JUDGMENT 1. - These three petitions U/s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short `the Cr.P.C.') seek the same relief of getting quashed the criminal proceedings in criminal case Nos. 156 of 1983 to 160 of 1983 State v. Ram Gopal and Ors. U/ss. 420, 465, 466, 467 and 468 r.w. Sec. 120B I.P.C. pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur. These were heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. The factual matrix which makes the common basis for the prayer made by the petitioners is as under: During the years 1969 and 1970 Lal Chand and Jai Singh petitioners were working as Store-Keepers and Dwarka Prasad petitioner as Store-Munshi in the Building and Roads (B&R) Section of the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) Distt. Division, Jaipur. Co-accused Ram Gopal, who is a co-accused alongwith the petitioners in the five cases mentioned above but who dies not appear to have filed any similar petition, was working for M/s. Madhu, S.T.S. Samiti Ltd., Jaipur Constructors. Instances of delivery of excess material from the stores of the B&R Distt. Division, Jaipur by the petitioners to the said contractors through Ram Gopal co-accused came to the notice of the authorities concerned. On enquiry of the matters the present petitioners were allegedly found responsible for making delivery of excess material to the aforesaid contractors by making false entries in the relevant record and thus to have cheated the department. Besides taking departmental action of suspending them, Sh. H.P. Kuchhal, the then Executive Engineer (B&R), Distt. Division, Jaipur sent a written report dated 23.7.70 to the Station House Officer, Police Station Sadar, Jaipur for registering a criminal case against the petitioners and Ram Gopal and investigate the same. At the said police station crime No. 134 for offences U/ss. 420, 465, 466, 467, 471 r.w. Sec. 120B IPC was registered on 28.7.70. After investigation, the police filed on 4.2.76 five separate charge-sheets numbered 137B, 137E, 137A, 137 and 137D relevant to criminal case Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159 and 160 of 1983 respectively against the present petitioners and Ram Gopal, aforementioned. The learned Magistrate & framed charges on 15.10.1987 and thereafter consolidated the cases on 4.10.1989 for the purpose of recording evidence. The prosecution could examine their first witness, Sh. 156, 157, 158, 159 and 160 of 1983 respectively against the present petitioners and Ram Gopal, aforementioned. The learned Magistrate & framed charges on 15.10.1987 and thereafter consolidated the cases on 4.10.1989 for the purpose of recording evidence. The prosecution could examine their first witness, Sh. H.R Kuchhal only on 2.3.1990 and since then ail the five cases are pending till date for enabling the prosecution to produce and examine their witnesses. It may be mentioned that in each case a list of 13 to 18 witnesses had been filed by the prosecution. Dwarka Prasad and Jai Singh petitioners are reported to have since retired from service. 3. Relying heavily on Supreme Courts decision in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak ( AIR 1992 SC 1701 ) and this courts decision in Chotey Lal Jain v. State of Rajasthan (1992 RCC 167) Mr. D.C. Swami, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has vehemently urged that the protracted trial of the petitioner infringes their fundamental right to speedy trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the proceedings pending against the petitioners in the five case amount to abuse of the process of the court which is required to be prevented by quashing such proceedings. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, urged that no time limit for completion of the criminal proceedings may be drawn and each case is to be decided on its own facts having regard to the nature of the offence involved therein. It was submitted that in the cases pending against the petitioners the offences relating to the cheating of the state employer and falsification of the public documents were involved and therefore, the proceedings be not quashed on the sole ground of delayed trial, 4. After having considered the rival submission and on making close study of the proceedings held in the cases against the petitioners by the authorities concerned. I am satisfied that continuation of the criminal proceedings in the five case against the petitioners not only infringes their fundamental right to speedy trial but also amounts to abuse of the process of the court of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate which abuse this court should prevent by exercising its jurisdiction U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. 5. I am satisfied that continuation of the criminal proceedings in the five case against the petitioners not only infringes their fundamental right to speedy trial but also amounts to abuse of the process of the court of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate which abuse this court should prevent by exercising its jurisdiction U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. 5. It is well settled by now that inherent powers of this court U/s. 482 Cr.P.C. are extraordinary powers which should be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases in which the court is satisfied that exercise of such powers by it is necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Proceedings being taken in a given case may be quite legal and proper yet this continuation may amount to abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, in each case this court shall have to satisfy itself, before quashing such proceedings, if those amount to abuse of the process of the court. The process of the court cannot be allowed to be misused or abused by either party to the proceedings. Therefore where it comes to the notice of this court that either party to the proceedings has tried or is trying to play with the process of the court leading to its abuse, this court shall not hesitate to prevent such abuse. Of course, a party cannot be allowed to be benefited by his own faults and reap the fruits of his own misdeeds. 6. The right to speedy trial is not only a valuable right of an accused flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution but it also reflects in the very scheme of the Cr.P.C. Determination of his guilt or innocence as quickly as possible in the circumstances of the case is always in the public interest and serves a social purpose. Such a right of the accused, as observed by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay's case (supra), encompasses all stages of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. Such a right of the accused, as observed by the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay's case (supra), encompasses all stages of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. Though no time limit for completion for criminal proceedings can be fixed, nonetheless whenever the plea to that effect is raised or arises for the consideration of this court it is to be seriously considered by it and after balancing and weighing all the relevant factors including nature of offence, negligence and lack of interest on the part of prosecution in taking steps for early completion of investigation, enquiry or trial and the well known delaying tactics by the accused such plea is to be decided. 