Judgment : Legal heirs of the defendant are the appellants before this Court. 2. The suit filed by the plaintiff was one for recovery of possession on termination of tenancy. 3. Material averments are as follows: Admittedly plaintiff is the owner of the building and the same was let out to the deceased defendant as per rent deed dated 14. 1969. The agreed rent was Rs.950 per mensem and the lease was for a term of three years. It is said that it is a composite lease and, therefore, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act will not apply. It is further said that rent must be paid according to English calendar month. It is further averred in the plaint that the tenancy is as per English calendar month, and every month’s rent was agreed to be paid on or before the 10th of the succeeding month. Subsequently rent was increased to Rs. 1,000 and the deceased defendant was paying the rent, and the rent deed was kept intact. It is said that after the expiry of the term, the defendant (since deceased) was allowed to continue as tenant holding over on the same terms. Finally, they say that a quit notice was issued on 11. 1980, terminating the tenancy by the end of November, 1980, and the defendant was directed to handover possession by 1st December, 1980. Since the defendant failed to handover possession, suit was filed, for recovery of possession. After the death of the defendant, his legal representatives were impleaded, who are appellants before this Court in this second appeal. 4. In the written statement filed by the defendant, he contended that the suit is not maintainable, and he also said that he received a notice, for which he sent a reply also. In paragraph 14, he said that the notice issued by the landlord is not in accordance with law, and he ought to have been given a three year period to terminate the tenancy. After the death of the defendant, his legal representatives were impleaded, and they filed an additional written statement and it was also accepted. .5. In the additional written-statement, they contended that the notice terminating the tenancy is not in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to them as per the terms of the lease deed, the tenancy month is from 14. .5. In the additional written-statement, they contended that the notice terminating the tenancy is not in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to them as per the terms of the lease deed, the tenancy month is from 14. 1969 to 14. 1972. So, the tenancy commences on the 13th of every English month and ends with the 12th of the next English month. Hence, the notice to suit treating the tenancy as starting from the 1st date of English month is clearly invalid in law and there is no proper termination of tenancy. It is also said that since there is no valid termination, recovery cannot be had. 6. Both the courts below came to the conclusion that the notice issued is proper. Both the courts below were of the view that since the rent was being paid according to English calendar month, the termination notice is in tune with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, the appellants are bound to surrender the building. The concurrent decisions are now challenged in this second appeal. .7. The following substantial question of law was raised for consideration at the time of admission of the second appeal: ."Whether the notice dated 11. 1980 is in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act?" 8. Ex.A-1 is the rental agreement dated 14. 1969. It is written in Tamil, and the document bears the date 29th Panguni, corresponding to 14. 1969. It says that the tenancy will commence from 14. 1969 and will expire on 14. 1972. The tenant has paid a sum of Rs. 10,000 as advance. It further provides that the rent has to be paid on or before the 10th of the succeeding month. Clause 5 of the agreement provides that if the rent is not paid by the end of the succeeding month, the tenant is liable to pay interest at 12% per annum on the arrears. From a reading of the entire deed, I do not find that there is any contract to the contrary incorporated in the deed. It is not disputed that after the expiry of the term, the deceased defendant was allowed to continue in the premises, except the enhancement of rent. Even the plaint allegations are clear in that regard. From a reading of the entire deed, I do not find that there is any contract to the contrary incorporated in the deed. It is not disputed that after the expiry of the term, the deceased defendant was allowed to continue in the premises, except the enhancement of rent. Even the plaint allegations are clear in that regard. It is also admitted that the deceased defendant was continuing in the premises on the same terms and conditions as a tenant holding over. Both the courts below have come to the conclusion that the rent is payable according to English calendar month. The tenancy also continued in the same way and, therefore, the termination notice is proper. Ex.A-3 is the legal notice terminating the tenancy. It was issued on 10. 1980. Two notices were issued and both are marked as Ex.A-3. One is dated 10. 1989 and the other is dated 11. 1980. In the notice dated 10. 1980, it is stated thus: "Therefore, my client hereby terminates your tenancy with the end of October, 1980 and you are directed to handover the possession without any let or hindrance to my client on 1st November, 1980, failing which a suit for ejectment will be filed against you and you will be held liable for all the costs and damages." In the notice dated 11. 