JUDGMENT 1. - This petition seeking to get the criminal proceedings, pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate against the petitioner quashed and dropped arises under the following circumstances. 2. On resumption and in lieu of his Jagir of village Choradya the State Government, at the recommendation of the Khud-Kasht Commissioner, had allotted to and conferred khatedari rights upon the petitioner in respect of 49 Bighas and 15 Biswas of agricultural land of Khasra Nos. 120/349 (5 Bighas), 123/354 (24 Bighas 15 Biswas) and 117/351 (20 Bighas) in Chak I STV (Annopgarh) Tehsil Raisinghnagar, Distt. Ganganagar. Being in the service of the State Government in its Forest Deptt. the petitioner found it difficult to manage the said agricultural property. Therefore while he was posted directed, Tiger Protection Plan, Wild Life at Sawai Madhopur he decided to settle dow Accordingly he made a request to Government through collector Sawin to allot to him agricultural land in Khasra adjoining to 'Bagh Pariyojna' (Tiger I Plan) at Sawai Madhopur in exchange of he agricultural land at 1 STV (Anoopgarh), atop said. After conducting necessary enquiries both the places the State Government accepted the propsal and request made by the petitioner. He was, therefore allotted 49 Bighas of agricultural land of Khasra No. 58 ad measuring 52 Bighas 10 Biswas at Sawai Madhopur (village Madhosinghpura) vide Collector Sawai Madhopur's order dated Feb., 14,1982. Relevant entries in the records of rights, as maintained by the State Government in respect of agricultural land, were also made describing the petitioner as Khatedar tenant of Khasra No. 58 and measuring 49 Bighas of village Madosinghpura. This all was done after having felt satisfied that the petitioner had surrendered all his rights to and title in the 49 Bighas and 15 Biswas of agricultural land of Chak I STV Anoopgarh, Tehsil Raisinghnagar, Distt. Sri Ganganagar and the Tehsildar Colonisation had already taken over the possession of the said land from the petitioner. 3. After the lapse of about one year of the above proceedings somehow it came to the notice and knowledge of the State Government that the petitioner had appointed his cousin, Sri. Prabhu Singh who is/was the father of present Respondent No.2 Capt. Ghanshyam Singh as his Mukhtare Aam in the year 1979 and the said Sri. 3. After the lapse of about one year of the above proceedings somehow it came to the notice and knowledge of the State Government that the petitioner had appointed his cousin, Sri. Prabhu Singh who is/was the father of present Respondent No.2 Capt. Ghanshyam Singh as his Mukhtare Aam in the year 1979 and the said Sri. Parbhoo Singh had entered into an agreement for sale of the land belonging to the petitioner in 1 STV (Anoopgarh) to his own minor son, Respondent No. 2 who was then a student at Mao College Ajmer and for whom Sri. Parbhoo Singh had got himself appointed as Mukhtare Khas. The said Sri. Parbhoo Singh appears to have sought the permission of the State Government to sell the land of the petitioner at 1 STV to his son, Respondent No-2, (for a consideration of Rs. 1,98,000/-which is stated to have been received by him from his minor son at the time of execution of the agreement for sale dated 13.4.82 but such request was turned down by the State Government on 13.9.97. Curiously enough the order passes on 13.9.97 was reconsidered and permission to sell the land was allegedly accorded to Sri. Parbhoo Singh on 3.10.79 vide Deputy Secy's letter No. F-3(246) Raj/Up/79 dated 1.10.79. But no sale deed has so far been admittedly executed in favour of Sri. Ghanashyam Singh Respondent. No. 2. On receipt of such information a report was called for from the authorities in the Colonisation Deptt. and on Deputy Commissioner (Colonisation) Bikaner reporting that no entries regarding the exchange of the land were made by then in the relevant records the State Government cancelled the allotment of 49 Bighas land of Khasra No. 58 of Madhosinghpura in favour of the petitioner and directed the District level authorities at Sawai Madhopur to take possession of the allotted land from the petitioner. 4. His rights in the allotted land of Khasra No. 58 of village Madhosinghpura having been threatened in the manner stated above the petitioner approached this Court through S.B. Writ. Petition No. 376 of 1983 for protection of his rights. On Feb. 8,1983 this Court passed an ad interim order staying the operation of the State Government's order dated 23.1.83 cancelling the allotment of the land in question. Such ad-interim order was subsequently made absolute on October 20,1983. 5. Petition No. 376 of 1983 for protection of his rights. On Feb. 8,1983 this Court passed an ad interim order staying the operation of the State Government's order dated 23.1.83 cancelling the allotment of the land in question. Such ad-interim order was subsequently made absolute on October 20,1983. 5. It was in the above backdrop that the Deputy Secy, Revenue (Group iii) Deptt. Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur vide his letter No. P-2 (356) Raj. 3/81 dated 13.7.83 directed the Inspector General (Police)/ Director Central Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur to act according to law in the matter. The Distt. Administration at the Distt. Level at Sawai Madhopur also came into action. The Officer Incharge, Revenue Section, Collector's Office at Sawai Madhopur, making reference to Dy. Secy's letter referred to above, sent a written complaint against the petitioner to the Superintendent Police at Sawai Madhopur for action according to law. On receipt of this complaint from the office of the S.P. Sawai Madhopur the Station House Officer at Police Station Madhopur registered on 2.1.84 Crime No. 2 of 1984 for offences u/Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 120B IPC against the petitioner. Subsequently, in the year 1988, Resp. No. 1 also proceeded to take disciplinary action against the petitioner and served a charge-sheet upon him under Rule 16 of the Raj. C.C & A Rules 1965. 6. During the meanwhile a post of Additional Chief Wild Life Warden fell vacant in the Forest Deptt. The petitioner was allegedly eligible for promotion to that post. He was, how ever, denied promotion to that post on the ground that a disciplinary enquiry was pending against him. The petitioner challenged the Government action by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5368 in this Court at its principal seat at Jodhpur. After hearing the parties this Court passed a stay order to the effect that the-petitioner's case for promotion to the post of Additional Chief Wild Life Warden be considered ignoring the Departmental enquiry pending against him. The orders so passed by this Court, allegedly, put the Government machinery into action not for compliance of the orders of the Court but for pursuing the progress of the case registered against the petitioner in the year 1984 on the basis of F.I.R. No. 2 of 1984, aforementioned. The investigation was expedited and a police report u /Section 173 Cr.P.C. was ultimately filed on July 28, 1991 against the petitioner. The investigation was expedited and a police report u /Section 173 Cr.P.C. was ultimately filed on July 28, 1991 against the petitioner. On submission of the charge-sheet against him the petitioner received the suspension order on September 16, 1991 instead of the promotion order to the post of Additional Chief Wild Life Warden. 7. At this stage it would be worthwhile to refer to another integrated aspect of the case. It appears that somehow or other Respondent No. 2 Capt. Ghanshyam Singh entered into possession of the agricultural land of Khasra Nos. 17, 120 and 123 of 1 STV (Annopgarh) Tehsil Raisinghnagar, Distt. Sri. Ganganagar which the petitioner had surrendered in favour of Respondent No. 1, the State of Rajasthan in exchange of the land allotted to him in Khasra No.58 of village Madhosinghpur, Distt. Sawai Madhopur. Since the land so taken possession of by Respondent No. 2 situated in an area to which the provisions of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act 1954 (for short the Colonisation Act') applied, the Tehsildar (Colonisation) took steps for dispossessing him from the said land as per provisions of Sections 22 of the Colonisation Act. Respondent No. 2 was ordered to be dispossessed from the said land and was required to pay penalty also for his mis-adventure. Respondent No. 2 does not appear to have ever applied for regularisation of the land in his favour as per provisions of Sections 13 of the Colonisation Act, on the basis of the alleged agreement for sale in his favour but on coming into force of the amended provision of Section 13A of the said Act w.e.f. 4.8.83 he applied on 18.3.84 for regularisation of the land on the basis of the alleged agreement for sale expressing his willingness to pay the requisite compounded fee of Rs. 15000/per 25 Bighas of land. But the Deputy Commissioner (Colonisation) Indira Gandhi Canal Project, vide his order dated 29.8.85 passed in Case No.1166 of the 1984, disposed of the case in the following manner : 8. Having lost his case before the Deputy Commissioner (Colonisation) Respondent No. 2 invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 200 of 1986 at the principal seat at Jodhpur. The stand taken by Respondent No. 1, the State of Rajasthan, in the reply filed in the said Writ Petition on its behalf, is note-worthy. Averments made by Capt. The stand taken by Respondent No. 1, the State of Rajasthan, in the reply filed in the said Writ Petition on its behalf, is note-worthy. Averments made by Capt. Ghanshyam Singh (Respondent No. 2) in various paras of the Writ Petition filed by him were answered, inter alia, in the following manner: "2. That in reply to para 2 of the writ petition it is submitted that Respondent No. 5 never applied for transfer his land or interest in the land to the petitioner as envisaged by Section 13 of the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1954) The petitioner has now produced an agreement to sale alleged to have been executed by Respondent No. 5 in his favour on 27.12.79 which is of no consequence as the document has been prepared at a subsequent stage to circumvent the provisions of the Act of 1954. In the first place it is submitted that no such agreement to sale was executed by Respondent No. 5 in favour of the petitioner and in the second place assuming for a moment that such an agreement had been executed, i t does not create any right in favour of the petitioner in view of the provisions contained in Section 13 of the Act of 1954. Section 13 (2) provides that any transfer made in contravention of Sub-section (1) shall be void and if the transferee has obtained possession he should be rejected under the orders of the Collector. 