This application in revision under section 115 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order passed by the learned Munsiff, Imphal on 21.4.92 in Misc Case No.32 of 1992 arising out of OS No.9 of 1992 whereby the learned Munsiff rejected the plaint of the petitioner. 2. Shri H. Dwijamani Dev Sharma, the petitioner herein filed two suits as plaintiff being OS No.9 of 1992 and OS No. 10 of 1992 in the Court of the learned Munsiff, Imphal, Manipur for recovery of possession of the suit land described in the Schedule to the plaint after evicting the defendant who are his sons. The plaintiffs case is that he is the absolute owner of the suit land described to the Schedule to the plaint together with other lands. To facilitate construction of separate houses for his sons, the plaintiff sometime in the year, 1962 earmarked the portion of his patta land into plots to be given to his son on some future date and also to the Hindu deity, Sri Balmukundo Dev worshiped by him as 'Savait'. The plaintiff also caused entry of the names of the said deity and his sons in the relevants revenue records, but without any valid legal documents. The plaintiff made the arrangements for demarcation of the plots with the sole object of facilitating the construction of separate houses for his sons inside their respective portions earmarked for them and not beyond that. But after sometime of earmarking the portion to be distributed to his sons, the plaintiff became very much annoyed with the activities of his sons, the defendants in the two suits, who made a public declaration in the issue of a local daily, namely, 'Manipur Mail' dated 12.11.86 saying that plaintiffs rights, title and interest in the property were extinguished. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the present two suits. 3. Both the sons resisted the suits by filing two applications under section 4 & of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. On the basis of this preliminary objection, the learned Munsiff registered 2 (two) miscellaneous cases, namely, Judicial Misc Case No.29 of 1992 arising out of OS No. 10 of 1992. The learned Munsiff disposed of both the misc cases by a common order dated 21.4.92. On the basis of this preliminary objection, the learned Munsiff registered 2 (two) miscellaneous cases, namely, Judicial Misc Case No.29 of 1992 arising out of OS No. 10 of 1992. The learned Munsiff disposed of both the misc cases by a common order dated 21.4.92. The learned Munsiff held that the suits were barred by section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and with this finding the learned Munsiff allowed both the miscellaneous cases and rejected the original suits of the plaintiff. 4. Having felt aggrieved by the order of the learned Munsiff rejecting both the civil suits, the plaintiff preferred two revision application before this Court which have been numbered as Civil Revision Nos. 10 and 11 of 1992. 5. The petitioner appeared before the Court personally and argued that the learned Munsiff has committed an error in holding that the present case is a case under Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The petitioner, further, submitted that the 'title deed' stands in the name of petitioner and therefore the petitioner is the. rightful owner of the suit land. The petitioner, further, submitted that the records of rights were altered keeping in view that the subsequent transfer deed may be executed without any difficulty. The petitioner, further, submitted that the records of rights is not an evidence of title and therefore the learned Munsiff should not have given any weights on such documents. The petitioner, therefore, submits that since the learned Munsiff has committed an error in rejecting the plaint, the same is required to be quashed. 6. On my request Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned Senior Advocate argued the case of the petitioner on legal points. 7. Mr. HNK Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has, at the very outset, submitted that this revision petitions are not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to Mr. HNK Singh the phraseology, 'decree' as defined under section 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code, will include the rejection of plaint and the learned Munsiff having rejected the plaint Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, this order of rejection is a decree. Hence, the petitioner has got remedy only on an appeal and no revision shall lie against the aforesaid order of the learned Munsiff. 8. Hence, the petitioner has got remedy only on an appeal and no revision shall lie against the aforesaid order of the learned Munsiff. 8. The question involved in this revision petition is whether the order dated 21.4.92 passed by learned Munsiff is a decree and if so whether the present revision application is maintainable. 9. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court under the powers vested in it in section 115 of the CPC can always correct the errors committed by the trial Court as, according to him, in passing the impugned order, the learned Munsiff not only committed jurisdictional error but she has also passed the order with material irregularity. The learned senior counsel laid emphasis to the expression, 'no appeal lies thereto' and contended that since no appeal will lie to the High Court against the impugned order, there is no bar for this Court to entertain the revision petition under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Nilamani Singh placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Smti Bidyabati vs. Debi Das reported in AIR 1977 SC 397 . In para 7 of the Bidyabati case, the Apex Court held : "7. When the hearing of the appeal commenced a contention of a preliminary nature was advanced on behalf of the respondent and it was that since the order of the learned Sub Judge impugned in revision before the High Court was an order allowing the review application, it was appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1, clause (w) of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence no revision was competent to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the High Court was right in rejecting the revision application. Now, there can be no doubt that under section 1 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure