Judgment D.P.Wadhwa and M.Y.Eqbal JJ. 1. In this writ application, the petitioner seeks indulgence of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of appropriate writ commanding upon the respondents to release in favour of petitioner 15% of the contract value together with interest against the schematic lay out and General Arrangement Drawings and the Plan which was approved by the respondents vide Memo No. 1410 dated 24th July 1990. 2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. Respondent No. Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation Limited being an Instrumentally of the State Government engaged in the Mining and Development of the Mineral Resources in the State of Bihar, on or about 24th July 1987 advertised for taking up two Projects, namely, Graphite Benefication and Magnetite Grinding Benefication. A copy of the tender notice is Annexure-1 to the writ application. Pursuant to that tender notice, the respondent No. 3 Bihar State Small Industries Corporation Ltd., besides others, submitted a tender to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and after pre-qualification selection and due negotiations, held on 7th December 1988, order was passed by the respondent No. 1 in favour of respondent No. 2 for setting up Graphite Projects at the work value of Rs. 1.77 crores on Truth Key basis as per the setting of the Magnetite Grinding and Benefication Projects at Rs. 2.49 crores on turn key basis vide letter dated 23rd December 1988. After issue of work order, an agreement was also entered into by and between respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and according to the petitioner, as per Clause 7.02 of the agreement, 15% amount was to be paid against the approval of schematic layout and G.A. Drawings. The petitioners case was that as respondent No. 3 procured the aforesaid orders for setting up the aforesaid two Projects, it had decided to get the same executed by the petitioner who is a Small Scale Industrial Unit. The petitioner said to have engaged in fabrication, civil works and turn key jobs approached the respondent No. 3 for the allotment of the said work for being executed by the petitioner themselves. Accordingly, the petitioner was assigned by the respondent No. 3 to complete the aforesaid two Projects under the Marketing assistances scheme by issue of letter No. 396/89 dated 11th January 1989 for the purpose of Magnetite Grinding Benefication. Accordingly, the petitioner was assigned by the respondent No. 3 to complete the aforesaid two Projects under the Marketing assistances scheme by issue of letter No. 396/89 dated 11th January 1989 for the purpose of Magnetite Grinding Benefication. A copy of the said letter is Annexure-3 to the writ application. The petitioner alleged to have incurred a huge expense in procurement of the lay out, G.A. and know how from their consultantants which was also approved by the respondent No. 1. The petitioner then submitted the provisions for Magnetite Projects to the respondent No. 3 in terms of their letter No. 280 dated 7th April 1990, forwarded the said drawings to the Respondent No. 2 for according approval of the said drawing after obtaining it and verification from the Bihar Industrial Technology and Consultants Ltd., Patna, a copy whereof is Annexure-4 to the writ application. Petitioners further case was that drawings submitted by the petitioner was approved by the consultant of respondent No. 1 Bihar Industrial and Technical Consultancy Organisation Ltd., Patna and communicated the same vice their letter dated 24th July 1990. The petitioner said to have submitted the bills against the approved drawings to Respondent No. 3 and the respondent No. 3, in turn, submitted bill to the respondent No. 2 on 26th July 1990 for a sum of Rs. 37.35 lacs. The said bill was against 15% of the total contract value of Magnetite Projects. The petitioner thereafter sent reminder against the non-payment and release of the aforesaid amount of 15% as per the agreement but the respondent Nos., 1 and 2 did not resound to any letter. A copy of the reminder dated 13th April, 1993 has been filed and marked as Annexure-7 to the writ application. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid drawings was already approved and the petitioner being and agent of the respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 3 having forwarded the bill to the respondent No. 1 for payment, there was no dispute, so far approval and finality of the drawings submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, seeks appropriate direction by this Court against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for payment of aforementioned amount to the petitioner together with interest which is payable under the Ordinance No. 15 of 1992. The petitioner, therefore, seeks appropriate direction by this Court against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for payment of aforementioned amount to the petitioner together with interest which is payable under the Ordinance No. 15 of 1992. Petitioners further case was that the respondents have acted arbitrarily in withholding the payment of 15% of the total value of the contract and the petitioner already pursuant to the agreement submitted the Plan which was approved. 3. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by filing their counter affidavit denied the claim of the petitioner by stating that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present writ application against these respondents, as there was no contract between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the petitioner is a stranger, so far the contract referred to in the writ application. It was further stated that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 never agreed to pay anything to the petitioner and, as such, the question of payment of any amount does not arise. The respondents further denied that any order was passed by respondent No. 1 in favour of respondent No. 3 for setting up Graphics Projects at the work value of Rs. 1.77 crores on turn key basis. The letter dated 23rd December, 1988 (Annexure-2) was a letter which was only an offer for acceptance within 15 days from the receipt of the letter. It was further stated in the counter affidavit that in the agreement entered into between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 3, there was an arbitration clause and, as such, the instant writ application was not maintainable. The respondents further denied their liability to pay 15% for approval of the Schematic lay out and general arrangements. It was stated that till now, no place was even selected where such construction has to be made and no work, order was ever issued to respondent No. 3 rather respondent No. 3 has withdrawn Rs. 17.70 lakhs without doing any work and the said respondent is liable to refund the amount received by it with interest @ 18% per annum. Last but not least, it was stated in the counter affidavit that the respondent No. 3 even if had decided to get the work done by the petitioner, these respondents are not bound by the same. These respondents had no knowledge with regard to the work being done by the petitioner. Last but not least, it was stated in the counter affidavit that the respondent No. 3 even if had decided to get the work done by the petitioner, these respondents are not bound by the same. These respondents had no knowledge with regard to the work being done by the petitioner. It was further stated that respondent No. 3 had no power to sublet the work to any other person or firm which action of the petitioner was illegal and without jurisdiction and was not binding on these respondents. 