3. That in reply to para No. 3 the writ petition it is submitted that the land in dispute earlier belonged to Respondent No.5 who applied with the State Government for exchange of his land with the request that the land in dispute may be taken over by the State Government and in exchange of this land he may be allotted some land at Sawai Madhopur. The State Government agreed to the request of Respondent No. 5 and allotted the land to the Respondent No. 5 at Sawai Madhopur in exchange the disputed land. The Respondent No. 5 thereafter handed over the possession of the land to Tehsildar Colonisation and the land was taken over by the State Government. The Respondent No. 5 was given the possession of the land at Sawai Madhopur in exchange of the disputed land. The Respondent No. 5 thereafter handed over the possession of the land to Tehsildar Colonisation and the land was taken over by the State Government. The Respondent No. 5 was given the possession of the land at Sawai Madhopur in exchange of the disputed land. It appears that the petitioner's father taking advantage of this situation entered into possession of the disputed land after it was taken over by the State Government and has created this document to sale at a belated stage. The document on the face of it does not appear to be genuine in the circumstances hereinafter referred to. (a) That the agreement to sale is alleged to have been executed in the year 1979. But no application was submitted before the Collector under Section 13 of the Act untill the land was actually surrendered by Respondent No.5 to the State Government. (b) At the time of execution of the agreement the petitioner was minor and any contract with the minor is void abinition under the provisions of the Contract Act. (c) The power of attorney alleged to have been executed by Respondent No. 5 is not registered in accordance with the provisions contained in the Registration Act and does not confer any power on the father of the petitioner to enter into any agreement to sale. (d) There was hardly any justification for the petitioner for not getting the registered sale deed executed in his favour uptill year 1983 when the Respondent No. 5 actually surrendered the property in favour of the State Government. The above circumstances clearly go to establish that the transaction is wholly sham, fictitious and this document An.1 has been created with a view to defeat the provisions of the Act of 1954 and to grab the property. The petitioner for the first time applied before the Dy. Commissioner Colonisation on 18.6.84 after the Respondent No.5 surrendered the possession of the disputed land and the same was taken over by the Tehsildar Colonisation. The application submitted by the petitioner was dealt with in accordance with law and the same was rejected vide order dated 29.8.85 after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Commissioner Colonisation on 18.6.84 after the Respondent No.5 surrendered the possession of the disputed land and the same was taken over by the Tehsildar Colonisation. The application submitted by the petitioner was dealt with in accordance with law and the same was rejected vide order dated 29.8.85 after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. As regards contention of the petitioner that the Secretary (Colonisation) granted permission to the Respondent No.5 to sell this land, it is submitted that Annexure 2 appears to be a fabricated document and does not find place in the record of the answering Respondents. Be that as it may, no sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioner and mere agreement to sale does not confer any right in favour of the petitioner. 6. That in reply to para 6 of the writ petition it is submitted that the proceedings were taken against the petitioner in accordance with Section 22 of the Act and from the record it was found that the petitioner entered into possession of the land in dispute after 5.6.1984. From the record it is clear that the land in dispute was surrendered by Sri. Fateh Singh Rathore, Respondent No.5, on 5.6.1984 and the document of handing over taking over was executed between the State and Respondent No.5 Thus the status of the petitioner is that of a tresspasser and he deserves to be dispossessed from the land in dispute. The possession of the petitioner cannot be taken to be lawful possession in view of Section 13 of the Act and the transfer if any cannot be validated under Section 13A of the Act once the property has already been surrendered by the owner in exchange of some other land. The owner after surrendering the land stands divested of his rights and the petitioner who claims derivative title in his favour, does not derive any title on the land in question." (Emphasis supplied) 9. Respondent No.1 took almost the same repetitive stand in all the 8 paragraphs and Para Nos A to 1 of the 'Reply to the grounds' of the reply filed by it in answer to the Writ petition filed by Respondent No.2 against it and its officers and also the petitioner. Reportedly the Writ Petition filed by Respondent No-2 is still pending disposal by this Court. Reportedly the Writ Petition filed by Respondent No-2 is still pending disposal by this Court. Due to the absence of the petitioner and his counsel during the hearing of this petition by me it could not be known as to what happened to the two writ petitions filed by the petitioner against Respondent No. 1, the State of Rajasthan. 