M. B. VISHWANATH, J. ( 1 ) ADMITTED. Heard on merits. The tenant has filed this revision-petition against the landlord-respondent (since deceased by L. Rs.) challenging the order dated 26-8-1993 passed by the 16th Addl. Small Cause Judge, Bangalore City allowing the eviction petition filed by the landlord (respondent herein) on the grounds under Section 21 (1) (a) (arrears of rent), 21 (1) (h) (reasonable and bona fide requirement) and under Section 21 (1) (p) (acquiring suitable premises) of the Karnataka Rent control Act (for short 'the K. R. C. Act') ordering eviction of the present revision petitioner-tenant. ( 2 ) IN this Court the learned Counsel for respondent-landlord submitted that he would not press the ground under Section 21 (1) (a) of the K. R. C. Act. So I will summarise the pleading only in regard to Section 21 (1) (h) and (p) of the K. R. C. Act. ( 3 ) THE parties will be referred to by their ranks in the Court below. The petitioner means the landlord (present respondent), the respondent means the tenant (present revision petitioner ). ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioner is: He let out the premises bearing No. 297, situate at 16th cross, Upper Palace Orchard, Sadashivanagar, Bangalore to the husband of the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/ -. The petitioner has been residing in a rented premises. He wanted to vacate the rented premises and occupy his own premises. Hence he filed the eviction petition against the late husband of the respondent. The requirement of the petitioner was reasonable and bona fide. The said petition was numbered H. R. C. No. 2014 of 1980 before the Court of Small Causes, Bangalore. ( 5 ) DURING the pendency of H. R. C. petition the husband of the respondent died. The respondent (present revision petitioner) was brought on record as the L. R. of her husband who was the tenant. The respondent conceded that the requirement of the petitioner was bona fide and reasonable and she agreed to vacate the premises if three years time was granted to her to vacate. Accordingly an order of eviction was passed granting time to the respondent till 5-9-1983 to vacate the premises. The respondent was to vacate on 5-9-1983. But the respondent implored the petitioner narrating her woes and prayed for further two years extension of time. Accordingly an order of eviction was passed granting time to the respondent till 5-9-1983 to vacate the premises. The respondent was to vacate on 5-9-1983. But the respondent implored the petitioner narrating her woes and prayed for further two years extension of time. The respondent also told the petitioner that she would voluntarily pay the rent of Rs. 2,500/- per month for the extended period. Accordingly, on the application filed by the respondent and by consent of the petitioner the Court extended the time by two years with effect from 5-9-1983. The respondent started paying rent of Rs. 2,500/- per month after 5-9-1983. In 1985 the respondent came to the petitioner and pleaded her inability to shift from the petition schedule premises and prayed for three more years time to vacate. She said that she would pay rent at the rate of Rs. 3,750/- per month. The respondent executed rent note on 9-12-1985 undertaking to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 3,500/- with effect from 9-12-1985. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENT to the rent note dated 9-12-1985 executed by the respondent there was a development in the family of the petitioner. Adesh Thirthankar son of the petitioner, filed a suit for partition and separate possession of his share in the petition schedule property in Original Suit No. 10/3 of 1995. This was decreed on 18-12-1985. According to the terms of that decree the share decreed in favour of Adesh Thirthankar has to be put in his possession and the remaining portion was to be occupied by the petitioner. ( 7 ) THE petitioner has been residing in a rented premises and the landlord of the petitioner has been compelling the petitioner to vacate. Further, on account of the dispute between the petitioner and his son Adesh Thirthankar, they are unable to live together in the same house. It has become very difficult for the petitioner to live with his son. For these reasons the petition schedule premises is reasonably and bona fide required for the use and occupation of the petitioner and also for the purpose of putting his son to his share which has fallen to him in the decree in Original Suit No. 10/3 of 1985. ( 8 ) DURING the pendency of the petition, the petitioner died and his legal representatives have been brought on record. ( 8 ) DURING the pendency of the petition, the petitioner died and his legal representatives have been brought on record. In view of the changed circumstances the petition has been amended and paragraph ll (a) has been inserted. ( 9 ) IT is averred by the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner that the 2nd