R. K. MAHAJAN, J. This is a first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 2-5-1980 passed by Sri Ghan Shyam Dass, Vlth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr by virtue of which original Suit No. 249 of 1976 between Jaipur Traders Corporation Private Limited and Lalit Kumar Jain & another was dismissed. 2. The material facts would be given only to understand the controversy. It ap pears that the suit was filed by plaintiff M/s. Jaipur Traders Corporation Private Limited against the defendants at Bulandshahr for rescission of contract dated 22nd February, 1971 with respect of sale of building, plant, machinery etc. for a consideration of a sum of Rs. two lacs. The material terms of the contract for sale, as mentioned in para 4 of the plaint, are as follows: "4. That the price of the whole property was settled at Rs. 2 lakhs. This amount was to be paid in the following manner: (i) Rs. 50,000 before the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration. (ii) Rs. 50,000 on or before 15-3-1971. (iii) Rs. 1,00,000 on or before 30-4-1971. " It is alleged that the possession of the property was given to the defendant-respondents and they physically entered into it. It was specifically mentioned that the transferees shall not in any manner be en titled to deal, sale, transfer or assign the immovable property or any part thereof hereby sold to them till such time as the entire balance sale consideration amounting to Rs. 1,50,000 (Rupees one lac and fifty thousand) is paid to the transferor. This document was presented before the sub-Registrar on 22nd February, 1971 but unfortunately it was impounded on 24th February, 1971 on the ground that the property had been under valued and the stamp duty paid thereon was insufficient. There is another development that on 26th February, 1971 as per allegations of the plaintiff, the Sub-Registrar received a letter from the Income Tax Officer that the in come tax certificate which had been issued under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act, had been cancelled and the registration of the property be stopped till the issue of fresh certificate. So the registration of the sale deed, as contemplated by the parties, could not see light of day. 3. So the registration of the sale deed, as contemplated by the parties, could not see light of day. 3. Facts have been placed from each side and the sequence of events, which are inferred from the notice as well as the al legations from the plaint and judgment are these. The plaintiff served a notice dated 6th March, 1971 (Ext. 37) for the payment of balance money treating the contract on the part of both the parties as subsisting. The defendants declined to pay the amount as per reply of notice on 26- 3-1971 (Ext. 33) unless a fresh clearance certificate was obtained. It appears that again another development took place. On 22-2-1971, second notice for payment of balance sale consideration was sent to the defendants mentioning that they had violated the terms of agreement by way of disposing the property and demolishing it without having been registered. There was insistence to the effect that unless clearance certificate from the income tax department is issued, the payment would not be made. Another factor was introduced that Shanti Lal happened to file suit No. 115 of 1971 claiming share in the property and the defendants took a stand that unless the suit was decided finally, the balance amount would not be paid. It is alleged by the plaintiff in a notice Ext. 39/25th May, 1973 that the defendants must make the payment of balance otherwise the contract of sale stand rescinded. 4. Final notice was given on 3rd July 1973 as alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff is willing to pay the interest and also to make payment towards the deficient stamp duty. It is further revealed from the evidence and the judgment of the court below that since Shanti Lals suit was dismissed and a request was made to pay the balance amount within 15 days and the income tax certificate could be handed over failing which the contract would be cancelled. It appears that income tax certificate was obtained on 30-6-1972 as there was no positive response from the defendants for payment of the money. Final notice was given to the defendants for the payment of money of getting the document registered and notice was given thereafter by the plaintiff to the Sub-Registrar Khurja that the contract of sale has been rescinded on 19-7-1973 and as such there is no need of registration of the document. Final notice was given to the defendants for the payment of money of getting the document registered and notice was given thereafter by the plaintiff to the Sub-Registrar Khurja that the contract of sale has been rescinded on 19-7-1973 and as such there is no need of registration of the document. The defendant- respondent replied on 19-2-1977 mentioning that the money cannot be paid unless the suit of Shanti Lal is decided. Ultimately the plain tiff filed suit against the defendants for physical possession of the property and for delivery of the document on the ground that the contract has been rescinded and it be treated as void. It appears that. . . . . . . . . . District Registrar in Registration Appeal No. 2 of 1973 directed the document dated 22-2-1972 be registered. 