J. C. GUPTA, J. This petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed with the prayers to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the charge-sheet dated 5-10-77 (Annexure-1), the finding of guilty dated 7-11-77 (Annexure 3-A) sentence order dated 7-11-77 the confirmation order dated 3rd December, 1977 (Annexure-6) and appellate order dated 31st January, 1979 (Annexure-8) and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties to treat the petitioner in service. 2. The petitioner was appointed as sepoy on 12-7-65 in the Army Medical Cor. and was posted at Lucknow. He was promoted on the post of Paid Acting Naik in the year 1975. While serving as Laboratory Assistant in the Military Hospital, Fatehgarh, the petitioner was duly tried by the District Court Martial for the following charge for committing a civil offence under Section 69 of the Army Act. in the he, at Fatehgarh, on 14th June 77, while working as Lab Assistant Military Hospital, directly accepted for himself from No. 4445174 Sep Saroop Singh of Depot Coy Sikh Li Regimental Centre, Fatehgarh, the sum of Rs. 100/- (Rupees one hundred only) a gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive for doing anofficial set, to with, to give normal blood report in respect of Shri Autar Singh, a civilian, for favour of enrolment. Place: Fatehgarh (U. P.) Dated 3-11-1977 Sd. /- (Nabasu) Ltd. Col. Commanding Military Hospital Fatehgarh. " "the accused No. 13905006 Sepoy/lab Assistant (Paid Acting Naik) Ram Ashish Singh, Military Hospital, Fatehgarh is charged with: - COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, BEING A PUBLIC SER VANT TAKING GRATIFICATION OTHER THAN LEGAL REMUNERATION IN RESPECT OF AN OFFICIAL ACT CON TRARY TO SECTION 161 OF THE IN DIAN PENAL CODE. 3. The District Court Martial was held on 24-10-77. Lt. Col. A. K. Arora of Sikh Light Infantry Regimental Centre presided the District Court Martial. The two other members were Major Behat Sureshwar and Major Devendra Pratap Singh. Major Satya Kumar Singh was ap pointed as Judge Advocate. The petitioner was also provided a defence Counsel Sri S. S. Chauhan. The Defending Officer Capt. Vijay Pal Singh was also provided by the competent authority. The petitioner was served with a copy of the charge- sheet to which he pleaded not guilty. Major Satya Kumar Singh was ap pointed as Judge Advocate. The petitioner was also provided a defence Counsel Sri S. S. Chauhan. The Defending Officer Capt. Vijay Pal Singh was also provided by the competent authority. The petitioner was served with a copy of the charge- sheet to which he pleaded not guilty. Before the District Court Martial a number of wit nesses were examined, who were duly cross-examined on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner also examined Sepoy/aa/shayam Lal Ram in his defence. The prosecution submitted a written closing Address to the District Court Martial and the petitioners Coun sel also submitted his written Closing Ad dress in support of the defence case, copy of which has been annexed with the peti tion. The District Court Martial found the petitioner guilty of the above mentioned charge and the findings were announced in open Court. The District Court Martial vide order dated 7-11-77 passed the order of sentence in the following terms: (1 ). To be reduced to the ranks: (2 ). To suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year; and (3 ). To be dismissed from the service. 4. The sentence was announced in open Court and was subject to confirma tion. Brigadier Commander Lucknow Sub Area confirmed the finding and sen tence of the District Court Martial, but set aside that part of the sentence which directed the petitioner to be reduced to the ranks. The rest of the order of sentence was confirmed. The petitioner then filed a petition under Section 164 (2) of the Army Act, 1950 (Act for short), praying that the sentence awarded by the District Court Martial as confirmed by the Brigadier Commander Lucknow Sub-Area, be set aside. This petition was, however, rejected by the Chief of the Army Staff, which order was communicated to the petitioner through letter dated 31-1-79. Aggrieved by the said action, the petitioner has ap proached this Court through this petition. The orders of the District Court Martial and of other authorities have been chal lenged on various grounds. 5. This petition was, however, rejected by the Chief of the Army Staff, which order was communicated to the petitioner through letter dated 31-1-79. Aggrieved by the said action, the petitioner has ap proached this Court through this petition. The orders of the District Court Martial and of other authorities have been chal lenged on various grounds. 