a revision application can lie before the High Court from an order made by a subordinate Court only if no appeal lies from that order to the High Court. Now, there can be no doubt that under section 1 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure a revision application can lie before the High Court from an order made by a subordinate Court only if no appeal lies from that order to the High Court. The words of limitation used in section 115 are "in which no appeal lies therefo" and these words clearly mean that no appeal must lie the High Court from the order sought to be revised; because an appeal is a much larger remedy than a revision application and if an appeal lies, that would afford sufficient relief and there would be no reason or justification for invoking the revisional jurisdiction. The question, therefore, here is whether an appeal against the order made by the learned Sub Judge allowing the review application lay to the High Court, if it did, the revision application would be clearly incompetent. Now Order XLIII, Rule 1; clause (w) undoubtedly provides an appeal against an order allowing a review application, but the order allowing the review application in the present case was made by the learned Sub Judge, and hence an appeal against it lay to the District Court and not to the High Court, and, obviously, since no appeal lay against the order of the learned Sub Judge to the High Court, the revision application could not be rejected as incompetent. The preliminary contention must, in the circumstances, be decided against the respondent." 10. Having regard to the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, Mr. A. Nilamani Singh submitted that since no appeal lies against the order of the learned Munsiff before the High Court, therefore, there is no bar for this Court to entertain the revision application. 11. Secondly, Mr. A. Nilamani Singh submitted that all orders rejecting a plaint cannot be treated as an order passed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC so as to make the order a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the CPC. In the instant case, the respondents as defendant filed the preliminary objection against the maintainability of suit in view of the provisions of section 4 of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, further submitted that the plaintiff has instituted the suit claiming his right as a lawful owner in pursuance of the registered patta. In the instant case, the respondents as defendant filed the preliminary objection against the maintainability of suit in view of the provisions of section 4 of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, further submitted that the plaintiff has instituted the suit claiming his right as a lawful owner in pursuance of the registered patta. The learned counsel, further, submits that even if some records of rights are prepared in the name of the defendants that cannot create a title in favour of the defendants. Because records of rights is not an evidence of title and it may have a presumptive value only and it can at best be an evidence of possession. The learned counsel, therefore argued that the learned Munsiff was not authorised to reject the plaint as on a reading of the plaint it will not appear that the plaintiff has claimed his title as Benamdar and therefore the order passed by the learned Munsiff rejecting the plaint is an illegality and without jurisdiction. Consequently such an order cannot be treated as a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of the CPC. Consequently a revision will lie against such order of the learned Munsiff. 12. I cannot agree with the first submission of Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, Senior Advocate arguing on behalf of the petitioner, because in a later case reported in AIR 1986 Madhya Pradesh 140 (Lala Lal Singh v. Seth Sohagchar) the decision of the case reported in AIR 1977 SC 379 has been discussed. In that case the learned Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court held that if the provisions of section 115 sub-section (1) and (2) are tested with the principle of interpretation on statute the true position which emerges but is that sub-section (2) of Section 115 prevails upon sub-section (1) of that Section and the words, ''no case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto" as interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (Smti Bidyabati case AIR 1977 SC 397 ) are of no help in view of the l976 Amendment (sub-section (2) of section 115) which was not the subject matter for consideration before the Supreme Court in Smti Bidyabati case (supra) as there was no occasion for it. So, on a plain reading of the case law reported in AIR 1986 Madhya Pradesh 140, it is clear that the decision given by the Apex Court in Bidyabati case has been swept away by section 115(2) of the CPC introduced by 1976 Amendment of the CPC. Secondly, if an appeal lies to the High Court directly or indirectly that is either by first appeal or second appeal then a revision application is not tenable in High Court. In the present case, the learned Munsiff rejected the plaint of the plaintiff and if such order is a decree then first appeal will lie in the District Court and second appeal can be filed in the High Court. 13. Mr. HNK Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that the learned Munsiff passed the order under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and therefore the order shall be deemed to be a decree under section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and consequently an appeal will lie against such a decree in the Court of District Judge. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that since an appeal lies indirectly to the High Court against the order passed by the learned Munsiff, the present revision application is not maintainable and it is required to be quashed. 14. It is now to be considered whether the order passed by the learned Munsiff on 21.3.92 rejecting the suit is a decree. In order to become a deemed decree as contemplated in section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order passed by the trial Court must fall within any of the clauses from (a) to (d) of Order VII Rule 11, because all order passed by the trial Court rejecting the plaint or suit may not be deemed to be a decree and if an order is not deemed as a decree, no appeal shall lie against such order. 