1980, it is stated thus: "Therefore, my client hereby terminates your tenancy with the end of November, 1980 and you are directed to handover the vacant possession without any let or hindrance to my client on 1st December, 1980, failing which a suit for ejectment will be filed against you and you will be held liable for all the costs and damages." 9. If the tenancy is in accordance with the English calendar month, the notice is in accordance with law. Therefore, the question to be considered is, whether Ex.A-3 notice amounts to valid termination notice. 10. Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act says that: "In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months’ notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." Sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act says as to when a tenancy will commence. It reads thus: "Where the time limited by a lease of immovable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in completing that time such day shall be excluded. Where no day of commencement is named, the time so limited begins from making of the lease. Where the time so limited is a year or a number of years, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the lease shall last during the whole anniversary of the day from which such time commences. Where the time so limited is expressed to be terminable before its expiration, and the lease omits to mention at whose option it is so terminable, the lessee, and not the lessor, shall have such option.“ 11. In one of the earliest reports reported in Benay Krishna Das v. Salscioni, 63 M.L.J. 685: L.R. 59 I.A. 414: A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 279, the tenancy began from 1st June, 1921 for a term of four years thence next ensuing. In so far as payment of rent is concerned, the agreement provided thus: ”Yielding and paying therefor the clear monthly rent or sum of Rs. 1,000 such rent to be paid on or before the seventh day of the month succeeding the month for which it is due the first payment being the rent for the month of June, 1921 to be paid on or before 7th July, 1921 and so on.“ That lease expired, and the lessee continued to occupy the premises as tenant holding over. On 1st February, 1928, a notice was issued with clear one month to take effect from that day. Their Lordships said construing Sec.10 read with Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, date of commencement of the tenancy, i. e., 6. 1921 had to be excluded. On 1st February, 1928, a notice was issued with clear one month to take effect from that day. Their Lordships said construing Sec.10 read with Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, date of commencement of the tenancy, i. e., 6. 1921 had to be excluded. In view of the agreement for payment of rent, a contention was taken before the Privy Council that operation of Sec. 110 of the Act is excluded and, therefore, the notice issued is not proper. Commenting on the same, it was held thus: ”...It clearly is not an agreement expressly excluding Sec. 110, because it has nothing to do with fixing the period covered by the term. It merely provides for the payment of the rent. Mr.Dunne’s argument must really amount to this: that because he suggests there is an inconsistency between the provision with regard to the payment of rent and the provision with regard to the length of the term, there must be implied an agreement to exclude the operation of Sec. 110. Now the answer seems to be that the section in terms applies unless there is an express agreement to the contrary, and no express agreement to the contrary, can, in fact, be found in the lease in question.....“ 12. In Bhaiyaa Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad , A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 120: 1963 S.C.J. 441, a similar question came for consideration. Their Lordships were considering the provisions of Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act (57 of 1947). The validity of a notice issued under Sec. 12 of the said Act was the subject matter under consideration. In that case, the tenant held the premises, agreeing to pay Rs.75 per mensem and the amount was paid according to Indian Calendar month. Tenancy was terminated, asking the tenant to quit on the last day of the month of tenancy which was Kartak Vad 30 of Samvat year 2011. Before Court, it was contended (1) that the month of tenancy was not by the Indian Calendar, but was by the British Calendar and that the courts below had ignored evidence in that regard. (2) Assuming that the month of tenancy was by the Indian Calendar according to the lease, it would be deemed to be by the British Calendar in view of the provisions of Sec.27 of the Act. (2) Assuming that the month of tenancy was by the Indian Calendar according to the lease, it would be deemed to be by the British Calendar in view of the provisions of Sec.27 of the Act. (3) As the arrears of rent had been paid within two months of the institution of the suit, the appellant be deemed to be ready and willing to pay the rent and that therefore the landlord was not entitled to recover possession of the premises. (4) It is discretionary with the court to pass a decree for ejectment in a case under Sec. 12(3)(a) of the Act, as the expression used in that sub-clause is ‘the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession. ‘Sec.27 of the Bombay Act referred to above read thus: ”(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or any contract, custom or local usage to the contrary, rent payable by the month or year or portion of a year shall be recovered according to the British Calendar. .