were made consistent with the provisions of rule 4 (2) of the said Rules, (iv) The writ petitioners have no legal right to get the services of the legally appointed candidates terminated, (v) His Lordships has further recorded that the writ petitioners fundamental rights have not been infringed, (vi) His Lordship also recorded that there is no illegality or. procedural defect in the appointment of the appellants in Letters Patent Appeal nos 22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995 and they are serving on the post for five years and as such there is no justification or any ground to terminate their services and thereby His Lordship set aside the judgment dated 23rd december, 1994 passed by the learned judge of the first Court in C. W. J. C. No.7995 of 1990 and allowed all the four appeals. 14. The other learned Judge, S. K. Singh, J. , in his dissenting judgment came to the conclusion that (i) the appeals are fit to be dismissed and that the judgment of the first Court is to be affirmed on the solitary ground that all the appointments were made in gross violation of the constitutional mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution and the relevant recruitment rules. On the question of not impleading those 235 persons as parties to the writ petition, the learned Judge held (ii)that assuming those persons are necessary parties, the judgment of the learned single Judge cannot be quashed as the principles of natural justice, cannot be put in a rigid formula. His Lordship also recorded (iii) that in course of hearing of the appeal where those persons who were not impleaded in the first Court were made parties but they could not point out any material fact which was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge while hearing the writ application nor could the persons in the course of hearing of the appeal controvert the assertion made in the writ petition that the appointments were made without any advertisement and without holding any competitive examination following the relevant procedure. In coming to these findings, His lordship recorded that (iv) it is not in dispute that the vacancies were neither advertised in any newspaper nor application of any kind was called for from any employment exchange. His lordship came to the conclusion that some sort of notice or advertisement is a must for the purpose of appointment on public posts. His lordship has given emphasis on the question of ensuring observance of proper selection process before appointment can be made to the public posts. His Lordship further held (v) that making such appointments disregarding the rules and regulations and in a hush hush manner amounts to fraud on public. His lordship has given emphasis on the question of ensuring observance of proper selection process before appointment can be made to the public posts. His Lordship further held (v) that making such appointments disregarding the rules and regulations and in a hush hush manner amounts to fraud on public. Therefore, S. K. Singh, j. , concurred with the learned Judge of the First Court that the appointments have been made in violation of the constitutional mandate and as such His lordship held that all the appointments of 285 persons should be declared void ab initio and all the appeals be dismissed as there is no infirmity in the judgment of the First Court. 15. Before dealing with the difference of view between the two learned judges which I have indicated above, I may consider the scope of hearing when a matter is referred to a third Judge. 16. The provisions for reference to a third Judge are contained under clause 28 of the Letters Patent of the patna High Court. Clause 28 of the letters Patent provides that in case of difference of opinion between the judges of a Division Bench, on any point or question, such difference shall be stated and the case, on being referred to the third Judge, will be heard on that point. Here, however, the learned Judges of the Division Bench did not formulate the point of difference. But that does not vitiate the reference. This question cropped up in the case of Rana Muneshwar Kumar singh V/s. The State of Bihar reported in 1976 B. B. C. J.233 but was not decided. Later on in the case of Most. Rubia devi and others Vs. Raghunath Prasad reported in 1979 B. B. C. J.49 :1989 BLJ 125, the question was again considered by Justice L. M. Sharma (as His lordship then was ). In Most. Rubia devi (supra) His Lordship held that such difference for the purpose of reference to a third Judge need not be confined to a question of law only and it can be on a question of fact also. His lordship also held that non-formulation of the point of difference by the teamed Judges of the Division Bench does not vitiate the reference, and it may be, at the most, a mere irregularity. 17. His lordship also held that non-formulation of the point of difference by the teamed Judges of the Division Bench does not vitiate the reference, and it may be, at the most, a mere irregularity. 17. In the subsequent decision of this Hon ble Court on this point in the case of Smt. Jay ami Devi Vs. Sri chandmal Agrawal reported in 1984 p. L. J. R. page 852 : 1985 BLJ 237 , the view taken in the case of Most. Rubia devi (Supra) has been registered. 18. Therefore, I hold that both on questions of facts and law the water is at large before the third Judge. 19. So, according to this Court, having regard to the nature of the controversy and the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges, the following broad questions fall for determination before this Court, sitting as the third Judge, and these questions are formulated hereunder: - (i) Whether the writ petitioners have the locus standi to maintain this writ petition (ii) Whether the selection process followed by the Speaker in appointing about 285 persons in the Assembly was valid under the Rules and whether it is in accordance with the constitutional mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (iii) Whether in the matter of making those appointments, the speaker of the Assembly enjoys any constitutional immunity from judicial scrutiny in view of the provisions of articles 187 and 212 of the Constitution (iv) Whether the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution is powerless to quash appointments made in public service even if it comes to the conclusion that the selection process is vitiated just because of the fact that all the holders of posts have not been impleaded (v) Whether the Appeal Court, even if after hearing the appointees finds that the selection process is invalid, is incompetent to set aside those appointments just because they were not parties to the writ petition before the first Court (vi) Whether the services of the persons, even if invalidly appointed, can be terminated when the appointees are working in the posts for a period of five years? 20. 20. Question (i): - Factually it cannot be said in this case that the writ petitioners after participating in the selection process and being unsuccessful have questioned its validity inasmuch as in this case there is hardly any selection process worth its name. What the writ petitioners challenged was the fact of large scale appointments in the assembly Secretariat without following any selection process. Factually it has been made clear that none except writ petitioner No.1 applied for such appointments and he was never called pursuant to his application. Writ petitioner no.1 was appointed temporarily from 8.7.1991 to 29.2.1992 to the post of personal Assistant to the Chairman, internal Resources Committee of Bihar vidhan Sabha. The said appointment of the writ petitioner No.1 stood terminated on and from 25.3.1992 by the order of the Chairman of the said committee. So there is no question of any of the writ petitioners participating in any selection process. 