JUDGMENT Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. : In common acceptation, the doctrine of Judicial review works through the remedies of appeal and revision as prescribed by the prevalent procedural law. The doctrine, however, has a special significance in public law particularly in the countries having a written Constitution and Ours being such the doctrine constitutes the essence of the system as introduced by the Constitution itself. The Constitution is a legal instrument and this law is superior in status to the laws made by the legislature. Dr. Basu in his Tagore Law Lectures very succinctly stated the broad features of the doctrine to the following effect. Dr. Basu stated: "Where the Constitution operates as a higher law, any act which transgresses the mandates of that higher law becomes unconstitutional and since not only the Executive but the Legislature itself is limited by that higher law, as in the U.S.A. or in India, a legislative act, too, would be unconstitutional and invalid when it contravenes the Constitution. The peculiarity of judicial review in the Constitutional sphere is that this power is wielded by the Judiciary, not over any inferior tribunal, but over coordinate authorities viz., the Legislature and the Executive." 2. In tracing out the history of the doctrine, we find that the pronouncement of Coke, C.J. in Bonham's case (1610 : 8 Co. 114(a) is the genesis of the doctrine. Coke, C.J., observed that an act of Parliament which is against common right and reason ought to be adjudged void by Court of Law in the event of there being any contravention of the principle of natural justice. Subsequently, Hobart, C.J., in Day vs. Savadge (1614 : Hob. 85) in the same vein held that an act of Parliament made against natural equity was void in itself. Be it noted that prior to the advent of constitutionalism, Law Court had to deal with the issue of judicial review on the basis of the doctrine as propounded by Coke, C.J., in Bonham's case and as followed by Hobart, C.J., in Day vs. Savadge (supra) in the year 1614. Subsequently, upon, however, the adaptation of a written Constitution in the United States, Law Courts did find a more tangible foundation for the claim in favour of fundamental law embodied in the Constitution. Marshall, C.J., in Merbury vs. Madison (1803 (1) Cr. Subsequently, upon, however, the adaptation of a written Constitution in the United States, Law Courts did find a more tangible foundation for the claim in favour of fundamental law embodied in the Constitution. Marshall, C.J., in Merbury vs. Madison (1803 (1) Cr. 137) stated : "The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written……………………. Certainly all those who have framed Written Constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation and consequently......... an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void." 3. Dr. Basu, in his lecture stated that wherever there is a written Constitution imposing legal limitations upon the organs of the Government, there must be an interpretor of the Constitution and that function must be entrusted to the Judiciary which alone is competent to interpret legal instruments. In fine, Dr. Basu stated the doctrine under three several Courts as follows : (i) Since the Court is to regard the Constitution as superior to an act of the Legislature, it is for the Courts, in case of conflict, to declare which law shall prevail and to disregard the repugnant Act, which is no law, in determining the case before it. (ii) Since the Constitution is the paramount law of the nation being the declared will of the people themselves, an act of the Legislature (whose powers are limited by the Constitution) which is repugnant to it must be void. (iii) it is the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is and if two laws conflict with each other the Courts must decide on the operation of each. 4. Ours is a written Constitution having three independent organs viz., the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary : Whereas the Legislature legislates and the Executive administers, the Judiciary is the controlling factor in regard to the abuse of power-be it the executive or the legislative : It is the Constitution which is supreme and it is the Constitution itself which has conferred power on to the Judiciary to discharge its role effectively in terms of the provisions of the Constitution. 5. Be it noted here that the people of India have conferred upto themselves this Constitution of Ours on 26th January, 1950 as a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic. 5. Be it noted here that the people of India have conferred upto themselves this Constitution of Ours on 26th January, 1950 as a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic. Democratic polity is the basic ferver of our Constitution and it is the judiciary alone which maintains this basic ferver by reason of the powers conferred on to it and is authorised to strike down an Executive ipsi dixit or Legislative impertinence, whenever occasion arises. The judiciary in terms of the provisions of the Constitution has the obligation to rise up to the occasion in the event of there being any departure from the guiding principles as laid down in the Constitution. 6. Let us now, however, at this juncture consider for ourselves as to the true purport of this doctrine as translated in the Constitution itself. It be noted that the recognition of the doctrine has amply been exhibited in Article 32 of the Constitution and having due regard to the language used it can safely be concluded that judicial review as evidenced in Article 32 is a basic feature of the Constitution and so far as the judicial precedents are concerned, there is total unanimity on this count and as such one need not dilate much on this score. But what about Article 226 which happens to be in Part VI of the Constitution-this is, however, where the debate starts: The debate being whether Article 226 also provides judicial review of an executive action or it is a mere jurisdictional issue by reason of its incorporation in Part-VI of the Constitution. We do not, however, see much of a difficulty in the matter of resolution of this debate : The language of the Article itself suggests a right conferred on to the citizens to move the Court in the event of there being an infraction in so far as the rights guaranteed under Part III is concerned and as such we need not involve ourselves in detail as regards the availability of a right to obtain judicial review under Article 226 excepting recording an observation that the same does provide a right to obtain judicial review though, however, the difference being whereas one is in Part III and the other in Part VI as regards the availability of doctrine of judicial review. 7. 7. In this context the observations of Bhagwati, J. in Minarva Mill's case (Minarva Mill vs. Union of India : AIR (1980) SC 1789) seems to be very apposite. Bhagwati, J. observed: "......... every organ of the State, every authority under the Constitution, derives its power from the Constitution and has to act within the limits of such power. But then the question arises as to which authority must decide what are the limits on the power conferred upon each organ or instrumentality of the State and whether such limits are transgressed or exceeded. Now there are three main departments of the State amongst which the powers of Governments are divided; the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Under our Constitution we have no rigid separation of powers as in the United States of America, but there is a broad demarcation, though, having regard to the complex nature of governmental functions, certain degree of overlapping is inevitable. The reason for this broad separation of powers is that 'the concentration of powers in anyone organ may' to quote the words of Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in Indira Gandhi case 'by upsetting that fine balance between the three organs, destroy the fundamental premises of a democratic Government to which we are pledged'. Take for example, a case where the executive which is in charge of administration acts to the prejudice of a citizen and a question arises as to what are the powers of the executive and whether the executive has acted within the scope of its powers. Such a question obviously cannot be left to the executive to decide and for two very good reasons. First, the decision of the question would depend upon the interpretation of the Constitution and the laws in this field and secondly, the Constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own action. So also if the legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in making the law the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence or the law is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other provisions of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be left to the determination of the Legislature. So also if the legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in making the law the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence or the law is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other provisions of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be left to the determination of the Legislature. The Constitution has, therefore, created an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent machinery is the Judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation passed by the legislature. It is the solemn duty of the judiciary under the Constitution to keep the different organs of the State such as the executive and the legislature within the limits of the power conferred upon them by the Constitution. This power of judicial review is conferred on the judiciary by Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution. Speaking about draft Article 25, corresponding to present Article 32 of the Constitution, Dr. Ambedkar, the principal architect of our Constitution, said in the Constituent Assembly on December 9, 1948 : If I was asked to name any particular Article in this Constitution as the most important-an Article without which this Constitution would be a nullity, could not refer to any other Article except this one. It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it and I am glad that the House has realised its importance. (CAD. VoI. VII, p. 953). 