JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been filed under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), against the order dated 26.7.:995 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Bhilwara in Civil Original Suit No. 171/86. 2. For the convenient disposal of this petition, it transpires that the plaintiff - non-petitioner instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant - petitioner from the suit premises, inter alia, on the ground of bonafide and reasonable personal necessity of suit premises. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant - petitioner moved an application under Order 6 r. 17 of the Code, representing that the plaintiff-non-petitioner had shifted to a. new residential accommodation in the Housing Board Colony and this was an important event having occurred subsequent to the institution of the suit and hence an amendment in the written statement was sought for. This amendment application was dis-allowed by the trial court vide its Against the order dated 26.7.1995 passed by Shri Ajai Singh, Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Bhilwara in Civil Original Case No. 171/86 Nanhu Lal v. Devi Lal order dated 2.5.94. This order was further subjected to a revision petition (No. 566/94) before the High Court and the same stood dismissed on 11.11.94 thereby upholding the order dated 2.5.94. Again, on 28.2.95, the defendant moved another similar amendment application for allowing amendment in the written statement seeking incorporating amendment in regard to partial eviction as per provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'). The plaintiff did not file any reply to such application and, lastly, vide its order dated 22.3.95, the learned trial judge, while rejecting such prayer for amendment in the written statement, having regard to the provisions of said sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, held that since it was the legal requirement of the law before the court could pass any decree for eviction of the defendant from the tenanted premises and, therefore, the law mandates that parties should he afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence for and against such partial eviction, if any and, therefore, he ordered for amendment of the issue in this respect and, accordingly, the issue was amended. The parties were allowed to lead evidence on this fact as well. 3. Admittedly, the order dated 22.3.95 was not challenged by either party. As regards the present controversy, while the defendant-petitioner was being examined in-chief before the trial court, the learned counsel for the defendant wanted to examine him in regard to partial eviction of the defendant from the suit premises by asking a question, which as translated, by the petitioner's side, into English, runs as follows : "what sort of difficulty the plaintiff is facing in living in his existing property, and in which particular property plaintiff is presently residing, and this property (wherein the plaintiff is residing) belongs to whom and how far it is from the premises in dispute, and how many rooms it contains, and in which position is the premise above the shop and whether anybody is residing in the same or not." 4. However, the same was seriously objected to by the plaintiff's side and consequently, an application was moved by the learned counsel for the defendant before the trial judge representing that the aforesaid question, which relates to the fact of partial eviction and since an amendment in the issue, as aforesaid, was allowed by the learned trial judge and hence the same being quite material in regard to establishment of fact of partial eviction under adjudication, must be allowed to be asked. However, though not objected to in writing by the plaintiff, on the oral objection raised by the plaintiff, after hearing both the parties, vide impugned order dated 26.7.95, the learned trial judge, though allowed the counsel for the defendant to examine him in regard to the condition of the upper story of the tenanted shop and whether anybody was residing in the same or not but, however, in regard to other facts borne out of the question quoted above, the defendant's prayer was rejected and hence being aggrieved by the same, this revision was filed. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and considered the legality and regularity of the same. 6. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and considered the legality and regularity of the same. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the learned trial judge, though rejected amendment application of the defendant vide order dated 2.5.94 and the same was upheld in the revision petition by the High Court, which however, as regards application dated 28.2.95, though requested amendment was not allowed but, keeping in view the mandatory provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act, allowed such application, without any formal amendment in the pleadings, by way of amendment in the issue itself and the parties were allowed to be examined in regard to the fact of partial eviction from the tenanted premises. On the contrary, vide its impugned judgment, the learned trial judge has proceeded to shut up evidence of the defendant as quoted above and this has resulted in gross injustice and material irregularity. 7. He has further contended that the plaintiff has brought such a suit on the ground mentioned in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act and consequently sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act mandates that no decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub- section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. 8. He has cited the case of Narsing Dass v. Jeth Mal (RLR 1988 (I) p. 656), wherein Hon'ble Mr. Milap Chandra Jain, J., while interpreting the purpose and intent of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, held that the question of partial eviction, not being a purely question of law, was also a question of fact and, therefore, an issue was required to be raised and the parties were required to lead evidence on the same. Milap Chandra Jain, J., while interpreting the purpose and intent of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, held that the question of partial eviction, not being a purely question of law, was also a question of fact and, therefore, an issue was required to be raised and the parties were required to lead evidence on the same. Besides, he has relied on the decision' rendered in ltahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand and others (AIR 1978 SC p. 413), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a similar matter, while interpreting the proviso to the explanation to Section 11(1)(h) of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, held that the proviso mandates the court to consider whether a partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be evicted. This aspect, therefore, requires judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both sides to lead evidence in this behalf. Therefore, the Hon'ble the Supreme Court was pleased to, direct the first appellate court to go into the question as to whether the reasonable requirement of the landlord may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises as contemplated in the proviso. If, after taking evidence, the court was satisfied that the entire house or premises must be vacated to fulfil the reasonable requirement of the landlord, the order was to stand, if, on the other hand the court finds, as a fact, that partial, eviction would meet the ends of justice, as visualised in the proviso, an appropriate order was to be passed on that footing. Thus the matter was remanded and further it was ordered that the parties were to be given an opportunity to lead evidence on this sole question and the appeal was to be disposed of in accordance with law. 9. Thus the matter was remanded and further it was ordered that the parties were to be given an opportunity to lead evidence on this sole question and the appeal was to be disposed of in accordance with law. 9. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that, though the learned trial judge had, initially because of the reasons mentioned in its order dated 2.5.94 and as also confirmed by the High Court in its revisional order dated 11.11.94, however, having regard to the mandatory provisions of the law as referred to above, the learned trial judge was compelled to amend the relevant issue in regard to partial eviction of the defendant - petitioner from the tenanted premises, as sought for by the defendant himself, and the issue was accordingly amended. The parties were allowed to lead evidence in regard to the requirements of the said issue and hence the defendant was legally entitled to have asked such a question which had direct bearing or the eviction of the defendant either from the whole of the tenanted premises or a part thereof. In this view of the matter, the learned trial judge has committed a serious error which has occasioned a failure of justice and this order is quite contrary to the one passed on 22.3.95 while amending the issue in regard to the partial eviction of the defendant-petitioner from the tenanted premises. 10. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the non- petitioner-plaintiff seriously contested this revision petition mainly on the ground that, keeping in view the provisions of Section 115 of the Code, since, vide its impugned order, the learned trial judge did not proceed to decide any dispute or matter and as such the same could not be subjected to a challenge by way of such a revision petition and, therefore, this revision petition was not maintainable. 11. He has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Baldev Das Shivlal and another, appellant v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others, respondents (AIR 1970 SC p. 406) , which has been followed by the Karnataka High Court in Murigappa, petitioner v. Channappa, respondent (AIR 1977 Karnataka 111) and has challenged the very maintainability of this revision petition itself. 12. 12. On consideration of the rival contentions of the parties, sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Codes reads as follows : "(1) The High Court may call for. the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally, or with material irregularity. the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit : provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where - (a) the order, if it had be made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Baldevdas. Shivlal (supra) while interpreting the provision of Section 115 of the Code observed as follows : "By Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court is invested with power to call for the record of any case decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, if such subordinate court appears:-(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, and to make such order in the case as it thinks fit. Exercise of the power is broadly subject to three important conditions (1) that the decision must be of a Court subordinate to the High Court; (2) that there must be a case which has been decided by the subordinate court; and (3) that the subordinate Court must appear to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed as follows : "It may also be observed that by ordering that a question may properly be put to a witness who was being examined, no case was decided by the Trial Court. The expression `case' is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in an action. This Court observed in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon (1964) 4 SCR 409 that the expression `case' is a word of comprehensive import : it includes a civil proceeding and is not restricted by anything contained in Section 115 of the Code to the entirety of the proceedings in a civil Court. To interpret the expression `case' as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceedings imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of powers of superintendence and may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and-may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. But it was not decided in Major S.S. Khanna's case, (1964) 4 SCR 409 (supra) that every order of the Court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 14. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 14. In the present case also, as discussed hereinbefore, though, the learned trial judge, having regard to the mandatory provisions of law, as required by the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act, felt compelled to amend the relevant issue in regard to the partial eviction from the suit premises and as is also necessary, also allowed the parties to lead evidence in this respect but, vide its impugned order, did not find any direct relevancy of the question, so disallowed vide its impugned order to be directly related and having a bearing on the decision of the said issue. Though, as regards its relevancy and admissibility, this is not the stage whereat such a question could be legally determined by the revisional court. As the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Baldev Das Shivlal and another's case (supra), by overruling an objection to a question put to a witness and allowing the question to be put, it cannot be said that the case, stands `decided' by the court in terms of revision under Section 115 of the Code, Similarly, when such a question is allowed, the position is the same. Similarly, in the case of Murigappa (supra), the Karnataka High Court has held, while interpreting the provisions of Section 115 of the Code, that every order of the court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case `decided' which could be subject matter of a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code. Similarly, in the case of Murigappa (supra), the Karnataka High Court has held, while interpreting the provisions of Section 115 of the Code, that every order of the court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case `decided' which could be subject matter of a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code. A case may be said to be decided, if the court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy and it is not each and every order in the suit that can be regarded as a `case decided' within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code and hence when any trial Judge allowed an objection and disallowed a question put to the witness or he overruled and allowed the question put to the witness, in either case, it cannot be said that the case is decided as such enabling the aggrieved party to challenge the same by way of revision petition. 15. In view of true purport, object and interpretation of the provisions of revision under Section 115 of the Code, since the impugned order, which merely disallowed the disputed question to be asked to the defendant in his examination-in-chief by his own counsel, cannot be said to have decided the case as required by sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code and as a result, on any of the grounds as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not enable the petitioner to challenge the same by way of revision petition. 16. Therefore, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner against the maintainability of this revision petition itself holds strong ground and as such this revision petition deserves to be dismissed. Further, when this revision petition is not maintainable, it is not permissible to embark upon adjudication of all the objections so advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In case irrelevant and/or inadmissible evidence stood allowed to be admitted or permitted to be adduced or, converse of it, in case admissible and/or relevant evidence has been allowed or disallowed to be adduced, it can be a ground to be agitated before the appellate court in appeal and not otherwise. 17. Therefore, this revision petition is dismissed as non- maintainable. 17. Therefore, this revision petition is dismissed as non- maintainable. However, it may be mentioned that the discussion made above would not effect the ultimate decision and discretion of the trial court in final decision of the suit pending before him. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this revision petition.Revision Dismissed. *******