Judgment : J. C. Gupta, J. 1. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order of termination dated 12-2-75 passed by Respondent No. 1 Executive Engineer, U. P. Electricity Board (to be referred to as the 'board' in short) and the order dated 1-8-79 whereby the petitioner was discharged from his duty w. e. f. 2-8-79 fore noon. The factual matrix in the case, in short, is that the petitioner was appointed as a Junior Meter Testor in the year 1971 by the Executive Engineer of the Board by Office Memorandum dated 16-10-71 copy of which was been annexed as Annexure-I to the writ petition. The order of appointment clearly indicated that the petitioner was appointed on a consolidated pay of Rs. 150 per month in the vacancy caused due to the promotion of another employee. It was further provided that the petitioner's appointment was purely temporary and liable to be terminated at any time without notice. It was also clearly stated that the petitioner would have no claim for absorption in regular establishment. The petitioner's services were terminated by the order dated 12-2-75 which reads as under: "as per Executive Engineer's E. T. D., Jhansi Office Memorandum No. 195 (1) E. T. D. /p. F. of dated Feb. 11,1975 and A. E. (M) Office Memorandum No. 11457 E. T. L. /p. F. Feb. 12, 1975 your services has been terminated w. e. f. Feb. 11, 1975 due to unsatisfactory work and conduct: You are requested to collect the duty pay and one month pay in lieu of the notice from the office of the Assistant Engineer (Meters) Elect. Test Lab., Orai. There fore you will not be treated on duty after Feb. 11, 1975. " 2. THE petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 1813 of 1975 challenging the aforesaid termination order. That writ petition was, however, dismissed as per the provisions of 42nd Amendment of the Constitution of India on the ground that the petitioner has an alternate remedy before the Public Service Tribunal. The present writ petition has again been filed with the allegation that the petitioner had no knowledge regarding the abatement of the earlier writ petition and since he has been discharged from his duty, he had no other remedy excepting to file the present writ petition. 3. The present writ petition has again been filed with the allegation that the petitioner had no knowledge regarding the abatement of the earlier writ petition and since he has been discharged from his duty, he had no other remedy excepting to file the present writ petition. 3. THE termination order is challenged mainly on the ground that though the petitioner was only a temporary employee yet he was entitled to the protection guarantee under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India and since no enquiry was conducted in the present case, the order of termination is liable to be set aside as the present order of termination has been passed by way of punishment. 4. THE case of the respondents on the other hand is that the services of the petitioner were no longer required as his work and conduct was not found satisfactory and therefore the services of the petitioner, who was merely a temporary servant, were terminated by the impugned termination order as per the terms of appointment order. THE mere fact that the order stated that the services of the petitioner were not required on account of his unsatisfactory work and conduct would not make the order of termination a punative one. In addition to the above defence, the respondents have also challenged the maintainability of the writ petition on two grounds. Firstly, that the writ petition is: liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the 'board' as a party and secondly, on the ground that earlier writ petition respecting the same subject- matter having been dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternate remedy before the Service Tribunal, the present petition is not legally entertainable. 5. AFTER considering the various arguments of both sides, I feel no necessity of entering into the controversy whether or not the impugned order of termination suffers from illegality of having been passed by way of punishment as this writ petition can be conveniently disposed of on the preliminary points raised from the side of the respondents. 6. THE first preliminary objection is that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the U. P. Electricity Board as a necessary Party. 6. THE first preliminary objection is that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the U. P. Electricity Board as a necessary Party. Admittedly the 'board* has not been impleaded as a party in the present writ petition despite the fact that in the counter affidavit the respondent specifically raised the plea that in the absence of impleadment of the 'board, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. No attempt has been made to implead the 'board* nor such a request has been made during the course of arguments by the learned counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Board* was not a necessary party inasmuch as the petitioner was appointed by the Executive Engineer and the Order of termination was also passed by the Executive Engineer of the Board, he alone was an appropriate party and not the 'board*. In the decision in Ranjeet Mai v. General Manager, Northern Railway and Ann, AIR 1977 S. C. 1701, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of non-impleadment of Union of India as a necessary party. In that case the petitioner in the writ petition was an employee of the Northern Railway. He was removed from service. His appeal against the order of removal was rejected by the General Manager. Ag grieved by the said decision, he filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the Union of India was not impleaded. Before the Apex Court it was contended on behalf of the employee that the General Manager of the Railway was the authority to hear the matters regarding the removal and therefore that was the appropriate party and the writ petition was wrongly dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of Union of India as a necessary party. The Apex Court while burning down the said contention, observed as follows: "it cannot be disputed that the appellant was a servant of the Union. It is equally indisputable that any order of removal is removal from service of the Union. The appellant challenged that order. Any order which can be passed by any court would have lo be enforced against the Union. It is equally indisputable that any order of removal is removal from service of the Union. The appellant challenged that order. Any order which can be passed by any court would have lo be enforced against the Union. The General Manager or any other authority acting in the Railway Administration is as much a servant of the Union as the appellant was in the present case. The Union of India represents the Railway Administration. The Union carries ad ministration through different servants. These servants all represent the Union in regard to activities whether in the matter of appointment or in the matter of removal. It cannot be denied that any order which will be passed on an application under Article 226 which will have the effect of setting aside the removal will fasten liability on the Union of India, and not on any servant of the Union. Therefore, from all points of view, the Union of India was rightly held by the High Court to be a necessary party. The petition was rightly rejected by the High Court. " 7. UNDISPUTEDLY the petitioner was in service of the 'board' as a temporary servant and his services were terminated by the impugned order passed by the competent authority. The petitioner has prayed for the quashing of the termination order and for issuing a direction to treat him to be in service of the Board. If ultimately the prayer made in the writ petition is allowed and the termination order is set aside, it will have to be enforced against the Board which alone will be fastened with the liability and not the Executive Engineer or any other servant of the Board. Therefore, the Board was a necessary party as in its absence no effective relief could be claimed. This defect is fatal to the present writ petition, which deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. 