8. It is a cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one howsoever highly placed and no authority however lofty can claim to be the sole Judge of its power under the Constitution or whether its action is within the confines of such power laid down by the Constitution. The judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution and to the judiciary is assigned the delicate task to determine what is the power conferred on each branch of Government, whether it is limited, and if so, what are the limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits. It is for the judiciary to uphold the Constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional limitations. It is for the judiciary to uphold the Constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional limitations. That is the essence of the rule of law, which inter alia requires that 'the exercise of powers by the Government whether it be the legislature or the executive or any other authority, be conditioned by the Constitution and the law'. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our Constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution." 9. Turning attention on to the factual score at this juncture, it appears that the principal grievance of the Writ Petitioner is in regard to establishment of State Administrative Tribunal in terms of Article 323A of the Constitution. Be it noted that this Article has been introduced in the Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 and became effective on 3rd January, 1977. Be it noted here also that the Central Government in terms of the powers conferred under Article 323A has, in fact, established and provided for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals' of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or under the control of the Government of India or of any other authority or Corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government. The establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal was effected in terms of the provisions of the Central Administrative Act, 1985 and it is now the State Government which is desirous of establishing the State Administrative Tribunal for the purpose of resolution of disputes in regard to recruitment and conditions of services of persons appointed by the State Government or any other local authority or of any Corporation owned and controlled by the State Government. It is the creation of this State Administrative Tribunal which is under challenge in this writ application. Mr. It is the creation of this State Administrative Tribunal which is under challenge in this writ application. Mr. Pal appearing in support of the writ application contended that incorporation of Article 323A in the Constitution by way of a Constitutional Amendment has taken away the right of judicial review-ability and special reliance was placed on Article 323A(2)(d) which read that a law made under clause 1 of the Article may exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause 1. On a plain reading of Article 323A it appears that the Parliament may by law can set up Administrative Tribunal in regard to the service of Government employees be that of the Central or the State Government or any other Corporation and that such a law may exclude the jurisdiction of all courts excepting however that of Supreme Court. The debate therefore follows as to whether this exclusion of jurisdiction under sub-Article 2(d) takes away the right of judicial review as enshrined in the Constitution in service matters. 10. Admittedly, judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed in any way. In this context reference may be made to Article 368 of the Constitution which provides the right to amend the Constitution and so far as judicial precedence are concerned, it is now well settled that basic feature of the Constitution cannot be amended. The judicial precedents also record that the fundamental rights cannot also be amended. In the event however, of the right to obtain judicial review be termed to be a right akin to a fundamental right being in Part III of the Constitution, there cannot be any manner of doubt as regards the limitation in the powers of the Parliament to curtail the right of judicial review-ability. It is the definite contention of Mr. Pal that if judicial review as prescribed under Article 226 is taken away by an amendment to the Constitution, then and in that event such an amendment cannot possibly be termed to be in accordance with the wishes and desires of the framers of the Constitution. It is the definite contention of Mr. Pal that if judicial review as prescribed under Article 226 is taken away by an amendment to the Constitution, then and in that event such an amendment cannot possibly be termed to be in accordance with the wishes and desires of the framers of the Constitution. Be it be noted here that if, on the other hand, the amendment itself protects the judicial review, then however question of curtailment of right for judicial review would not arise as is being contended by the respondents. The specific case of the respondents is that it is not curtailment as such but conferment of powers of judicial review on to another body which happened to be a substitute for the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in so far as service matters are concerned, be it Central or State Government employees, as laid down in Sampat Kumar's case. The debate therefore proceeds on to the issue as to whether there is, in fact, any curtailment of right to obtain judicial review or by reason of the amendment there is mere transposition of the forum for judicial review from the High Court to the Tribunal. The respondents contended that it is not the High Court as such which is a basic feature of the Constitution, or exercise of a jurisdiction by the High Court which can be termed to be a basic structure, but it is a right of the parties to obtain judicial review and the moot question that is to be decided as to whether this particular right is lost on the wake of amendment to the Constitution since it is a judicial review which is of prime consideration and not the forum for such judicial review. Prior to the amendment to the Constitution, the forum was High Court in regard to specific matters as being dealt with under Article 226 of the Constitution and after the amendment to the Constitution and inclusion of Article 323A in the Constitution and by reason of subsequent legislation on the basis of the newly incorporated Article, this particular forum stands shifted from the High Court to the Tribunal and as such question of there being any curtailment of judicial review does not arise. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. Pal, however, contended that the vice of curtailment of judicial review-ability arises by reason of inclusion of Article 323A(2)(d) and not otherwise. It has been contended that creation of tribunal by itself cannot be said to be curtailment of jurisdiction of the High Court. Mr. Pal contended on an analyses of various other Constitutions that settlement of disputes in various spheres of judicial arena by the tribunals is now a well-settled and a well-accepted reality but in order to achieve the reality, law makers may introduce such a law which ought to be in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution and not de-hors the same. Article 368 of the Constitution provides the power and authority of the Parliament to amend the various provisions of the Constitution. But the language used by the framers of the Constitution in Article 368(1) is rather significant. Article 368, Mr. Pal contended, provides that Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend the Constitution-thus the power to amend the Constitution is a sovereign power as opposed to the ordinary legislative power. Mr. Pal contended that the Supreme Court in Golak Nath's case observed that fundamental rights are outside the amendatory process if that amendment takes away or abridges any of the rights but subsequently the same did not find favour with the Supreme Court since after the decision in Golak Nath's case the Supreme Court in propounding the Keshabananda doctrine, observed that in regard to the exercise of power of amendment under Article 368, one ought to read certain amount of inherent limitation. The Supreme Court stated that the Parliament cannot amend the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. According, however, to the summary signed by 9 out of 13 Judges in Keshabananda Bharati's case, it was held that Article 368 does not enable the Parliament to alter the basic structure or the framework of the Constitution. Subsequent to the decision in Keshabananda Bharati's case, the Supreme Court in a later decision in the case of Indira-Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain has had the occasion to make a reference to Keshabananda Bharati and accepted the majority opinion on the doctrine of basic structure for framework of the Constitution. 12. Let us now concentrate ourselves in regard to the observations of the Supreme Court from time to time in regard to this specific power to amend. 