5. Firstly, it is alleged that the petitioner was not a public servant within the definition of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and this fact is admitted in paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit, wherein it is stated that the petitioner was not a public servant and as such no prior sanction for holding District Court Mar tial from the Central Government was re quired. Since the charge mentioned that the petitioner committed the civil offence being a public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act contrary to Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, trial stood vitiated because of this defect. The learned Stand ing Counsel appearing for the respon dents argued that in the charge-sheet it is clearly mentioned that charge was framed in respect of Section 69 of the Army Act. Section 69 of the Army Act permits trial by the Court Martial of persons subject to the Act, who at any place in or beyond India commits any civil offence and the said person would be deemed to be guilty of an offence under this Act, if charged under this Section. Civil Offence has been defined in Section 3 (2) of the Act as an offence, which is triable by a criminal Court. 6. Civil offence can be sub-divided into three classes, viz. (a) civil offences covered by Section 69 of the Army Act which may be tried by a Court martial; (b) civil offences not ordinarily triable by a Court martial (Section 70); (c) civil offen ces over which the civil and military Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. They are covered Sections 125 and 126of the Act. 7. The charge against the petitioner was that while working as Lab Assistant in Military Hospital at Fatehgarh on 14-6-77 he accepted for himself from No. 4445174 Sepoy Saroop Singh a sum of Rs. They are covered Sections 125 and 126of the Act. 7. The charge against the petitioner was that while working as Lab Assistant in Military Hospital at Fatehgarh on 14-6-77 he accepted for himself from No. 4445174 Sepoy Saroop Singh a sum of Rs. 100/- as a gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive for doing an official act, to wit, to give normal blood report in respect of Shri Autar Singh a civilian, for favour of enrol ment. The averments disclosed in the charge thus made out a civil offence covered by Section 69 of the Army Act, which was triable by a District Court Martial. The point raised on behalf of the petitioner in my opinion, does not carry weight. 8. It has next been argued by the petitioners C mnsel that orders of Dis trict Court Martial and of the confirming authority are vitiated as do not furnish any reasons. It has also been contended that after closure of evidence closing Ad dress on behalf of the petitioner was filed before the District Court Martial, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-2 and therefore, the District Court Martial was bound to consider the same before record ing the findings of guilt against the petitioner. The learned Counsel for Union of India, on the other hand, urged that the proceedings under the Army Act are dif ferent from quasi-judicial proceedings. The members of the District Court Martial have to express their opinion as to the findings by word of mouth and the finding on the charge is to be recorded simply as a finding of "guilty" or of "not guilty" and it is not necessary under law for them to record reasons like the criminal Court. The order as contained in Annexure 3 contains the findings recorded by the District Court Martial in the following terms: COURT CLOSEd The Court is closed for the consideration of the finding. FINDINGs The Court finds that the accused No. 13905006 Sep/lab Asst. (Paid Acting Naik) Ram Ashish Singh, Military Hospital Fatehgarh. GUILTY is "guilty" of the charge. ANNOUNCEMENT OFFINDINGS COURT RE-OPENEd The Court being re-opened the accused is again brought before it. The finding is read in open Court, and is announced as being subject to confirmation. FINDINGs The Court finds that the accused No. 13905006 Sep/lab Asst. (Paid Acting Naik) Ram Ashish Singh, Military Hospital Fatehgarh. GUILTY is "guilty" of the charge. ANNOUNCEMENT OFFINDINGS COURT RE-OPENEd The Court being re-opened the accused is again brought before it. The finding is read in open Court, and is announced as being subject to confirmation. Annexure-5 contains the order of sentence passed by the District Court Martial and the sen tence, which was announced, was subject to confir mation. Annexure- 5 runs as follows 3/4. "the Court sentence the accused No. 13905006 Sep/lab Asst. (Paid Acting Naik) Ram Ashish Singh, Military Hospital Fatehgarh. Reduced to Ranks (a) To be reduced to the ranks. R. I. one year (b) To suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. Dismissed. (c) To be dismissed from the service. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SEN TENCe The Court having re-opened, the accused is brought before it. The sentence is announced as being subject to confirmation. " Confirmation order dated 23rd Decem ber, 1977 as contained in Annexure-6 runs in the following terms: "i confirm the finding and sentence of the Court but set aside that part of the sentence which reads to be reduced to the ranks. I directed that the sentence of rigorous imprisonment shall be carried out by confine ment in a civil prison. The accused is recommended Division b or II while undergoing sentence in the civil prison. If there are only two divisions of prisoners, the accused is recommended Division b or II". 