21. The traditional doctrine of locus stand! is based on the sound policy that in matters of administration of justice the time of the Court should not be wasted by entertaining abstract or hypothetical challenge at the instance of professional litigants or busy body. In this famous treatise, Judicial Review of administrative Action (4th Edition ). S. A. De Smith at page 109 has explained the position in these words: - "all developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of public interest in the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional. litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke do not concern him. " 22. Recent trends in all courts are in favour of applying a liberal approach on the question of locus standi. In a concurring opinion delivered by Justice krishna Iyer in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar union (Regd.) Sindri and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in a. I. R.1981 S. C.344. In a concurring opinion delivered by Justice krishna Iyer in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar union (Regd.) Sindri and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in a. I. R.1981 S. C.344. His Lordship, after reviewing various authorities learned in favour of a liberalised approach in matters of standing and approved the following observation in paragraph 46 at page 356 of the report: -"perhaps - and it is only a perhaps -there was once some justification for restricting access to the Courts to prevent their being bogged down in a morass of ineffectually. But todays better informed, better educated, more literate and more politically aware citizens should certainly not be barred from the Courts by tradition. The law can no longer be a closed shop. " 23. The aforesaid principles have been followed by the Apex Court in umpteen number of cases and recently the Apex Court in the case of Prem singh and others V/s. Haryana State electricity Board and others reported in (1996) 4 S. C. C.319 in a matter relating to appointment and selection held that even a candidate who participated in the selection process if it is not justified. In paragraph 12 at page 326 of the report, the following observations have been made: "in our opinion, there is no substance in the objection raised with respect to locus stand! of the original writ petitioners. The candidates could not have anticipated when they appeared for the interview that the Selection Committee would recommend candidates and the board would make appointments far in excess of the advertised posts. The petitioner who was not eligible had a just grievance that due to appointments of candidates in excess of the posts advertised he was deprived of the right of consideration for appointment against the posts which would have become vacant after he acquired eligibility. " 24. Therefore, this Court hold that the writ petitioners have the locus standi to file the writ petition praying for cancelling the appointments of persons in public employment which were made without following the requirement of a valid selection procedure especially when petitioners are also qualified to apply tor such posts, provided a proper advertisement was issued and a selection procedure was followed. Here the petitioners cannot be characterised as a group of professional litigants or members of a busy body litigating for a lark. 25. Questions (ii), (iii) and (iv): -For the purpose of convenience, these questions are taken up together. Factually the stand of the Speaker in making these appointments is that (i)he has made those appointments after processing the applications made by the candidate, (ii) The Speaker himself held the interview, (iii) The Speaker was satisfied about the merit and competence of the candidates, (iv) Under the Bihar Vidhan Sabha Secretariat (Recruitment and Conditions of Service)Rules, 1964, the Speaker is competent to decide the method of appointment and he has done that and, therefore, there is no illegality. This is the stand taken in the counter-affidavit affirmed on 12.3.1992 filed on behalf of the Speaker in the first Court. 26. This stand was sought to be slightly altered in the supplementary counter-affidavit affirmed on 29th september, 1993 before the first Court. In the supplementary counter-affidavit the stand was that the Speaker was going out of the country on urgent business and there was urgent need of hands in the establishment of Bihar Legislative assembly and so in making the appointment "there was un-avoidable departure from the normal rules. " But the Speaker, it was asserted, followed a fair procedure by (i) properly screening the applications of those who were found eligible and then (ii) those persons were interviewed. In some cases relaxations were also made by the speaker, for ends of justice. 27. A clear stand has been taken in the supplementary affidavit that advertisement is not necessary in all cases of making appointments to public office. 28. In the supplementary affidavit certain orders passed by the Speaker in connection with the appointments have been annexed. Those orders are dated 27th August, 1990, 15th June, 1990. A combined reading of those orders would show that the Speaker was proceeding on a foreign tour and it would take him about a month to come back. There is shortage of staff in the Assembly secretariat and it would take about eight to ten months time to complete the selection process if applications are invited and regular interview takes place. The Assembly session is to start from 22nd June, 1990 and if the appointments are not made there may be difficulties in the smooth functioning of the Assembly Session. The Assembly session is to start from 22nd June, 1990 and if the appointments are not made there may be difficulties in the smooth functioning of the Assembly Session. So taking these factors into consideration, permanent appointments were made to various unemployed persons to the posts shown against the names of these persons according to their educational qualifications. In making those appointments age of several persons were relaxed by the Speaker. It was also stated by the speaker in his order that the appointment letters should immediately be issued and the candidates appointed be asked to join immediately. 