12. Let us now concentrate ourselves in regard to the observations of the Supreme Court from time to time in regard to this specific power to amend. In Keshabananda's case the Supreme Court in paragraph 762 observed: "762. The principal question which falls for determination is whether the power to amend is under any express limitation of Article 13(2). Another question is whether there are implied and inherent limitations on the power of amendment. Can there be any implied or inherent limitation in the face of any express power of amendment without exception? Questions have been raised that essential features of the Constitution cannot be amended. Does the Constitution admit of distinction between essential and nonessential features? Who is to determine what the essential features are? Who is the authority to pronounce as to what features are essential? The pre-eminent question is whether the power of amendment is to be curtailed or restricted, though the Constitution does not contain any exception to the power of amendment. The people gave the Constitution to the people. The people gave the power of amendment to Parliament. Democracy proceeds on the faith and capacity of the people to elect their representatives and faith in the representatives to represent the people. Throughout the history of mankind if any motive power has been more potent than another it is that of faith in themselves. The ideal of faith in ourselves is of the greatest help to us." 13. In Minarva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court observed: "It is clear from the majority decision in Keshavananda Bharati case that our Constitution is a controlled Constitution which confers powers on the various authorities created and recognised by it and defines the limits of those powers. The Constitution is supreme lex, the paramount law of the land and there is no authority, no department or branch of the State which is above or beyond the Constitution has devised a structure of relationship with checks and balances and limits are placed on the powers of every authority or instrumentality under the Constitution. Every organ of the State, be it the executive or the legislature or the judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it has to act within the limits of such authority. Every organ of the State, be it the executive or the legislature or the judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it has to act within the limits of such authority. Parliament too, is a creature of the Constitution and it can only have such powers as are given to it under the Constitution. It has no inherent power of amendment of the Constitution and being an authority created by the Constitution, it cannot have such inherent power, but the power of amendment is conferred upon it by the Constitution and it is a limited power which is so conferred. Parliament cannot in exercise of this power so amend the Constitution as to alter its basic structure or to change its identity. Now, if by Constitutional amendment, Parliament were granted unlimited power of amendment, it would cease to be an authority under the Constitution, but would become supreme over it, because it would have power to alter the entire Constitution including its basic structure and even to put an end to it by totally changing its identity. It will therefore, be seen that the limited amending power of Parliament is itself an essential feature of the Constitution, a part of its basic structure, for if the limited power of amendment were enlarged into an unlimited power, the entire character of the Constitution would be changed. It must follow as a necessary corollary that any amendment of the Constitution which seeks, directly or indirectly, to enlarge the amending power of Parliament by freeing it from the limitation of unamendability of the basic structure would be violative of the basic structure and hence outside the amendatory power of Parliament." 14. Bhagwati, J. however, in the case of Minarva Mills (supra) stated: "I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But what I wish to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If by a Constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is provided that the validity of any law made by the legislature shall not be liable to be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the legislative competence of the legislature or version of the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative power between the Union and the States and render the fundamental rights meaningless and futile. So also if a Constitutional amendment is made which has the effect of taking away the power of judicial review and providing that no amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be questioned on any ground, even if such amendment is violative of the basic structure and, therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, would be making Parliament sole Judge of the Constitutional validity of what it has done and that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution." 15. It is at this juncture, however, one of the other contention of Mr. Pal in regard to Article 368 vis-a-vis Article 323A ought to be noted. Mr. Pal contended that incorporation of Article 323A is wholly unauthorised and ultra vires Article 368 of the Constitution, by reason of impermissible delegation of constituent power. It has been the specific case of the petitioner that on a plain reading of Article 368 the amendment has to be made by the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power and the same being sui generis and is thus fundamentally different in character from the ordinary legislative power. Any amendment of the Constitution has to be brought about by the constituent body itself and the latter cannot authorise a non-constituent body to bring about an amendment. Any amendment of the Constitution has to be brought about by the constituent body itself and the latter cannot authorise a non-constituent body to bring about an amendment. It has, further, been submitted that there is no scope for creating another quantitatively inferior legislative body to exercise power under Article 368 neither there is any scope for delegating the constituent power to any other body since no other body including the Parliament acting as an ordinary law maker can exercise such constituent power. Elucidating the same Mr. Pal in support of the writ petition contended that delegation to ordinary legislature would mean nullifying clause II of Article 368 because the ordinary legislature does not require such a special majority for passing a bill neither there is any obligation on to the President to give his assent as required under clause II in the case of ordinary law making. Keshavananda's doctrine as propounded by the Supreme Court has been taken recourse in support of his contentions. 16. This submission at the first blush seems to be very attractive. But on a proper consideration in my view it does not stand the test of further scrutiny. Parliament is one indivisible institution having manifold powers and functions one cannot delegate to oneself. As a matter of fact, the amendment of the Constitution was complete by insertion of Article 323A and Article 323A(3) provides that Article 323A shall have the effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other provisions of the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. Clause (3) of Article 323A provides the protective umbrella for clauses (1) and (2) of Article 323A. The Parliament in exercise of its constituent power has empowered itself to make law in a specified field-it is not thus a case of delegation. Be it noted that the Writ Petitioners do not contend that the Act of 1985 is in violation of any of the provisions as contained in Article 323A. 17. Constitution does not make statutory laws but such powers have been vested in the legislature and the legislature is otherwise competent to make laws in exercise of its powers as conferred by the Constitution. 17. Constitution does not make statutory laws but such powers have been vested in the legislature and the legislature is otherwise competent to make laws in exercise of its powers as conferred by the Constitution. It is tryte knowledge that while the ordinary legislative powers emanate from Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution, various other provisions of the Constitution which can be termed to be special powers on to the Parliament to enact laws and Article 323A is one such power conferred on to the legislature with a protective umbrella under Article 323A. The Parliament by reason of incorporation of Article 323A has acquired a special legislative competence to make special statutory laws and in regard to such law the obligation of the Court is to see whether the special law has been made in accordance with the Constitutional authority and whether the same is within the parameters of the grant of such authority and in the event the answer is in the affirmative, question of further consideration of matter would not arise. 18. It is well-settled that the Constitution is supreme. All powers flow from the Constitution. By the constituent power provided in Article 368 the Parliament has been authorised to amend the constitution by way of addition, variation or repeal of any provision of the Constitution itself. This authority is limited to the extent that the amendments do not abrogate the basic features and structures of the Constitution. This constituent power is, however, independent of the doctrine of separation of powers. This power is sovereign but not above the Constitution itself. One of the basic features of the Constitution, as is now well-settled, is right to have judicial review of State actions. Along with the said right a remedy has also been provided through the Constitutional Courts under Article 32 and 226. If these rights and remedies are taken away, then it may be said that there has been an abrogation of the basic structure impermissible by the Constitution but if such rights are preserved and remedies are provided through a different mechanism it cannot be said to be, according to Supreme Court, against the basic structure of the Constitution. Article 323A(1) which has been inserted by use of constituent power provides for establishment of a forum for obtaining judicial review which is in addition to the existing forum for such judicial review. Article 323A(1) which has been inserted by use of constituent power provides for establishment of a forum for obtaining judicial review which is in addition to the existing forum for such judicial review. Article 323A(2)(d) authorises the Parliament to take away the existing forum of judicial review at its discretion. In order to do so, the Parliament is required to be satisfied that the quality of judicial review that may be available under Article 323A(1) is equally efficacious to that of the existing forum of judicial review and that is why, as it appears to us, in Article 323A(2) the word 'may' has been used. 19. Article 323A(2)(d) authorises the Parliament to debar the litigants in respect of service matters to approach the existing forum after establishment of the alternate forum by debarring the High Court to entertain service matters, a class of litigation's after establishment of a forum specially established to adjudicate and try such litigations. 