(2) The State Government may prescribe the manner in which rent recoverable according to any other calendar before the coming into operation of this Act shall be calculated and charged in terms of the British Calendar.“ It is on the basis of Sec.27 (extracted above) the Courts below in that case held that the tenancy was in accordance with British calendar since the rent was payable according to British Calendar month after commencement of that Act. The question before the Supreme Court was, what is the impact of Sec.27 on the commencement of the tenancy. Whether it was in accordance with Indian Calendar month, or the monthly tenancy will have to be calculated on the basis of rent payable which is in accordance with British calendar month. Commenting on the same, the Lordships held thus: ”There is nothing in the aforesaid rule or the section about the conversion of the month of the tenancy from the month according to the Hindu Calendar to the month according to the British calendar. They only provide for the recoverability of the rent according to the British Calendar. Since the enforcement of the Act on February 13, 1948, the monthly rent would be for the month according to the British Calendar. They only provide for the recoverability of the rent according to the British Calendar. Since the enforcement of the Act on February 13, 1948, the monthly rent would be for the month according to the British Calendar. The monthly rent could be recovered after the expiry of a month from that date or the rent for the period from the 13th February to the end of the month could be recovered at the monthly rate and thereafter after the expiry of each calendar month. There is nothing in the section or the rule in regard to the date from which the month for recovery of rent should commence. This provision was made, probably, as a corollary to the statute providing for standard rents. Standard rents necessitate standard months. There are a number of calendars in use in this country. The Hindu themselves use several calendars. The Muslims use a different one. Some calendars are used for particular purposes. It appears to be for the sake of uniformity and standardisation that a common calendar was to govern the period of the month of the tenancy and the date for the recovery of the rent. Rule 4 provided a procedure for adjustment of the recovery of the rent according to Calendar other than the British Calendar, and further provided that the rent chargeable per month, according to the British Calendar, would not exceed the rent which was chargeable followed immediately before that date. In the absence of any specific provision in the Act with respect to any alteration to be made in the period of the month of the tenancy, it cannot be held merely on the basis of an alteration in the period for the recovery of rent that the monthly period of tenancy had also been changed. The tenancy can be from month to month and the recoverability of the rent may not be from month to month and may under the contract, be based on any period say, a quarter or half year or a year. There is nothing in law to make the month for the period of recovering rent synchronize with the period of the month of the tenancy. The tenancy must start on a particular date, and consequently, its month would be the month from date, according to the calendar followed. There is nothing in law to make the month for the period of recovering rent synchronize with the period of the month of the tenancy. The tenancy must start on a particular date, and consequently, its month would be the month from date, according to the calendar followed. The months of tenancy according to that calendar are settled by contract from the commencement of the tenancy. The tenancy under a lease for a certain period starts from a certain date, be it according to the British calendar or any other calendar. The period of lease, and consequently, the tenancy, comes to an end at the expiry of that period according to the calendar followed by the parties in fixing the commencement of the tenancy. A lease, even according to the British Calendar can start from any intermediate date, of the calendar month. There is nothing in Sec.27 to indicate that the month of the tenancy to such a lease will start from the first of a regular month. Sec.27 simply states that the rent would be recovered according to the British calendar without fixing the first date of the month as the date from which the month, for the purposes of the recovery of the rent, would be counted. It follows that the month of the tenancy which commences on the 14th of a month, would be from the 14th to the 13th of the next month, according to the British calendar. The rent would be recoverable with respect to this period of a month. No interference with any such term of the contract has been made by any provision of the Act and therefore we hold that the provisions of Sec.27 of the Act and R.4 of the Rules, do not in any way convert the month of the tenancy according to the Indian calendar to the month of the British Calendar. The High Court said in the judgment that Mr.Parghi, who was appearing for the appellant, was unable to cite any decision in support of the contention raised by him. Our attention was, however, has been drawn to two cases decided by the Bombay High Court. They are Civil Revision Application No.247 of 1956 and 1583 of 1960 decided by Dixit and Tendulkar, JJ. and Patwardhan J., on 22. 