29. One of those orders, dated 27th august, 1990 (Annexure a to the supplementary affidavit) refers to certain documents but they were not enclosed with that order. So this Court, while hearing the appeals, by an order dated 27th August, 1996 gave liberty to the counsel appearing for the Speaker to file an affidavit of documents disclosing those documents. Accordingly an affidavit was filed. From perusal of that affidavit, it is clear that Annexure a refers to 13 lists of candidates and on those lists there were orders of appointments. The lists are nothing but applications filed by the candidates for appointments and there is a general order by the Speaker for appointment of the candidates mentioned in those lists. There is no record of any interview or of any screening of applications by any body. There is no evidence of a regular selection procedure. There is no inkling of any eligibility criteria also. 30. The learned Judge of the first court recorded in his judgment that no copy of advertisement or notice claimed to be pasted on the notice-board was produced before him. In the two separate judgments of the two learned judges, there is no reference to any such advertisement being produced. Before this Court also the learned Counsel for the Speaker could not produce anything of the kind. 31. Against this factual background, an argument has been made by the learned Counsel appearing for the appointees that under the relevant rules, namely, the Bihar Vidhan Sabha secretariat (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called the said Rules), the speaker is empowered under Rule 4 (2)of the Rules to specify the method or methods by which a post or class of posts may be filed. The provisions of rule 4 (2) of the said Rules is set out below: - " (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (a) of rule 6, the Speaker may, by order, from time to time (a) specify the method or methods by which a post or class of posts may be filled; (b) determine the proportion of vacancies to be filled by each method; and (c) in case of recruitment by promotion, specify the class of officers who, and the conditions subject to which they, shall be eligible for such promotion : provided that appointments to be posts in Class II of the Secretariat by promotion or direct recruitment shall be made only after consultation with the Bihar public Service Commission : provided further that in the case of temporary or officiating appointments by promotion to a post in Class II for a period not exceeding six months in consultation with the Bihar Public Service Commission shall not be necessary. " 32. Reliance was placed on Rule 10 of the said Rules. The said rule provides for relaxation and is set out below: - "relaxation in exceptional cases -Where the Speaker is satisfied that the operation on any rule or provision in the matter of the conditions of service of an officer causes undue hardship in any particular case, the Speaker may, after consultation with the Finance Department, by order, dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule or provision to such extent and subject to such conditions as may be considered necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. " 33. Relying on the aforesaid provisions of the Rules it has been urged by the appellants that since the speaker is empowered to specify the methods of filing a post or a class of posts and in this case he has done that by appointing about 285 persons to various Classes III and IV posts by scrutinising their applications and then interviewing them there is no illegality in the selection process and the appointments are valid. It is also urged that the action of the Speaker in appointing the persons concerned has been made in exercise of his discretion under Rule 4 (2) of the said Rules and for such exercise of discretion, his actions cannot be subjected to a judicial scrutiny before the Courts in the same way in which the actions of other appointing authorities can be scrutinised by the Courts. This is because the speaker enjoys a position under the constitution and specially in view of the provisions of Article 212 (2) thereof. 34. It is also urged that there is no law which says appointments in public office must be advertised and in the absence of advertisement, the selection procedure is bad. Alternatively it has been urged that as the appointees, most of whom are appellants in L. P. A. Nos.22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995, are continuing in their appointments for more than five years, their services cannot be quashed by the Court now. 35 In support of the aforesaid contentions, reliance was placed on a large number of decisions by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and some of them are considered below: "reliance was placed on the constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Banarsi Das and others V/s. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in 1956 S. C. R.357. Reliance was placed on Banarsi Das (supra) to show that the rights of the writ petitioners under Article 16 of the constitution have not been violated in view of the appointments made by the Speaker. But the ratioin Banarsi Das (supra) in the context of Article 16 is quite different. The petitioners in Banarsi Das (supra) were the Ex-Patwaris of Uttar Pradesh. They were part-timers and initially went on a pen-down strike and then resigned enmasse to paralyse the revenue administration. They complained that their rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution have been violated in matters of appointments to the regular cadre of "lekhpals" created by the Government. They were part-timers and initially went on a pen-down strike and then resigned enmasse to paralyse the revenue administration. They complained that their rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution have been violated in matters of appointments to the regular cadre of "lekhpals" created by the Government. The said grievance was repelled by the supreme Court with the following observations in page 362 of the report: if the Government have decided to exclude all those who had proved themselves as part-time servants of the government to be lacking in a sense of discipline and of responsibility, it cannot be said that that had been denied equal opportunity of appointment and employment under the Government. Government have not laid down rules excluding any particular group of persons from being candidates for appointment. They had only Issued departmental instructions not to employ those who had not a satisfactory record of service in the past. Selection for appointment in Government service has got to be on a competitive basis and those whose past service has been free from blemish can certainly be said to be better qualified for Government service than those whose record was not free from any blemish. " (Emphasis added ). 36 Here nothing of the kind mentioned above has taken place. On the other hand, the ratio in Banarsi Das (supra) is to the effect that appointment to Government service has to be on a competitive basis and the same has not been followed here. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the appointees, on the Full bench judgment in the case of Daljit singh Minhas and others Vs. The State of punjab and others reported in A. I. R.1978 P and H 117 in order to contend that when appointments are made without advertisement in paper, that does not violate Article 16 of the Constitution. The learned Judges of the Full Bench in daljit Singh Minhas (Supra) held that no doctrinaire approach can be taken in relation to compliance with the provisions of Article 16 and it cannot be said unless the advertisement through press reaches every conceivable candidate within the country there is violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. The learned Judges of the Full Bench in daljit Singh Minhas (Supra) held that no doctrinaire approach can be taken in relation to compliance with the provisions of Article 16 and it cannot be said unless the advertisement through press reaches every conceivable candidate within the country there is violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. In the said judgment it has also been observed in paragraph 12 that whether article 16 has been violated by arbitrary exclusion of candidates for the purpose of public employment will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The following observations in paragraph 12 of the report are very relevant for proper appreciation of the ratio: - "one must sound a note of caution that it is not to be understood that appointments to public office are to be made in a cloistered manner. What is clearly implied is this that the mode and manner of giving adequate publicity for the posts to be filled either to the public at large or to the class or source to which recruitment may be confined, as necessarily to be left to the judicious discretion of the authority concerned. Probably, in the majority of the cases Public advertisement may still be the best mode of reaching out to the candidate concerned. However, that By itself would be a far cry from holding that it should be made a constitutional requirement under Article 16, and thus invalidating all appointments in the absence of press advertisements. Whether in a particular case, there has been a hostile discrimination or arbitrary exclusion of the citizen for the purpose of public employment under the State resulting in violation of Article 16 has necessarily to be decided on its peculiar facts. " (Emphasis added) 37 In the case of Daljit Singh Minhas (supra) factually there was appointment of ad hoc employees who were fully qualified for the post through the open and well-established channel of employment Exchange for temporarily filling up the posts. The Full Bench held that in the facts of the case the said mode of appointment was the legitimate and perhaps the only other fair mode available (Paragraph 30 ). Therefore, the decision in Daljit Singh Minhas (Supra) was given in a totally different factual context and is not applicable here. 38. Mr. The Full Bench held that in the facts of the case the said mode of appointment was the legitimate and perhaps the only other fair mode available (Paragraph 30 ). Therefore, the decision in Daljit Singh Minhas (Supra) was given in a totally different factual context and is not applicable here. 38. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, Learned counsel for the appellants in Letters patent Appeal No.20 of 1995 relied on the decision in the case of M. N. Srinivasan V/s. The Board of the Kamataka legislature Secretariat, reported in 1988 lab. I. C. page 853 in order to contend that in Letters of appointment made by the Speakers, the application of Articles 14 and 16 is contemplated in a restricted way. This contention is rather misconceived as would appear from the judgment itself. In M. N. Srinivasan (Supra)the Court was concerned with the validity of appointment to an ex-cadre post, namely, the post of Secretary to the Speaker. In case of such an appointment, the Court held, that the nature of the post, the purpose for the creation of the post and the manner in which the appointment is contemplated along with the need of Speaker are to be considered. In such considerations an element of subjective satisfaction cannot be ruled out. But here the appointments in question are not to any ex-cadre post nor are they of the personal staff of the speaker. Such appointment is made to the Assembly Secretariat. Therefore, the principles laid down in M. N. Shrinivasan (Supra) are of no relevance to the facts of this case. 39. One thing must be made clear that the appointees are not members of the Speakers personal staff. They are staff of the Secretariat of Bihar Vidhan Sabha. 40. In matters of such appointments of the Secretariat of State Legislature, there are provisions under article 187 (2) and (3) of the constitution of India. They are on the same lines as in Articles 98 (2.) and 98 (3) of the constitution where provisions are made for the staff of the Secretariat of Parliament. 41. The provisions of Articles 98 (2) and 98 (3) and 187 (2) and (3) had to be made separately despite the existence of Article 309 in order to ensure the independence of the Legislative bodies from the Executives. 41. The provisions of Articles 98 (2) and 98 (3) and 187 (2) and (3) had to be made separately despite the existence of Article 309 in order to ensure the independence of the Legislative bodies from the Executives. The members of the Staff of the Secretariat are servants of the Secretariat and are independent of the Executive. Subhash C. Kashyap in his Monograph Series on "servicing Parliament" has traced the need for such independence from the pre-independence days and explained the rationale behind Article 98 of the constitution in-the following words: - "article 98 of the Constitution specifically guaranteed the separate character and independence of the secretariats of the two Houses of Parliament. It said inter alia that each House of Parliament shall have a separate secretariat staff and the parliament may by law regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of its staff. The posts In the Secretariats of the Lok sabha and the Rajya Sabha were exempted from the purview of the Union public Service Commission by the UPSC (Exemption from Consultation) Rules, 1958. Thus the secretariats of Parliament are now completely independent of the executive government in all matters including recruitment. They have their own competitive examinations; their own recruitment boards; and their own rules governing the conditions of service of employees and governing their recruitment, promotion and so on. " 42. Such independence is essential for the proper functioning of the legislature and is in accordance with the parliamentary practice in England. In england also, the staff of the House of commons are the servants of the House and they are not subject to the control of the Executive like other civil servants. 43. In England such appointments are now controlled under the House of commons Administration Act, 1978. Under the said Act, a new Commission, namely, the House of Commons commission has been created under Section 1 (2) of the said Act. The Commission is to consist of the Speaker, the leader of the House, a member of the House nominated by the leader of the opposition, three other members of the House of Commons appointed by the House but none of them shall be a Minister of the Crown. 44. The Commission is to consist of the Speaker, the leader of the House, a member of the House nominated by the leader of the opposition, three other members of the House of Commons appointed by the House but none of them shall be a Minister of the Crown. 44. Section 2 of the said Act authorises the said Commission to appoint all the staff of the House Department, excluding, however, the Clerk of the House : Any Clerk Assistant, the serjeant at Arms and the Speakers personal staff, please see Erskine Mays parliamentary Practice, 21st Edition (Butterworths) page 192. I also find from mays Treatise at page 192 that terms and conditions of such service shall be broadly on lines similar to those in home Civil Service. From J. A. G. Griffith and Michael Ryles Parliament -Functions Practice and Procedure, 1989, sweet and Maxwell, I find that Serjeant at arms, the Clerk of the House, The clerk Assistant are appointed by the crown. In respect of other members of the House Staff, excepting Speakers personal staff, the said Commission is the employer. 