20. The Parliament while exercising its constituent power can take upon itself the power of judicial review but cannot abrogate the rule of law. It has to follow the existing law or to introduce a new law which should be applicable to each citizen or a class thereof, but it cannot exercise the power of judicial review without there being a law or norm. That was exactly what was intended to be done by Article 323(A)(1). 21. in the instant case, the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power, being aware of the fact and as noted above, that the High Courts are having mounting arrears, inserted Part XIVA in the Constitution and thereunder inserted Articles 323A and 323B for the purpose of fulfilling the object i.e. 'to reduce the mounting arrears in High Courts and to secure the speedy disposal of service matters, revenue matters and certain other matters of special importance in the context of the socio-economic development and progress.' While the said new part was inserted, the Parliament used its constituent power and complied with the procedure for user of such power. The moment assent to the amending bill was received from the President, the said part stood included in the Constitution as a part thereof. It is not in dispute that the Constitution may have self-executing provisions or nonself-executing provisions. Even our Constitution has self-executing and nonself-executing provisions. Article 323A(2) is a non-self-executing provision. The moment assent to the amending bill was received from the President, the said part stood included in the Constitution as a part thereof. It is not in dispute that the Constitution may have self-executing provisions or nonself-executing provisions. Even our Constitution has self-executing and nonself-executing provisions. Article 323A(2) is a non-self-executing provision. The Parliament while exercising its constituent power under Article 368 is deemed to be aware that judicial review as was available before inserting Part XIV-A is a basic structure of our Constitution. The preamble Itself provides for, inter alia, securing to all citizens justice, social, economic and political. It therefore, could not authorise abrogation of such judicial review. By Article 323A(1) the Parliament in its constituent capacity authorised itself in its ordinary legislative capacity to establish a forum for trial and adjudication of service matters. It thereafter provided by Article 323A(1) establishing such a forum, the Parliament may exclude the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226. 22. Significantly, however, the language used in Article 323A(1) is 'may' and not 'shall' so as to allow the Parliament a free hand in the matter of introduction of a new law in regard to the establishment of Administrative Tribunals so far as the service jurisprudence is concerned. This authority to legislate was given to the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power. The Constitution, therefore, authorised the Parliament in its legislative sphere, if deemed expedient to provide for a forum for judicial review in respect of service matters and in order to avoid conflict, empowered the Parliament to prevent further approach to the existing forum in respect of certain classes of matters. Therefore, the whole object applying the doctrine of pith and substance, has been achieved for providing an alternate forum by making an appropriate law for judicial review. 23. Law making power is genus. Power to amend a written Constitution i.e. constituent power, as well as other law making power i.e. legislative powers are species. A law making body is aware of what the law is. While the Constituent body grants power to legislates having regard to the need, the legislative body legislates on the basis of such grant. In the instant case the Constituent body thought that the High Courts are over-burdened and in consequence thereof a section of citizens are suffering. A law making body is aware of what the law is. While the Constituent body grants power to legislates having regard to the need, the legislative body legislates on the basis of such grant. In the instant case the Constituent body thought that the High Courts are over-burdened and in consequence thereof a section of citizens are suffering. They wanted, therefore, to give relief to such citizens by establishing a forum with an object of expediting their litigations. They, themselves while exercising constituent power could have established such alternate forum; similarly they could also entrust the legislature to do so by making an appropriate law. In the instant case they choose the latter option. While choosing such option they, however, could not shut their eyes to the fact that the judicial review-ability of State actions is a basic structure of the Constitution. They, therefore, provided that judicial review-ability as is available through the tribunal to be set up, and only if such judicial review-ability should be made available through the tribunals and not through the Courts. 24. The observations of Bhagwati, J., in Mlnarva Mill's case (supra), as noted above, lends support to the above. It is not, as a matter of fact, an abrogation of any right but introduction of an alternative institutional mechanism for judicial review and as such the contention in regard to impermissible delegation of constituent power cannot thus be sustained. 25. Be it noted here that Article 323A together with the constitution of the Central Administrative Tribunal came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in S.P. Sampat Kumar vs. Union of India (1987(1)SCC 124 wherein Bhagwati J., expressing a concurring opinion with Mishra, J. observed: "It is undoubtedly true that my judgment in Minarva Mills Ltd. case was a minority judgment but so far as this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution and it is equally clear from the same decision that though judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament by amending the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament can certainly, without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine, set up effective alternative institutional menhanisms or arrangements for judicial review. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. Then, instead of the High court, it would be another institutional mechanism or authority which would be exercising the power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the Constitutional limitations and maintaining the Rule of Law. Therefore, if any Constitutional amendment made by Parliament takes away from the High Court the power of judicial review in any particular area and vests it in any other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be violative of the basic structure doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, viz., that the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the Parliamentary amendment is no less effective than the High Court." 26. In paragraph 4, Bhagwati, J. in no uncertain terms observed that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 by any law made by Parliament under clause (1) of Article 323A is therefore specifically authorised by the Constitutional amendment enacted in clause 2(d) of that Article. Bhagwati, J. stated that this Constitutional amendment authorising exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under clause (1) of Articles 226 and 227 must provide for an effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority for judicial review. If this Constitutional amendment were to permit a law to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 without setting up an effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, it would be violative of the basic structure doctrine and hence outside the constituent power of Parliament and as such it must be read as implicit in this Constitutional amendment that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it must not leave a void but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism and vest the power of judicial review in it. 27. Be it recorded that prior to Sampat Kumar's case the Supreme Court did intervene by reason of total abrogation of judicial review. In both Kesavananda and in Minarva Millis case there was an attempted abrogation of judicial review. 27. Be it recorded that prior to Sampat Kumar's case the Supreme Court did intervene by reason of total abrogation of judicial review. In both Kesavananda and in Minarva Millis case there was an attempted abrogation of judicial review. A distinction ought to be made between and amendment which destroys a right and an amendment which destroys a remedy-while the latter can be declared unconstitutional the former cannot. The Supreme Court has, in fact, scrutinised the powers of the Central Administrative Tribunal and State Administrative Tribunal in considerable detail and came to the conclusion that the provisions are Constitutional. Though, however, certain changes were suggested and such suggestions, were as a mater of fact duly incorporated in the Amendment Acts of 1986 and 1987. It is on this count Mr. Jayram, Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Attorney General of India submitted that it would be impermissible for the petitioner to contend that the Act is open for any further challenge. It is a settled law and one need not dilate much on this score that once the Supreme Court has declared the Constitutionality of an enactment, question of a subsequent attack even on any other ground co laterally raised does not and cannot arise-Article 141 stares at us and the law is also well-settled on this score to the effect that reagitation of a question settled by an earlier decision will not be permitted. 