1957 and 18. 1961 respectively. The latter decision had to follow the earlier one. Our attention was, however, has been drawn to two cases decided by the Bombay High Court. They are Civil Revision Application No.247 of 1956 and 1583 of 1960 decided by Dixit and Tendulkar, JJ. and Patwardhan J., on 22. 1957 and 18. 1961 respectively. The latter decision had to follow the earlier one. In the earlier case, the notice to quit required the tenant to give possession on May 1, 1953. The tenancy had commenced according to the Hindu calendar. The notice was given according to the British Calendar. The High Court held that notice to be valid, agreeing with the contention that the effect of the provisions of Sec.27 of the Act was to make the tenancy which was originally according to the Hindu Calendar, a tenancy according to the British Calendar. This ratio of the decision, in the words of the learned Judges, is: "Now rent is payable for occupation by the defendant and, therefore, the tenancy must be deemed to be one according to the British calendar from the first of the month to the end of the month.... Here is a local law which by Sec.27 makes the tenancy as one according to the British calendar." We are of opinion that this view is wrong, We, therefore, hold that the notice to quit issued to the appellant was therefore a valid notice as held by the court below and determined the tenancy of the appellant." [Italics supplied] 13. The decision reported in Bhaija Punilal Bhawwaddin v. Dave Bhagwantprasad Prabhuprasad, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 120, was followed by this Court in the judgment reported in Ramachandran v. Lakshminarayanaswami, (1976)2 M.L.J. 107 . In paragraphs 17 and 18 of the said judgment, a learned Judge of this Court has elaborated the point thus: "Even if the defendant is not entitled to six months notice and he is entitled to only 15 days’ notice, undoubtedly the notice in this case is not proper under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the tenancy is a monthly one, there can be no doubt the month of the tenancy is from 9th of a particular month and ending with the 8th of the succeeding month as per the English calendar. The lease deed, as already seen is dated 9th November, 1959 and it says that the monthly rent is payable by the 10th of the succeeding month. The lease deed, as already seen is dated 9th November, 1959 and it says that the monthly rent is payable by the 10th of the succeeding month. The contention on behalf of the plaintiff is that there is an averment in the plaint that the defendant was paying the rent according to the calendar month and there is no denial of such averment and that therefore it must be held that the month of tenancy is from the first of the calendar month. It is clear that in spite of the abovesaid assertion in the plaint admittedly the defendant had never paid rent according to calendar month. The only payment he made was on 31st March, 1961 for the accrued rents from the date of the lease deed upto the date of payment. However, as the plaintiff has averred that the defendant had been paying rent according to calendar month and such averment has not been transversed by the written statement, I may take for the present purpose that rent was being paid according to the calendar month. But that fact would not in any way alter the month of tenancy. The month of tenancy is from the 9th of a particular month to the 8th of the succeeding month. The mere fact that the rent was being paid not according to the month of tenancy but according to the calendar month would not alter the month of tenancy itself, as one from the first of the calendar month. Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwanprasad Prabhu Prasad and others, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 120, is a case where the month of tenancy was according to Hindu calendar, but the rent was being paid according to the British calendar. The Gujarat High Court which heard the case earlier held that as rent is payable according to English calendar, the tenancy must be deemed to be one according to the said calendar from the first of the month to the end of the month. The Supreme Court pointed out that the view of the Gujarat High Court is wrong At page 447, the Supreme Court observed: "The tenancy can be from month to month and the recoverability of the rent may not be from month to month, and may, under the contract, be based on any period say, a quarter or half year or a year. There is nothing in law to make the month for the period of recovering rent, synchronising with the period of the month of the tenancy. The tenancy must start by a particular date and consequently its month would be the month from that date, according to the calendar followed." Therefore, assuming that the defendant had been paying rent according to calendar month, the month of tenancy is certainly not from the first of the calendar month till the end of the said month, but it is only as provided in the document itself. There can be no doubt that the lease commenced on the 9th of a particular month and therefore the month of tenancy would be from the 9th of a particular month till the 8th of the succeeding month. The notice in this case terminated the tenancy by the midnight of 31st May, 1965. That is certainly not in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as 15 days notice ending with the month of tenancy has not been given." 14. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held as follows in the decision reported in Carrara Marble and Terraze Company Limited v. Charu Chandra Guha, A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 357. "Where a tenant after the expiry of the term of his lease on the 25th of the English calendar month continued to hold over the premises with the consent of the plaintiff landlord at an enhanced rent which was used to be realised according to the English calendar month, the monthly tenancy would not coincide with the English calendar month but the month of the tenancy would be from the 25th of one month to the 24th of the following month, and in order to prove that the month of the old tenancy was altered by a fresh agreement the plaintiff must prove that fact by more satisfactory evidence. Even assuming that the tenant has become a statutory tenant under the House Rent Control Order that statutory tenancy ran from the 25th of one month to the 24th of the following, and the plaintiff must prove how the month of the original tenancy came to be altered. Even assuming that the tenant has become a statutory tenant under the House Rent Control Order that statutory tenancy ran from the 25th of one month to the 24th of the following, and the plaintiff must prove how the month of the original tenancy came to be altered. The mere payment of rent from month to month according to English Calendar would not be sufficient, by itself, to prove the month of the tenancy, because the month of the tenancy may very well be different from the month according to which rent is realised, and the payment of rent according to English Calendar may be merely a mode of payment and nothing more.“ In that case, their Lordships distinguished the decision of this Court reported in Arunachal Chettiar v. Ramiah Naidu, I.L.R. 30 Mad. 109. In the decision of this Court, it was held thus: ”It is also a widespread practice to make the monthly letting to coincide with the Calendar month. Where then we find an entry takes place in the middle of a calendar month and rent is payable from the date of entry, but the parties agree that the rent is payable at the end of the calendar month, we think the reasonable inference is that they intended that the monthly tenancy should coincide with the calendar month.“ This, according to their Lordships, goes against the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in the decision reported in Benay Krishna Das v. Slecioni, A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 279. .15. Again, in B.Bhattacharjee v. Nirmala Bala, A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 649, their Lordships held thus: .”The mere fact that rents are paid and received according to English Calendar months is not sufficient to show that the month of the tenancy runs according to the English calendar month. The manner or mode of payment of rents may be an important element or factor to be considered on the point, but it cannot be the sure indication of the month of the tenancy in all cases.“ .16. In J.Mc.Gaffin and another v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1978 Cal. .123, also, the same principle was enunciated. The manner or mode of payment of rents may be an important element or factor to be considered on the point, but it cannot be the sure indication of the month of the tenancy in all cases.“ .16. In J.Mc.Gaffin and another v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1978 Cal. .123, also, the same principle was enunciated. In that case, their Lordships held that ‘even though payment of rent by a calendar month may be some or even an important indication about the tenancy being formed month by month according to calendar month, but that by itself would not be sufficient to hold that the ten- ancy was from the first day of the month to the last day of the month, when there is other best evidence to the contrary. .17. As against the said decisions, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the oral evidence of the parties and also the recital in the rent deed will only show that the intention of the parties was to begin the tenancy in accordance with English calendar month. He stressed the wordings in clause 1 and Clause 5 of Ex.A-1. Clauses 1 and 5 read thus: .In paragraph 4 of the plaint, plaintiffs has stated that the tenancy was according to English calendar month, which has not been specifically denied in the written statement. He also brought to my notice the evidence of D. W. 1, one of the defendants in the case, wherein he said that the rent is being paid according to English calendar month and in the accounts also, the rental arrangement is treated in accordance with English calendar month. He also said that in Ex.A-2, it is stated as rent for the month of June. From this evidence, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, it has to be concluded that the tenancy began only on the first of English calendar and, therefore, Ex.A-3 notice is properly issued, terminating the tenancy. Learned counsel relied on the following decisions, which I will consider in seriatim. 