15. The second contention of Mr. A. Nilamani is that Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC being qualified it has to be examined whether the order passed by the learned Munsiff rejecting the plaint falls under any of the four clauses. 16. From the order passed by the learned Munsiff, it appears that the order has been passed under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. From the order passed by the learned Munsiff, it appears that the order has been passed under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order VII Rule 11 (d) provides as follows : “(d) Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.” 17. In the instant case it is an admitted fact that the defendant who is the respondent here did not file any written statement. He simply filed an application under section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh senior counsel therefore, contended that before an order can amount to be a deemed decree due to rejection of the plaint then in such case the rejection must be authorised by some provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, Mr. A. Nilamani Singh submitted that if the plaint is rejected for a cause for which the Court is not empowered to do so, it would not be a decree even though the Court may use the words, 'rejected' in disposing of the suit. There is sufficient force in the submission of Mr. A. Nilamani Singh. Order VII Rule 11 (d) is attracted only when admitted facts, as appearing from the plaint itself, the suit is prima facie, not maintainable. To attract Rule 11 (d) no investigation into fact is necessary. If the 'law' by which exclusion of civil Court's jurisdiction is contemplated, on its fact, manifest the requirement of investigation into any fact then there will be no scope for passing order of rejection of plaint. In the present case, the plaintiff petitioner filed the suit claiming the ownership over the suit land on the basis of a registered instrument in his favour. The ownership of the suit land has not been transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant by any registered instrument. Although records of right has been prepared in the name of the defendant that cannot create any title in favour of the defendants without the suit land being transferred in their name by a registered instrument as contemplated by Transfer of Property Act and Indian Registration Act. The learned Munsiff decided the issue on the basis of an application filed by the respondent/defendant under section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The learned Munsiff decided the issue on the basis of an application filed by the respondent/defendant under section 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The learned Munsiff could have treated this objection as a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the suit and she could have decided the issue after taking evidence of the parties. For deciding such a issue a judicial determination is necessary. But to attract Rule 11 (d) no investigation into fact is necessary. In the instant case the learned Munsiff investigated the case before passing the order and the learned Munsiff considered some documents which have not been converted into evidence. The object of provisions of Rule 11 (d) is that on a plain reading of the plaint it must appear to the trial Court that the suit is barred by any law. On a plain reading of the plaint it does not appear that the suit is barred by any law and therefore the order of the learned Munsiff cannot be treated as an order passed under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to attract the order to be a deemed decree under section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The present order has been passed by the learned Munsiff after making judicial determination on the basis of the objection filed by the respondent defendant. Consequently such an order cannot be treated as an order passed under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the CPC. Further, I am of the opinion that though the learned Munsiff has stated in the order that the suit is rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this order cannot be treated as an order of rejection of plaint & under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC to treat the same to V a deemed decree as contemplated under section 2 (2) of the CPC. Hence the order is revisible. Consenquently, I am of the clear view that the learned Munsiff has illegally exercised the jurisdiction not vested in law and serious error has been committed by the learned Munsiff in rejecting the suit. I am, therefore, of the further view . that if the revision application is not entertained and order passed by the learned Munsiff is allowed to stand then there will be a serious miscarriage of justice. I am, therefore, of the further view . that if the revision application is not entertained and order passed by the learned Munsiff is allowed to stand then there will be a serious miscarriage of justice. 18. In the instant case it would appear from the order of the learned Munsiff that in arriving at the decision, she took into consideration the Jamabandi of the land of copattadar, certified copy of the letter of the Income Tax Officer, Manipur Circle (B) Ward, Income Tax return of the plaintiff and also other documents. These documents may be examined by the trial Court during the trial of the suit. At this stage I do not like to express any opinion on the merit of those documents as this may influence the trial Court. But on a plain reading of the plaint, I have no hesitation to say that the suit will not be a bar under the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. 19. Haying regard to the facts and circumstances stated above, the order passed by the learned Munsiff on 21.4.92 in Misc Case No.32 of 1992 and in OS No.9 of 1992 is quashed. The trial Court is directed to try the suit in accordance with the law after service of notice upon both the parties. 20. Send the case records back to the Court of the learned Munsiff along with the copy of this judgment immediately. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on the date fixed by the trial Court.