10. It is in the context and back ground of the above narrated factual matrix that this Court has been required to consider and opine whether the criminal proceedings initiated on the basis of the First Information Report lodged by the Officers of Respondent No.] against the petitioner in the year 1984 for his having committed the offence of cheating punishable U/Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B IPC against the State amount to the abuse of the process of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur. The case had been notified for hearing on 19.7.96 but on that day neither the petitioner nor his Counsel appeared before the Court. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents were therefore, heard and the case was fixed for dictating the orders today with a view that if somebody appeared today for and on behalf of the petitioner he may also be heard before dictating the order. However, since no body appeared to-day for the petitioner had to proceed to dictate this order in his absence. 11. At the very outset I must record my appreciation of the services and assistance rendered to the Court by the learned Counsel for the Respondent for taking me through almost all the relevant record as available on the file of this Court as also that of the lower Court. 12. Raising a preliminary objection the learned Counsel for the Respondent urged that the impugned order whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance of certain offences against the petitioner was a revisable order against which no petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. was maintainable. 13. In the case of Neeraj Kumar & Ors. v. State of Rajashtan & Ors., (1996 (2) W.L.C.(Raj) 215) a Division Bench of this Court has taken he view that 'the order taking cognizance is an interlocutory order passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the accused. It can be varied or recalled as it is not a judgment and bar of Section 362 Cr. P.C. will not be attracted. It can be varied or recalled as it is not a judgment and bar of Section 362 Cr. P.C. will not be attracted. The issue of the process by the trial Court will not act as a bar for reconsideration of the cases of the petitioner by it for dropping the proceedings. 14. The view expressed by Arora, J in Neeraj Kumars case (supra) gets support from the view expressed by the Apex Court in the case K.M. Mathew v. The State of Kerala & Ors., (JT 199](4) 464=1 (1992) CCR316 (SC) wherein it was held that 'the order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled.' 15. In view of the above position of law on the point the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondent is overruled. 16. It was next urged by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that in examining the legality and validity of the order taking cognizance of certain offences against the petitioner this Court cannot look into the evidence which was placed before the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences and summoning the petitioner as an accused in the case. It was pointed out that the petitioner had filed the copy of the reply, filed for and on behalf of Respondent No. 1. The State of Rajasthan in the Writ petition No. 200 of 1986 by Respondent No. 2 against State of Rajasthan and Ors., along with the petition and thereafter further filed the copies of the application under Section 13-A of the Colonisation Act Presented by Respondent No. 2 before the Deputy Commissioner (Colonisation) and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Colonisation) on that application. It was submitted that those documents cannot be considered while examining the justification of the action of the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence in the present case and summoning the petitioner as an accused. This argument too is misconceived and deserves to be rejected. 17. Section 397 deals with the revisory powers of this Court and of the Sessions Judge. and lays down that in exercise of their powers under that provision the validity and legality of an order made by an inferior Court may examined by them. Section 482 Cr. P.C. on the other hand, deals with the inherent power of the High Court. Section 397 deals with the revisory powers of this Court and of the Sessions Judge. and lays down that in exercise of their powers under that provision the validity and legality of an order made by an inferior Court may examined by them. Section 482 Cr. P.C. on the other hand, deals with the inherent power of the High Court. The scope and ambit of Section 482 is distinctly different from the powers conferred under Section 397Cr. P.C. Whereas in exercise of the powers under Section 397 Cr. P.C. the High Court or the Sessions judge is required to examine the record of any proceedings before any inferior Criminal Court for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, Legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, Section 482 regulates the inherent powers of the High Court to pass such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Section starts with a non obstante clause excluding the operation of any restrictive provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, where an order passed by any Court brings about a situation which amounts to abuse of the process of the Court or perpetuates injustice, the interference by the High Court becomes necessary. In such a situation no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure can restrict the powers of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 18. Thus it is noticed that in principle, Sections 397 and 482 Cr. P.C. operate in different