5. It is alleged by the defendants that Shri B. D. Meattle, Director of the Company received Rs. 50,000 and agreed that the matter would be finally settled after the settlement of dispute of Shanti Lal and clearance certificate from Income Tax Officer. 6. So the short controversy in this appeal is that the payment of money as stipulated in the contract forms material terms of the contract even if the document is not registered and also the time is essence of the contract. 7. The court below gave a finding on issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5, which deals with the breach of contract on the part of the defendants and rescission of contract on the part of plaintiff, and issue No. 5 relates to plaintiffs right to rescind the contract, that the defendants are not guilty of the breach of contract and the plaintiff has no right to rescind the contract and it is treated to be a valid contract. The court below gave a finding on issue Nos. 1 and 2, which deals with the execution of the sale deed by the plain tiff on 22-2-1971 without certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act and the registration order dated 24-12-1976 as illegal and void as well as the illegality, that there is nothing bad or illegal in the order of the District Registrar, Bulandshahr. 1 and 2, which deals with the execution of the sale deed by the plain tiff on 22-2-1971 without certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act and the registration order dated 24-12-1976 as illegal and void as well as the illegality, that there is nothing bad or illegal in the order of the District Registrar, Bulandshahr. It was also held that the defendants had initiated the proceedings under Section 77 of the Registration Act before the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr and simultaneously they filed the appeal before the District Registrar, Bulandshahr and the court below was also of the view that the registration would take effect by the order of the District Registrar back from 22-2-1971 i. e. the execution of the document retrospectively. 8. The court below gave finding on issue No. 6, which deals with specific performance of the contract, that the plea has become infructuous in view of the fact that the defendants have become full owner under the sale deed dated 22-2-1971 which has already been registered and all the registration formalities have already been completed. This plea was raised in the writ-ten-statement, because at that time, the registration was not ordered by the District Registrar, Bulandshahr and the registration was not complete. The position is now changed and the plea has become infructuous. 9. Issue Nos. 7 and 8 relate to the principle of acquiescence and relief. The court below was of the view that the defendants have not committed breach of contract and as such there is no involvement of the principle of acquiescence and on this finding, the suit was dismissed. 10. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant Shri Sudhir Chandra has submitted that the lower court has given a wrong finding that time was not essence of contract. He has further submitted that it is admitted fact that possession of the property was handed over and this fact has been not denied in the written statement. He further submitted that there was embargo in sale deed dated 22-2-1971 that it is hereby clearly under stood that transferee (sic) moveable property or any part whereof sold to that as the entire balance sale consideration amount to Rs. 15,000 to be paid. He further submitted that there was embargo in sale deed dated 22-2-1971 that it is hereby clearly under stood that transferee (sic) moveable property or any part whereof sold to that as the entire balance sale consideration amount to Rs. 15,000 to be paid. He further submitted that the payment was essence of the contract and despite notices as mentioned in earlier part of judgment i. e. including notice given on 3-7-1973 the payment was not given despite that the plaintiff was ready to produce the income tax certificate and also amount regarding the deficiency of stamp duty. He further submitted that the lower court finding that the defendants did not commit breach of contract is erroneous on facts and law. He further submitted that even time is the essence of the contract can be gathered from the notice given and surrounding circumstances of the case. He also submitted that settlement made by one Shri R.K. Meattle was not binding on the company regarding the deferment of the matter of payment and till the dispute is settled finally. He further submitted that for a consideration of Rs. 5,000 such type of admission could not bind the company nor it is expected from a Director who is to exercise degree of care, skill and diligence on behalf of the company as is expected of a man of his position. He further submitted that there was no such specific authorisation and he finally submitted that there is no positive admission by him. He invited the attention of the letter dated 7-8-1977 of the company which mentions that R. K. Meattle claim and requested them to pay Rs. 5,000 against the arrears of sale deed executed by the appellant firm in favour of the company for the expenses to get the dispute decided so that the formality of the sale deed may be executed. It was further argued by him that the firm will not claim any amount till the formality of the execution of the sale deed is completed. 