R. R. K. TRIVEDI, J. In this writ peti tion, Sri S. N. Upadhyay appeared for respondent No. 1 and Sri Vijaya Bahadur Singh appeared for respondent No. 2 Learned counsel for the parties have agreed that this writ petition may be disposed of finally at this stage. 2. The facts, in short, necessary for appreciation of the controversy are that the petitioner Dr. Indrapal Singh was ap pointed Vice Chancellor of Chandra Shek har Azad University of Agriculture and Technology (here-in-after referred to as university) by the Chancellor by his order dated 14th April, 1994 for a period of three years. A copy of the order of appointment has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. He assumed charge of the office of vice Chancellor in pursuance of the aforesaid appointment on 23rd April, 1994, The Chancellor, however, vide order dated 6th June, 1996 has suspended petitioner with full pay. This order has been passed on various allegations of corrupt practices, abuse of power, favoritism, financial ir regularities etc. By another order of the same day, respondent No. 2 Sri Prabhat Chandra Chaturvedi, Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur has been appointed as Vice Chancellor to discharge the duty during the period of suspension. The legality and correctness of the aforesaid two orders has been questioned by petitioner by filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that under Section 11 of Uttar Pradesh (Krishi Evam Prodyogik Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam), 1958, (here in-after referred to as Act), the appoint ment of the petitioner was for three years and in view of the provisions contained in sub-Section (2), (4) and (6) of Section 11, the petitioner cannot be suspended from his office which amounts to curtailment of the tenure of three years prescribed by law. It has been further submitted that in whole of the Act or Statute framed therein, there is no provision conferring power on the Chan cellor to suspend or dismiss Vice- Chancel lor during period of three years and in the circumstances the order is without authority of law. It has been further submitted that in whole of the Act or Statute framed therein, there is no provision conferring power on the Chan cellor to suspend or dismiss Vice- Chancel lor during period of three years and in the circumstances the order is without authority of law. It has also been submitted that Section 16 of Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1994 will not be applicable in the present case in view of the provisions contained in sub-Section (2) and Sub-Sec tion) of Section 11 of the Act, which clear ly express contrary intention that the period of tenure of the Vice- Chancellor shall be three years. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that Section 11 (2) of the Act is not subject to pleasure of Vice-Chancellor. The term of three years provided therein is a condition of service which cannot be changed after appoint ment, a provided under Sub-Section (4) of Section 11 of the Act. The provisions of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act are clearly excluded. It has also been submitted that the alleged enquiry directed against petitioner is wholly futile exercise as petitioner cannot be dismissed from service until he completes the period of three years. Learned counsel has also assailed the appointment of respondent No. 2 under Sec tion 11 (6) (a) of the Act on the ground that there is no vacancy and the respondent No. 2 cannot be appointed as Vice-Chancellor. Learned counsel has also submitted that if petitioner has been appointed as Vice-Chancellor and if he is not permitted to work, it is highly improper and the orders cannot be sustained merely on the ground that the pay and emoluments of petitioner have not been effected. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in cases of PK. Chinnasamy v. . Government of Tamil Nadu and others, reported in A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 78, Professor Pratima Asthana v. Chan cellor, Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur and others, reported in (1991) 1 U. P. L. B. E. C. 448 (D. B.)and Professor B. S. Rajput v. Chan cellor and another, reported in (1995)2 UPLBEC 818 (D. B ). 4. Chinnasamy v. . Government of Tamil Nadu and others, reported in A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 78, Professor Pratima Asthana v. Chan cellor, Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur and others, reported in (1991) 1 U. P. L. B. E. C. 448 (D. B.)and Professor B. S. Rajput v. Chan cellor and another, reported in (1995)2 UPLBEC 818 (D. B ). 4. Sri Vijaya Bahadur Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, in reply, submitted that the power to appoint includes power to suspend, dismiss, remove or otherwise terminate the tenure of the office of the person appointed, by virtue of Section 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 and the order of suspension is fully justified. The order does not curtail pay and emoluments or any other benefit of the petitioner. By the impugned order only his activities have been brought to an end. During period of enquiry it could be prejudicial to the interest of the University and the enquiry. Learned counsel has sub mitted that there is no provision in the Act or the statute indicating the contrary inten tion that Section 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act will not be applicable in the present case. Learned counsel has sub mitted that under C1. (a) of Section 11 (6) of the Act, respondent No. 2 could be ap pointed as petitioner is incapable of functioning as Vice-Chancellor in view of the order passed against him during pen dency of the enquiry, this situation shall be covered by the Phrase any cause and the appointment is perfectly legal and justified. Learned counsel has submitted that con sidering seriousness of the charges the Chancellor had no option but to suspend the petitioner. It has been further submitted that Section 11 (6) of the Act provides three circumstances out of which clause (a) will apply to cases of suspension. The Statute has only fixed