18. In Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy and others, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102, their Lordships were considering how a termination notice has to be inter-preted. Learned counsel relied on the following decisions, which I will consider in seriatim. 18. In Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy and others, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102, their Lordships were considering how a termination notice has to be inter-preted. It was held thus: ”The principles governing the construction of a notice to quite laid down by English cases are equally applicable to cases arising in India and they establish that notices to quit, though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statement embodied in them, may still be good and effective in law; the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all ti:e facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all those facts and circumstances: and further, they are to be construed not with a desire to find fault in them which would render them defective but to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat.........." The said decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Burmah Shell Oil Distributor v. Khaja Midhat Noor, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1470, and in paragraph 9, their Lordships have said thus: "The question is whether there was a valid notice. The High Court held that in the facts of this case, there was a valid notice of termination and after the valid notice of termination of the lease to the lessee, there was no need to give a fresh notice to the sub-lessee. Notice must be read in the context of the facts of each particular case having regard to the situation of the parties to whom it is addressed." 19. In Lalbhai Ramjibhai v. A.V. Seth, A.I.R. 1974 Cal. 362, a learned Judge of that High Court, held thus: "Where a tenant who enters into premises in the middle of a quarter by agreement pays a proportionate rent for the broken quarter and afterwards on the regular quarter days the tenancy is deemed to commence with the first day of such quarter days which follows his entry and a notice to quit must be given accordingly." The said decision has no application since on the facts of that case, it is clear that the tenancy was in accordance with English calendar month. 20. 20. Mulla, in ‘The Transfer of Property Act’ - 8th Edition (1995), has also commented as to the form and construction of notice to quit. At pages 817 and 818 of the said book, learned Author says that ‘a liberal construction is therefore put upon a notice to quit in order that it should not be defeated by in accuracies either in the description of the premises, or the name of the tenant or the name of the landlord, or the date of the expiry of the notice. ‘But the learned Author has also said that ‘but a liberal construction must not ignore the fact that the provision is for the benefit of lessees, and a construction which deprives the tenant of the minimum period of notice stipulated in this section is not permissible [Italics supplied] 21. Learned Author also relies on the decision reported in Mangilal v. Sugan Chand, (1964)2 S.C.R. 239: A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 101, which is also followed in Burma Shell Oil Distributor v. Khaja Midhat Noor, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1470. 22. In Mangilal v. Sugan Chand, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 101, their Lordships distinguished the decision reported in Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 102 and extracting a passage cited therefrom, it was held thus: "...The decision really is of no assistance in this case because there the defect which was not said to invalidate the notice appertained to the description of the demised premises and the Privy Council held that the recipient of a notice would be quite conversant with the actual description and could know what the description stood for. Here the question is entirely different and that is whether the landlord had given the minimum period contemplated by Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the tenant within which to vacate the premises. This provision is evidently intended to confer a facility on the tenant and must, therefore, he so construed as to enable him to have the fullest benefit of that facility. It seems to us that a liberal construction of a notice which would deprive the tenant of the facility of having the benefit of the minimum period of 15 days within which to vacate is not permissible....... " [Italics supplied] 23. It seems to us that a liberal construction of a notice which would deprive the tenant of the facility of having the benefit of the minimum period of 15 days within which to vacate is not permissible....... " [Italics supplied] 23. Even if I agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that liberal construction has to be put on clear notice, there is a limit for that interpretation also as held in Mangilal v. Sugan Chand, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 101. 24. On the basis of the above decisions, let us consider what is the date of commencement of the tenancy in this case. In paragraph 2 of Ex. A-1 it is stated thus: The document of lease is written on 29th Panguni corresponding to 14. 1969. So even though the document was executed on 14. 1969, the parties wanted a different date for commencement i.e., from 14. 1969. When the parties have agreed for a definite date, the mode of payment of rent cannot change the same as held by the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwanprasad Prabhu Prasad and others, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 120 and the date of payment need not synchronise with the commencement of the tenancy. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the deceased defendant has not disputed the validity of the notice, and the pleading regarding the same was also brought to my notice. It is only the legal representatives who are agitating this question, and, when the original tenant (deceased defendant) has accepted the same, the legal representatives are not entitled to challenge the validity of the same. The legal contention of the respondents merits consideration. But when we go by the facts of the case, I find that the same may not have any application. The contention raised by the deceased defendant regarding the validity of the notice is contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the written statement. In paragraph 13, he says thus: In paragraph 14, he says thus: In their additional written statement, the legal representatives have taken a definite stand that ‘the notice to quit is not in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act and hence invalid in law. As per the terms of the lease deed, the tenancy month is from 14. 1969 to 14. 1972. As per the terms of the lease deed, the tenancy month is from 14. 1969 to 14. 1972. So, the tenancy commences on the 13th of every English month and ends with the 12th of the next English month. Hence, the notice to quit treating the tenancy as starting from the 1st date of the English month and ending with the end of the English month is clearly invalid in law and there is no proper termination of tenancy and on this ground alone the suit is liable to be dismissed." 26.. Paragraph 19 of the decision reported in Ramachandran v. Lakshminarayanaswami, (1976)2 M.L.J. 107 gives an answer to the contention of the respondents. There also, the contention that 15 days notice was not given was not taken. But a plea was taken that the notice issued was not proper, and he also pleaded that he is entitled to six months notice. This contention was accepted by this Court to hold that the validity of the quit notice was challenged, and that will be sufficient to enter finding or to decide whether the quite notice is proper or not. In paragraph 19 of the judgment, their Court has held thus: "It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant has not specifically stated in the written statement that even if 15 days’ notice is sufficient, the notice is not proper. The plea that the notice to quit is not proper has been specifically taken. The defendant has pleaded that he is entitled to six months’ notice. Even if it is to be held that he is not entitled to such notice one has to find whether 15 days’ notice has been given in accordance with Sec. 106, Certainly it is not a case where the defendant has not taken the plea that the notice to quit is not proper." It may be further noted that before the trial court as well as the first appellate court, the parties joined in issue as to the validity of the notice. We find that the main contention that was put forward before the Courts below was regarding the validity of the notice, and the finding was entered in favour of the plaintiffs. So, the plaintiffs had also understood the scope of the (deceased) defendant’s plea, namely, that he has questioned the validity of the termination notice. We find that the main contention that was put forward before the Courts below was regarding the validity of the notice, and the finding was entered in favour of the plaintiffs. So, the plaintiffs had also understood the scope of the (deceased) defendant’s plea, namely, that he has questioned the validity of the termination notice. It is too late for them now to contend that the defendant has not specifically pleaded the case. 27. Learned counsel also wanted this Court to rely on the oral evidence of D.W. 1, and also the admission in the pleading, in the sense that when the plaintiffs have alleged that the tenancy is according to English calendar month, and when the same is not disputed by the deceased defendant, the same amounts to an admission under O.8, Rule 6, C.P.C. 28.. I cannot agree with the said submission. Even in the plaint, it is admitted that the tenancy began, when the lease deed was executed on 14. 1969. The parties are governed by the written agreement. It is also admitted that after the expiry of the term, the tenant continued to hold over the property on the same terms. The terms are incorporated in the deed. The same can be varied only by way of another written document. On the basis of deposition alone, it cannot be taken that the terms of Ex.A-1 had been changed. I have also gone through the evidence of D.W. 1. We speaks only about the payment of rent, and not about the commencement of the tenancy. So, nothing turns on the oral evidence of D.W.1. 29. The courts below have held that the termination notice is proper only for the reason that the rent is being paid in accordance with English calendar month. Once it is held that the tenancy month and payment of rent need not synchronise, that conclusion has to be only set to aside, and I do so accordingly. 30. In the result, setting aside the judgments of both the courts below, the second appeal is allowed, and the suit is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.