Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. This appeal is against an order passed by a single Judge of this Court in Application No. 2230 of 1996 on 10.7.1996, appointing the 1st respondent herein as the trustee of the Wakf known as “Saidani Bibi and Masthan Owlia Durga and Makan Trust.” The Management of the trust is governed by a scheme framed in CS No. 43 of 1951 on 27.4.1954. It is provided in Clause 4 of the said Scheme that the Board of Trustees shall consist of three members and it shall be constituted as follows: I. One Member to be the hereditary member of the defendants family and after them one of their male issues desending either through sons or daughters to be appointed by this court for life, on the principle of the most eligible amongst them. On the extinction of the line of these two brothers, this hereditary trusteeship shall stand converted into an ordinary one and the trustee shall be appointed by the court. ii. The other two trustees shall be appointed by the court and they shall hold office for a period of 5 years. 2. The 1st defendant in the suit was one P.A. Gulam Dastagit Rowther. The 1st respondent in this appeal filed Application No. 2230 of 1996, which, according to learned counsel for the applicants, was numbered earlier as Application No. 1637 of 1995. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants that by mistake the Registry has duplicated the numbering and the same application, which had the number 1637 of 1995, was later numbered as No. 2230 of 1996. Even so, the order of the learned Judge has been made only in Application No. 2230 of 1996 and this appeal also refers only to that number. 3. In the said application, the 1st respondent herein claimed that he is the only son of the 1st defendant in C.S. No. 43 of 1951 and thereby entitled to be appointed as the hereditary trustee. The application was opposed by the appellants herein. In the counter affidavit, the appellants stated that the burden was on the 1st respondent herein to prove his relationship with the 1st defendant in the suit. It was also contended by the appellants that the application was not maintainable, as the permission of the Wakf Board had not been obtained. The application was opposed by the appellants herein. In the counter affidavit, the appellants stated that the burden was on the 1st respondent herein to prove his relationship with the 1st defendant in the suit. It was also contended by the appellants that the application was not maintainable, as the permission of the Wakf Board had not been obtained. It was also contended that the applicant/1st respondent herein was not a trustee and therefore, he had no locus standi to file the application. In the additional counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants, similar contentions were reiterated. 4. The learned Judge, who heard the application, passed an order rejecting the contentions of the appellants and appointing the 1st respondent herein as trustee. It is the said order that is challenged in this appeal. 5. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that the 1st respondent has failed to prove his relationship with the 1st defendant in the suit. When a specific averment has been made by the 1st respondent in his affidavit filed in support of the application for the appointment of hereditary trustee, the appellants herein did not have the courage to dispute the same. They did not categorically or specifically say that the 1st respondent herein was not in any way related to the 1st defendant in the suit or that he was not the son of the 1st defendant. On the other hand, a vague allegation was made in the counter as well as additional counter affidavit, that it was for the 1st respondent herein to prove the relationship with the 1st defendant in the suit. The learned Judge has rightly rejected the said contention after observing that they have not come forward with a specific case on the said aspect of the matter. 6. The second contention urged by learned counsel for the appellants is that it is necessary for the 1st respondent to have obtained the permission of the Wakf Board before filing the application. Our attention is drawn to S. 56 of the Wakfs Act, 1954. 6. The second contention urged by learned counsel for the appellants is that it is necessary for the 1st respondent to have obtained the permission of the Wakf Board before filing the application. Our attention is drawn to S. 56 of the Wakfs Act, 1954. Under that section, no suit shall be instituted against the Board in respect of any act purporting to be done by it in pursuance of that Act or of any rules made thereunder, until, the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to, or left at, the office of the Board, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. That section cannot apply to the present case, as that will apply only to suits instituted against the Wakf Board. This is not an application against the Wakf Board as such; but it is a dispute, if at all, between a person who is claiming to be an heir of the 1st defendant in CS. No. 43 of 1951 and the appellants herein, who claim to be in management of the said trust. 7. The next contention urged by learned counsel for the appellants is that the 1st respondent herein not being a trustee, has no locus standi to maintain the application. For this purpose reliance is placed on clause 8 of the Scheme decree. According to that clause, the Trustee shall be at liberty to ask for directions of this court to carry out the objects of the Trust or in regard to its management, It is argued that the 1st respondent not being a Trustee cannot maintain the application. There is no substance in this contention. The 1st respondent has come forward with a prayer to recognise him as the hereditary trustee by virtue of the provisions contained in clause 4 of the Scheme Decree. For such an application, clause 8 will not at all apply and no reliance can be placed thereon. 8. It is next argued that the remedy of the 1st respondent is to move only the Wakf Board and he cannot approach the Civil court for any relief. There is no merit in this contention also. For such an application, clause 8 will not at all apply and no reliance can be placed thereon. 