9. Under the Constitution of India itself protection of fundamental rights of the personnel of Armed Forces is limited. The Constitution contains certain special Provisions in regard to the members of the Armed Forces. Article 33 of the Constitu tion empowers Parliament to make law determining the extent to which any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Con stitution shall in their application to the members of the Armed Forces, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline amongst them. Article 33 of the Constitu tion empowers Parliament to make law determining the extent to which any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Con stitution shall in their application to the members of the Armed Forces, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline amongst them. The appellant jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitu tion has also been excluded in relation to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces, Similarly Clause (4) of Article 227 denied to the High Courts to exercise the power of su perintendence over any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. The Supreme Court and the High Court have simply been vested with the power of judicial review in respect of proceedings of Courts-martial and the proceedings subsequent thereto. These Courts can grant appropriate relief if the said proceedings have resulted in denial of the fundamental rights or if they suffer from a jurisdictional error or any error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Apex Court in Prithvi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 S. C. 1413, stated as follows: "section 21 of the Army Act merely con fers an additional power to modify rights con ferred by Art. 19 (1) (a) and (c) by Rules and such rules may set out the limits of restriction. But the specific provision does not derogate from the generality of power conferred by Art. 33. Therefore, the law prescribing procedure for Trial of offences by Court Martial need not satis fy the requirement of Art. 21 because to the extent the procedure is prescribed by law and if it stands inderogation of Art. 21, to that extent Art. 21 in its application to the Armed Forces is modified by enactment of the procedure in the Army Act itself. . . . . . . . . In the larger interest of na tional security and military discipline, Parlia ment in its wisdom may restrict or abrogate such rights in their application to the Armed Forces but this process should not be carried so far as to create a class of citizen not entitled to the benefits of the liberal spirit of the Constitu tion. . . . . . A marked difference in the procedure for trial of an offence by the Criminal Court and the Court Martial is apt to generate dissatisfac tion arising out of this differential treatment. " 10. In the decision in Som Datta v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 411, it was held that there is no need to give reasons while pronouncing findings and sentence by a Court Martial in proceedings under the Army Act. 11. This question has been recon sidered again in a recent decision by the Honble Supreme Court in S. N. Muxherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 . The Apex Court reviewed the legal position and held that the position as to the re quirement to furnish reasons in ad ministrative orders in India is more similar to that of the United States of America. The reasons have to be given not only to enable the aggrieved party to take note of them but 10 enable an appellate Court or a Court having powers of judicial review to know the reasons. It was further held that this requirement could be dispensed with either expressly or by necessary implica tion. The Honble Supreme Court con sidered various provisions of the Army Act and Rules, which have a bearing on the requirement to record reasons for the finding and sentence of the Court Martial and after examining them it was held that a Court Martial records its findings after the Judge-Advocate sums up in open Court the evidence and gives his opinion upon the legal bearing of the case. The members of the Court have to express their opinion as to the findings by word of mouth on each charge separately, and the finding on each charge is to be recorded simply as a finding of guilty or of not guilty". The Honble Supreme Court in para 43 ob served that: "there is no such requirement in other provisions relating to recording of findings and sentence. The Honble Supreme Court in para 43 ob served that: "there is no such requirement in other provisions relating to recording of findings and sentence. Rule 66 (1) proceeds on the basis that there is no such requirement in other provisions relating to recording of findings and sentences. Rule 66 (1) proceeds on the basis that there is no such requirement in other provision relating to recording of findings and sentence. Rule 66 (1) proceeds on the basis that there is no such requirement because if such a requirement was there it would not have been necessary to make specific provision for recording of reasons for the recommendation to mercy. The said provisions thus negative a requirement to give reasons for its finding and sentence by the Court-martial and reason are required to be recorded only in cases, where the Court martial makes a recommendation to mercy. " 12. In para 45 again it was held that confirming authority is also not required to record reasons while confirming the findings and sentence of the Court Martial nor such reasons are required to be recorded, be insisted upon at the stage of consideration of post confirmation peti tion under Section 164 (2) of the Act. The same view has been expressed by Kerala High Court in the decision in Purushothaman. N. v. Officer Commanding, 1992 Lab. I. C. 1924. 