outer limit of the term of office at the time of appointment, Learned counsel has also submitted that the office of Vice-Chancellor is very high and respected office and if the person appointed in such office, acts in any manner prejudicial to the interest of the University, he can be suspended. It can not be the intention of the law that he should be continued in office irrespective of the charges alleged against him. It can not be the intention of the law that he should be continued in office irrespective of the charges alleged against him. Learned counsel has placed reliance in cases of Acharya Prabhakar Mishra v. The Chancellor and another, reported in A. I. R. 1972, Pat 393, The Vice Chancellor, Jammu University and another v. Dushinant Kumar Rampal, reported in A. I. R. 1977s. C. , 1146, Dr. Boolchand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University, reported in A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 292, Mis Heckett Engineering Co. v. Their Workmen, reported in A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 2257, Pradyat Kumar Base v. The Honble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court reported in A. I. R. 1956 S. C, 285, Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari and ors. , reported in J. T. 1996 (3) S. C. 96, : 1996 (2) LBESR 263 (SC), Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasah; reported in. T. 1996 (3) S. C. 202 : 1996 (2) LBESR 262 (SC), U. P. Rajya Ktishi Utapadan Mandi Parishad & Ors. v. Saniv Rajan, reported in J. T. 1993 (2) S. C. 550, Professor B. S. Rajput-v. Chancellor and another, reported in (1995)2 UPLBEC 818. 5. Sri Ramesh Upadhyay, holding brief of Sri S. N. Upadhyaya, appearing for respondent No. 1 has submitted that in case of Professor Pratima Asthana v. Chancellor, Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur and others, reported in (1991)1 UPLBEC 448, the order of suspension was quashed on the ground of delay in enquiry and was under the provisions of U. P. State Universities Act 1973. The case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is clearly distin guishable. It has also been submitted that in case tenure is fixed, it does not amount to express contrary intention so as to exclude the provisions of Section 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. The order of suspen sion by respondent No. 1 is perfectly jus tified in the facts and circumstances of the case and it does not suffer from any error of law. It has been submitted that interference by this court under Article 226 of the Con stitution at this stage will not be in the interest of the University. 6. I have seriously considered the sub mission of the learned counsel for the par ties. It has been submitted that interference by this court under Article 226 of the Con stitution at this stage will not be in the interest of the University. 6. I have seriously considered the sub mission of the learned counsel for the par ties. Learned counsel for the parties though have referred to certain charges during ar guments but the main thrust through out the arguments was about the question of the authority on the part of the Chancellor to dismiss and suspend the Vice-Chancellor after appointmentand further as the en quiry is pending, it does not appear neces sary to discuss the charges which have been mentioned in the impugned order. The ap pointment of the Vice-Chancellor of the University is provided u/s. 11 of the Act. As controversy which is subject matter of this writ petition, is about interpretation of various provisions of S. 11 of the Act, the relevant portion of it is being reproduced below for better appreciation:- "11 (1)-The (Kulpati) shall be a whole-time officer of the University. The First (Kulpati)-after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Vishwavidyalaya (Sanshodhan) Ad-hyadesh, 1966, shall be appointed by the (Kulad hipati ). The subsequent (Kulpati) shall be ap pointed by the (Kuladhipati) out of a panel of three persons nominated by a committe consisting of a representative of the Board chosen in the prescribed manner and two other. members ap pointed by the State Government. (2) The term of office of the (Kulpati) shall be three years. (4) The employments and other conditions of service of (Kulpati) shall be such as may be prescribed and shall not be varied to his disad vantage appointment. (6) In any of the following circumstances (of the existence of which the Kuladhipati (Chancel lor) shall be the sole Judge) the Kuladhipati (Cha ncellor) may appoint any suitable person to the office of the Kulpati (Vice-Chancellor) for such term not exceeding six months as he may specify. (a) Where a vacancy in the office of the Kulpati (Vice-chancellor) occurs or is likely to occur by reason of leave or any cause not being expiry of term. (b) Where a vacancy in the office of the Kulapti (Vice-chancellor) occurs and it cannot be conveniently and expeditiously filled in. (c) Any other emergency. (a) Where a vacancy in the office of the Kulpati (Vice-chancellor) occurs or is likely to occur by reason of leave or any cause not being expiry of term. (b) Where a vacancy in the office of the Kulapti (Vice-chancellor) occurs and it cannot be conveniently and expeditiously filled in. (c) Any other emergency. Provided that the Chancellor (Kuladhipati) may from time to time extend the term of appoint ment of any person to the office of the Kulpati (Vice-Chancellor) under this sub-section, so how ever, that the total term of such appointment (including the term, fixed in the original order) does not exceed one year. " 7. The principal submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that sub-Section (2) of Section 11 of the Act fixes the term of three years for the office of the Vice- Chancellor of the University and as the term has been fixed by the statute itself it cannot be curtailed in any way. Sub-Section (4) of Section 11 of the Act further provides that the emoluments and other conditions of service of Vice-Chancellor shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appoint ment. Learned counsel has submitted that term of the office is