legal representative (P. W. 2-Adesh thirthankar) married on 2-9-1990. He is entitled to the property which has fallen to his share in the decree passed in the partition suit. Adesh Thirthankar wants to live separately by taking possession of the share which has fallen to him. He has no other house to live in. The 1st legal representative-Kamala devi (wife of deceased petitioner) and daughter were required to take the property that has fallen to the share of the deceased petitioner. They also do not have any other house to live in. If an order of eviction is not passed greater hardship would be caused to the petitioner. ( 10 ) SUBSEQUENT to the rent note executed by respondent in December 1985, the respondent has duly constructed a residential house in Matadahalli layout and she has let out the building on higher rent. Inspite of the construction of the house, the respondent falsely implored the petitioner about her difficulty to vacate the petition schedule premises. As the respondent has acquired a suitable house of her own in matadahalli layout eviction has to be ordered on this ground also. ( 11 ) IN the objections the respondent has contended: It is not true that the original petitioner (deceased had to vacate the rented premises and so he filed the eviction petition against the late Kemparaja Urs. (husband of present petitioner ). It is true that H. R. C. No. 2014 of 1980 filed by the original petitioner ended in an order of eviction permitting the respondents who had been brought on record as legal representatives to vacate the premises on or before 5-8-1983. It is true that the respondent signed the compromise petition. It is true that a petition for extension of time was filed in H. R. C. No. 2014 of 1980. That application for extension of time had to be filed because the deceased petitioner agreed for the continuance of respondent on the petition schedule premises. It is true that the respondent signed the compromise petition. It is true that a petition for extension of time was filed in H. R. C. No. 2014 of 1980. That application for extension of time had to be filed because the deceased petitioner agreed for the continuance of respondent on the petition schedule premises. ( 12 ) IT is not true that the respondent again approached the petitioner and pleaded her helplessness and requested the petitioner to extend the period of lease and the respondent agreed to pay rent at Rs. 3,500/- per month. The petitioner came to the house of respondent on 5-9-1985 and told the respondent that he had no objection to grant a fresh lease in respect of the petition schedule if the respondent consented to pay Rs. 3,500/- per month. It was under these circumstances she executed a fresh rent note. ( 13 ) IT is true that respondent constructed a house as stated in the petition, But he has inducted a tenant into that house in view of the assurance given by the deceased petitioner that he would allow the respondent to continue in the petition schedule premises. ( 14 ) THE petition schedule premises is not required for the bona fide use and occupation of the members of the family of the original petitioner. Alternatively, it is submitted that the petition schedule premises being a big house consisting of ground and first floor the members of the deceased petitioner's family and the respondent could be accommodated independently. ( 15 ) THE suit filed by the petitioner's son Adesh Thirth ankaragainst the deceased petitioner is a collusive one. If eviction is ordered, the respondent will suffer greater hardship. ( 16 ) THE new house constructed by the respondent is in possession of tenant on term lease basis. ( 17 ) ON behalf of the petitioner P. W. 2-Kamala Devi wife of deceased petitioner and P. W. 2-Adesh Thirthankar son of deceased petitioner have been examined. On behalf of respondent she has got herself examined and closed her case. ( 18 ) AS I have already stated above, the lower Court allowed the petition on all the three grounds viz. , arrears of rent, bona fide and reasonable requirement and acquiring vacant possession of a suitable premises. On behalf of respondent she has got herself examined and closed her case. ( 18 ) AS I have already stated above, the lower Court allowed the petition on all the three grounds viz. , arrears of rent, bona fide and reasonable requirement and acquiring vacant possession of a suitable premises. In this Court, as I have already stated, the ground under Section 21 (1) (a) (arrears of rent) has not been pressed by the landlord (respondent ). ( 19 ) NOW the point for consideration is, whether the order passed by the Court below holding that the legal representatives of deceased petitioner have made out grounds under Section 21 (1) (h) and (p) of the K. R. C. Act can be sustained. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the tenant (revision-petitioner)first argued on the ground under Section 21 (1) (h) and then argued on the ground under Section 21 (1) (p) of the K. R. C, Act. The learned Counsel for the landlord (respondent) first argued on the ground under Section 21 (1) (p) and then the ground under section 21 (1) (h) of the K. R. C. Act. ( 21 ) I will first take up the ground under Section 21 (1) (p) of the K. R. C. Act. It should be remembered at the outset that the tenancy commenced in the year 1976. It was in 1976 the husband of the present tenant became a tenant under the husband of the first L. R. Kamala Devi-P. W. 1. ( 22 ) THE tenant-R. W. 1 has admitted in her evidence that during 1984 she built a house at Matadahalli, Bangalore. She has admitted that the house constructed by her is a residential house. She has further admitted that it was proposed at the time of construction of the house that they would live there. She has stated that the house built by her consists of three rooms. The case of the tenant is that this house is not suitable for her living. The further case of the tenant is that she has let out the house because she was in financial difficulty. She has stated that the house built by her consists of three rooms. The case of the tenant is that this house is not suitable for her living. The further case of the tenant is that she has let out the house because she was in financial difficulty. The learned H. R. C. Judge, with whom I agree, has observed:"that even according to her, her deceased husband was a well known personality in the world of films and such being the case it cannot be imagined that the respondent had to discharge any liability by letting out her house". It cannot bo believed that the tenant was in financial crisis and so she let out the house built by her. ( 23 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the petition schedule house. is big, whereas the house constructed by her is small and tenant, being used to live in a big house, cannot now be asked to live in a small house. It has been laid down by this Court in R. Anantha Rao v Indumathi alias Lakshmi Bai, that where the tenant states that he built the building for his own residence, it may be assumed that he took into account all relevant circumstances which make the premises suitable for his residence. ( 24 ) IN a recent decision, this Court in Dr. Shashibushan M, v M/s. Bata India Ltd. and Another, white interpreting Section 21 (1) (p) has held that the object underlying the clause is to prevent a tenant who builds or acquires a suitable building continuing to occurpy the tenanted premises. It is further laid down in the runing of this Court that it is not open for such a tenant to avoed his liability for eviction from the premises even if he establisles that the building so built or acquired by him, which could have been put to use but in fact was not put to such use or was not intended to be put to such use. ( 25 ) THE tenant cannot be permitted to contend, having built her own house, that it is not suitable to her. The tenant built a house in 1984. The rent note Ex. P-2 between the present tenant and the deceased landlord-Devapal is dated 9-12-1985. ( 25 ) THE tenant cannot be permitted to contend, having built her own house, that it is not suitable to her. The tenant built a house in 1984. The rent note Ex. P-2 between the present tenant and the deceased landlord-Devapal is dated 9-12-1985. On the strength of this evidence it is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that Section 21 (1) (p) is not attracted. The learned counsel relied on the decision in Bheem Singh v Hemavathi , in which it has been laid down that Section 21 (1) (p) of the K. R. C act is attracted only when tenant has built, acquired vaccnt possession of or been allotted a suitable building after becoming a tenant. True, the tenant built her house in 1984 and the rent note Ex. P-2 is in 1985. ( 26 ) IN the instant case the tenancy commenced in 1976 during the lifetime of the present tenant's husband. Ex. P-2 is only an agreement to increase rent. No fresh tenancy was seated under ex. P-2. The tenancy commenced pretty long before Ex. P-2. So the law laid down by this Court is not applicabe to the facts of this case. ( 27 ) THE present eviction petition was filed in the year 1986. The tenant built her house in the year 1984 and let it out. So the house built by the tenant was not vacat at the time when the eviction petition was filed in the year 1986. The learned Counsel for the tenant relied on the decision of this Court in Gangadhara setty v Thirukappa Setty, where it has been laid down that that if the building built by the enant is not vacant at the time the eviction petition is presened then the landlord cannot seek eviction of the tenant from the tenanted premises. ( 28 ) THE ruling of this Court does not help the tenant turn the tables on the landlord. "existing rules and principles can give us our present location, our bearings, our latitude and longitude. The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The law, like the