Research › Browse › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1996 DIGILAW 764 (MP)

Mehtab Singh v. Manju

1996-08-27

S.C.PANDEY

body1996
ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This revision is directed by against an order, dated 3.8.95, passed by Civil Judge, Class-II, Patan in C.S. No. 20-A/95, whereby the trial court has rejected the objection raised by the petitioner defendant under Order 7 Rule 10 of C.P.C. on the ground that the suit is under valued and is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. 2. The respondent No. 1 filed a suit against the petitioner and respondents No. 2 and 3 for declaration and injunction. The respondent No. 1 in her suit claimed that she had share in Khasra No. 53/5 area 1.60 acre, situate in village Gwari, Tehsil Patan, District Jabalpur, the disputed land was Khasra No. 53/5, 0.80 acre of land. The claim of the respondent No. 1 was that she was an owner of the suit land and was in possession of 0.80 acre of land out of 1.60 acre of land, Khasra No. 53/5. It was alleged by the respondent No. 1 that Smt. Janki Bai, respondent No. 2, was recorded as the guardian of the respondent No. 1, but she had no right or title over the suit land. It was further alleged by her that the aforesaid guardian by a registered sale-deed, dated 22.9.94, has sold the land to the petitioner. It was stated in the plaint that the sale-deed, dated 22.9.94, was totally void because the respondent No. 2 had no right or title to transfer the suit land to the petitioner. It was also stated in the plaint that no permission was obtained by the respondent No. 2 for selling that property from the competent authority and, therefore, also the sale-deed is null and void. It was claimed by the respondent No. 1 that she was in actual physical possession of the suit land, but the petitioner wanted to dispossess her forcibly and, therefore, she filed a suit for declaration of her title and permanent injunction restraining the petitioner and respondent No. 2 from interfering with her possession. The respondent No. 3 State was merely a proforma party. She claimed that she valued the suit for the purpose of declaration at Rs. 300/- and for permanent injunction at Rs. 300/-. 3. The trial Court rejected the objection of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent No. 1 was required to value her suit at Rs. The respondent No. 3 State was merely a proforma party. She claimed that she valued the suit for the purpose of declaration at Rs. 300/- and for permanent injunction at Rs. 300/-. 3. The trial Court rejected the objection of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent No. 1 was required to value her suit at Rs. 48,000/- which was the value of the sale-deed, executed by respondent No. 2 in favour of the petitioner. The trial Court has held that it is not necessary for respondent No. 1 to get the sale deed set aside by the decree of the Court for the reason that she has alleged in para-8 of the plaint that she had become major and after death of her husband, she became the owner of the land and the sale-deed was got executed by fraud by respondent No. 2. It appears that the Trial Court has held that the reliefs of declaration and injunction claimed by the respondent No. 1, are two independent reliefs. The relief of injunction is not consequential to the relief of declaration. Therefore, the suit is not governed by, Clause 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. According to the trial Court, so far as declaration is concerned, the respondent No. 1 was bound to pay fixed Court fee of Rs. 30/- under Section 17 (3) of Schedule - II of the Court Fees Act. The trial Court also held that so far as declaration is concerned, Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is not applied for the purpose of declaration and, therefore the respondent No. 1 need not value the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction u/s 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The respondent No. 1 was free to value the relief of injunction and she had valued the relief of injunction, at Rs. 300/-. However, the trial Court has found that the suit land was agricultural land assessed to land revenue at Rs. 2/- per acre. The trial Court also found that the total land assessed to land revenue was about two acres and, therefore, the maximum valuation would be twenty times the land revenue payable on two acres of land for the purpose of Court fees and also for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction. The Trial Court, however, has not stand in its order how it came to the conclusion that Rs. The Trial Court, however, has not stand in its order how it came to the conclusion that Rs. 80 would be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction in a suit for permanent injunction. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the respondent No. 1 was bound by the sale-deed, dated 22.9.94 unless she got it set aside. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, u/s 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, a minor is bound by a sale-deed executed by his/her guardian. It was argued that as per section 3 (2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, transfer made by a natural guardian has to be set aside by a minor because such a transfer is only voidable and not void. The immovable property of the minor can be said by the natural guardian with the permission of the Court. Even if no permission is obtained by the guardian then also the sale-deed or any other transfer dead cannot be held to be void unless the minor tiles a suit for declaration that such a transfer is void. The sale-deed, therefore, is good and valid until it is set aside. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the allegations made in the plaint show that the transfer was made during the minority of the respondent No. 1. Therefore she was bound to get the sale-deed set aside. In her claim for relief for declaration, there is an implicit prayer for setting aside the sale-deed and, therefore, she must pay ad valorem Court fees on Rs. 48,000/- which was the consideration in the sale-deed, dated 22.9.94. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, said that the allegation in the plaint shows that the respondent No. 1 had come to the Court not for setting aside a sale-deed, but for only claiming declaration that the sale-deed is void. In fact, her suit was governed by a declaratory relief and for permanent injunction u/s 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. No relief of setting aside the sale-deed was involved in this case. 5. It is well established that in order to determine the question of payment of Court Fees and jurisdiction, it is necessary to study the plaint. The court is not to be guided by the relief clause in the plaint. No relief of setting aside the sale-deed was involved in this case. 5. It is well established that in order to determine the question of payment of Court Fees and jurisdiction, it is necessary to study the plaint. The court is not to be guided by the relief clause in the plaint. Accordingly, the plaint was examined by this Court very carefully. We find from para-3 of the plaint that the respondent No. 1 has alleged that she has become major at the time of filing of the suit. In para-8 of the plaint it is specifically alleged that she inherited the property after the death of