essentially the condition of service and sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 11 if read together they clearly con tain a contrary intention and the provisions of Section 16 of U. P. General Clauses Act can not be attracted. Section 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 is para-materia of Section 16 of the Central General Clauses Act and the difference is only that it also includes the other ways of terminating tenure of office and is wider in scope. Sec tion 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act is being reproduced below:- "where, by any Uttar Pradesh Act, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, un less a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being power to make the appo intment shall also have power to suspend, dism iss, remove or otherwise, terminate the tenure of office of any person appointed, whether by itself or by any other authority in rexrcise of that power" 8. Learned counsel for the respon dents, on the other hand, has submitted that under Sub-Section (2) of Section 11 only outer limit has been fixed for purposes of making appointment and there is nothing in Sub-Section (4) on which basis it may be said that the provisions contained contrary in tention so as to exclude the application of Section 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. Learned counsel have also referred to the emoluments, terms and conditions of the service of Vice-Chancellor as provided in Chapter XX of the 1st Statute of the University and has submitted that the Statute also does not contain any provision on which basis the application of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act may be excluded. 9. It is true that the term of office is a condition of service. However a close read ing of Sub-Section (2) and Sub-Section (4) indicates that the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been separately mentioned in Sub-Section (2 ). Sub-Section (4) of Sec tion 11 of the Act refers only to employ ments and other conditions of service. The word other placed before word condition in Sub-Section (4) is of significance. In my opinion, the word other has been used only to exclude the three years term of office if the Vice-Chancellor which has been separately dealt with in Sub-Section (2) of Section 11 of the Act. Thus Sub-Section (4) of Section 11 of the Act provides that the emoluments and conditions of service (other than the term of office), shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appoint ment. The intention of the legislature is clear from the use of the language in sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (4 ). The inten tion appears to be that legislature has kept the power of Chancellor intact to suspend or dismiss with the help of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act which codified the well-known rule of general law that the power to terminate flows naturally and as a necessary sequence from the power to cre ate. In other words, it is a "necessary adjunct" of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to or consequence of the power. In other words, it is a "necessary adjunct" of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to or consequence of the power. The authority to call such officer into being necessarily implies the authority to terminate his functions when their exercise is no longer necessary or to remove the incumbent for an abuse of those functions or for other causes shown. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that sub-Section (2) of Section 11 of the Act contains a contrary intention so as to exclude the application of provisions of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act cannot be accepted. The provisions contained in sub-section (2) are only with regard to the appointment that Chancellor while making appointment of the Vice-Chancellor initially, the term provided shall not be less than three years. In identical situation, a-Division Bench of the Patna High Court in case of Acharya Prabhakar misra v. The Chancellor and another, reported in A. I. R. 1972 Pat 393 repelled the identical contentions. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench of Patna High Court were interpret ing Sub-Section 10 (2) of Shri Kameshwar Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya Act, 1962 which contained the identical words and provided that the Vice- Chancel lor shall be appointed by the Chancellor on such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Chancellor and hold office for a term of three years from the date he assumes charge of his office and the said term of three years shall include any further period which may elapse between the expiration of the said three years and the date on which his successor assumes charge of his office. Thus the learned Judges of the aforesaid Division Bench Specifically held that Sec tion 19 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917 shall be applicable. The Division Bench placed reliance in case of Dr. Bool Chand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University reported in A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 292. Honble Supreme Court while interpreting Cl 4. (vii) of the statute which prescribes that the appointment of the Vice- Chancel lor shall ordinarily be for a period of three years, held that Cl. The Division Bench placed reliance in case of Dr. Bool Chand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University reported in A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 292. Honble Supreme Court while interpreting Cl 4. (vii) of the statute which prescribes that the appointment of the Vice- Chancel lor shall ordinarily be for a period of three years, held that Cl. 4 (vii) does not purport to confer upon a person appointed Vice-Chancellor an indefeasible right to continue in office for three years ; the clause merely places a restriction upon the power of the Chancellor when fixing the tenure of the office of Vice-Chancellor. Honble Supreme Court in para 8 of the judgment observed as under:- "we are unable to agree with that conten tion. It is true, the