ORDER : J.S. Verma, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench dated 31-8-1989 in WP No. 7815 of 1986. The writ petition was filed by some Private Secretaries to the learned Judges of the High Court by which a challenge was made to an order dated 9-7-1982 (Annexure IV) in the form of a letter of the State Government to the High Court. That letter referred to the decision taken on the recommendations of the Second Pay Commission (1979-80) of U.P. in regard to selection grade and conveyed the sanction of the Governor to 15% posts in the selection grade of Private Secretaries with a higher pay scale. The High Court came to the conclusion that the creation of 15% selection posts in the cadre of Private Secretaries amounted to creation of two grades therein, namely, selection and non-selection grades which is discriminatory and arbitrary. Consequently, the High Court directed that all Private Secretaries attached to the learned Judges of the High Court were entitled to the same pay scale which was specified for the selection grade post. The writ petition was allowed in this manner and a mandamus was issued directing the placing of all the Private Secretaries in the grade prescribed for the selection post. This appeal by special leave is against that judgment. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we have formed the opinion that this appeal has to be allowed. Creation of some selection posts in the same cadre is well known and, therefore, by itself cannot be treated as arbitrary or discriminatory. It is sufficient to refer to the decision in State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 . for this purpose wherein a similar dispute arose amongst the Bench Secretaries of the same High Court. Shetty, J. speaking for the Bench reiterated the position thus: (SCC pp. 135 & 136, paras 29 & 31) "Even in Randhir Singh case, Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 , this principle has been recognised. O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed that the classification of officers into two grades with different scales of pay based either on academic qualification or experience on (sic or) length of service is sustainable. O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed that the classification of officers into two grades with different scales of pay based either on academic qualification or experience on (sic or) length of service is sustainable. Apart from that, higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is very common in career service. There is selection grade for District Judges. There is senior time-scale in Indian Administrative Service. There is super time-scale in other like services. The entitlement to these higher pay scales depends upon seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority. The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination. The classification based on experience is reasonable classification. It has a rational nexus with the object thereof. To hold otherwise, it would be detrimental to the interest of the service itself. * * * In the present case, all Bench Secretaries may do the same work, but their quality of work may differ. Under the rules framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court, Bench Secretaries Grade I are selected by a Selection Committee. The selection is based on merit with due regards to seniority. They are selected among the lot of Bench Secretaries Grade II. When Bench Secretaries Grade II acquire experience and also display more merit, they are appointed as Bench Secretaries Grade I. The rules thus make a proper classification for the purpose of entitlement to higher pay scale. The High Court has completely overlooked the criterion provided under the Rules. The merit governs the grant of higher pay scale and that merit will be evaluated by a competent authority. The classification made under the Rules, therefore, cannot be said to be violative of the right to have equal pay for equal work." 3. It is, therefore, obvious that the view taken by the High Court is contrary to the settled principles of service jurisprudence and cannot be sustained. We may also add that the ultimate direction given by the High Court requiring all Private Secretaries to be given the pay scale of the selection grade is even more untenable. However, in view of the conclusion reached by us that there was no basis to quash the creation of 15% selection posts in the cadre, it is not necessary to deal further with the other aspect. 4. However, in view of the conclusion reached by us that there was no basis to quash the creation of 15% selection posts in the cadre, it is not necessary to deal further with the other aspect. 4. It was stated at the Bar that the effect of this decision is only for the period prior to 1-1-1986 since after that date, there is another judgment which covers the period and there is a different higher pay scale in effect from that date. 5. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside resulting in dismissal of the writ petition filed in the High Court. 6. No costs.