8. It is next argued that the remedy of the 1st respondent is to move only the Wakf Board and he cannot approach the Civil court for any relief. There is no merit in this contention also. It is contended that once the Wakf Board has notified the Trust as a Wakf, the provisions of the Scheme become ineffective and they are no longer in force. This contention was urged before the learned Judge also and he found that there was no substance in that contention. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge. It has been held repeatedly by this court that the notification under Wakfs Act or the management of the day to day affairs of the Wakf Board will not in any way suspend or affect the operation of a Scheme decree passed by a civil court. 9. In the Palani Muslim Dharmaparipalana Sangam through its office Bearer, Paini v. Wakf Board ( 1975 (I) MLJ 201 = 88 L.W. 2), a judge of this Court held that the power of general superintendence of all wakfs in the State vested under Section 15 of the Wakfs Act, 1964 in the Wakf Board does not extend to nullify or ignore or supersede a scheme settled by a decree of court for the administration of the Wakf and so long as the decree is in existence and has not been modified or set aside or reversed, the Wakf Board has no jurisdiction to ignore iit and act contrary to its general powers ot superintendence under section 15 of the Act 10. A similar view has been expressed by another learned judge of this court in Syed Peer Shah Mohideen Kadiri v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board (89 LW 708). A similar view has been expressed by another learned judge of this court in Syed Peer Shah Mohideen Kadiri v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board (89 LW 708). In that case, the learned Judge observed that in respect of an institution, for which a scheme had been framed by the Civil Court, the Wakf Board cannot file an application under Sec. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, for issuing directions to the effect that the framed by the court shall be deemed to be the scheme framed by the Wakf Board, in order to enable it to manage and administer the same in their own right and in effect to substitute themselves as the authors of the scheme in the place of the Civil Court, which originally framed the scheme. In that case, the learned Judge reversed the order passed by the lower court granting the prayer of the Wakf Board and held that there was wrong application of the law on the subject. The learned Judge also said that when a scheme has been framed by a civil court prior to the passing of the Wakf Act then it shall prevail and shall be taken as the basis by the Wakf Board for administering a particular Wakf for which that scheme has been framed. That has no application to the facts of this case. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the judgment of a Full Bench in Mohd. Jacoo v. Dist. Collector (AIR 1962 Kerala 343). That is a case in which the scope and interpretation of S. 55 of the Wakfs Act was considered. The question whether it impliedly repealed S. 92 and 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act, was considered. That ruling has no relevance whatever in the present case. 12. Our attention is drawn to the judgment of a single Judge of this court in Rahmath Bi v. State Wakf Board ( AIR 1982 Mad 202 ). The court held that no exception can be made to the explicit terms of section 56 of the Wakfs Act on account of consideration of hardship and absence of prejudice or detriment. It was pointed out that the plaintiff therein could not be allowed to withdraw the suit under Order 23, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure and the failure to comply with the provisions of sec. It was pointed out that the plaintiff therein could not be allowed to withdraw the suit under Order 23, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure and the failure to comply with the provisions of sec. 56 of the Wakfs Act was not a defect, which could be equated to a formal defect contemplated by Order 23, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, as it was a radical defect going to the root of the claim of the plaintiff. The learned Judge held that the terms of Sec. 56 were express, explicit and mandatory and admitted of no exception. The ruling has no relevance whatever in the present case. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon a judgment of a single Judge of this court in Yusuf v. T.N. Wakf Board ( 1982 (I) MLJ 245 ). In that case, the Wakf Board filed an application before the trial court for transfer of the absolute control of the Wakf and its properties for the day to day management, including the power to appoint Muthavalli on the basis that after the passing of the Wakfs Act, the general superintendence of all Wakfs vested in the Wakf Board under Sec. 15(1) of the Act. The learned Judge held that suchan application was maintainable and the prayer could be granted. As pointed out already, it was an application by the Wakf Board itself and the ruling has no bearing on the facts of the present case. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants was fair enough to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ghouse v. Mohammad Kuthubudin. ( AIR 1985 SC 375 = (1986) 99 L.W. 4), in which, it was held that a suit under Section 52, Code of Civil Procedure, filed prior to the enactment of the Wakfs Act did not abate on coming into force of the said Act. The court held that a decree passed in the suit framing scheme for the wakf, after the enactment of the Wakfs Act, was not void and unenforceable. In a way, the ruling of the Supreme Court will go against the contention put forward by learned counsel for the appellants. 15. The court held that a decree passed in the suit framing scheme for the wakf, after the enactment of the Wakfs Act, was not void and unenforceable. In a way, the ruling of the Supreme Court will go against the contention put forward by learned counsel for the appellants. 15. In Abuthagir v. Peer Mohammed ( 1992 (I) MLJ 172 ), a Division Bench of this Court held that the Special Officer of a Wakf Board ought not to have framed a suo motu scheme without notice to interested persons. The court held that the suo motu scheme was against all the established procedures and norms and therefore, not valid. This ruling does not help the appellants in this case. 16. Thus, we do not find any merit in any of the contentions urged by learned counsel for the appellants. Hence, we reject the same and dismiss the appeal. No costs.