traveller, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle of growth". says the 'incomparable' Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo. "existing rules and principles can give us our present location, our bearings, our latitude and longitude. The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end. The law, like the traveller, must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle of growth". says the 'incomparable' Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo. ( 29 ) IT has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Mohini Badhwar v Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran , while interpreting Section 14 (1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which is similar to Section 21 (1) (p) of the K. R. C. Act, that the tenant would be liable to be evicted on the ground of acquiring vacant possession of a residence, even though the tenant had lost possession of that acquired residence on the date the eviction petition was presented by the landlord. The Supreme Court was again pleased to lay down in Sh. Dewan Chand Bhalla v Dr. Ashok Kumar Bhoil :"it is clear from the plain words of Section 14 (3) (a) (iv) that the landlord's right to obtain possession of a residential building in the occupation of a tenant under the said provision accrues, when the tenant either before the commencement of the Act. . . . . . . or after the commencement of the Act. . . . . . . has built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a residence, reasonably sufficient for his requirements. Clear and unequivocal words employed in the said provision give no scope for a tenant to say that the accrued en right of the landlord to get back possession of the residential building from him under the provision is lost when the tenant parts with possession of the residence which had come to him in one or the other way referred to therein". The Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that the provision enables the tenant to make his landlord lose his right would result in encouraging unscrupulous tenants to practice deceit against landlords by adoption of some trick or strategy which could defeat their (landlords') valuable accrued rights. This law has been laid down by the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 14 (3) (a) of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act which is similar to Section 21 (1) (p) of the K. R. C. Act. This law has been laid down by the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 14 (3) (a) of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act which is similar to Section 21 (1) (p) of the K. R. C. Act. ( 30 ) IN view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the two decisions referred to above, the law laid down by this Court in Gangadhara Setty's case, supra, is not good law. The learned counsel for the tenant submitted that the matter should be referred to a Division Bench. That is not necessary since the law has been laid down by the Supreme Court. ( 31 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of opinion, the finding of the Lower Court that the ground under Section 21 (1) (p) of the k. R. C. Act is proved is neither unreasonable nor illegal. ( 32 ) NOW I take up the ground under Section 21 (1) (h) of the K. R. C. Act. P. W. 1-Kamala Devi is the 1st legal representative. She has stated that she and her son Adesh 'thirthankar have been residing on rented premises known as Mahadeshwara nilaya, that the owner of the house is one Satish and that their landlord has been compelling her to vacate the premises and she has assured him that she would vacate immediately after getting the petition schedule premises. She has also stated that her son was not getting on well with her deceased husband which resulted in the suit for partition filed by her son. She has further stated that even now her son insists on living separately from her. P. W. 1 has stated that neither she nor her son has any other property in Bangalore to live in. ( 33 ) P. W. 1 has stated in her evidence that her son wants to live separately in the ground floor of the petition schedule house, which ground floor has been allotted to him in the partition decree. P. W. 1 has stated that she wants to live separately in the first floor of the petition schedule house with her widowed daughter-Anita and her child. She has again asserted in her evidence that they do not have any other premises in Bangalore. P. W. 1 has stated in her evidence that her son who is. P. W. 1 has stated that she wants to live separately in the first floor of the petition schedule house with her widowed daughter-Anita and her child. She has again asserted in her evidence that they do not have any other premises in Bangalore. P. W. 1 has stated in her evidence that her son who is. aged 32 years is engaged in business and has his sales office at J. C. Road, Bangalore. He got married on 2-9-1990. P. W. 1 has clearly stated in her evidence that her son, though married, continues to live with her for want of accommodation. This evidence of P. W. 1 is corroborated by her son P. W. 2-Adesh Thirthankar, ( 34 ) P. WS. 1 and 2 have been cross-examined but there is nothing elicited to show that their evidence is false or exaggerated. ( 35 ) IT is not disputed that P. Ws. 1 and 2 have been residing in a rented house. ( 36 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the landlord of the present landlord has not issued any notice to him and has not filed any eviction petition against him. ( 37 ) THE learned Counsel for the tenant relied on M/s. Mysore Chemical and Biological Agencies and Others v J. M. A. Ahmed moideen and Others , in which it is laid down that though the landlord is living on rented premises, in the absence of examination of the landlord and in the absence of production of the letter written by the landlord the requirement of the landlord lacks bona fides. It is clear from paragraph 28 at page 341 of this ruling that the landlord had written a letter asking the tenant to vacate but the landlord did not produce that letter. Under these circumstances this Court held that the requirement lacks bona fides. This authority is not applicable to the facts of this case and is clearly distinguishable. ( 38 ) THIS Court in M/s. Akberali Sons Estate v M/s. The Pen Shop, held:"to say that the landlord who is residing in tenanted premises cannot ask for eviction from his property for his own use unless he is dragged into litigation by his landlord, amounts to too much stretching of the regulatory provisions in favour of tenants. ( 38 ) THIS Court in M/s. Akberali Sons Estate v M/s. The Pen Shop, held:"to say that the landlord who is residing in tenanted premises cannot ask for eviction from his property for his own use unless he is dragged into litigation by his landlord, amounts to too much stretching of the regulatory provisions in favour of tenants. When there is uncontroverted evidence on record to show that the landlord of the premises seeking eviction is insisting for vacating the premises, then it has to be accepted that the plea of personal necessity is genuine and bona fide. Non-examination of the owner of the premises of the building is not of much consequence". In view of the law laid down by this Court it must be held that the requirement of P. W. 1 is reasonable and bona fide. ( 39 ) THE certified copy of the decree Ex. P-5 shows that P. W. 2-Adesh Thirthankar filed a suit against his father in Original suit No. 10/3 of 1985 and it came to be decreed by consent. As per the decree the ground floor in the petition schedule house has been allotted to his father which is now required for his wife and widowed daughter-Anita. It is argued by the learned counsel for the tenant that the decree is collusive. It is clear from Ex. P-5 that the suit was filed on 1-4-1985 and it was decreed on 18-12-1985 since compromise petitioner was filed. If ex. P-5 were a collusive decree, it would have been decreed on the first hearing date or the next. Bearing in mind the suit was filed on 1-4-1985 and it was decreed on 18-12-1985, it cannot be said that the decree is collusive. Even otherwise when one member of a family files a suit against another member, third parties interested in the family will prevail upon them to enter into a compromise to save the prestige of the family. ( 40 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the difference between the son-P. W. 1-Adesh Thirthankar and his father have not been pleaded in the eviction petition and so the requirement lacks reasonableness and bona fides. Court proceedings are not meant to expose skeletons in the family cupboard. This is the view expressed by this Court in Ramanna v Abdulla. Court proceedings are not meant to expose skeletons in the family cupboard. This is the view expressed by this Court in Ramanna v Abdulla. "the litigants even if they have been compelled to come to the Court are entitled to the same protection in regard to their privacy. They do not have to disclose material details of disharmony in the family whether it be husband and wife, father and son, brother and sister or mother-in-law and daughter-in-law that such meticulous details as to inform the whole world of the situation that exists in that family. It will be sufficient for the landlord to prove that he has reasons of his own volition to part company with rest of his family with whom he is residing". More importantly, it is not even suggested to P. W. 2 that the decree as per Ex. P-5 is collusive. ( 41 ) THERE is material on record to show that the deceased landlord-Devapal had filed another eviction petition-H. R. C. No. 2014 of 1980 against the deceased tenant-Kemparaj Urs (husband of present tenant) in which a decree for eviction was passed by consent. On the strength of this evidence, it is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the landlord had waived his right to file