JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 21.4.79 passed by Shri M.A.A. Khan, Additional Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar (as His Lordship then was), in Criminal Appeal No. 51/76. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the Food Inspector Ganganagar, took a sample of Jalebi weighing 15 gms. from the accused- respondent's possession who was found selling such sweet-meats on his shop situated in Dhan-Mandi, Ganganagar, on 11.11.72 at about 11.55 A.M. The Sample was duly packed and sealed as per the Rules. A sample was sent to the Public Analyst for examination, and, vide Ex.P 3, it was confirmed that the sample contained non-permitted Colter Dye and as such it was injurious to the public health. Consequently, the Food Inspector of Ganganagar, filed a complaint under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short "the Act"), the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ganganagar. The accused-respondent was tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and, after trial, holding the sample of the Jalebi to be adulterated, held the accused-respondent guilty of commission of an offence punishable under Section 7/16 of the Act, and, sentenced him to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, he was further required to undergo one months' R.I. Being aggrieved, accused-petitioner filed an appeal No. 51/76 in the court of Sessions Judge, Ganganagar, which was further transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar, and consequently, the same was decided vide judgment dated 15.3.77 and the same was accepted and the case was remanded to the trial court to afford an opportunity to the accused-respondent to be heard in regard to award of sentence as mandated by the Provisions of Section 248(2), Cr.P.C. However, this order of remand was challenged by way of Criminal Revision (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 262/77), before the High Court and the same was accepted vide order dated 18.11.78 and, accepting the revision petition, it was ordered that the appellate Court itself would afford an opportunity to the accused- respondent to be heard, as required by the provisions of Section 248(2), Cr.PC., and pass an appropriate order according to the Law. 3. 3. As a result, the learned presiding Judge of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, vide his impugned judgment and order dated 21.4.79, while confirming the judgment of the trial court as regards the conviction of the accused- respondent under Section 7/16 of the RF.A. Act, 1954, set aside the sentence of imprisonment and fine imposed on the accused-respondent and, instead, ordered to accused appellant (before the appellate Court) to be released on a probation of good conduct for a period of two years on furnishing of bail bonds in sum of Rs. 1,000/-each. Accordingly, accused-appellant furnished required bail bonds on 21.4.79 itself. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of release of the accused- respondent giving him the benefit of Provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, the State has come in appeal, as above. 5. I have heard the learned PP for the State as well as the learned counsel for the accused-respondent, perused the impugned order and judgment alongwith the record of the trial court. 6. The learned PP has vehemently argued that it was a serious case of adulteration of food stuff and. once the accused-respondent was found to be guilty of commission of such an offence and, was convicted by the trial court and the same having been affirmed by the appellant court, the learned appellate Judge fall into grave error, while extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. He also contended that there was a provision for a minimum sentence of six months' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/- besides an offence of adulteration of food articles is an anti-social and injurious to the health of the public and the accused-respondent, by way of adulteration of Jalebies, was benefiting himself economically at the cost of public health. Admixture of Coltar was by itself injurious to the health and, even then the learned trial Judge, after upholding the judgment of conviction of the accused-respondent, erroneously extended benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the Accused-respondent. Accused-respondent deserves to be awarded an exemplary sentence looking to the gravity of the offence. 7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the accused- respondent has contended that this occurrence took place on 11.11.72, while the impugned judgment and order were passed on 21.4.79. Thus the impugned order itself was passed about 17 years back. Accused-respondent deserves to be awarded an exemplary sentence looking to the gravity of the offence. 7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the accused- respondent has contended that this occurrence took place on 11.11.72, while the impugned judgment and order were passed on 21.4.79. Thus the impugned order itself was passed about 17 years back. Accused-respondent also filed bail bonds as per the order passed by the appellate court and the period of probation of two years also elapsed long back. There is no complaint that the accused-respondent, in any way, had indulged in such alleged anti-social acts again. Thus, accused-respondent has been of good conduct and he did not repeat commission of any offence so far. Therefore, after a lapse of about 24 years from the date of the incident and passing of the appellate judgment before about 17 years back, therefore, since there has been an extra ordinary delay in hearing this appeal for which the accused-respondent does not stand to be blamed and, therefore, it is not in the interest of justice that the accused-respondent should be awarded any sentence of imprisonment of fine, as contended by the learned P P 8. Having regard to the facts mentioned above, there is no denial of the fact that this case is pending for last about 24 years. The impugned order was also passed about 17 years back. The accused-respondent did not repeat commission of such offences so far and he has been of good conduct throughout the period of his release on probation and thereafter. Therefore, since a period of about 24 years has passed and the accused-respondent has been throughout of the good conduct and, as observed by the learned appellate Court, he has also left the business of sweet-meats and besides he has a family of six persons to support and having regard to the Provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. prior to 1.4.76 when new Section 20AA was added in the Act thereby prohibiting but the extension of benefit of Probation of Offenders Act as well as the Provisions of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, prior to it to the accused-respondent convicted under Section 7/16 of the Act, there was no prohibition against extending benefit of Probation of Offenders to the offence punishable under Section 7/16 of the PF.A Act. Therefore, the impugned order was not illegal or contrary to law and, therefore, it was within the judicial discretion of the trial Magistrate as well as the learned appellate judge, who thought it just and expedient in the interest of justice, having regard to the totality of the facts which are borne out of the impugned order, to give benefit of such Provisions to the respondent, therefore, the impugned order cannot be termed to be illegal unjust. improper or irregular so as to warrant interference by this Court. 9. In the result, having regard to the facts and circumstances discussed above, there is no justification for setting aside the impugned order and instead imposing sentence of imprisonment/fine of the accused-respondent. 10. Therefore, there is no merit in this appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed.This appeal is dismissed and the impugned order dated 21 4.79, is affirmed.Appeal dismissed. *******