11. Learned counsel Shri Sudhir Chandra has also submitted that the defendant had no right to dispose of the property till the registration was effected as no title was passed as it was contingent on the payment of loan. 11. Learned counsel Shri Sudhir Chandra has also submitted that the defendant had no right to dispose of the property till the registration was effected as no title was passed as it was contingent on the payment of loan. He further made submission that the defendant has enjoyed the property without making any payment and at the most if there was any difficulty in title he could be indemnified. He further submitted that despite the notices sent that new certificate has been obtained from the appropriate authority of the income tax department and the registered sale deed be got effected and money be paid through the representative of the company no heed was paid. Under these circumstances he submits that the decree of the lower court may be set aside. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent Shri Ravi Kant submitted that once a sale deed has been effected there cannot be rescission of the contract. He further submitted that there was no default committed by the respondent as no clearance certificate from income tax authority was produced and ultimately when the registry decided in their favour and on appeal filed by the respondent as well as suit the registration of sale deed took place. He further submitted that the payment was not essence of the contract and the respondent can protect his possession, under Section 53 (A) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Another submission which he has made, very vehementally regarding the powers of director of a company and admission of director Shri B. D. Mittal. He further submitted that condition regarding putting embargo regarding sale of the property is hit by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. He also submitted that according to Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act the transfer of property passes forthwith unless there is a different intention and on completion of the sale which passes forthwith. 13. Learned counsel of both sides have also submitted brief synopsis of written arguments to assist the Court. 14. Now I would deal with the submission of the counsel for the parties. Firstly, I would take whether the contract has been rescinded by giving a final notice on 3-7-1973 ; whether the time was the essence of the contract and payment as stipulated under the contract was precedent condition in passing the title? 14. Now I would deal with the submission of the counsel for the parties. Firstly, I would take whether the contract has been rescinded by giving a final notice on 3-7-1973 ; whether the time was the essence of the contract and payment as stipulated under the contract was precedent condition in passing the title? I would also deal with the submission of Shri Ravi Kant regarding passing of the complete title at the time when the sale deed has been effected. 15. I would like to quote first of all definition of sale under Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act: "54. Sale-"sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part- promised. " In case sale relates to immovable property and its value is more than Rs. 100 which has to be registered by registered instrument. The contract of sale definition is also mentioned in Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1882) A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on such property the legislature has laid emphasis that price paid or promise or part paid or part promised and terms settled. It may be mentioned at the very outset that only Rs. 50,000 was paid and later on Rs. 5,000 more to Shri R. K. Mettale. Now I would like to mention Section 55 of the Act of 1882 which deals regarding rights of buyer and seller. "55. Rights and liabilities of buyer and setter - In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immovable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold: (d) on payment or tender of the amount due in respect of the price, to execute a proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders it to him for execution at a proper time and place". 16. In this case admittedly the possession has been given. There is also implied-contract that in case there is defect in title of the property the buyer is entitled to be indemnified 17. 16. In this case admittedly the possession has been given. There is also implied-contract that in case there is defect in title of the property the buyer is entitled to be indemnified 17. Now I would like to quote Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act: "section 230-A (1 ).- Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force, where any document required to be registered under the provisions of clause (a) to clause (e) of sub- section (I) of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) purports to transfer, assign, limit or extinguish the right, title of interest of any person to or in any property valued at more than fifty thousand rupees, no registering officer appointed under that Act shall register any such document, unless the Income lax Officer certified that: (a) such person has either paid or made satisfactory provision for payment of all existing liabilities under the Act, the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1950 (51 of 1950), the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, (21 of 1947), the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the Expenditure- tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958), the Super Profit Tax Act, 1963 (14 of 1963) and the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 (7 of 1964); or 18. Now I would like to quote Section 8 and 10 of the Act of 1882 which have been relied upon by the counsel for the respondent: "section 8. Operation of transfer - Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Operation of transfer - Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Such incidents include, where the property, is land, the easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the earth; and, where the property is machinery attached to the earth the moveable parts thereof; and, where the property is a house, the rent thereof accruing after the transfer, and the locks, keys, bars, doors, windows and all other things provided for permanent use therewith; and, where the property is a debt or other actionable claim, the securities there for (except where they are also for other debts or claims not transferred to the transferee), but not arrears of interest accrued before the transfer; and, where the property is money or other property yielding income, the interest or income thereof accruing after the transfer takes effect. " "section 10. Condition restraining alienation - Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or-disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him: provided that property may be transferred or for the benefit of a woman (not being a Hindu, Mohammadan or Buddhist), so that she shall not have power during her marriage to transfer or charge the same for her beneficial interest there in. " 19. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has also relied upon Section 10 of the Act of 1822. Shri Ravi Kant learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Section 10 of the Act of 1882 to buttress his argument that condition regarding alienation or transferring of the property in the sale-deed, as mentioned in earlier part of judgment is void. 20. Section 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1963) is quoted with advantage: "31. 20. Section 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1963) is quoted with advantage: "31. When cancellation may be ordered - (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue lo have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . " 21. Obviously there is no ground of misrepresentation. There is only a ground for cancellation of document i. e. non-payment of the price and lingering the matter unnecessarily. I am of the considered view that instrument of contract deserves to be rescinded on the following reasonings: 22. Now I would take firstly whether the time of payment was the essence of the contract and whether it was a condition precedent of passing of the title in property. After carefully going through Section 54 of Act of 1882 and the agreement the parties settled that the payment would be made as stipulated and there was no intention to the contrary. The defendant also disposed of the property and demolished it. From the plain tiff-appellant side he did what was possible for the delivery of possession and even procuring of the certificate from the Income Tax authority, as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment and requested the defendant to make a payment and get a certificate so that the registration of sale deed can be made. The defendant on one pretext or another dragged the plaintiff into the litigation. The question of Seth Shanti Lals title in the suit property which ultimately was dismissed. The defendant in all fairness should have made payment and in case ultimately there was difficulty in title he could have sued the plaintiff for indemnification. The defendant has enjoyed the property after taking the possession and deliberately did not make payment on the plea that there is no income tax certificate and the sale deed registration cannot be effected. Generally under Section 55 of the Contract Act time in case of contract of immoveable property is not essence of con tract. 23. The defendant has enjoyed the property after taking the possession and deliberately did not make payment on the plea that there is no income tax certificate and the sale deed registration cannot be effected. Generally under Section 55 of the Contract Act time in case of contract of immoveable property is not essence of con tract. 