fields and are intended to serve different purpose and achieve different objectives. Section 397 confers jurisdiction upon the High Court and the Sessions Judge to examine the correctness, legality and validity of an order or sentence made or passed and proceedings taken by an inferior Court and such jurisdiction is defined and limited in Scope. P.C. operate in different fields and are intended to serve different purpose and achieve different objectives. Section 397 confers jurisdiction upon the High Court and the Sessions Judge to examine the correctness, legality and validity of an order or sentence made or passed and proceedings taken by an inferior Court and such jurisdiction is defined and limited in Scope. Therefore, the legality or validity of an order or sentence made or recorded and the proceedings taken by an inferior Court is required to be examined in the light of the material on the basis of which the inferior Court had made or recorded the impugned order or sentence or taken the impugned proceedings. Section 482, Cr.P.C. on the other hand does not confer any new jurisdiction upon High Court but reiterates its very jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process of law or Court and to secure the ends of justice, a jurisdiction which is very much inherent in it by virtue of its being the highest Court in the hierarchy of Courts in a State or States. In the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of the process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice the High Court has all the powers to look into such material which as though not there before a lower Court or authority at the time of passing a n order or initiating a criminal proceedings or lying foundation for initiation of such proceedings but which is, in the opinion of the High Court relevant to the issue before it and may help it to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In that respect the power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. in no way stands restricted or controlled by the material which was there before the lower Court or authority while making an impugned order or initiating or laying foundation for initiation of the Criminal proceedings. The order taking cognizance of the offence and summoning a person to answer the charge for that offence is made in the absence of that person. Such an order is made on the basis of the ex-parte evidence which is placed by the complainant before the Criminal Court. The order taking cognizance of the offence and summoning a person to answer the charge for that offence is made in the absence of that person. Such an order is made on the basis of the ex-parte evidence which is placed by the complainant before the Criminal Court. The person against whom cognizance of an offence is taken has no opportunity at that time to put up his case before the Court. On the basis of the ex-parte-evidence placed before the Court by the complainant the order of taking cognizance may be legally correct and valid. But if the person summoned has in his possession such evidence which may negate or destroy the worth of the ex-parte evidence produced by the complainant in his absence, the person concerned shall have a right and opportunity to put up such evidence before the Court so that the wheel of the criminal litigation may not take the avoidable lengthy round to his d is advantage. That is why the order of taking cognizance of the offence is considered to be an interim order liable to be revised, modified or cancelled by the Court passing that order before allowing the wheel of criminal prosecution to takes full round. That can also be done by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. thus the objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor is over-ruled. 19. Now coming to the merit of the case, it may he stated at the very outset that the powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are extraordinary to be very sparingly exercised in exceptionally rarest of rare cases. It is particularly so when a criminal prosecution is in its inception and the Court has to enquire into the guilt alleged to have been committed by a person. If the ex-parte evidence produced by the complainant justifies the commencement of enquiry trial against the alleged offender with regard to the Commission of the offence, them the normal course of the proceedings should not be interfered with higher Courts. If the ex-parte evidence produced by the complainant justifies the commencement of enquiry trial against the alleged offender with regard to the Commission of the offence, them the normal course of the proceedings should not be interfered with higher Courts. But if on consideration of the entire facts and circumstances attending on the commission of the alleged of fence this Court finds that the prosecution is false and frivolous commenced with the oblique motive of unnecessarily harassing the accused for no cogent and valid reasons and in fact no case for prosecuting the accused on the charge for the commission of the alleged offence is made out, then this Court should interfere in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice. The forum of criminal Courts cannot be allowed to be misused for harassment of such person who have committed no offence, otherwise it would bring the very system of criminal justice into disrepute. In this behalf the following observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai & Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 