45. From page 152 of Griffiths book I find that recruitment in respect of some such staff is by public advertisement and interviews and in some cases by competitive examinations also. 46. In India also in accordance with the provisions of Article 98 (3) of the constitution the Parliament enacted lok Sabha Secretariat (Recruitment and Conditions) Rules, 1955 and the rajya Sabha Secretariat (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1957. 47. From Kaul and Shikdars Practice and Procedure of Parliament, 4th edition, page 911,1 find that in 1974, it was decided to have joint recruitment to common categories of posts in the Lok sabha and Rajya Sabha Secretariats by holding combined recruitment tests and interviews and drawing up of panels. 48. In the present case also under similar constitutional provisions, namely, Article 187 (3) the said rules have been framed. There is no denial of the fact that Bihar Legislative Council while making similar appointment to its secretariat issued public advertisement. The notification dated 14th November, 1967, issued by the Speaker in respect of such appointment under Rule 9 of the said Rules also provides for competitive examination to be conducted by the Secretariat. 49. There is no denial of the fact that Bihar Legislative Council while making similar appointment to its secretariat issued public advertisement. The notification dated 14th November, 1967, issued by the Speaker in respect of such appointment under Rule 9 of the said Rules also provides for competitive examination to be conducted by the Secretariat. 49. So the mode of appointment which has taken place in the instant case has no sanction either under the relevant rules or under the Constitution or any precedent under the Parliamentary practice either in England or in India. 50. Learned Counsel for the appellants in L. P. A. Nos.22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995 have sought to justify such appointments on three grounds of which are (i) since the appointments have been made by the Speaker, he enjoys an immunity from judicial scrutiny under Article 212 of the Constitution, (ii) the Speaker being empowered under rule 4 (2) (a) of the said Rules to specify the modes of appointment, he has done that. So the exercise of discretion by the speaker cannot be interfered with by this Court and (iii) the notification dated 14th November, 1967 being issued under Rule 9 of the said Rules cannot be related to the present appointments inasmuch as Rule 9 speaks of other conditions of service. 51. Learned Counsel for the speaker appearing for the appellants in l. P. A. No.20 of 1995 did not, however, claim any immunity from judicial scrutiny of the Speakers action under article 212 of the Constitution but he urged the two other points. 52. Immunity from judicial scrutiny has been given to the proceedings in the assembly under Article 212 of the constitution of India. Similar provisions have been made in Article 122 of the constitution of India in respect of proceedings in Parliament. 53. The Constitution has not defined what is meant by proceedings in parliament but in order to understand the precise meaning of proceedings in parliament, we can look for guidance in erskine Mays Parliamentary Practice. May is considered an authority even by the Apex Court. 53. The Constitution has not defined what is meant by proceedings in parliament but in order to understand the precise meaning of proceedings in parliament, we can look for guidance in erskine Mays Parliamentary Practice. May is considered an authority even by the Apex Court. From the aforesaid treatise of May, I find the following meaning given to proceedings in parliament which is set out below: - "the primary meaning, as a technical parliamentary term, of proceedings (which it had at least as early as the seventeenth century) is some formal action, usually a decision, taken by the house in its collective capacity. This is naturally extended to the forms of business in which the House takes action, and the whole process, the principal part of which is debate, by which it reaches a decision. " 54. Judicial immunity in respect of parliamentary proceedings is a rare privilege enjoyed by Parliament. Such parliamentary privilege has its origin in article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1688. The said Article reads thus: "that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of Parliament. " 55. It is obvious from the aforesaid connotation of the Parliamentary proceedings and its privilege that the speakers decision to appoint the persons concerned in exercise of his statutory powers under the rules cannot be equated with proceedings in parliament and any attempt to do so is wholly untenable. Therefore, reliance by Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned Senior counsel for the appellants in L. P. A. No.25 of 1995 on the decisions of the Supreme court in the case of In re, Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India reported in A. I. R.1965 S. C. page 745, M. S. M sharma V/s. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and others reported in A. I. R.1960 S. C. page 1186, M. S. M. Sharma V/s. Sri Krishna sinha and others reported in A. I. R.1959 s. C. page 395 is rather misconceived. All these cases related to questions of breach of privileges of legislature in respect of proceedings in the legislative and are not remotely relevant for the purpose of justifying the impugned action of the Speaker in appointing the appellants of L. P. A. No.22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995. 56. All these cases related to questions of breach of privileges of legislature in respect of proceedings in the legislative and are not remotely relevant for the purpose of justifying the impugned action of the Speaker in appointing the appellants of L. P. A. No.22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995. 56. It is not in dispute that the speaker enjoys a dignified position under the Constitution. Referring to the office of the Speaker, Pandit Nehru said "the Speaker represents the House. He represents the dignity of the House, the freedom of the House and because the house represents the nation, in a particular way, the Speaker becomes the nations freedom and liberty. " So, Pandit nehru advocated that the post of the speaker "should be occupied always by men of outstanding ability and impartiality. " 57. How far the dream of our first prime Minister has been fulfilled is for the posterity, and not for this Court, to judge. But the authority which the speaker exercised in this case under the said rules in making the impugned appointment is that of a statutory authority under the rules. Under the said rules, the Speaker is an appointing authority and also as an appellate authority. While acting as an appointing, punishing and an appellate authority under the said rules, the action of the Speaker is obviously amenable to judicial scrutiny like any other authority under similar rules. Under the said rules there is no clause for ouster of Courts jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of Court cannot be barred except by clear and express words. 58. This Court, therefore, holds that the claim of immunity from judicial scrutiny of the Speakers action as advanced by Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel, if upheld would make the speaker an "imporium In Imperio" and this is not permissible under the constitutional scheme of our country. 59. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that there is no unbridled power given to an authority in the public law field and un-controlled power is alien both to the constitutional logic and the basic postulates of the rule of Law. 59. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that there is no unbridled power given to an authority in the public law field and un-controlled power is alien both to the constitutional logic and the basic postulates of the rule of Law. Professor Wide in the 6th edition of his Administrative Law at page 399 has summed up the position with a remarkable facility of expression in the following words: - "statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely - that Is to say, it can validty be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended. Although the Crowns lawyers have argued in numerous cases that un-restricted permissive language confers un-fettered discretion, the truth is that, in a system based on the Rule of Law, un-fettered governmental discretion is a contradiction in terms. " At page 39 of the same book, professor Wade has observed that those lawyers who argue for the Government departments that some Act confers unfettered discretion on the authority are guilty of constitutional blasphemy. 60. Here of course Mr. Mihir kumar Jha, learned Counsel appearing for the Speaker in L. P. A. No.20 of 1995 has not argued that the power of the speaker under rule 4 (2) (a) of the said rules to specify the methods of filling up the post is an un-fettered power. But the same argument has been advanced by Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel for the appointees in the other appeals and the said argument is, for the reasons stated above, rejected as untenable. 61. There is no doubt that discretion has been conferred on the Speaker under Rule 4 (2) (a) of the said rules. But such discretion has to be exercised according to "the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion" and "according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. " This dictum of Lord chancellor Haisbury in the decision of the house of Lords in Sharp and Wake fleld and others reported in 1891 Appeal cases page 173 at page 179 of the report is the locus classicus on the subject and has been approved by the Supreme court. In Rockers Case, another old english authority reported in 77 English reports Page 209 is also very instructive. At page 210 of the said judgment it has been said, "discretion is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glasses and pretences. . . . . " 62. Keeping those time honoured principles in mind, on an examination of the actions of the Speaker in this case, it appears that a large number of appointments have been made to public office without any advertisement without holding any competitive test and without any record of interview but only on the purported plea of emergency arising out of his foreign trip and the impending assembly session. This large scale appointments to public posts without any selection process cannot be said to be a valid exercise of discretion by the Speaker. In making such appointments, the Speaker has admitted that there has been departure from the rules and some appointments have been made in relaxation of the rules. 63. This Court is not satisfied with the plea of urgency advanced by the speaker. Prospect of a foreign trip of the Speaker for a month coupled with the impending Assembly does not give rise to an emergent situation justifying such large scale appointments in departure from the rules as also against post which have not been sanctioned. Speaker was elected to his office on 20th March, 1990 and all those appointments were completed between the months of June 1990 and November, 1990. Holding of Assembly Session is a routine matter and for a constitutional functionary like a Speaker foreign trip is most usual. Therefore, this Court is not satisfied about the factual existence of emergency. 64. Apart from that Speaker does not enjoy any emergency power under the said rules. Holding of Assembly Session is a routine matter and for a constitutional functionary like a Speaker foreign trip is most usual. Therefore, this Court is not satisfied about the factual existence of emergency. 64. Apart from that Speaker does not enjoy any emergency power under the said rules. Whenever power is conferred on a particular authority to act in an emergent situation, such power is specifically conferred. Under various laws relating to the affairs of University, emergency powers are conferred on vice Chancellor. Under various Land acquisition Laws also such power is vested on the Collector. But there is no such power conferred on the Speaker under the said Rules. 65. The Speaker, under the said rules, also does not enjoy any unilateral power of relaxation either. Power of relaxation is contained under Rule 10 of the said Rule. The Speaker can exercise such power only in consultation with the Finance Department. Here no claim is made on behalf of the Speaker that such consultation has taken place. Therefore, the power of relaxation exercised by the Speaker is obviously not sustainable in law. In State of Orissa Vs. Sukanti Mohapatra and others reported in (1993) 2 S. C. C. page 486, Supreme court held that the rules conferring power of relaxation must be strictly construed. Here the power of relaxation has been exercised by the Speaker in a manner which is ultra vires the rules. As such the impugned appointments made by relaxing the rules are wholly bad in law. 66. It has been already held by me that the Speaker cannot be an imperium in imperio and cannot avoid judicial scrutiny in respect of the action as an appointing authority under the said Rules. The recent trend in judicial climate shows that the Speaker does not enjoy any immunity from judicial scrutiny even when he is acting in connection with exercise of his power under section 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the constitution. Sec.6 (2) of the Tenth schedule expressly states that all proceedings under Sec.6 (1) of the tenth Schedule relating to the decision of the Chairman or Speaker about the disqualification of a member of the house shall be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Article 122 or the proceedings of state Legislature within the meaning of article 212 of the Constitution. 67. 67. But the Apex Court while deciding the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule and the width of the speakers power under Sec.6 (2) of the same came to the conclusion that the Speaker while functioning under section 6 (1) of the Tenth Schedule in determining the disqualification of the member was acting as Tribunal and his decisions are subjected to judicial scrutiny on certain grounds under articles 32, 136, 226 and 227 of the constitution - See the decision of the supreme Court in Kihota Hollobon V/s. Mr. Zachillu and others reported in a. I. R.1993 S. C. page 412. Judgment in kihota (supra) has been relied subsequently by the Supreme Court in Ravi s. Naik V/s. Union of India and others reported in (1994) Supplementary 2 S. C. C. pige 641. 68. Therefore, the argument of immunity from judicial scrutiny in the present case, where protection of article 2l2 is not even remotely relevant, is totally misconceived. 