8. THE other preliminary objection raised by the respondents' counsel is also sustainable. THE petitioner in paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 of the petition has admitted that in respect or the same subject- matter and issue the petitioner had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 1813/75 and the same was dismissed as abated by virtue of the provisions of 42nd Amendment of the Constitution of India on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy before the Service Tribunal. THE petitioner has filed the present petition merely stating that he had no knowledge of the abatement of the earlier writ petition. On this averment alone the second writ petition would not become entertainable because the earlier writ petition was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of a statutory remedy available under the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act. In this connection reference may be had to the decision in "state of U. P. v. Labh Chand, AIR 1994 S. C. 754. " wherein it was held that if the earlier writ petition is dismissed by a Single Judge or a Division Bench of the High Court on the ground of non-exhaustion by the petitioner of a statutory remedy, the order of dismissal cannot be ignored by the same High Court when the party whose writ petition was earlier dismissed files a second writ petition respecting the same subject- matter, the second writ petition would not be entertainable. It was further held that while entertaining the second writ petition the Judge or Judges have to follow the well established salutary rule of practice and procedure that an order of a Single Judge Bench or of a larger Bench of the same High Court dismissing the writ petition either on the ground of laches or non-exhaustion of alternate remedy, shall not be by-passed by a Single Judge Bench or Judges of a larger Bench except in exercise of review or appellate powers possessed by it. THE Apex Court observed: "when a Judge of single Judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another single Judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. Second writ petition cannot be, so entertained not because the learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition would render the order of the same Court dismissing the earlier writ petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power/besides, if a learned single Judge could entertain a second writ petition of a person respecting a matter on which his- first writ petition was dismissed in limine by another learned single Judge or a Division Bench of the same Court, it would encourage an unsuccessful writ petitioner to go on filing writ petition after writ petition in the same matter in the same High Court, and have it brought up for consideration before one Judge after another. Such a thing, if is allowed to happen, it could result in giving full scope and encouragement to an unscrupulous litigant to abuse the process of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in that any order of any Bench of such Court refusing-to entertain a writ petition could be ignored by him with impunity and relief sought in the same matter by filing a fresh writ petition. This would only lead to introduction of disorder, confusion and chaos relating to exercise or writ jurisdiction by Judges of the High Court for there could be no finality for an order of the Court refusing to entertain a writ petition. It is why, the Rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second writ petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject-matter respecting which the first writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same Court even if the order of such dismissal was in limine, be it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternate remedy, has come to be accepted and followed as salutary Rule in exercise of writ jurisdiction of Courts. " In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner had filed Writ Petition No. 1813/75 challenging the same termination order which is the subject-matter of the present writ petition and that writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had alternate remedy against the impugned order before U. P. Public Service Tribunal. " In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner had filed Writ Petition No. 1813/75 challenging the same termination order which is the subject-matter of the present writ petition and that writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had alternate remedy against the impugned order before U. P. Public Service Tribunal. Instead of going before Service Tribunal the petitioner has filed the present writ petition which in law is not entertainable. If the petitioner was otherwise not satisfied with the order of this Court dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy, the proper course for him was to have applied for review or filed an appeal if permissible in law but the second writ petition in respect of the same subject-matter cannot be allowed to be entertained. 9. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner on the issue vehemently argued that since the present writ petition has already been admitted, the objection raised on behalf of the respondents cannot be entertained at this stage. It may be suffice to mention here that the order of admission was passed by this Court in the absence of the respondents, even before issuing notices. The respondents therefore had no occasion to bring to the notice of this Court that the second writ petition respecting the same subject-matter was not legally entertainable. In the counter-affidavit the respondents have raised such a plea specifically and this Court will hot decline to go into the question of maintainability or otherwise of the present writ petition merely because the writ petition has earlier been admitted ex parte. An order admitting an appeal, revision or writ petition made in the absence of the respondent even before issuing notices cannot come in the way of respondents right of raising the plea that in law the appeal, revision or writ petition, as the case may be, was not entertainable, and when such a plea is raised after when the respondent puts in appearance, the court is duty bound to decide the same and such a plea cannot be turned down merely on the basis that the petition already stood admitted and if the court finds that in law the petition was not entertainable, it has the power to dismiss the same. 10. FOR the above reasons this writ petition is liable to be dismissed as being not maintainable in law and is dismissed accordingly. 10. FOR the above reasons this writ petition is liable to be dismissed as being not maintainable in law and is dismissed accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.