V. RAMACHANDRAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU BY THE DRUGS INSPECTOR
1996-07-26
M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- ( 1 ) THIS case has got a chequered history. ( 2 ) THE petitioner, the proprietor of M/s R. V. Traders is charged for the offence under section 18 (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as TAct), punishable under section 27 (b) (ii) of the Act, for dealing the drugs without any valid licence. The offence was detected by the respondent/complainant on his inspection on 17-9-1992. In 1993, a complaint was filed against the petitioner in C. C. No. 5765 of 1993, before the IV Metropolitan Magistrate. Saidapet, Madras. Even before the commencement of the trial, the petitioner filed petitions in Cr1. O.P. Nos. 3275 to 3282 of 1994, before this Court, for quashing the proceedings in this case as well as the other connected cases and obtained orders of stay, on the ground that proper and valid licence was obtained subsequently. When these matters came up for final disposal, this Court did not incline to quash the proceedings, on that ground. However, this Court observed that this ground could be urged before the trial Court at the time of trial. As the learned Counsel appeared for the petitioners in the petitions for quashing the proceedings represented that this is a warrant case, this Court while dismissing the said petitions observed that liberty is reserved to the petitioners to raise the said ground before the trial Court during the course of trial to be conducted under warrant procedure. This order was passed on 25-1-1995. (3) AFTER receipt of the records from this Court, the trial Court posted the case for trial. Strangely the petitioner, at the commencement of the trial on 7-12-1995 filed a petition praying the Court to try these cases summarily, as per the provisions of section 36-A of the Act. The complainant/respondent filed a counter on 19-1-1996. opposing the said prayer. On perusal of the records and after hearing both the parties, the learned IV Metropolitan Magistrate, has dismissed the said petition, holding that these cases are to be tried only under the warrant procedure. This order was passed on 19-4-1996. Against this order of dismissal the petitioner has resorted to this revision before this Court. ( 4 ) MR.
On perusal of the records and after hearing both the parties, the learned IV Metropolitan Magistrate, has dismissed the said petition, holding that these cases are to be tried only under the warrant procedure. This order was passed on 19-4-1996. Against this order of dismissal the petitioner has resorted to this revision before this Court. ( 4 ) MR. Samuvel Rajapandian, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that under section 36-A of the Act, these cases have to necessarily be tried summarily, and that the decision arrived at by the trial Court to conduct the cases under warrant procedure was not valid in law. ( 5 ) IN the light of the said submission, I have perused the petition, counter and the orders of the Court below. It is very unfortunate that on the complaint filed in 1993 for the offence that was detected on 17-9-1992, the trial has not been allowed to go on till date. The petitioner in the year 1994 filed petitions for quashing the proceedings, and enjoyed the order of stay passed thereon till 25-1-1995, the date on which the order of dismissal on the petitions for quashing the proceedings was passed by this Court, and then very belatedly he has raised this kind of new objection on 7-12-1995, well recently at the commencement of the trial.
( 6 ) SECTION 36-A of the Act reads thus: certain offences to be tried summarily: notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under this Act, punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, other than an offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 33-1, shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial: provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment of a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who has been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code. ( 7 ) OF-COURSE, section 36-A of the Act provides, all offences under this Act, punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, shall be tried in a summary way by the Judicial Magistrate, in accordance with the provisions of sections 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But, in the discretion of the Magistrate, under the proviso, at the commencement of the trial, if the Magistrate considers that the nature of the case is such, that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is for any other reason, undesirable, to try the case summarily, he can after hearing the parties conduct the trial as per the warrant procedure. ( 8 ) IT is, as per the order of the Court below, impugned herein, very clear that a representation was made on behalf of the petitioner before this Court in the petitions for quashing the proceedings, that the case would be conducted under warrant procedure and this has been recorded in the order of this Court itself.
( 8 ) IT is, as per the order of the Court below, impugned herein, very clear that a representation was made on behalf of the petitioner before this Court in the petitions for quashing the proceedings, that the case would be conducted under warrant procedure and this has been recorded in the order of this Court itself. The wordings contained in section 36-A of the Act, would make it clear that the Magistrate can arrive at a conclusion either to conduct the case under warrant procedure or to conduct the case summarily, even at the commencement of the trial. In the instant case, the learned IV Metropolitan Magistrate, has come to the conclusion that this is a case, where a punishment of more than one year could be imposed, in the event of the charge being proved, and that this Court also observed in the earlier occasion that the petitioners shall be allowed to raise the ground mentioned in the petitions for quashing the proceedings before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, in the trial to be conducted under warrant procedure. As such the learned Magistrate is well within his powers to conduct these cases under warrant procedure. The reasons given in the order for coming to such a conclusion cannot be said to be invalid in law. Moreover, no prejudice would be caused to the accused in the conduct of the trial under warrant procedure, since the accused would be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, twice, as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner cited a decision in Surinder Kumar Tuteja v. State of Haryana and another, in support of his submission that the complaint for the offence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, could be tried only in a summary way. In that decision the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at paragraph 5, has observed as follows: "Learned A. A. G. , Haryana has conceded before me that before September 20, 1991. State Government of Haryana had not issued any notification empowering the Magistrate to try the aforesaid offences under the Act. She also admits that after the amendment of section 36-A in 1982, these offences can be tried only in a summary way unless otherwise the proviso to the amended section is made applicable by the learned Magistrate (which is not the case here ).
She also admits that after the amendment of section 36-A in 1982, these offences can be tried only in a summary way unless otherwise the proviso to the amended section is made applicable by the learned Magistrate (which is not the case here ). "this decision will not be applicable to the facts of the present case, since the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, came to the conclusion that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the cases, in the absence of the notification issued by the Government. The High Court further observed that proviso to section 36-A of the Act would not be applicable to that case, and as such, the Magistrate was to try the case only in a summary way, and this position was conceded by the counsel for the complainant. That is not the case here. As referred to earlier, the proviso to section 36-A of the Act is squarely applicable to the present case. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons stated above. I see no ground to interfere with the orders passed by the learned Magistrate. This case has been dragged-on successfully for three years without any progress by the petitioner. Therefore, the trial Court is directed to take up the case immediately and complete the trial as expeditiously as possible. The learned Magistrate is further directed to consider the grounds stated in the petitions in Cr1. O. P. Nos. 3275 to 3282 of 1994, filed before this Court for quashing the proceedings and the orders dated 25-1-1995, passed thereon, by giving full opportunity to the petitioner. ( 11 ) WITH these observations, the revision, which has no merits, is dismissed. Revision dismissed.