4. Mr. Dayal learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner on the basis of statements made in the writ application and the letters annexed there with submitted that it is a fit case where respondents should be directed by issuance of appropriate writ for payment of 15% of the total value as per the bills submitted by the petitioner to the respondent No. 3. The learned Counsel gave much stress on theory of legitimate expectation and submitted that the respondents being the instrumentality of the State are supposed to act fairly and reasonably and they are bound to make payment of the amount on the approval of the lay out Plan submitted by the petitioner. Learned Counsel relied upon the decisions in Union of India and Ors. V/s. Hindustan Development Corporation and Ors. -- , Sterling Computers Ltd. V/s. MN. Publications Ltd and Ors. (1993) (2) PLJR 12 and Dumraon Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. -- 5. On the other hand, Mr. Mehta appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 firstly submitted that the disputed question of facts is involved in this writ application which cannot be gone into under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel submitted that in view of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement entered into between respondent Nos. 1 and 3, no relief can be granted in writ jurisdiction. The learned Counsel lastly submitted that since the claim arose out of an ordinary contract, the remedy available to the petitioner is before an appropriate forum and not before this Court. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel relied upon the decisions in Radha Krishna Agrawal and Ors. V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. -- , Panchan Singh V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel relied upon the decisions in Radha Krishna Agrawal and Ors. V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. -- , Panchan Singh V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. 1991 (1) PLJR 352 and Binod Kumar Srivastava V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. 1992 (2) PLJR 229. 6. The short question which falls for consideration before us is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case a writ of mandamus can be issued under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India directing the respondents to make payment of bills to the petitioner who is a contractor? In this regard two important facts have not been disputed by the petitioner. Firstly there was no agreement or previty of contract between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 Secondly, the contract, if any by and between the respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 3 was neither executed by the respondents in exercise ofstatutory powers under certain Act or Rules framed thereunder nor the agreement was a sort of contract within the meaning of Article 229 of the Constitution. In the light of the above admitted facts, the answer to the question involved in this writ application shall be negative. 7. In Radha Krishna Agrawal (Supra), the Supreme Court discussed this question in detail and upheld the earlier judgment of this Court holding that in such type of cases, power under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be invoked. The Apex Court held as under:- In the case before us that contracts do not contain any statutory terms or obligations and no statutory power de obligation which could attract the application of Article 14 of the Constitution is involved here. Even the cases where the question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before an entry into the filed of contract, acted have to be investigated and found before the question of violation of Article 14 could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such proceedings are summary proceedings reserved for extra-ordinary cases where the exceptional and what are described as perhaps not quite accurately prerogative powers of the Court are invoked. We are certain that the cases before us are not such in which powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. 8. In M/s. Panchan Singh (supra), a Full Bentjh of this Court noticed the decision in M/s. Radha Krishna Agrawals case (supra) and later decisions of the Supreme Court and held that in spite of the later judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court, the law laid down in M/s. Radha Krishna Agrawals case holds the field. The said view was reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Binod Kumar Srivastava (supra). 9. Besides the above, from the pleading of the parties and the stands taken by the respondents in the counter affidavit, it is apparent that serious disputed question of facts is involved and in that circumstances, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be warranted. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, referred to hereinabove. We further hold that no relief could be granted to the petitioner in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. Mr. Dayal tried to impress us by submitting that even if there was no contract or agreement under which respondent No. 1 could be compelled to make payment of the alleged bills to the petitioner but the respondents being the insturmentalities of the State are bound to pay the amount to the petitioner under the theory of legitimate expectation. 11. We do not find any substance in the submission of the learned Counsel. In Union of India V/s. Hindustan Development Corporation, -- upon which Mr. Dayal learned Counsel put heavy reliance, the Supreme Court has discussed the theory of legitimate expectation at length. 11. We do not find any substance in the submission of the learned Counsel. In Union of India V/s. Hindustan Development Corporation, -- upon which Mr. Dayal learned Counsel put heavy reliance, the Supreme Court has discussed the theory of legitimate expectation at length. A passage of the same, which is relevant for the instant case is quoted herein below:- On examination of some of these important decisions it is generally agreed that legitimate expectation gives the applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is to be confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as to crystalized right as such is invoked. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words where a persons legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. Therefore even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person, It simply ensures the circumstances in which that expectation may be denied or restricted. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits. But as discussed above, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same, several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is, a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question of fact. If it is, a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation in made out then the next question would be whether failure to give an opportunity of heading before the decision affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so, then what should be the relief is again a matter which depends on several factors. In F.C. I. V/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, -- the Apex Court, while considering the application of theory of legitimate expectation, has observed as under:- The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness a necessary concomitant of rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due considering in a fair decision-making process whether the expectation of the claming is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arise, it is to be determined not according to claimants perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may out weight what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operators in our legal system in this manner and this extent. 12 We are of the firm view that the decisions of the Supreme Court (supra) do not in any way help the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case and no relief could be granted by applying the theory of legitimate expectation. 13. 12 We are of the firm view that the decisions of the Supreme Court (supra) do not in any way help the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case and no relief could be granted by applying the theory of legitimate expectation. 13. Be that as it may, as we have noticed above, the parties have not disputed that in the agreement entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3, there is an arbitration clause which provides the adjudication of dispute through arbitration. In that view of the matter, no relief could be granted to the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of claim arising out of an agreement having arbitration clause. Reference may be made to the decisions in Eqbal Singh V/s. Guards Singh -- and Smt. Rukmanibai Gupta V/s. The Collecotor, Jabalpur and Ors. -- 14. For the reasons stated avove, this writ application has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.