28. Having due regard to the above, question of further consideration in the matter probably would not arise but since detailed submissions have been made by the parties, judicial ethics and decorum, however, prompt this Court to deal with the same. 29. Admittedly there is an exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Court. In Sampat Kumar's case the expression used viz., 'not less effective' was construed in the subsequent decision to the effect that there was undoubtedly no contemplation to create a parallel High Court in the context of service matters. The factors relevant for consideration is however whether judicial review has been abrogated or it can be termed to be equally alternative effective mechanism. Subsequent to Sampat Kumar's case the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Jain, Patro, Majumdar, Chopra, Dipchand Pandey and others, again examined the ground of attack made against the Constitutionality of the Act and the constitution of the Tribunals but has declined to interfere and rejected the challenge. Subsequent to Sampat Kumar's case the Supreme Court in the case of R.K. Jain, Patro, Majumdar, Chopra, Dipchand Pandey and others, again examined the ground of attack made against the Constitutionality of the Act and the constitution of the Tribunals but has declined to interfere and rejected the challenge. The Supreme Court was clearly of the view that while the Tribunal cannot be equated to the High Court, it has a distinct personality of its own, distinct from the High Court and therefore can be regarded as a substitute for the High Court so far as judicial review is concerned. 30. In R. K. Jain's case the Supreme Court, in paragraphs 66, 67 and 68 of the Report observed: "66. In S.P. Sampath Kumar vs. Union of India this Court held that the primary duty of the judiciary is to interpret the Constitution and the laws and this would predominantly be a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, as judiciary alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly the constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own action. The Constitution has, therefore, created an independent machinery i.e. judiciary to resolve disputes, which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of the legislative and executive actions and to ensure compliance with the requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. The function is discharged by the judiciary by exercising the power of judicial review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for maintenance of the rule of law. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. The judicial review, therefore, is basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution and provide alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution and provide alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in the constitutional scheme that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it, must not leave a void but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of judicial review in it which must be equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power of judicial review. The tribunal set up under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was required to interpret and apply Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. Therefore, the personnel manning the administrative tribunals in their determinations not only require judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in that particular branch of constitutional and administrative law. The efficacy of the administrative tribunal and the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input and not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunals. Therefore, it was held that an appropriate rule should be made to recruit the members, and to consult the Chief Justice of India in recommending appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Tribunal and to constitute a committee presided over by a Judge of the Supreme Court to recruit the members for appointment. In M.B. Majumdar vs. Union of India when the members of CAT claimed parity of pay and superannuation as is available to the Judges of the High Court, this Court held that they are not on at par with the Judges but a separate mechanism created for their appointment pursuant to Article 323A of the Constitution. Therefore, what was meant by this Court in Sampath Kumar case ratio is that the tribunals when exercise the power and functions, the Act created institutional alternative mechanism or authority to adjudicate the service disputations. It must be effective and efficacious to exercise the power of judicial review. This Court did not appear to have meant that the tribunals are substitutes of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It must be effective and efficacious to exercise the power of judicial review. This Court did not appear to have meant that the tribunals are substitutes of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. J.B. Chopra vs. Union of India merely followed the ratio of Sampath Kumar. 31. The tribunals set up under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution or under an Act of legislature are creatures of the statute and in no case can claim the status as Judges of the High Court or parity or as substitutes. However, the personnel appointed to hold those offices under the State are called upon to discharge judicial or quasi-judicial powers. So they must have judicial approach and also knowledge and expertise in that particular branch of Constitutional, administrative and tax laws. The legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input and not giving it sufficient weightage and teeth would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the judicial adjudication. It is therefore, necessary that those who adjudicate upon these matters should have legal expertise, judicial experience and modicum of legal training as on many an occasion different and complex questions of law which baffle the minds of even trained judges in the High Court and Supreme Court would arise for discussion and decision. 32. In Union of India vs. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth this Court at p. 463 laid emphasis that: (SCC pp. 236-37, para 50) 'Independence of the judiciary is a fighting faith of our Constitution. Fearless justice is the cardinal creed of our founding document. It is indeed a part of our ancient tradition which has produced great Judges in the past. In England too, ......... judicial independence is prized as a basic value and so natural and inevitable it has come to be regarded and so ingrained it has become in the life and thought of the people that is now almost taken for granted and it would be regarded an act of insanity for anyone to think otherwise.' At page 471 (SCC p. 245) it was further held that if the beacon of the judiciary is to remain bright, court must be above reproach, free from coercion and from political influence. At page 491 (SCC pp. At page 491 (SCC pp. 263-64) it was held that the independence of the judiciary is itself a necessitous desideratum of public interest and so interference with it is impermissible except where other considerations of public interest are so strong, and so exercised as not to militate seriously against the free flow of public justice. Such a balanced blend is the happy solution of a delicate, complex, subtle, yet challenging issue which bears on human rights and human justice. The nature of the judicial process is such that under coercive winds the flame of justice flickers, faints and fades. The true judge is one who should be beyond purchase by threat or temptation, popularity or prospects. To float with the tide is easy, to counter the counterfeit current is uneasy and yet the Judge must be ready for it. By ordinary obligation for written reasoning, by the moral fibre of his peers and elevating tradition of his profession, the Judge develops a stream of tendency to function 'without fear or favour, affection or ill-will', taking care, of course, to outgrow his prejudices and weaknesses, to read the eternal verities and enduring values and to project and promote the economic, political and social philosophy of the Constitution to uphold which his oath enjoins him. In Krishna Swami case in para 67 at p. 650 it was observed that to keep the stream of justice clean and pure, the judge must be endowed with sterling character, impeccable integrity and upright behaviour. Erosion thereof would undermine the efficacy of rule of law and the working of the Constitution itself." 33. In paragraph 70 of the Report the Supreme Court observed: "70. In a democracy governed by rule of law surely the only acceptable repository of absolute discretion should be the courts. Judicial review is the basic and essential feature of the Indian Constitutional scheme entrusted to the judiciary. It cannot be dispensed with by creating a tribunal under Article 323A and 323B of the Constitution. Any institutional mechanism or authority in negation of judicial review is destructive of basic structure. So long as the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by an Act is not less effective than the High Court, it is consistent with the constitutional scheme. The faith of the people is the bedrock on which the edifice of judicial review and efficacy of the adjudication are founded. So long as the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by an Act is not less effective than the High Court, it is consistent with the constitutional scheme. The faith of the people is the bedrock on which the edifice of judicial review and efficacy of the adjudication are founded. The alternative arrangement must, therefore, be effective and efficient. For inspiring confidence and trust in the litigant public they must have an assurance that the person deciding their causes is totally and completely free from the influence or pressure from the Government. To maintain independence and imperativity it is necessary that the personnel should have at least modicum of legal training, learning and experience. Selection of competent and proper people instils people's faith and trust in the office and helps to build up reputation and acceptability. Judicial independence which is essential and imperative is secured and independent and impartial administration of justice is assured. Absence thereof only may get both law and procedure wronged and wrong-headed views of the facts and is likely to give rise to nursing grievance of injustice. Therefore, functional fitness, experience at the Bar and Aptitudinal approach are fundamental for repository of the confidence, as its duty, the tribunal would properly and efficiently interpret the law and apply the law to the given set of facts. Absence thereof would be repugnant or derogatory to the Constitution." 