Judgment : U. P. Singh, J. 1. THE controversy centres round the selection made by the Public Service Commission for the Medical Officers of Homoeopathy. THE mode and manner of selection adopted by the Public Service Commission as also the select list impugned in all these cases, dated 24th February, 1994 has been questioned by all the petitioners in these three writ petitions. Since a common question has been raised, all these petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. IN pursuance of the advertisement dated 22nd March, 1984 and issuance of further corrigendum dated 14th November, 1987, 390 posts were advertised to be filled up by the Homoeopathic Medical Officers in the State of Uttar Pradesh. They were required to be filled up by recruitment made by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. Along with others, the petitioners were also the applicants and the interview was held on 23rd October, 1990. The appointments were to be made on the basis of oral interview as also the marks to be awarded on the qualifications of each candidate. These are undisputed facts in all these cases. The petitioners possessed the Bachelor Degree of Homoeopathic Medicine and Surgery (B.H.M.S.) after completion of five-years course including one year compulsory routine internship in Government Hospitals and Public Health Centres from Homoeopathic Medical Colleges affiliated with the Agra University, in the year 1985. 3. IN order to appreciate the real controversy, it would be necessary at this stage to notice the required qualifications mentioned in the advertisement as per the requirement of Rule 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Homoeopathic Medical Service Rules, 1990, which reads as under: "8. Academic qualification. -A candidate for direct recruitment to the service must possess- I. a recognised Degree in Homoeopathy, the duration of study of which is not less than five years according to its syllabus or course. or a recognised Diploma in Homoeopathy the duration of study of which is not less than four years according to its syllabus or course: Provided that preference will be given to degree holders. II. or a recognised Diploma in Homoeopathy the duration of study of which is not less than four years according to its syllabus or course: Provided that preference will be given to degree holders. II. The applicant should be duly registered with the Homoeopathic Medicine Board, Uttar Pradesh." IN accordance with Rule 8 those candidates who were to be directly recruited to the service, must possess the recognised Degree in Homoeopathy, the duration of study of which should not be less than five years according to its syllabus or course and in respect of those who obtained recognised Diploma in Homoeopathy, the duration of study should not be less than four years according to its syllabus or course. IN addition to these, the proviso stated that "preference will be given to degree holders." 4. THE Uttar Pradesh Homoeopathic Medical Service Rules, 1990 was made in exercise of the power under Article 309 of the Constitution by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, prior to the issuance of the advertisement dated 21.12.1991. At the time when the advertisement in question was made in 1986, these Rules had not been enacted although, it now appears that the clarification which is now appearing in the Rules of 1990 is in terms the same as the one inserted in the advertisement. THE advertisement of 1986 specifically mentioned that "the degree holders shall be preferred to Diploma holders, i.e., Diploma holders will be considered only when the Degree holders are not available in requisite number." In the second advertisement of 1989, it was mentioned : "Preference shall be given to those possessing Degree." In the advertisement of 1991 along with the same qualification as mentioned in the other advertisements, it was provided that preference will be given to the Degree holders. THE corrigendum issued on 14.11.87 did not change the preference clause rather it emphasized that the other terms and conditions shall continue to be the same. There is no dispute that the petitioners of all these writ petitions are Degree holders with full qualifications as prescribed in the advertisement. The bone of the contention centres round this proviso. In support of their contention that such preference has not been given to the Degree holders and the Degree holders and Diploma holders were clubbed together by the Public Service Commission, the entire selection has been challenged as ultra vires the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement. The bone of the contention centres round this proviso. In support of their contention that such preference has not been given to the Degree holders and the Degree holders and Diploma holders were clubbed together by the Public Service Commission, the entire selection has been challenged as ultra vires the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement. The select list has been challenged as arbitrary since no reasonable criteria was adopted by the Commission while awarding marks to the candidates at the interview. The preference clause was totally ignored and it has not been established by the Commission by providing any cogent and reliable evidence as to how the marks were awarded separately in accordance with the provisions of the Rules and the criteria prescribed in the advertisement. 