69. For all the reasons discussed above, I hold that the action of the speaker in making large scale appointments to Class III and Class IV posts in bihar Legislative Assembly are in violation of and contrary to the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. Such appointments are also contrary to the notifications dated 14th november, 1967 which has been framed under the Rules. Admittedly there has been no advertisement, no selection test, there is no record of even screening of application nor is there any record of interview. Records disclose that directly applications have been made to the speaker and the appointments have been ordered by him on the basis of such personal approach. The whole lot of appointments have been made on the basis of a procedure which is unknown to law and is a glaring instance of pure caprice and arbitrary exercise. This court does not find that there is any semblance of reason and fairness in the procedure adopted by the Speaker in making such large scale appointments. In the case of the Manager, Government branch Press and another V/s. D. B. Belliappa, reported in 1979 S. C. page 429, supreme Court said that fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomised in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Here the said guarantee under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has been totally breached. 70. Here the said guarantee under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has been totally breached. 70. The exercise of so-called discretion by the Speaker has not been, as already held above, either reasonable or just or within the permissible limits of his power. In the matter of exercise of such discretion, Speaker cannot act, as a free wheeler. Therefore, the impugned appointments are wholly infirm and are invalid. 71. This Court also holds that the notification dated 14th November, 1967 is a valid notification and can lay down the conditions for appointment and is attracted to the appointments in question. Since the procedure for the appointments in question has already been notified in exercise of a statutory power the same cannot be ignored or bye-passed by the Speaker. Non- compliance with the procedure under the said statutory notification is also a ground which nullified the appointments. 72. The next question is can these invalid appointments be set aside after a lapse of about five years. In this case there is no delay in the part of the petitioners as they filed the writ-petition in 1990 itself challenging appointments made in 1990. The time taken by this Court to decide the writ petition and the L. P. As. arising out of that, in the facts of this case, cannot enure to the benefit to the appointees. In this case merits or entitlements of the appointees have not at all been judged before their appointments to the post and there is no selection procedure. Therefore, the appointees cannot be said to have been validly appointed. As there is no valid appointment, the appointees have not acquired any right in law to hold the post. So by just continuing to hold such an illegal appointment, they cannot acquire any right. 73. It has been contended by Mr. Shyama Prasad. Mukherjee, learned senior Counsel appearing for some of the appointees, that as subsequently the services of the appellants have been confirmed, the validity of appointment cannot be questioned now. The said argument is not acceptable to this Court for the simple reason that when the appointment is initially invalid, as in the instant case, such an invalid appointment cannot be validated by the subsequent confirmation. A thing which is non-est in the eye of law cannot be confirmed. 74. The said argument is not acceptable to this Court for the simple reason that when the appointment is initially invalid, as in the instant case, such an invalid appointment cannot be validated by the subsequent confirmation. A thing which is non-est in the eye of law cannot be confirmed. 74. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the supreme Court in the case of baradakanta Mishra Vs. The High Court of Orissa and others reported in A. I. R.1976 S. C. page 1899. It has been decided in Barada Kanta (Supra) that if an order is initially void, by mere confirmation it cannot be validated. Therefore, it has been held that it is only something which is valid that can be confirmed and not a thing which is void. 75. In the instant case, I have held that there is no valid selection procedure, as such the order of appointment being unconstitutional are void and inoperative in the eye of law. Mere confirmation of the same does not clothe it with any validity. 76. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that merely because a period of five years have elapsed in conclusion of this proceeding before this Court, it cannot be said that the appointees have acquired any right either in law or in equity in respect of such appointments. The concept of equity is also based on equality and when the appointment of the appellants of L. P. A. Nos.22 of 1995, 23 of 1995 and 25 of 1995 are admittedly based on an un-equal and discriminatory treatment and uneqnal consideration, equity will not step into rescue or validate such rank discriminatory acts. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned appointment cannot be sustained just because the appointees have been allowed to continue in office for five years or so. 77. Question Nos. (iv) and (v): -These two questions relate to the consicleration of the issue whether the judgment of the learned Judge of first Court can be sustained as by that judgment appointment of 285 persons have been quashed, even though most of them were not parties and were not heard before the order was passed. 78. The idea of impleading a party is to give the persons concerned an opportunity to contest the proceeding in which the orders is to be passed. 79. 78. The idea of impleading a party is to give the persons concerned an opportunity to contest the proceeding in which the orders is to be passed. 79. In this connection the writ petitioners have made respondent Nos.6 to 17 parties before the learned Judge of the First Court in a representative capacity and these respondent Nos.6 to 17 are the appointees in the Assembly. Despite service of notice on those persons, they did not appear before the court to contest the proceeding, Both before the first Court as well as before the appeal Court where about 171 appointees filed three appeals, no material was produced by them to show that the process of appointment is legal and valid. In fact, the allegation of invalidity of the appointments has virtually been accepted. As noted already, before the appeal Court which is a continuation of the original proceeding, about 171 out of 285 appointees, whose appointments have been cancelled, appeared as appellants but even before the appeal Court they could not produce anything to show that their appointments were validity made. 80. In the peculiar facts of this case, this Court is of the opinion that when the purposes of impleading a person is to give him an opportunity of rebuttal and when no rebuttal was given by respondent Nos.6 to 17 before the learned Judge of the first Court and also by 171 appointees before the appeal court, the obvious conclusion is that factually no rebuttal to the case made out in the writ-petition was there. 