33A. In paragraph 76 of the Report the Supreme Court observed: "76. Before parting with the case it is necessary to express our anguish over the infectivity of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial reviews. The judicial review and remedy are fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensation of justice by the tribunals is much to be desired. We are not doubting the ability of the members or Vice-Chairman (non-Judges) who may be experts in their regular service. But judicial adjudication is a special process and would efficiently be administered by advocate judges. The remedy of appeal by special leave under Article 136 to this Court also proves to be costly and prohibitive and far-flung distance too is working as constant constraint to litigant public who could ill afford to reach this Court. But judicial adjudication is a special process and would efficiently be administered by advocate judges. The remedy of appeal by special leave under Article 136 to this Court also proves to be costly and prohibitive and far-flung distance too is working as constant constraint to litigant public who could ill afford to reach this Court. An appeal to a Bench of two Judges of the respective High Courts over the orders of the tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction on questions of law would assuage a growing feeling of injustice of those who can ill afford to approach the Supreme Court. Equally the need for recruitment of members of the Bar to man the tribunals as well as the working system of the tribunals need fresh look and regular monitoring is necessary. An expert body like the Law Commission of India would make an in-depth study in this behalf including the desirability to bring CEGAT under the control of Law and Justice Department in line with Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and to make appropriate urgent recommendations to the Government of India who should take remedial steps by an appropriate legislation to overcome the handicaps and difficulties and make the tribunals effective and efficient instruments for making judicial review efficacious, inexpensive and satisfactory." 34. While it is tryte that the functioning of CEGAT was duly considered by the Supreme Court and Ramaswamy, J.'s anguish as expressed in paragraph 76 in regard to the mode of functioning of the tribunals but the prayer of the Petitioner was not granted. The recommendations are there and it is for the executive to take appropriate steps in the matter. 35. Let us now, however, deal with the issue in regard to the impact of amendment and whether the amendment constituted any modification of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 36. The discussion noted above answers the enquiry as posed in the negative. To elaborate, however, on this count the decision in R. K. Jain's case (supra) ought to be noted. Rameswamy, J. with the concurrence of Ahmedi and Poonchi, J.J. observed: "Therefore, what was meant by this Court in Sampat Kumar's case ratio is that the tribunals when exercise the powers and functions, the act created institutions alternative mechanism by authority to adjudicate the service disputations. It must be effective and efficacious to exercise the power of judicial review. Rameswamy, J. with the concurrence of Ahmedi and Poonchi, J.J. observed: "Therefore, what was meant by this Court in Sampat Kumar's case ratio is that the tribunals when exercise the powers and functions, the act created institutions alternative mechanism by authority to adjudicate the service disputations. It must be effective and efficacious to exercise the power of judicial review. This Court did not power to have meant the tribunals are substituted of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. J. B. Chopra vs. Union of India merely followed the ratio of Sampat Kumar." 37. The observations of the Supreme Court, noted above, categorically records that the act has not created as a matter of fact a substitute for the High Court but it is an institutional alternative mechanism to adjudicate the service disputes. It is not an abrogation of judicial review-ability as such but creation if an equally efficacious alternative mechanism for the purposes of effective and expeditious disposals of service matters. Laws delay in this subcontinent is not unknown but the requirement of expeditious disposal of service matters has laid the law makers to amend the Constitution and introduce in the Statute book the legislation of 1985 while it is true that Article 226 enjoins the High Court to issue writs under the article and is not confined to fundamental rights but extends to all cases where the abridgement of a right is alleged. But the issue arises as to whether introduction of Article 323A in the Constitution by way of an amendment and subsequent legislation, to wit the Act of 1985 has, in-fact, affected the basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it is on this context a recapitulation of the observation of the Supreme Court in R. K. Jains's case seems to be very apposite. The Supreme Court in the above noted decision in no uncertain terms held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and the same cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, observed that though the basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution and provide alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review provided, of course, it is no less efficacious than the High Court. The Supreme Court, however, observed that though the basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution and provide alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review provided, of course, it is no less efficacious than the High Court. The Supreme Court in the above noted decisions held that it must be read as implicit in the constitutional scheme that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 is permissible but there ought not to be a void and the same must be filled up by another effective institutional mechanism or authority to be vested with the power of judicial review in it and which must be equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power of judicial review. As a matter of fact, the decisions of the Supreme Court, noted above, categorically recorded that so long as the alternative institutional mechanism set up by an act is no less effective than the High Court it is consistent with the constitutional scheme. In the matter under consideration the ineffectiveness of the Tribunal set up under the Act, of 1985 has not been agitated before this Court as such one need not specifically go into the same. 38. To sum up therefore that the concept of judicial review by an independent judiciary is the sine qua non of our democratic set up cannot amount to any modification of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and no amendment can be introduced to change the very basis of the doctrine of judicial review-ability. But does the amendment to the Constitution by introduction of Article 323A seek to abridge such a right the answer cannot but be in the negative it is not abrogation but vesting of the same power and authority on to a tribunal which cannot but be termed to be an equally efficacious one. 39. In the premises, judicial review' being a basic feature of the Constitution, is still available but from the Tribunal. If power of a superior tribunal is also exercised by inferior tribunal it does not necessarily have the effect of lavating the inferior tribunal to the status of the superior tribunal or equating each other. One has to see wether judicial review as was available from the superior tribunal is also available from the inferior tribunal. If power of a superior tribunal is also exercised by inferior tribunal it does not necessarily have the effect of lavating the inferior tribunal to the status of the superior tribunal or equating each other. One has to see wether judicial review as was available from the superior tribunal is also available from the inferior tribunal. It cannot be said that the tribunal contemplated under 1985 Act shall be equal in all respect to that of the High Courts nor the same is expected but one has to look whether the same judicial review is available or not. In the event the answer is in the affirmative, question of inference by the law courts would not arise. 40. In any event shifting of judicial review from the High Court to the Administrative Tribunal restricted to service jurisprudence is essentially a matter of State policy and the same is thus inherently inappropriate for judicial consideration. Judicial review does not by any stretch mean review by the High Court only. While it is true that the exclusion of judicial review is prohibited but creation of an alternate forum for judicial review cannot be said to be impermissible. Article 323A, for the reasons noted above, does not contemplate abridgement or abrogation of judicial review but merely authorises the establishment of an alternate forum for judicial review. 