5. LEARNED counsel appearing for the Public Service Commission, Mr. V. M. Sahai has contended that while calling the candidates for interview, the ratio for filling up 390 total seats was in the ratio of 1 to 8. In other words, for filling up the 390 total seats, 2553 candidates were called for interview out of which 1989 were Diploma holders. 6. LEARNED counsel for the Commission has relied upon a direction given by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2373 of 1986 in support of his contention that according to the said direction of the High Court, both were to be treated at one par. At the very outset, we reject this contention raised on the basis of the direction in the said writ petition, as that is misreading of the order of the High Court. The High Court had simply said this : "In the meantime, the petitioners may be provisionally allowed to appear before respondent No. 2, if they are eligible and subject to the norms of the Commission for calling the candidates without discriminating the petitioner from Degree holders." We are afraid we cannot put interpretation over this order that ignoring the preferential clause as prescribed in the advertisement, this order could be read de hors the qualification prescribed therein whereby preference was to be given to the Degree holders over Diploma holders. Now we are informed that the said writ petition has also been dismissed on 16.11.1994 by a Division Bench of this Court. It is interesting to notice the contention and stand of the Commission before this Court in the said writ petition. Now we are informed that the said writ petition has also been dismissed on 16.11.1994 by a Division Bench of this Court. It is interesting to notice the contention and stand of the Commission before this Court in the said writ petition. In the said case, the Diploma holders were the petitioners and the contention raised on their behalf was that while calling for interview, the Public Service Commission had discriminated between the Degree holders and Diploma holders. According to them, the Diploma holders should have been called for interview. On the other hand, Mr. Sahai, learned counsel appearing for the Commission in the said writ petition, emphatically urged that the Degree holders were to be preferred because, they were having five years' experience of attending classes before they could obtain a Degree, whereas the Diploma holders attended classes only for four years before obtaining Diploma. In the earlier writ petition, it was, thus, contended on behalf of the Commission that the Degree holders were having more experience than Diploma holders and, therefore, it was open to the Commission to a call for those candidates from amongst the Degree holders for interview than those holding Diplomas. The said contention was accepted by the Court in the said writ petition that the Degree holders were to be preferred to the Diploma holders at the time of short-listing the candidates. 7. IT is quite strange that now the same contention is being put in the reverse process contrary to their contention in the earlier writ petition. The argument is now being placed on wrong interpretation of the preferential clause. 8. THE fact is not in dispute that for total seats of 390. 716 Degree holders applied, out of which, 565 were found eligible and out of them 109 have been appointed. Total number of Diploma holders who had applied for the post concerned, were 4239 out of which 1989 were called for interview. THE Diploma holders in general category who had secured 49% marks were called for interview, whereas, in the case of backward class candidates those who had secured 48.7% marks were called for interview. At one point of time, it was also urged by the learned counsel for the Commission that the three petitioners in Writ Petition No. 10175 of 1994, namely. Dr. Shiv Narain, Dr. Radhey Krishna Srivastava and Dr. At one point of time, it was also urged by the learned counsel for the Commission that the three petitioners in Writ Petition No. 10175 of 1994, namely. Dr. Shiv Narain, Dr. Radhey Krishna Srivastava and Dr. Om Prakash were not registered with Homoeopathic Medical Board and were not eligible for the post in terms of the conditions of the advertisement, but in course of argument the said contention was not pressed and was withdrawn. It was well accepted that they were all having recognised Degree according to the terms and conditions of the advertisement. The common contention, raised by the petitioner appearing in person in Writ Petition No. 10175 of 1994 and by Sri A. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 11438 of 1994, was that the preference clause stipulated in the advertisement has to be correctly interpreted and the manner in which the Commission has interpreted it, is totally unfounded, based on no principle. If we read the preferential clause, giving the ordinary literal meaning, the Degree holders were to be preferred to Diploma holders, as has been explained in the advertisement itself, i.e., the Diploma holders will be considered only when the Degree holders are not available in requisite number. These are the words used in the clarification clause given in the advertisement. It is plain and clear from those words that in case where Degree holders are not available in requisite number, only then. Diploma holders are to be considered. Therefore, there was no rationality in clubbing them together while considering the preference to be given to the Degree holders. 