her husband. Thereafter, she became major and came into the possession of the suit property and since then she was in the possession of the suit land. For this reason, the respondent No. 2 played fraud upon her and sold the suit land to the petitioner. It was also alleged that the respondent No. 2 had no right to sell the suit land. It is true that in para-5 she has also alleged that respondent No. 2 had no right to sell the Land without the permission of the competent authority, but that pleading is only by the way. The real pleading is that after she was placed in possession when she had already attained majority, the respondent No. 2 sold the suit land to the petitioner. It is thus clear that on these allegations, it is not necessary for the respondent No. 1 to get the sale-deed set aside as she is not party to it. 6. If we examine the suit further, we find that the relief of permanent injunction directly and essentially flows from the relief of declaration. She is claiming that she is already in possession of the suit property and the petitioner is interfering with her rights on the basis of & sale-deed. Therefore, the suit framed and filed by the respondent No. 1 is governed by section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. The relief of permanent injunction cannot be separated from the relief of declaration. Therefore, the trial Court wrongly held that both reliefs are independent of each other. Therefore, the suit framed and filed by the respondent No. 1 is governed by section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. The relief of permanent injunction cannot be separated from the relief of declaration. Therefore, the trial Court wrongly held that both reliefs are independent of each other. However, it does not matter whether a relief is for injunction simplicitor or whether a relief of injunction is consequential to the relief of declaration for the simple reason in both the cases, the plaint is bound to value the relief of permanent injunction according to value of the relief, claimed by him. In both the cases, the relief of injunction would have to be valued by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, necessary to reproduce Section 7 (iv) (c) and 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act in order to determine the valuation for the purpose of Court Fees. They are being reproduced as fallows : (iv) In Suits- * * * * * * * * * * (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, (d) to obtain an injunction, * * * * * according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal with a minimum fee of twenty rupees. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. It may be readily seen that in both the cases, relief of permanent injunction has to be valued and it is provided in section 7 (iv) that the valuation should be according to the amount at which the relief is sought and the plaintiff is entitled to put his valuation. This clause is applicable in both the cases Section 7 (iv) (c) as well as 7 (iv) (d), that is to say, whether the suit is for declaration and injunction or injunction simplicitor. 7. We have already held in this particular case that the suit is governed by section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. Therefore, we must find how respondent No. 1 should value the relief of permanent injunction. It is also well established that since the plaintiff is given opportunity to value the relief, she can put a reasonable valued to the relief claimed by her and pay ad valorem Court Fees on that. Therefore, we must find how respondent No. 1 should value the relief of permanent injunction. It is also well established that since the plaintiff is given opportunity to value the relief, she can put a reasonable valued to the relief claimed by her and pay ad valorem Court Fees on that. The Court cannot interfere with the valuation put by the plaintiff unless it finds it totally arbitrary or unresonable. In this particular case, the respondent No. 1 wrongly valued the relief of declaration at Rs. 300/- because it was not necessary for her to value it. She has also valued the relief of injunction at Rs. 300/- and paid court fees on Rs. 600/-. A Division Bench of this Court relying on a Full Bench case has laid down in Badrilal Bholaram v. State of M.P. and another 1963 M.P.L.J. 717 that normally where the plaintiff claims a relief of injunction and he is required to put his value on that, he must value it according to the value of the property for the reason this is the value of the relief to him. It has been held that where the property to involved in the suit has a real money value then that value should be put by the plaintiff. If it is not done so then the Court may hold it to be arbitrary or unreasonable and interfere with the valuation put upon it by the plaintiff. But there are exceptions to this rule and the Division Bench has also noticed this aspect of the matter. The Division Bench has pointed out that in certain cases, this rule may not apply, for the reason, the value of the relief sought may not be the same as the thing affected. In such a case, the plaintiff may not be required to value the relief in accordance with the value of thing affected. The plaintiff may then, in such a case, put his own value to the relief and if the Court does not find it arbitrary or unreasonable, the Court may not interfere with the valuation put upon it by the plaintiff. The plaintiff may then, in such a case, put his own value to the relief and if the Court does not find it arbitrary or unreasonable, the Court may not interfere with the valuation put upon it by the plaintiff. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court comes to the conclusion that in this particular case, the respondent No. 1 need not value the consequential relief of permanent injunction in accordance with the value given in the sale-deed for the simple reason she has not been dispossessed as per her version in the plaint. She is claiming permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with her possession, who claims it on the basis of a sale-deed, which according to her is totally void as she was not party to it. In such a case, the value of relief can not be the value of the thing affected and, therefore, the valuation put by the respondent No. 1 at Rs. 300/- cannot be said to be arbitrary. For this reason, the Court would not interfere with her valuation. 8. It is made clear that the Court is bound to examine in each and every case the allegation made in the plaint in order to find out as far as possible whether the valuation put upon by the plaintiffs is arbitrary or not. In certain cases, the relief of injunction would involve valuation in accordance with the thing affected, that is to say, the subject matter of the suit. The market value of the thing affected would determine the valuation to be put by the plaintiff u/s 7 (iv) (c) or 7 (iv) (d) of the Court Fees Act. Only in these cases where it is not possible to value the relief in accordance with the thing affected, the plaintiff may put an artificial value to the relief claimed by him. In this case, it is made clear that the court has accepted the artificial value to the relief claimed by him. For the reason, it is not necessary to value the relief claimed by the plaintiff otherwise. 9. For the reasons aforesaid, this revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee at Rs. 100/-.