23. So far the defendant did not per form his essential part of contract regarding making payment and the plaintiff was right-in residing the contract. Learned counsel for the appellant has quoted authority AIR 1978 Patna 97 (Baldeo Singh and others v. Dwarika Singh and others) which lays down: "the question whether title passes on mere execution and registration of a deed or only on payment of consideration depends upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the deed. Where, from the recital in the deed, it is obvious that the parties to the sale deed had agreed that title to the property in question should pass to the vendee only after payment of the full consideration money is not paid at the time of the execution and registration of the deed, the title would not pass to the vendee. " The Division Bench farther observed on page 100 that: "but equity will not assist where there has been undue delay on the part of one party to the contract, and the other has given him reasonable notice that he must complete within a definite time. The vendor cannot be expected to wait in definitely to enable the vendee to perform his part, and he is at liberty in such a situation to sell the property to another person. If the amount is tendered by the vendee after such repudiation it is of no significance." 24. Again learned counsel for the appellant has quoted 1995 (1) Current Civil Cases (Durgamani Behera and others v. Ghasiram Mohanta and others) in which it has been held: "if intention of parties is that title should pass only on payment of consideration and if the recital of payment of consideration is in writing (sic) mere execution and registration of the sale deed. " 25. " 25. Another authority relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is AIR 1977 SC 1517 (Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal v. Devaji Supdu Dorik and others) in which it is held: "contract Act (1872) Sections 39, 55 suit by A against B for specific performance of contract. Property agreed to be sold only for a sum of Rs. 17,000 B from time to time paying Rs. 12,000, B was also in possession of property. A calling upon B to pay full amount of purchase price. Failure of B to do so. As suit for possession and in alternative for the balance amount of purchase price and interest thereon is maintainable. " 26. Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon 1994 Supp (2) SCC 545 (1) (Balbir Singh and another v. Gurbachan Kaur and others) in which it is held that: "sale-deed containing a clause to the effect that if sale consideration was not paid before a certain date the document shall be deemed to be cancelled. Deed executed only by transferor, there being no reciprocal promise to pay by the transferee. Held, it was not a case where the sale consideration was promised to be paid on a future date. Hence the courts below were right in holding that there was no valid contract for performance. " 27. Shri Sudhir Chandra, counsel for the appellant has also relied upon AIR 1993 SC 1742 (Para 28) (Smt. Chand Rani v. Smt. Kamal Rani) regarding the fact that general law is that time is not essence of the contract in the case of the sale of the immovable property yet the parties intended to make time as the essence under clause (1) of the suit agreement. From this point of view, we are unable to see how the case in Nathulal ( AIR 1970 SC 546 ) could have any application to the facts of this case. 28. Shri Sudhir Chandra, counsel for the appellant has further relied upon AIR 1967 SC 868 (Gomathinayagam Pillai and others v. Palaniswami Nadar) in which it is held that time is essence of the contract can be made by serving a notice on the other party. 28. Shri Sudhir Chandra, counsel for the appellant has further relied upon AIR 1967 SC 868 (Gomathinayagam Pillai and others v. Palaniswami Nadar) in which it is held that time is essence of the contract can be made by serving a notice on the other party. His argument is that fourth notice was served in the month of July, 1973 and plaintiff-appellant made time as essence of the contract again beside previous notice sent but not a whisper of any kind of reply came from the defendant to make payment. No payment has been made even during the pendency of the suit, and finally lower court had to pass a decree for remaining amount. This shows mala fide conduct on the part of the defendant. 29. Regarding another aspect that sale-deed under Section 47 of the Registration Act takes its effect from the date of execution even if registered afterwards is of no consequence as the notice was sent to the Registrar as well as to the parties not to affect the sale deed as the contract has been terminated. The provision of Section 230 of the Income Tax Act are meant to realise the dues from the vendor so that the government money is realised and there is no other intention except this and the embargo has been put on not to affect the registered deed. It does not mean that execution of a document i. e. agreement to sell is of no consequence and the defendant is not to abide by the terms of the agreement. There is force in the submission of the counsel for the appellant. 30. Shri Ravi Kant, counsel for the respondent has also cited the following authorities regarding sale deed on Section 54 of the Act of 1882 that seller cannot repudiate sale. He can only bring a suit for recovery of purchase money: (i) AIR 1916 Allahabad 366 (D. B.). (ii) AIR 1944 Bombay 50 (56, 57). (iii) AIR 1929 Bombay 147 (150). (iv) AIR 1934 Lahore 917 (919) (DB). (v) AIR 1947 Madras 30 (Para 7). (vi) AIR 1990 Patna 26 (Para 36). (vii) AIR 1916 Madras 1215 (1217). (viii) 6 Indian Cases 117 (All) (DB) (ix) AIR 1967 A. P. 7 (page 8) (x) AIR 1990 Karnataka 128. (xi) AIR 1990 Kerala 169. 