Judgment :- 1. Tenant in R.C.O.P. No. 4 of 1985, on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif, Gobichettipalayam), is the revision petitioner. 2. Though eviction was sought on various grounds by the respondent herein, the only ground that now survives is, the claim for eviction on the ground of wilful default, and also the ground that the building is required for the bona fide own occupation of the respondent. 3. In the petition for eviction, regarding the default in payment of rent, the landlord has stated in paragraph 4 thus:— “The respondent is a tenant of the petition mentioned premises. He was inducted into possession of the petition mentioned premises as a tenant, as per the Rent deed dated 1-5-1983, the agreed rent being Rs. 130/- per month. As per the terms of the agreement, the respondent has to pay the monthly rent of Rs. 130/- on the first of every succeeding month without fail. But the respondent has not paid rents for October, November and December, 1983 and January to December 1984 (i.e.,) for a total period of 15 months. Thus, he has committed wilful default in payment of rent. He has to pay in all Rs. 1,950/- towards arrears, i.e., rent for 15 months as aforesaid. A registered notice (Ex. A-2) was sent on 24.8.1984, demanding the respondent to vacate the petition mentioned property and hand over vacant possession of the same, on the ground of wilful default, among other grounds. It was ackno wledged by the respondent on 27.8.1984. (Ex. A-4). Second notice was sent on 13.9.84. But the respondent has neither paid the rent, nor has he sent any reply. Two months have elapsed after service of notice. Hence the respondent is to be evicted on the ground of wilful default.” In regard to the claim on the ground of requirement of the building bona fide for own occupation of the landlord, paragraph 7 of the petition says thus:— “The petitioner and his son Dr. Ashok Kumar are practising as dental surgeons, separately. The petitioner intends to start a separate clinic and medical shop in the petition premises for the benefit of his son. Running a pharmacy is a necessary adjunct for the profession. Thus, the petitioner requires the petition premises for his own use and occupation, for running a pharmacy and for starting a separate clinic for his son. The petitioner intends to start a separate clinic and medical shop in the petition premises for the benefit of his son. Running a pharmacy is a necessary adjunct for the profession. Thus, the petitioner requires the petition premises for his own use and occupation, for running a pharmacy and for starting a separate clinic for his son. The shop is ideally suited for running a medical shop.” 4. The above allegations are answered in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the counter. It is stated therein that the rent is not payable by month, but the agreement is to pay rent once in a year. He further said that the rental arrangement began long before, i.e., in 1968, and the original rent was only Rs. 25/- and the same was enhanced to Rs. 130/-. He said that from 1979 onwards, the monthly rent was agreed to be paid only every year. In paragraph 5 of the counter, he gave details of certain payments which, according to him, will show that there is a contract between the parties to pay and receive the amount only once a year, and that too after Deepavali Holidays. Regarding the bona fide requirement for own use, the same is answered in the counter. He said that the petitioner (landlord) is in possession of more that 25 buildings, and the claim put forward by the landlord is lacking in good faith. Ultimately, the tenant prays for dismissal of the eviction petition. 5. Both the Authorities below have held that the requirement of the petition mentioned building for own use and occupation is bona fide. and have further held that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent. 6. Let me first consider whether the landlord needs the building for his own occupation. 7. The main contention put forward by learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant) is that the pleading in paragraph 7 of the petition in this case is lacking in details, and the statutory grounds enabling the petitioner to seek eviction are not put forward, and, therefore, for that reason itself, the eviction petition has to be rejected. For the said purpose, learned counsel relied on the decision reported in (1981) 3 S.C.C. 103 = A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711 (Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad) where their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 12 of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. For the said purpose, learned counsel relied on the decision reported in (1981) 3 S.C.C. 103 = A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1711 (Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad) where their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 12 of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. In that judgment, it was held thus:— “Section 12 of the M.P. Act is an enabling section. The burden to establish both the requirements of Section 12(1)(f) is squarely on the landlord. And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings requires that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Ordinarily, therefore, when a landlord seeks eviction under Section 12(1)(f) the court after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings must frame two issues, namely, (i) whether the plaintiff-landlord proves that he bona fide requires possession of building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business; and (ii) whether he proves that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. Any amount of proof offered without pleadings is generally of no relevance.” The said decision was followed in the decision reported in (1987) 1 S.C.C. 254 =A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 406 (Duggi Veera Venkata Gopala Satyanarayana v. Sakala Veera Raghavaiah and another) wherein, in paragraph 6, their Lordships held thus:— “There can be no doubt that under the law of pleadings facts mentioned in sub-clause (iii) are to be pleaded in the petition and thereafter proved at the trial for the purpose of an order of eviction against the tenant. In a decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad , it has been observed by Desai, J. that in order to obtain an order of eviction of a tenant under Section 12(1)(f) of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the landlord has to plead and establish (i) that he bona fide requires the accommodation let to the tenant for non-residential purposes for the purpose of continuing or starting his business; and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or the town concerned. Further, it has been observed that any amount of proof offered without appropriate pleading is generally of no relevance. Further, it has been observed that any amount of proof offered without appropriate pleading is generally of no relevance. We respectfully agree with the above statement of law and reiterate the same.” Learned counsel also relied on the decision reported in 1993-1- L.W. 356 (Ramalingam Pillai v. Murugesan) wherein, Venkataswami, J. (as he then was), following the decision reported in (1981) 3 S.C.C. 103 (supra), has held thus:— “ it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents/landlords that in the petition for eviction, there is no averment to the effect that the son of the first respondent herein does not own any non-residential building of his own to enable the landlords to invoke S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. It is common ground that there was no pleading to the effect that P.W. 1 for whose benefit the suit premises was bona fide required, has no other non-residential building of his own in the same city. Of course, he has vaguely stated in the evidence that he does not own any other shop. The absence of necessary pleadings and clear evidence is fatal to the petition for eviction filed by the landlords. The petitioners/tenants are entitled to succeed on that ground. On facts, in this case, apart from the fact that there was no specific averment, the oral evidence was also not so clear. As the petitioners herein (tenants) have to succeed on the question of absence of necessary pleading, the question of bona fides need not be gone into in this case.” 8. I cannot agree with the said submission of the learned counsel for more than one reason. The contention of lack of pleadings was not raised before the Authorities below, and I further find that the lack of pleadings, if any, has not prejudiced the case of the tenant, petitioner herein, in any way. The object of pleading is only to put the parties on notice, of the real matter in issue. But, if the parties are already aware of the real matter in issue and they have also joined in issue over the same, the lack of pleadings can never be treated as a ground to reject the claim. Pleadings before Rent Controller cannot be given that much of importance given to pleadings in a suit before Civil Court. But, if the parties are already aware of the real matter in issue and they have also joined in issue over the same, the lack of pleadings can never be treated as a ground to reject the claim. Pleadings before Rent Controller cannot be given that much of importance given to pleadings in a suit before Civil Court. Proceeding before a Rent Control Court is summary in nature and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not fully made applicable to the extent provided under the statute. We must further note that the Rent Control Court is not a Civil Court and the Act itself is more or less a self-contained Code, so far as the relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned. 9. I do not find that such a ground is taken in the Memorandum of Revision even though as many as 31 grounds have been taken. Before the lower appellate court and also before the Rent Controller, this objection was not taken. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that unless there is a pleading that the landlord or his son has no other building of their own, the statutory conditions or qualifications to file an eviction petition are not fulfilled and, therefore, the tenant is not expected to answer the same. But, unfortunately for the petitioner, I find that the tenant has anticipated the case of the landlord, and in paragraph 9 of the counter, he himself has stated that the petitioner has other buildings of his own and, therefore, he has not satisfied the statutory conditions. So, he himself is aware of the qualifications to seek eviction, and that is why, he wanted the eviction petition to be rejected on the ground that the respondent/landlord has got other buildings of his own When he himself is aware of the real matter in dispute, the lack of pleadings, even if any, is not prejudicial to his interest. 11. In the decision reported in (1987) 1. S.C.C. 254 (supra)), even though their Lordships said that the pleadings must be there, this contention was never allowed to be argued before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships said that what was not taken in any of the courts below was not taken in the S.L.P also, and that it was argued for the first time before them. Their Lordships have further said: “Mr. Their Lordships said that what was not taken in any of the courts below was not taken in the S.L.P also, and that it was argued for the first time before them. Their Lordships have further said: “Mr. P.P. Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has produced before us a copy of the Memorandum of Civil Revision Petition that was filed in the High Court. We do not, however, find that the point has been specifically taken in the grounds of revision. It is not disputed that the point was not also argued before the High Court”. 12. The reasons found by the Supreme Court for disallowing permission to raise such a contention, will also apply to the facts of this case as well. 13. On merits, no argument was put forward by learned counsel for the petitioner. On evidence, the Authorities below have held that the claim put forward by the petitioner is bona fide since a medical shop adjacent to their clinic and consulting room is necessary. The same is based on appreciation of evidence, and this Court does not find any infirmity in those findings. 14. The other ground for eviction is, default in payment of rent. Ex. A-6 is the rent deed admittedly executed by the revision petitioner. It is dated 1-5-1983. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a typed set showing the rent paid by him from 11-12-1970 onwards. He wanted this Court to take note of these facts. From 11-12-1970 till 30-9-1971; rent was being paid every month. From 3-12-1971 to 21-3-1972, for a period of five months, the entire rent was paid only on 21-3-1972. On 10-9-1972, rent was paid for a period of three months, namely, February, March and April, 1972. For May, June and July, 1972 rent was paid on 3-10-1972. Rent for August to November 1972 (4 months) was paid on 5-2-1973. Likewise, rent for December 1972 and January 1973 to May, 1973 was paid on 21-9-1973; rent for September to December 1973 was paid on 26-1-1974; January to April 1974 was paid on 5-6-1974; and rent for May, June and July, 1974 was paid on 10-9-1974. Like that, rent for August to December, 1974 was paid on 12-2-1975; for January to April, 1975 was paid on 7-5-1975; rent for May and June, 1975 was paid on 9-7-1975, and a sum of Rs. Like that, rent for August to December, 1974 was paid on 12-2-1975; for January to April, 1975 was paid on 7-5-1975; rent for May and June, 1975 was paid on 9-7-1975, and a sum of Rs. 165/- towards rent for July, August and September, 1975 was paid on 10-10-1975. Rent for October, November, December 1975 and January 1976 was paid on 25-2-1976. On 18-5-1976, rent payable for February, March and April 1976 was paid. On 19-9-1976, rent was paid for May, June, July and August 1976. Rent for the months of September and October 1976 was paid on 15-12-1976, and rent for November and December 1976 was paid on 3-2-1977. Likewise, rent for January to July (7 months) was paid only on 2-9-1977, and for months August to November 1977 was paid on 9-1-1978. Rent for December, 1977 and January and February, 1978 was paid on 18-3-1978, and for March, April and May 1978 was paid on 31-5-1978. Finally, learned counsel says that the rent from June to December, 1978 and January to March 1979 (10 months) was paid on 22-10-1979 under one receipt and April to August, 1979 on the same date, namely, 22-10-1979 under another receipt. Rent for September 1979 to August 1980, rent was paid on 8-11-1980 and September 1980 to August 1981 was paid on 28-10-1981. Likewise rent for November 1981 to October 1982 was paid on 17-11-1982. As per Ex. B-12, rent for November 1982 to October 1983, was paid on 5-11-1983. It is also his case that the rent for November 1983 to August 1984, was paid on 20-9-1984. But no receipt was issued, and the handbook retained by the petitioner was also not signed by the landlord. According to the learned counsel, it could be seen that he used to pay rent only once in a year or the habit of the landlord was to receive the rent in a lump sum. In the pleadings, it was stated that the monthly rent will be paid once in a year. Learned counsel also submitted that such arrangement began from 1979 onwards. The said contention cannot be accepted and, according to me, the same is taken only for the purpose of this case, without any good faith. It is admitted that Ex. A-6 was executed by the petitioner in 1983. Learned counsel also submitted that such arrangement began from 1979 onwards. The said contention cannot be accepted and, according to me, the same is taken only for the purpose of this case, without any good faith. It is admitted that Ex. A-6 was executed by the petitioner in 1983. If the contract was to pay the monthly rent only once in a year, nothing prevented the parties from providing the same in the contract itself. But in Ex. A-6, it is said that the monthly rent has to be paid every month in advance. From his own showing, it is clear that the tenant was not paying the rent in time, and the landlord was compelled to receive the rent as and when he paid the same. The silence of the eviction/petitioner (landlord) has been exploited by the tenant, petitioner herein. 15. The case of the petitioner that he paid the rents for the months of November 1983 to August 1984 on 20-9-1984 also cannot be believed. Petitioners son has been examined and he has categorically said that such payment was not made, nor did his father refuse to sign the handbook or issue any receipt. The circumstances also belive the case put forward by the tenant. Before 20-9-1984, the date of alleged payment, petitioner has received the eviction notice Ex. A-2. He did not reply the same. Thereafter, a second notice was also received by him, which is marked as Ex. A-4. For that notice also, no reply was sent. In fact, Ex. A-4 was refused to be accepted by the tenant. 16. Even after the eviction petition was filed, the so called contract alleged by the petitioner was not obeyed by him. We find that the landlord had to file a petition in the year 1988 for a direction compelling the tenant to deposit the rent that had become due from the month of September, 1984 to the date of that interim application. That application was allowed and the amount was paid in two or three instalments. It is clear from the said conduct of the tenant that he is not a person who will pay the tenant regularly, and that he will stoop to any level to cling on to the demised premises, without paying any rent. 17. The case put forward by the tenant that he has paid rent has also to be discarded. It is clear from the said conduct of the tenant that he is not a person who will pay the tenant regularly, and that he will stoop to any level to cling on to the demised premises, without paying any rent. 17. The case put forward by the tenant that he has paid rent has also to be discarded. When he is not paying rent in time without any reason, and even in spite of notice, he did not care to pay the rent within two months, statutory presumption against the tenant arises. He will be deemed to be a wilful defaulter. The tenant has failed to rebut the said presumption. 18. The findings of the Authorities below are, therefore, justified, and I do not find any infirmity in the orders of the Authorities below. 19. Confirming the decisions of the Authorities below, I hold that the tenant is liable to be evicted from the building. I also do not find any ground to grant any time to the tenant to surrender vacant possession in view of the false case put forward by him and also his conduct. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs, directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession forthwith.