13. In view of the above legal posi tion, no force is found in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the orders as contained in Annexure-3, Annexure-5, Annexure-6 and Annexure-8 are bad for non-disclosure of reasons. 14. Next it has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the evidence of Major Sarmukh Singh and Major Avinash Chandra was in the nature of accomplice, as such in the absence of any independent corroboration of their evidence, the District Court Martial ought not to have placed reliance upon the same and therefore there was no material to ac cept the prosecution allegation of accep tance of bribe by the petitioner. The learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, con tended that this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitu tion cannot re-appraise the evidence nor can it act as a Court of appeal. 15. The learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, con tended that this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitu tion cannot re-appraise the evidence nor can it act as a Court of appeal. 15. In the decision in Ruval Kumar Vasave v. Chief of Army Staff, Army Head Quarter, New Delhi and others, 1986 UPLBEC, 663, the Division Bench of this Court refused to re- appraise the evidence to set aside the findings of the Court Mar tial. It held that his Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as a Court of Appeal and, as such, is not en titled to re-appraise evidence and come to its own findings. The Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder provides the procedure relating to the investigation and Trial of an Army -personnel and the proceedings if under the Act had become final, the High Court cannot, under Ar ticle 226 of the Constitution reverse that findings. The Army Act makes the findings and sentences of the Court Martial final, conclusive and binding upon all. 16. In the decision in S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (supra) the Honble Supreme Court held that the High Court has the power of Judicial review, in respect of the proceedings of Courts Mar tial as well as the proceedings subsequent thereto, even though to a limited extent, and can in appropriate cases, grant relief, where there has been denial of the fun damental rights of the citizen or if the proceedings before the Court Martial suf fer from a jurisdictional defect or any error of law apparent on the face, of the record. 17. In the decision Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 S. C. 2386, it was laid down that Judicial review generally speaking is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the decision making process. Irrationality and perversity has also been held to be recognised grounds of judicial review. 18. The view taken in the case of S. R. Bommai & Ors. v. Union of India, JT 1994 (2) S. C. 215, was that judicial review is not concerned with the merits of the decision, but the manner in which the decision was taken. 19. Irrationality and perversity has also been held to be recognised grounds of judicial review. 18. The view taken in the case of S. R. Bommai & Ors. v. Union of India, JT 1994 (2) S. C. 215, was that judicial review is not concerned with the merits of the decision, but the manner in which the decision was taken. 19. In another decision in Union of India v. Upendra Singh, JT 1994 (1) S. C. 658, the Honble Supreme Court held that a judicial review cannot extend to the ex amination of the correctness of charge or reasonableness of a decision. 20. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review in the manner in which the decision is made. 21. Bearing in mind the aforesaid legal principles regarding scope of inquiry in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the question which falls for consideration is whether there was any evidence in support of the finding of guilt recorded by the District Court Martial. The learned Counsel for the petitioner took me through the statement of wit nesses, which have been annexed with the supplementary affidavit and I have also examined the proceedings of the Court. A perusal of the same indicates that the petitioner committed civil offence under Section 69 of the Army Act and it cannot be said that there was absolutely no evidence to warrant finding of guilt. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction is a question which was to be answered by the Court Martial and this Court will not go into the suf ficiency or insufficiency of the evidence adduced against the petitioner before the District Court Martial. As already pointed out above, this Court in writ juris diction will not interfere even if another view on the evidence was possible. The present case is not one of those cases where the Court Martial recorded findings of guilt without there being any evidence at all. The order and sentences therefore, cannot be quashed on the basis of this ground also. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also could not satisfy me that the petitioner did not have a fair trial before the District Court Martial and no illegality in the procedure could be pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The order and sentences therefore, cannot be quashed on the basis of this ground also. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also could not satisfy me that the petitioner did not have a fair trial before the District Court Martial and no illegality in the procedure could be pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner was afforded full opportunity to defend himself and the proceedings were held in consonance with the provisions of the Army Act and Rules framed therein. 22. The next point urged by the petitioners Counsel is that the Army Authorities had no power to award the sentence of dismissal from service in addi tion to imprisonment. In this connection he referred to Rule 65 of the Army Rules, 1954, which runs as under: "65. Sentence.- The Court shall award a single sentence in respect of all the offence of which the accused is found guilty, and such sen tence shall be deemed to be awarded in respect of the offence in each charge in respect of which it can be legally given, and not to be awarded in respect of any offence in a charge in respect of which it cannot be legally given. " 23. According to the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner two punishments awarded to the petitioner, one of sentence of Rigorous Imprison ment for one year and the others of dis missal from service, are against the spirit of said Rule and not warranted in law. The learned Standing Counsel however, ar gued that these are two different types of punishments and can be combined together to form one single sentence. He is support of his arguments referred to the provisions of Section s 71,72 and 73 of the Army Act. He also placed reliance on the decision in Purushothamman N. v. Officer Commanding (Independent) Artillery Brigade Workshop Company and other, 1992 Lab. 1c. 1924. He is support of his arguments referred to the provisions of Section s 71,72 and 73 of the Army Act. He also placed reliance on the decision in Purushothamman N. v. Officer Commanding (Independent) Artillery Brigade Workshop Company and other, 1992 Lab. 1c. 1924. In that decision a Division Bench of Kerala High Court after making reference to the relevant statutory provisions as contained in Sections 41,71, 72 and 73 held that Section 73 refers to the combination of punishments which states that the Court-martial may award punish ments specified in clause (d) or clause (e) of Section 71 and any one or more of the of the punishments specified in clauses (f) to (i) of that Section in addition to any other sentence or without any other punish ment. The Court Martial has jurisdiction it inflict the punishment of dismissal in addition to punishment of Imprisonment. 24. Similar view was taken by Division Bench of this Court in Ranjeet Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1976 All 405 and by other High Courts See Saubhagay Chandra Palnaik v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Orissa 169. 25. In the instant case the District Court Martial passed the sentence against the petitioner for reduction to ranks, to suffer R. I. for one year and of dismissal from service. However, the confirming authority set aside that part of the sen tence which relates to the reduction to the ranks and the rest of the sentence was confirmed which included the dismissal from service and R. I. for one year. This was permissible under the provision of Sec tion 73 of the Army Act. Rule 65 is not in conflict to Section 73 of the Army Act. Rule 65 is to be read together with Sec tions 70 to 73 and not in isolation. In view of this clear legal position I do not find any merits in this submission also of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 26. Lastly, it was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the sentence of dismissal and Imprisonment imposed on the petitioner was wholly dis proportionate to the gravity of the offence proved. In this connection it may be stated that the High Court and Tribunal has no power to go into the question of adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide. In this connection it may be stated that the High Court and Tribunal has no power to go into the question of adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide. What punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdic tion of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and if imposed on proved misconduct, the High Court would not ordinarily interfere and substitutes its own decision for that of the authority. In the instant case no mala fide have been established and the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the petitioner has been sentenced for commit ting civil offence under. Section 69 of the Army Act on the grave charge of accepting bribe and I do not think that the petitioner deserves any leniency or sympathy in the matter of quantum of punishment. No merit is found in this submission as sell. 27. For the above reasons and discus sions, this writ petition must fail and ac cordingly it is dismissed with costs on par ties. Petition dismissed. .