41. Turning attention on to the grievance of the writ petitioners in regard to the establishment of State Administrative Tribunal in terms of the provisions of Article 323A of the Constitution be it noted that s. 1 (4) of the Act of 1985 expressly recorded that the provisions of the Act in so far as it relates to an Administrative Tribunals for the State the same shall come into force in a State on such date as the Central Government may by notification appoint. In the contextual facts it appears that by a notification dated 21st December, 1994 the Central Government notified that the provisions of the Act of 1985 in so far as they relate to Administrative Tribunals for the State of West Bengal shall come into force with effect from 21st December, 1994. The process of an establishment of an Administrative Tribunal, however, commenced since March, 1987. The records depict that on 15th April, 1991 the Central Government issued an order regarding the procedure for appointment of Vice-Chairman and Members of the State Administrative Tribunal. The process of an establishment of an Administrative Tribunal, however, commenced since March, 1987. The records depict that on 15th April, 1991 the Central Government issued an order regarding the procedure for appointment of Vice-Chairman and Members of the State Administrative Tribunal. The order provided that for the purpose of selection of Vice-Chairman and members of the concerned State Administrative Tribunal there shall be a Selection Committee consisting of the Chief Justice of the High Court of the concerned State : The Chief Secretary of the concerned State Government and the Secretary (Law) of the State Government. The order further provided that the Selection Committee shall recommend from among the persons on the list of candidates prepared by the Chief Secretary or the Secretary in the General Administrative Department or Personal Department of the State Government after writing to various cadre controlling authorities of the State. The records depict that by a letter dated 27th March, 1992, the Government of West Bengal requested the Central Government to furnish the procedure for appointment of Chairman of State Administrative Tribunal. In reply to it, by a letter dated 6th April, 1992 the Government of India informed the State of West Bengal that no guidelines/instruction had been issued in regard to appointment of Chairman in the State Administrative Tribunal. 42. In the said letter dated 6th April, 1992, it was mentioned that, as has been provided in s. 6(7) of the 1985 Act, the State Government shall send proposal for appointment of Chairman with the approval of the Governor to the Central Government for obtaining the approval of the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. 43. Subsequent thereto on 14th May, 1993, a meeting of the Selection Committee for selection of the Members of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal was held in the Chamber of the Hon'ble Chief justice of the Calcutta High Court. The said meeting was attended by the Hon'ble Chief Justice, Calcutta High Court, the Chief Secretary to the State of West Bengal and the Secretary Judicial of the State of West Bengal. At the said meeting, the Selection Committee approved the proposal for appointment of Sri S. K. Guin (A retired Judge of this Court) as Chairman, Sri D. N. Sen as Judicial Member and Sri M. K. Kargupta as Administrative Member of the State Tribunal. 44. At the said meeting, the Selection Committee approved the proposal for appointment of Sri S. K. Guin (A retired Judge of this Court) as Chairman, Sri D. N. Sen as Judicial Member and Sri M. K. Kargupta as Administrative Member of the State Tribunal. 44. On 27th May, 1993 the Government of India issued Order No. A -11013/94-90/AT and thereby laid down a further procedure for appointment of Vice-Chairman and Members of State Administrative Tribunal. By the said order the Constitution of the Selection Committee was altered. The Selection Committee contemplated by the said order consists of-(1) Chief Justice of the High Court of the concerned State, (2) Chief Secretary of the concerned State Government, (3) Chairman of the State Administrative Tribunal of the concerned State and (4) Chairman of the State Public Service Commission of the concerned State. 45. By a letter dated 28th May, 1983 the State Government informed the Central Government as follows:- (I) The Government of West Bengal wants to have an Administrative Tribunal for adjudication of disputes with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointment to public services and post in connection with affairs of the State. (II) It was desired that such tribunal should be effective from the 1st September, 1993. (III) The State Government has nominated Sri S.K. Guin Sri D.N. Sen and Sri M.K. Kargupta respectively for the post of Chairman, Judicial Member and Administrative Member of the .................. proposed tribunal as per the law laid down in the Government Order No. A-11013/54/90-AT dated 15th April, 1991. 46. By the said letter dated 28th May, 1994 the Government of West Bengal requested the Central Government for establishment of Tribunal in terms of s. 4(2) of the 1985 Act and for issuance of necessary notifications. 47. Subsequent thereto by a letter 21/22 July, 1993, the Government of West Bengal informed the Central Government that since the reconstituted Selection Committee for appointment of Vice-Chairman and Members includes the Chairman of the Tribunal, the State Government was not in a position to proceed further in the absence of appointment of Chairman and requested the Central Government to take necessary action for obtaining approval of the President to the appointment of Sri S.K. Guin as Chairman. 48. 48. In reply to the said letter of the State Government dated 21/22nd July, 1993 the Central Government by its letter dated 16th September, 1993 informed the State Government that the appointment of Chairman cannot be notified unless the Tribunal comes into existence. It was further contended in the said letter that the Tribunal can come into existence only when there is at least one Judicial Member and one Administrative Member as provided in s. 5(2) of the 1985 Act. It was suggested in the said letter that Selection Committee may meet and conclude its deliberations without the Chairman of the State Administrative Tribunal. By a letter dated 14th May, 1993 addressed to the Selection Committee the State Government nominated the names of Sri D.N. Sen and Sri R. Kharlukhi for appointment in the post of Judicial Member and Administrative Member of the proposed Tribunal respectively. Subsequent, thereto, the Selection Committee comprising of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, the Chief Secretary to the State of West Bengal and the Chairman of the State (West Bengal) Public Service Commission, met in the Chamber of the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 21st December, 1993 and approved the proposal for appointment of Sri D.N. Sen and Sri R. Kharlukhi as Judicial and Administrative Members respectively of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal. 49. The minutes of the meeting of the Selection Committee held on 21st December, 1993 was forwarded to the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training, by the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal under cover of a letter dated 13th January 1994. In the said letter it was mentioned that the State Government and also the Governor of the State of West Bengal have approved the proposal for appointment of Sri D.N. Sen and Sri R. Kharlukhi as Judicial Member and Administrative Member respectively of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal. In the said letter it was indicated that the State Government is very keen to see that the State Administrative Tribunal is set up as early as possible. 50. Thereafter, the Secretary, Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training forwarded to the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal offer of appointment of Justice S.K. Guin, Sri D.N. Sen and Sri R. Kharlukhi under cover of a letter dated 21st December, 1994. 50. Thereafter, the Secretary, Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training forwarded to the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal offer of appointment of Justice S.K. Guin, Sri D.N. Sen and Sri R. Kharlukhi under cover of a letter dated 21st December, 1994. In the said letter an anxiety was shown for obtaining the dates of the earliest availability of the said three gentlemen as it was indicated that the actual date of setting up of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal will be the appointed date as defined in s. 3(c) of the Act and the same will depend on availability of the said persons. A draft notification under s. 4(2) of the Act was also enclosed with the said letter for concurrence of the State Government. 51. It appears from record that the State Government as well as the Central Government claimed to have published the notification under subs. (4) of s. 1 of the Act in the Gazette of India extraordinary Part II. Section 3(1) on 21st December, 1994. By the said notification the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal was established with effect from 10th January, 1995. 52. By a letter dated 3rd January, 1995 Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, informed the Secretary, Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training, that Justice S.K. Guin, Sri D.N. Sen and Sri R. Kharlukhi have expressed their willingness to accept the appointment. In the said letter a request was made for issue of formal letters of appointment. It was indicated in the said letter that the State Government proposed 16th January, 1995 as the appointed date as defined in s. 3(c) of the Act. By the said letter a further request was made for issue of notification under s. 4(2) of the Act. The concurrence to the draft notification sent under cover of the letter dated 21st December, 1994 was also accorded by the said letter. 53. The notification under sub-s.(2) of s. 4 of the Act was thereafter, said to have been, published on 10th January, 1995, establishing the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal with effect from 16th January, 1995. In the said notification it was mentioned that 16th January, 1995 shall be the appointed date within the meaning of clause (c) of s. 3 of the Act. 54. In the said notification it was mentioned that 16th January, 1995 shall be the appointed date within the meaning of clause (c) of s. 3 of the Act. 54. On 10th January, 1995, itself orders of appointment were issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India which recorded the pleasure of the President in regard to such appointments. 