644 ) observed as under: "After all, as said earlier, the purpose of law is to prevent brooding sense of injustice. It is not the words of the law but the spirit and internal sense of it that makes the law meaningful. The letter of the law is the body but the sense and reason of the law is the soul. Therefore, pragmatic approach would further the ends of justice, and believe the male of female heir from hardship and prevent unfair advantage to each other. It would, therefore, be just and proper for the Court to adopt common sense approach keeping at the back of its mind, justice equity and good conscience and consider the facts and circumstances of the case on hand." 20. Judged in the light of the observations of their Lordships of the Apex Court the position in the instant case is made abundantly clear from the narration of the facts, made herein above, and which need no repetition. The sequence of events loudly speak that the prosecution of the petitioner was launched with the oblique motive of harassing him mainly for his repeatedly seeking assistance from this Court for the protection of his legal rights, and with absolutely no basis for launching such prosecution. The sequence of events loudly speak that the prosecution of the petitioner was launched with the oblique motive of harassing him mainly for his repeatedly seeking assistance from this Court for the protection of his legal rights, and with absolutely no basis for launching such prosecution. Undisputedly the petitioner was the recorded khatedar tenant of 49 Bighas 15 Biswas of Agricultural land situate at I.S.T.V. Tehsil Anoopgarh and was competent to surrender the same to the State Government in exchange of other land at Sawai Madhopur. Admittedly, he applied for such exchange and the authorities concerned conducted necessary enquiries with regard to his existing rights in land to be surrendered. It was after satisfaction with the result of the enquiries conducted by the concerned authorities that the State Government vide its letter No. F. 2 (355) Rev. 111 /81 dated December 6,1982 had allowed the exchange. The petitioner, vide his letter dated 14.12.82, had handed over all the relevant documents pertaining to the surrendered land of ISTV, Anoopgarh, which forwarded by Collector Sawai Madhopur to the State Government vide his letter of the even date. Necessary and relevant entries in revenue record were also made by the Revenue authorities at Sawai Madhopur. It is abundantly clear from the reply filed for and on behalf of the State Government in the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 2 that the present petitioner had handed over the possession of the land at ISTV Anoopgarh to Tehsildar Colonisation and the land was taken over by the State Government. Despite such a clear case put forth by the State Government before this Court the necessity for prosecuting the petitioner on the basis of his allegedly executing a power of attorney in favour of his cousin, Sri Prabhu Singh and the said power of attorney holder executing an agreement for sale in favour of his minor son, Respondent No. 2 as back as in 1979, was felt after the lapse of about one year of the delivery of possession of the land at I STV Anoopgarh, to the Tehsildar Colonisation. Those were the documents whose genuineness was not only seriously doubted by Respondent No. 1 itself but was also positively negatived by the Deputy Commissioner Colonisation after hearing Respondent No. 2 And what was the basis for assuming that the petitioner had not delivered the possession of the land at ISTV Anoopgarh ? Those were the documents whose genuineness was not only seriously doubted by Respondent No. 1 itself but was also positively negatived by the Deputy Commissioner Colonisation after hearing Respondent No. 2 And what was the basis for assuming that the petitioner had not delivered the possession of the land at ISTV Anoopgarh ? it was only a vague report dated 22.9.1993 from Deputy Director Colonisation, Bikaner that no entry was passed with regard to the delivery of possession of the land in exchange in the relevant record. It was due to the inaction and dereliction from their duties by the Officers of the Respondent No.1 which as made the basis for launching the prosecution in 1984 which was kept pending like a sword of Democles on the head of the petitioner for 7 long years only to dissuade him from asserting his legal rights regarding property and position before a Court of law and which culminated into submission of a policy report in 1991 when the petitioner persisted in repeatedly knocking at the doors of this Court. The conduct and behaviour of the officers of Respondent No. 1 in the context of the sequence of events in this case pricks the conscience of this Court making it sad for the scant regard given by the machinery of the State to the legal rights of a citizen his efforts to seek the protection of law, and in substance, to the rule of law itself, Better it is on the part of this Court to leave the matter with no further comments. 21. To sum up, l hold that the proceedings pending in the Court of Magistrate in this case against the petitioner in the opinion of this Court, amount to abuse of the process of the said Court and therefore, in order to prevent such abuse of the process of that Court and to secure the ends of justice it is necessary to quash such proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C.Ordered accordingly.Petition allowed. *******