office of the Vice-Chancellor of a University is one of great responsibility and carries with it considerable prestige and authority. But we are unable to hold that a person appointed a vice-Chancellor is entitled to continue in office for the full period of his appointment even if it turns out that he is physically decrepit, mentally infirm, or grossly immoral. Absence of a provision, setting up procedure for determining the employ ment of the Vice-Chancellor in the Act or the Statutes or Ordinances does not in our judgment, lead to the inference that the tenure of office of Vice-Chancellor is not liable to be determined. The first contention raised by counsel for, the appellant must therefore fail. " 10. The Division Bench of the Patna High Court noticed that the aforesaid view of the Honble Supreme Court was not based on the word ordinarily used in Cl. 4 (vii) of the Statute which was subject-matter of the consideration in case of Bool Chand. In my opinion, the aforesaid two cases are squarely applicable in the present case. As already stated above, from perusal of sub section (2) and sub-Section (4) there is nothing to infer that they contained any contrary intention to exclude the applica tion of Section 16 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. The order suspending petitioner does not suffer from want of authority or any legal infirmity. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner also assailed the appointment of respon dent No. 2 as Vice- Chancellor. However the contention does not appear to be correct. Cl. The order suspending petitioner does not suffer from want of authority or any legal infirmity. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner also assailed the appointment of respon dent No. 2 as Vice- Chancellor. However the contention does not appear to be correct. Cl. (a) of sub-Section (6) of Section 11 clearly covers the present situation where the Vice-Chancellor has been put under suspension, somebody has to be appointed as vice-Chancellor for the discharge of the duties of the office of Vice- Chancellor. The word and cause used in Cl. (a) of sub-Sec tion (6) of Section 11 is wide enough to include the present situation. The appoint ment of respondent No. 2 as Vice-Chancel lor thus is also legal and justified and does not suffer from any illegality. 12. At this place it is also required to be mentioned that the impugned order specifi cally mentions that the petitioner shall con tinue to receive same salary. The impugned order does not violate sub-Section (4) of Section 11 of the Act in any manner. The order of Suspension thus does not cast any prejudice to petitioner. He has only been kept away from the office so that he may not indulge in the identical activities about which complaints have been made against him and he may not create any hindrance in completing the enquiry against him. The exercise of power appears to be bonafide and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case and does not call for any inter ference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on certain cases which have been mentioned above. I have perused the cases and in my opinion they do not help petitioner in any manner. In case of Profes sor Pratima Asthana the Division Bench of this Court interfered on the ground of delay caused in enquiry against the Vice-Chancel lor. The provisions of U. P. State Univer sities Act, 1973 which were subject matter of the consideration before the Division Bench are different from the provisions of the Act. In that case the Ordinance was promulgated conferring the power of suspension of Vice-Chancellor. In case of Professor B. S. Rajput also the facts are dis tinguishable as the provisions of U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 had already been amended by U. P. Act No. 20 of 1994. In that case the Ordinance was promulgated conferring the power of suspension of Vice-Chancellor. In case of Professor B. S. Rajput also the facts are dis tinguishable as the provisions of U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 had already been amended by U. P. Act No. 20 of 1994. Thus the aforesaid two Division Bench cases are not applicable in the present case. In case of Dr. Bool Chand referred to above, Honble Supreme Court while upholding the power of Chancellor to suspend, terminate or dis miss the Vice-Chancellor left a note of cau tion on basis of the observations in case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani, reported in A. I. R. 1967 SC, 1269. The ob servations are reproduced below:- "it is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would therefore arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed; it need not be shown to be super- added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance there of transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case. The power to appoint a Vice-Chancellor has its source in the University Act; investment of that power carries with it the power to determine the employment; but the power is coupled with duty. The power may not be exercised arbitrarily; it can be only exercised for good cause i. e. in the inter ests of the University and only when it is found after due enquiry held in manner consistent with the rules of natural justice, that the holder of the office is unfit to continue as Vice-Chancellor. " The aforesaid caution has to be kept in mind by the respondents in the present case also. The dignity and the importance of the office of Vice-Chancellor should not be un dermined in any manner. It is expected that the enquiry directed by respondent No. 1 shall be fair and shall be concluded ex- peditiously without any delay. 14. " The aforesaid caution has to be kept in mind by the respondents in the present case also. The dignity and the importance of the office of Vice-Chancellor should not be un dermined in any manner. It is expected that the enquiry directed by respondent No. 1 shall be fair and shall be concluded ex- peditiously without any delay. 14. Subject to aforesaid observations, this writ petition is rejected. There will be no order as to costs. Petition rejected .