a fresh petition on the ground under section 21 (1) of K. R. C. Act. It has been laid down by the supreme Court in K. S. Sundararaju Chettiar v M. R. Ramachandra Naidu, at paragraph 8:"it should be borne in mind that cause for eviction is a recurring cause of action and even if the existence of such cause of action had not been found in a previous proceeding for eviction, the same cannot be discarded if such claim is established by cogent evidence adduced by the landlord in subsequent proceedings". In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court that cause for eviction is a recurring cause of action the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for tenant has to be rejected. ( 42 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the reasonableness and bona fides of the petitioner's claim have not been properly stated in the eviction petition. I agree that complete details of the requirement have not been stated though it is alleged that their requirement is reasonable. ( 42 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the reasonableness and bona fides of the petitioner's claim have not been properly stated in the eviction petition. I agree that complete details of the requirement have not been stated though it is alleged that their requirement is reasonable. This argument also does not hold water in view of the law laid down by the supreme Court in Sundararaju Chettiar's case, supra. "that non-mention of a reasonable ground for eviction in the notice for eviction on the basis of which a claim for eviction is later on founded usually raises suspicion about the existence of such ground but such non-mention by itself cannot disentitle a landlord to claim for eviction on such ground. If a claim for eviction founded on such ground in the petition for eviction is proved to be well-founded and the same is consistent with the grounds on which eviction is permissible in law, the landlord will be entitled to a decree for eviction not withstanding the fact that such ground was not mentioned in the notice for eviction. . . . . . . . . ". ( 43 ) THE respondent's husband became a tenant in 1976. The respondent admittedly has since built a house but she did occupy it. P. W. 1-Kamala Devi and her son Adesh Thirthankar want to live separately. P. W. 1 and her widowed daughter require the first floor for their occupation. P. W. 2 and his wife require the ground floor for their occupation. If eviction is ordered respondent will not be put to greater hardship and inconvenience. On the other hand if eviction is refused, P. Ws. 1 and 2 would be put to greater hardship. ( 44 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of opinion, the claim of petitioner, since deceased by L. Rs. P. Ws. 1 and 2 and others is reasonable and bona fide. ( 45 ) THE petition schedule house consists of ground and first floor. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that in any case partial eviction can be ordered. The tenant has built a house of her own. P. W. 1 and her widowed daughter and her child require the first floor of the petition schedule house for their residence. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the tenant that in any case partial eviction can be ordered. The tenant has built a house of her own. P. W. 1 and her widowed daughter and her child require the first floor of the petition schedule house for their residence. The son of P. W. 2 and his wife require the ground floor for their residence. It is not unusual for members of a family who are not getting on well to reside in this fashion, some members in the first floor and others in the ground floor. The petition schedule house, though it has a first floor, is not a single unit. The tenant-R. W. 1 has stated in her evidence that she is not accustomed to living in a small house and has always been living in a large sized house. The Lower Court has observed that if any portion of the house is to be occupied by the respondent, it will not be convenient for her. ( 46 ) IT has been laid down by this Court in S. N. Nagaraja Setty v Bramalavathamma , that the Court has to examine the question of partial eviction from a practical point of view. In the process of reducing the comparative hardship of the parties, court cannot and should not create a situation of permanent hardship. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case I am of opinion that this is a case in which partial eviction cannot be ordered. ( 47 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of opinion, the order of the Lower Court allowing the eviction petition on the ground under Section 21 (1) (h) also is eminently reasonable. It is neither unreasonable nor illegal. ( 48 ) LOWER Court's order of eviction on the grounds under Section 21 (1) (h) and (p) of the K. R. C. Act is confirmed. ORDER ( 49 ) THE revision petition is rejected. The revision petitioner-tenant is granted three months time to vacate. No costs. --- *** --- .