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1996 DIGILAW 77 (MP)

Commissioner Of Income Tax v. K. N. Oil Industries.

1996-01-16

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ORDER BY THE COURT : This is a reference called by this Court on application made by the Revenue under s. 256(2) of the IT Act from the Tribunal and the Tribunal has referred the following question of law for opinion of this Court, which reads as under : "Whether in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Lohia Machines Ltd. vs. Union of India (1985) 152 ITR 308 (SC), the Tribunal was justified in law in confirming the order of the CIT(A) and quashing the order of the ITO under s. 154 of the IT Act, 1961, rectifying the quantum of relief allowable under s. 80J of the Act for the assessment year in question ?" 2. The brief facts giving rise to this reference are thus : The original assessments in this case were made under s. 143(3) on 5th Jan., 1972. On scrutiny of the order, the ITO found that a mistake has been crept in the assessment order in computing the deduction under s. 80J of the IT Act and allowing the same. Therefore, the ITO after issuing a show cause notice to the assessee and after rejecting its objections to the proposed rectification, proceeded to recompute the relief admissible to the assessee under s. 80J. 3. Against the order of the ITO the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the question whether the borrowed capital should be included in the capital employed by the assessee in a new industrial undertaking for the purpose of relief under s. 80J was highly debatable issue and such cannot be rectified under s. 154 of the IT Act. 4. The Revenue, against the order of the CIT(A), preferred an appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal after considering the matter, dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. Thereafter, the Revenue moved an application for making a reference to this Court which was rejected by the Tribunal. Ultimately, the Revenue approached this Court for calling a reference from the Tribunal and, accordingly, a reference was called from the Tribunal and the Tribunal has referred the aforesaid question for answer of this Court. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Ultimately, the Revenue approached this Court for calling a reference from the Tribunal and, accordingly, a reference was called from the Tribunal and the Tribunal has referred the aforesaid question for answer of this Court. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. The basic question is that whether the borrowed capital should be included in the capital employed by the assessee in a new industrial undertaking for the purposes of relief under s. 80J. This question though was earlier debatable but this issue has been finally set to rest by the decision of the Honble Supreme Court given in the case of Lohia Machines Ltd. vs. Union of India (1985) 152 ITR 308 (SC). In that case, the validity of r. 19A was challenged which provided for the exclusion of borrowed capital from the capital employed in the new industrial undertaking for the purpose of s. 80J. While upholding the aforesaid rule, their Lordships held that it is well within the competence of the rule framing authority to frame the rule, and while discussing the legislative policy and other connected matter, their Lordships observed : "The essential legislative policy of allowing relief to an assessee who starts a new industrial undertaking or business of a hotel and declaring the period for which such relief shall be granted, is laid down by the legislature itself in the various sub-sections of s. 80J and all that is left to the Board to prescribe is the manner of computation of the capital employed with reference to which the quantum of the relief is to be calculated. It is only the details relating to the working of the exempting provision contained in s. 80J which are left by the legislature to be determined by the Board. This is clearly permissible without offending the inhibition against excessive delegation of legislative power. It is only the details relating to the working of the exempting provision contained in s. 80J which are left by the legislature to be determined by the Board. This is clearly permissible without offending the inhibition against excessive delegation of legislative power. Sec. 80J enacts an exemption in a taxing statute and a certain margin of latitude is always allowed to the executive in working out the details of exemption in such a taxing statute." Keeping in view of this policy background, their Lordships held that there are factors which may change from time to time and, hence, in the very nature of things, the working out of the mode of computation of the capital employed for the purpose of determining the quantum of the relief must necessary be left to the Board which would be best in a position to consider what should be the quantum of the relief necessary to be given by way of tax incentive in order to promote setting up of new industrial undertakings and hotels and, for that purpose, what amount of the capital employed should form the basis for computation of such relief, and in that context, their Lordships upheld the validity of the rule and held that such borrowed capital cannot be included in the capital for grant of relief under s. 80J for new industrial unit. Since this controversy has been resolved by the Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court; therefore, this reference has to be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.