55. On 13th January, 1995, by the order of the Governor of the State of West Bengal, the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal issued a notification under clause A of s. 36 read with s. 12 of the Act, laying down the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal (Financial and Administrative Powers of the Chairman) Rules, 1995. 56. On 14th January, 1995 by the order of Governor of the State of West Bengal, the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal specified the place at which the Principal Bench of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal shall ordinarily sit and notified the same by a notification issued under sub-so (8) of s. 5 of the Act. 57. This longish narration of the events that have taken place in regard to the establishment of the State Administrative Tribunal could have been avoided but by reason of the submissions made from the bar in regard to the procedural lapses in regard thereto, judicial ethics prompted this court to record the same in extenso. 58. It is on this factual back-drop it was urged before us that since only one name was sent to the Selection Committee for selection of the Chairman, and since similar procedure was followed in regard to selection of administrative and judicial members, and since the procedure of preparation of a list of candidates and forwarding the list for consideration by the Selection Committee was not followed, the selection is bad. We do not concur to such submission for we have held that the Selection on Committee itself was free to reject the names sent to it but the same was not done. In addition thereto it has not been contended before us that any other suitable person has been ignored without any reason. 59. We do not concur to such submission for we have held that the Selection on Committee itself was free to reject the names sent to it but the same was not done. In addition thereto it has not been contended before us that any other suitable person has been ignored without any reason. 59. It was contended that no procedure has been laid down for Selection of Chairman in terms of the order of the Supreme Court passed in S.P. Sampat Kumar II reported in 1987 (supra) SCC 73 and therefore the appointment of the Chairman is without any guidelines and should be held to be invalid. In Sampat Kumar (I) the Supreme Court observed appointment of High powered Selection Committee for selection of Vice-Chairman and Members and not for selection of Chairman. Further, in Saran Singh Lamba's case, the Supreme Court has held that even the observation for setting up of a high powered committee as made by the Supreme Court in Sampat Kumar's case, was merely advisory and not mandatory in character. In spite thereof the selection of the Chairman of the State Tribunal was done by a selection committee headed by the Chief Justice of this Court. The candidate is a retired High Court Judge. It has not been contended, it could be either, that the candidate so selected has any short-coming of any nature in the matter of being selected as the Chairman of the State Administrative Tribunal. 60. It was also contended that the notifications were not published. Therefore, the State Administrative Tribunal has not been constituted or established. We reject the said contention on the ground that the printed notifications were produced before the Trial Court. The main thrust of the argument of the Writ Petitioners was that the notices in question were not available across the counter selling such notifications. They have not been able to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that notices were not in fact, published on the date as is said to have been published. They, however, contended that the press was made a party but it did not choose to come forward and controvert the allegations in the writ petition and therefore, we should presume that the Gazette notification is anti-dated. Strictly speaking the doctrine of admission by non-traverse as is applicable in Civil matters by reason of Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to writ petitions. 61. Strictly speaking the doctrine of admission by non-traverse as is applicable in Civil matters by reason of Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to writ petitions. 61. In order to bring into operation various provisions of the 1985 Act publication of the notices in the official gazette was of prime importance and not making the same available through the normal selling counters of such notices. The notices as printed in the official gazette were produced. It bears date when the same had been published, as contended by the State respondents. It is elementary that governmental actions should be presumed to have been done in accordance with law unless contrary is shown. The Writ Petitioners have failed to show by any cogent acceptable evidence that the Gazette notifications are ante-dated. 62. The Supreme Court in D.K. Srinivasan's case reported in AIR 1987 SC 1059 held a subordinate legislation will take effect from the date of publication or promulgation and when the parent statute prescribes the mode of publication or promulgation that mode must be followed. In our case the mode is publication in the official gazette and that has been followed. 63. In Jayanta Kumar Banerjee's case reported in AIR 1981 Cal 1833 a positive cogent evidence shown to the effect that the printing of the notification dated 18th May, 1979 published in the Calcutta Gazette (Extraordinary) was printed on 18th July, 1979. There is no such evidence in this case. 64. The observations of the Supreme Court in Harla's case reported in AIR 1951 SC 467 to the effect that natural justice requires before law can become operative it must be promulgated or published, was made with reference to a law authorising a citizen to be punished or penalised. It was A said that the person cannot be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the due exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. In the same judgment it was held that the concerned Act was not published at all in the gazette. Our case has no nexus to that case. 65. In that view of the matter we decline to accept such contention of the Writ Petitioners. 66. In the same judgment it was held that the concerned Act was not published at all in the gazette. Our case has no nexus to that case. 65. In that view of the matter we decline to accept such contention of the Writ Petitioners. 66. As regards the Full Bench Judgement of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, (1994) 1 Andhra Pradesh Law Journal, 1, we express our inability to lend our concurrence to the judgment. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in that judgment proceeded to hold that the theory of alternative institutional mechanism as propounded by Bhagabati J. in the minority judgment of the Minarva Mill's case and which subsequently found favour in the majority judgments of SP. Sampat Kumar's case and Sambamurthy's case (reported in AIR 1987 SC 663 ) is contrary to the ratio decidendi of the earlier larger Benches in Kesavananda Bharati's case, privileges case (reported in AIR 1965 SC 745 ) and Indira Gandhi's case. The Andhra Pradesh High Court proceeded to hold that in Keshavananda Bharati's case, privileges case and Indira Gandhi's case the Supreme Court has laid down the principle that the Constitutional courts i.e. the Supreme Court and High Courts alone have the power of judicial review. We fail to find any such pronouncement of the Supreme Court either in Keshavanda's case or in the privileges case or in the Indira Gandhi's case. As a matter of fact the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide the power of judicial review under Article 226 being a basic feature of the Constitution. On the contrary, the subsequent Constitutional Benches being quite alive of the Constitutional power of High Court under Article 226 held that such power can be transmitted to an alternate mechanism. 67. The issue as to whether the Tribunals have served the purpose and object for their effectiveness cannot possibly be gone into by this Court by reason of the fact that in R.K. Jain's case the Supreme Court itself has observed that it is now time to take stock of the situation and recommended that Law Commission ought to make an extensive study in regard to the Constitution of Tribunals as also the quality of performance so as to ensure the tribunals independence and consequent public confidence on to such tribunals in the event of their being a tribunal which is otherwise efficacious. By reason of the decisions of the Supreme Court question of High Court coming into different findings does not arise. 68. Be it noted that on 16th January, 1995, the Writ Petition was filed and on 17th January, 1995 an ad interim order of stay was passed by the learned Trial Judge and it is an admitted position that the State Tribunal has not discharged any judicial function and two applications filed before it have since been transferred to this Court. 69. The writ petition has been filed by four practising Advocates of this Court. Originally, there were only five respondents, viz., the Union of India, the State of West Bengal, the Secretary, Finance Department, Government of West Bengal, and the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal through its Registrar. Subsequently, the Manager, Government of India Press, the Chief Justice of this Court, the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court, the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal and the Chairman of the State Tribunal were added as respondents. On the prayer of some others claiming to have filed writ petitions to redress their grievances relating to service matters, were also added as respondents to the present writ petition. 70. In that view of the matter the, appeal is allowed. The order of Learned Trial Judge is set aside. The Writ 'Petition is dismissed upon treating the same on the day's list. All interim orders stand vacated. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 71. Prayer for certificate is refused and so also the prayer for stay. 72. Let signed copy of the minutes of the operative portion of this Judgment be made available to the parties. 73. Sarin Ghosh, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed.