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1996 DIGILAW 760 (PAT)

Vagish Kumar v. Sandhya Kumari

1996-11-21

S.N.JHA

body1996
Judgment S.N.Jha, J. 1. This civil revision by the husband is directed against order directing him to pay maintenance pendente lite and cost of litigation to the wife opposite party under Sec. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (in short the Act). 2. The suit seeking decree of divorce under Sec. 13 of the Act was filed by the husband-petitioner on 31.1.94. The application seeking interim maintenance etc., was filed on 20.6.96. The impugned order was passed on 9.7.96, made effective from March 1994 itself. The suit has since been disposed of on 23.8.96. The court below has granted the husband the decree of divorce but asked him to pay monthly allowance of Rs. 2500.00 during her entire life and other expenses in terms of Sec. 25 of the Act. Such payment is to be made from the month of August 1996. It may be stated that the petitioner had preferred appeal being F.A. No. 478 of 1996 against the said judgment and order in this Court, which is pending. 3. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Jha learned Counsel for the petitioner, highlighted the fact that the divorce was sought on two fold grounds, namely, cruelty and desertion by the wife, the latter of which has been found to be proved in the aforesaid final judgment. Therefore asking the petitioner to pay maintenance pendente lite under Sec. 24, or for that matter, maintenance under Section 25, was not correct exercise of discretion on the part of the Court. He also submitted that in any view the direction to pay cost of litigation @ Rs. 600 per month is contrary to the spirit of the provisions. Mr. Anil Kumar Jha, learned Counsel for the opposite party, submitted that the conduct of the party is not to be seen while passing order regarding payment of interim maintenance under Sec. 24. 4. I have perused the judgment and order of the Court below dated 23.8.96 granting decree of divorce to the petitioner. The court in view of the pleadings of the parties framed three issues, namely, (i) Is the wife guilty of committing act of cruelty towards the husband and his family member? (ii) Is the wife also guilty of desertion intentionally and willfully without any valid reasons? and (iii) Is the husband guilty of his own misconduct or is trying to take advantage of his own fault? (ii) Is the wife also guilty of desertion intentionally and willfully without any valid reasons? and (iii) Is the husband guilty of his own misconduct or is trying to take advantage of his own fault? The Court held that the instances of cruelty were not proved. The Court, however, held that the life-opposite party had deserted the husband willfully and without any cause, and further that the husband has not tried to take advantage of his own guilt or fault. On these findings the court granted the husband decree of divorce. It also directed him to pay a monthly allowance of Rs. 2500.00 as also other expenses during her entire life. Since appeal against the said judgment is pending at the instance of the husband and the correctness of the aforementioned part of the order regarding maintenance is to be considered in that appeal, it is not proper for met to make any observation as to the correctness or propriety of the order. The only point for consideration is whether the impugned order directing payment of interim maintenance and cost of litigation should be sustained. 5. It is true, as pointed out by the Counsel for the opposite party, that the words "conduct of the parties" do not appear in Sec. 24 in contradistinction to the provisions of Sec. 25 but the conduct of the parties may be taken into account in making the order or in assessing the amount of maintenance. The following passage from Mullas Hindu Law (16th Edn. at page 728) may usefully be quoted in this connection: In considering an application for such and order the court would take into account all relevant circumstances, including the adultery, the conduct of the parties and any plea of conduct conducive or condonation. Cases are conceivable in which although the Court has power to award alimony, pendente lite no order may be made. Thus, fir instance, in case of a wife who has brought co-habitation to an end by admitted misconduct for which the husband is not to be blamed or in case where the conduct of the erring spouse is shown to have caused exceptional hardship to the other or where the erring spouse is shown to have been guilty of exceptional depravity the court may refuse to grant alimony pendente lite. The aforequoted passage has been noticed with approval by the Rajasthan High Court in Balbir Singh V/s. Swam Kant -- : 6. The situations in which the pendente lite maintenance can be refused cannot be exhaustively mentioned. In the present case, however, I do not want to make any exercise in that regard. As noticed above, the Court below has held in its final judgment that the wife has deserted the husband and has, thus, brought co-habitation to an end without any cause by committing is misconduct for which the husband is not to be blamed and, therefore, the present case is covered by the aforesaid statement of law. 7. It is true that at the stage of making any order under Sec. 24 the court is not supposed to go into the merits of the rival contention of the parties, which is to be gone into at the stage of trial. But where the court has already gone into the merits of rival contentions in a full fledged manner and finally decided the suit, the judgment is produced before the superior court to showd the conduct of the party, is the jurisdiction of the superior court limited to considering the correctness of the interim order ignoring the final judgment as if the same has not been delivered? It is difficult to answer the question in the affirmative. It would be unjust and arbitrary to saddle an innocent husband with the burden of paying the amount of maintenance even though he has been held to be not guilty of misconduct or responsible for the cessation of the marital relationship. In other words, whether the husband, who is not sinning but sinned against, should be punished for having committed no sin, find it difficult to reconcile myself to such a situation. It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the case in the court below, in anticipation of the decree of divorce, as the court below has put it in para 26 of the judgment, the wife-opposite party had filed a petition on 18.9.96 to award lump sum maintenance per month. Counsel for the petitioners rightly took the plea that this shows that the wife was more interested in monetary compensation than co-habiting with the husband. Counsel for the petitioners rightly took the plea that this shows that the wife was more interested in monetary compensation than co-habiting with the husband. In the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the impugned order awarding maintenance pendentre lite and the cost of litigation require interference. 8. By interim order dated 27-8-96 this Court while issuing notice to the Opposite Party had directed the petitioner to deposit the arrears of maintenance @ Rs, 800.00 per month from June to September 1996 by 5-9-96 and go on depositing future maintenance from October 1996. It is an admitted position that pursuant to the said interim order the petitioner has made the deposit/payment. So far as the question of payment of maintenance @ Rs. 2500.00 per month from month of August 1996 as directed by the judgment and order dated 23-8-96 is concerned, as stated above, the appeal is pending in this Court and it is for the petitioner to seek appropriate interim order in that appeal. So far as the present impugned order is concerned, pursuant to interim order of this Court in the present case, he has made deposit @ Rs. 800.00 per month for the months of June to September, part of which overlaps the period mentioned in the judgment dated 23-8-96. In the facts of the case, I am of the opinion that it would not be proper to ask the Opposite Party to refund the amount of maintenance for the months of June and July 1996; the period commencing from August 1996 is already subject matter of F.A. No. 478 of 1996. Subject to this, the impugned order dated 9-7-96 is set aside. 9. This application is, accordingly, allowed. No cost.