7. In Chotey Lal's case (supra) this court examined the validity of the right of an accused for speedy trial quite extensively and elaborately and Tibrewal J. made the following exposition of law on the subject: "The old saving `justice delayed in justice denied' has now been given shape in the investigation and trial of criminal cases. After dynamic interpretation to Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Menaka Gandhis case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) the judgment of the apex court of the country in Hussainara Khatton's case (AIR 1979 1369) has further expanded Article 21 in dispensation of criminal justice recognising the right to speedy trial as a party and parcel of the fundamental right. The constitutional position is now well settled, the right to speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, the application of this doctrine is a vexed question. While a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of a fair trial, the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. Therefore, several questions arise for consideration in this connection when the matter is judicially examined by a court of law, some of them are:- (i) How long is the delay and whether it is unreasonable? (ii) was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances? (iii) Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency? (iv) Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agency ? (ii) was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances? (iii) Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency? (iv) Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agency ? (v) Is there any likelihood of accused being prejudiced in his defence? (vi) Whether inordinate delay itself is sufficient to drop the criminal proceedings without any prejudice to the accused? (vii) Whether any outer delay can be spelt from the date of commission of the offence to be the period beyond which a criminal proceeding is not to be continued at all?" 8. After discussing a number of judicial pronouncements on the point the learned Judge laid down the following proposition: "(i) A speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused within the ambit of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India is no more in dispute. But, the question whether this fundamental right has been violated or is likely to be violated on account of the delay in the trial will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no outer limit can be fixed in a general way for all the cases; (ii) While considering the length of delay, the Court will take into account the period consumed in the investigation of the case and the delay caused in actual proceedings in Court after filing of the charge-sheet. A speedy investigation and a trial are equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973; (iii) While deciding such question, the Court shall take into account the working of the judicial system in India and the lack of satisfactory working conditions in judicial courts, including large pendency and institution of the cases, inadequacy of judge strength and under staffing etc.; (iv) In a pending case to decided the question whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial court to secure the ends of justice will depend on several factors to be taken into consideration, such as the gravity and seriousness of the offence, whether the delay was occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself, whether the accused objected at any stage when such delay occasioned and whether the accused is prejudiced-in his defence on account of the delay? (v) If the delay has caused prejudice to the accused in the conduct and his defence, the pending criminal proceedings should be normally quashed as in that situation it could be said theft the accused has been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself and the trial is not fair and reasonable; (vi) In grave and serious offences against the society or in relation to Nations economy, defence or security, the criminal proceedings should not be normally quashed on the ground of delay simplicitor without anything further. (vii) In trivial offences having no or very little impact on the society, quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay simplicity shall be in the interest of justice as it will provide a room for serious and grave offences and will lessen the burden of the Court with heavy work-load." 9. I am in respectful agreement with my learned brothers views over the relevant aspects of right of an accused for speedy trial and do not feel inclined to add more to them. 10. Judged in the light of the propositions laid down by this court in Chotey Lal's case (supra) the position in the present petition comes to this. The offences are alleged to have been committed by the petitioners as back as in 1969 and 1970. The FIR was lodged in 1970 i.e. more than a quarter of a century ago. The completion of the investigation took as many as 6 years. The offences are alleged to have been committed by the petitioners as back as in 1969 and 1970. The FIR was lodged in 1970 i.e. more than a quarter of a century ago. The completion of the investigation took as many as 6 years. During all these years the petitioners remained victims of worries, anxiety. Their suspension in service added to disturbance to their vocation, peace and economy adversely affecting their dependents as well. Though the petitioners had put in their appearance before the court in 1976 or 1977 yet charges against them could be framed after a decade i.e. on 15.10.87. During this long period it was only occasionally that the petitioners did not appear before the court and sought exemption from personal appearance but such occasional requests afforded no justification for framing the charges as late as on 15.10.87. Any way, the first witness was examined on 2.3.90 and thereafter no other witness was produced by the prosecution during all the long 5 or 6 years. During this period the petitioners attended the court for more than hundred times and the court issued summons warrants to the prosecution witnesses. That apart the court administered warnings to the prosecution several times for closing the doors of opportunity to produce witnesses upon the prosecution but with no results. Such a conduct on the part of the prosecution dearly exhibits indifferent attitude of the prosecuting agency towards the proceedings as also lack of interest on the part of officers of P.W.D. in such proceedings. A close scrutiny of the proceedings taken by the Magistrate in the five cases present a sorry. State of affairs in the matter of effecting service of the process issued by the court on the witnesses besides showing lack of interest in the proceedings by the officers of the concerned departments. The delay caused is not found attributable to the petitioners of whom two have already retired from service. Under such circumstances, the continuation of the proceedings in the five cases, in my opinion, amounts to abuse of the process of the court which is required to be prevented by this court in the interest of justice. 11. In the result this petition is allowed. Criminal proceedings in Criminal Regular case Nos. 156/83, 157/83, 158/83, 159/83 and 160/83, pending against the petitioner in the court of Addl. 11. In the result this petition is allowed. Criminal proceedings in Criminal Regular case Nos. 156/83, 157/83, 158/83, 159/83 and 160/83, pending against the petitioner in the court of Addl. C.J.M. No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur or in other transferee court are hereby quashed and the petitioners discharged of all the charges framed against them in those cases. *******