81. It is not a case where promotion of a person has been set aside without impleading him to the case nor is this a case where a person suffers adverse consequences in his service career as a result of an order which has been passed by the Court without impleading him. Nor is this a case where as a result of judicial proceeding some stigma is cast on a person concerned in his absence. This is a case which is peculiar for its facts as noted above. 82. I have already held that in the eye of law the persons who have been allegedly appointed have not acquired any right. Nor is this a case where as a result of judicial proceeding some stigma is cast on a person concerned in his absence. This is a case which is peculiar for its facts as noted above. 82. I have already held that in the eye of law the persons who have been allegedly appointed have not acquired any right. Therefore, in the facts of the instant case the requirement of impleading those appointees which is virtually a requirement in the field of natural justice, has to be considered keeping in view the most cardinal principles in the field of natural justice, namely, that such principles are not cast in a rigid mould. 83. The principles of natural justice have made great strides in the field of Administrative Law and is firmly established in all civilised legal system but those principles must be pressed into service considering the situational requirement. There is nothing known as technical rules of natural justice. This has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik (Supra ). In the said judgment the learned Judges of the supreme Court quoting from Professor wades Administrative Law, 6th Edition page 530 approved the proposition advanced by the learned author that "so called rules of natural justice have not been engraved on tablets of stone". The learned author further made it clear by saying that their application must always be in conformity "with the subject matter of the case". There must be real flexibility in the concept of natural justice and the learned author concluded by saying that there is no such thing as merely technical infringement of natural justice. " The learned Judges of the Supreme Court also quoted another passage from Clive Lewis judicial remedies in public Law (1992), page 290 in support of the aforesaid proposition. Their Lordships have also quoted in support of the same proposition of the speech of Lord Wilberforce in malloch V/s. Aberdeen Corporation reported in 1971 (2) A. E. R. page 1278. The said speech of Lord Wilberforce is set out below: - "a breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice, or an essential administrative fault, cannot give him a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain. " 84. The said speech of Lord Wilberforce is set out below: - "a breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice, or an essential administrative fault, cannot give him a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain. " 84. This Court is in respectful agreement with the aforesaid views expressed by learned Judge and which has been expressly approved by the supreme Court in Ravi S. Naik (Supra ). 85. In course of hearing before this court, the learned Counsel appearing for the appointees has never pointed out how the judgment of the learned judge of this first Court would have been different if those appointees were impleaded before His Lordship. In fact, it would not have been different which is clear when this Court heard about 171 of those appointees who filed those three Letters Patent Appeals. 86. As such in this peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, this court is of the view that there would have been no material alteration in the judgment of the first Court by impleading the appointees as parties to this proceeding. So the said judgment passed by the learned Judge of the first court cannot be said to be vitiated foe non-impleading all those appointees as parties. 87. From the affidavit filed before this Court by the learned Counsel for the Speaker, it appears that during the regime of previous Speaker Mr. Ghulam Sarwar about 460 appointments have been made in similar fashion. The said affidavit has been filed before this Court by Mr. Rajni Kant dev, who is the Deputy Secretary of the bihar Vidhan Sabha Secretariat and the said averment made in paragraph 17 of the said affidavit have been affirmed as true to the information derived from the records. 88. This is a very serious matter involving a great deal of public interest. Therefore, this is not a case merely between the parties, but this case has ultimately taken the shape of a kind of public interest proceeding as. has been noted by the learned Judge of the first court while referring to the decision of the Supreme Court. in the case of shivajirao Nilangekar Patil V/s. Dr. Mahesh madhav Gosavi and others reported in a. I. R.1987 S. C. page 294. 89. has been noted by the learned Judge of the first court while referring to the decision of the Supreme Court. in the case of shivajirao Nilangekar Patil V/s. Dr. Mahesh madhav Gosavi and others reported in a. I. R.1987 S. C. page 294. 89. This Court cannot shut its eyes to such defiance of constitutional mandate in the matter of so many appointments to public office. So even if strict rules of procedure are not followed, the court feels that ends of justice require its intervention and the learned Judge of the first Court has rightly intervened. Such judgment cannot be set aside merely on the ground of certain technical objections. 90. Before concluding, this Court also voices the same concern which was expressed by the learned Judges of the apex Court in the case of Shivajirao nilangekar Patil (Supra ). In paragraph 51 of the page 311 of the said judgment, the following observations were made: - "this Court cannot be oblivious that there has been a steady decline of public standards or public morals and public morale. It is necessary to cleanse public life in this country along with or even before cleaning the physical atmospheres. The pollution in our values and standards is an equally grave menace as the pollution of the environment. Where such situations cry out the Courts should not and cannot remain mute and dumb. " 91. This Court also shares the same anxiety which was expressed by the Apex court in 1987 and it is common knowledge that over the years situation in public life and public moral has not improved. 92. For all the reasons started above, this Court cannot but hold that the judgment given by the learned judge of the first Court has to be sustained and for the same reasons this court affirms the judgment given by s. K. Singh, J. , and does not aeree with the judgment given by B. L. Yadav, J. , (as His Lordship then was ). 93. 93. It is now open to the Speaker to initiate appropriate selection proceedings in accordance with the law and in accordance with the provisions of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of india for selection and appointment of class III and Class IV staff of the assembly Secretariat at an early date and if such a proceeding is initiated all those 285 appointees whose appointments have been set aside are entitled to participate in the same and their candidature may be considered on merit in the said selection procedure and, if necessary, by condoning their age bar suitably. 94. In the result all the four Letters patent Appeals fail and are dismissed. The judgment given by the learned judge of the first Court is hereby affirmed. There will be no order as to cost. L. P. As Dismissed