31. (iii) AIR 1929 Bombay 147 (150). (iv) AIR 1934 Lahore 917 (919) (DB). (v) AIR 1947 Madras 30 (Para 7). (vi) AIR 1990 Patna 26 (Para 36). (vii) AIR 1916 Madras 1215 (1217). (viii) 6 Indian Cases 117 (All) (DB) (ix) AIR 1967 A. P. 7 (page 8) (x) AIR 1990 Karnataka 128. (xi) AIR 1990 Kerala 169. 31. The facts of each case are different from another case and on principle of law there is no dispute but in the facts and circumstances of this case before the registration of the sale deed the contract has been rescinded. These authorities are not applicable to this case. 32. Regarding submission of Shri Ravi Kant, counsel for the respondent on Section 10 of Act of 1882 that condition of sale of the property in an agreement to contract for sale in this case was void. This plea is not available as on one hand the defendant plea is that there is no transfer of title unless certificate is issued by income tax office an d he is not performing duties under Section 37 of the Contract Act read with Section 55 of the Contract Act regarding payment of money and which were precedent condition in the agreement. So the respondent has demolished the property without payment which looks contradictory stand on his part regarding the aspect that there was no complete title unless certificate was issued and Shanti Lals Case was settled. There is another aspect of the case that Shri B. D. Mittal had power to modify the contract. No director of prudent intelligence after accepting Rs. 5,000 can waive the rest of the money till the matter is finally decided and postpone the execution of the document. Shri Ravi Kant submitted that the Directors act of extending the time of payment can bind the company when he is ac ting within his powers. It has been further submitted by him that if on the representation of the Director the other party does something the company is bound by such representation to a third party. 33. In the facts and circumstances of the case it was very funny that after accepting Rs. 5,000 his intention was to charge the mode of payment without proper authorization or authority of the company. 33. In the facts and circumstances of the case it was very funny that after accepting Rs. 5,000 his intention was to charge the mode of payment without proper authorization or authority of the company. No prudent Director would like to do so and if he has done it is not in the interest of the company and does not find the company specially when he knew the previous controversy of exchange of notices and final notice sent to rescind the contract. The argument of learned counsel Shri Ravi Kant is not sustainable. 34. I, therefore, for the reasons recorded and the lower court has committed a mistake in appreciation of law as well as facts that there is no decision of the con tract and the contract cannot be declared void. The lower court has committed an error of law by holding that valid title has passed and time of payment was not essence of contract. The lower court did not appreciate the correct aspect of law that title was to pass only on the payment of the money and even in the lower court no offer was made for payment of money by the defendant to show his conduct. In this case the conduct of the defendant would have been more fair if he had at least made at tempt to payment of money after final notice i. e. fourth notice sent in July, 1973 before filing of the suit when there was a mentioning that the money can be paid and as the income tax clearance certificate has been procured and the sale deed may be got registered. The money should have been sent even by so many modes. 35. Rescission of contract is nothing but declaration of rights that the plaintiff has put an end to the contractual obligation as the defendant has rescinded to fulfil his part of contractual obligation and the con tract is voidable and the contract can be repudiated by the plaintiff and it was rightly done. 36. In view of the reasons recorded I reverse the findings of the lower court. I set aside the judgment and decree dated 2-5-1980 passed by the VIth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr. The appeal is allowed. 36. In view of the reasons recorded I reverse the findings of the lower court. I set aside the judgment and decree dated 2-5-1980 passed by the VIth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr. The appeal is allowed. The suit of the plaintiff is decreed as prayed with costs giving the following reliefs: (a) that the plaintiff is granted a decree of actual physical possession of the proper ties in suit described hereinabove against the defendants by actual dispossession of the defendants. The Indenture dated 22- 2-1971 is rescinded, after taking its delivery from the sub-Registrar, Khurja. (b) that a decree for payment of the sum of Rs. 95,000 being the value properties wrongfully demolished and sold and wrong ful benefit derived by the defendants as aforesaid after adjustment of Rs. 55,000 is passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants. Interest pendents and till realisation at 12% is also granted. Appeal allowed.