9. RELIANCE has been placed by the learned counsel for the Commission on a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Sher Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 200 . This was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939, wherein, constitutional validity of Section 47 (1H) of the Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939) had been challenged as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the said case, Section 47 (1-H) provided that in the case of inter-State route, the Undertaking will have preference in the matter of stage carriage permit and in that context, the expression 'preference' was being interpreted. The expression 'preference' means prior right, advantage, precedence, etc. In the said case, Section 47 (1-H) provided that in the case of inter-State route, the Undertaking will have preference in the matter of stage carriage permit and in that context, the expression 'preference' was being interpreted. The expression 'preference' means prior right, advantage, precedence, etc. While interpreting Section 47, it was said that when an application for stage carriage permit is processed, the application of the undertaking for an inter-state route shall be examined as the application of any other private operator. Their merits and demerits must be ascertained keeping in view the requirements of clauses (a) to (f) of Section 17 (1) and after comparing the merits and demerits of both, not with the yardstick of mathematical accuracy, but other things being equal, the application of the undertaking will have preference over others. Qualitative and quantitative comparison on broad features of passenger transport facility, such as, fleet, facilities to travelling public and other relevant consideration may be undertaken and after balancing these factors, other things being equal, the application of the Undertaking shall be given preference over other applicants. There is no question of eliminating private operators merely because the Undertaking applies for a stage carriage permit under Chapter IV. We do not see how this will land any assistance to the respondent Commission while interpreting preferential clause provided in the advertisement. The word 'preference' has to be interpreted in the context of a particular rule of provision and in the present case, the preference has to be given considering its true scope and meaning given to the preferential clause, as provided in the advertisement. The terms are clear and unequivocal and it cannot be read so as to equate the two Degree holders and Diploma holders contrary to the preference clause. 10. THE proviso to Rule 8 admits of no other interpretation and the preferential clause inserted in the advertisement provides in unequivocal terms that when requisite number of degree holders are not available, only then the Diploma holders are to be given appointment. Thus other things being equal, the Degree holders were to be preferred over the Diploma holders. Strangely enough, on the question of giving preference, we find conflicting stand of the Commission emerging in their counter-affidavits filed from time to time. Thus other things being equal, the Degree holders were to be preferred over the Diploma holders. Strangely enough, on the question of giving preference, we find conflicting stand of the Commission emerging in their counter-affidavits filed from time to time. One statement in different counter-affidavits are not clear rather it reflects the shifting stand adopted by the Commission while applying its method in giving preference to the candidates who were holding recognised Degrees. The select list shows that the very first 33 candidates selected for the posts are only Diploma holders. It has not been demonstrated as to what marks were obtained by the Degree holders on their qualification and what they obtained in interviews. It does not appear whether they secured lesser marks to those diploma holders so that they could not be preferred over the Diploma holders. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out from the result sheet produced by the Commission that the last person who has been selected, is also a Diploma holder and has secured only 56% marks. It has been rightly pointed out that even petitioner No. 2 also secured 56% marks but the Commission by adopting its policy of pick and choose method, did not include his name in the select list. The preference to Degree holders would mean that everything being equal, the Degree holders were to be preferred over the Diploma holders. 11. IN its first counter-affidavit, sworn by Sri Ashok Kumar Lal, Section Officer, dated 19.4.1994, the stand taken by the Commission was that both the Degree holders and Diploma holders were treated equally and no preference was given to the Degree holders. Thereafter, in the first supplementary counter- affidavit sworn by Sri S. H. Zamali, Section Officer, dated 6.12.1994, the Commission drastically changed its stand and stated that preference was given by awarding marks on academic qualification and 15 marks were given to the first Division Degree holders, 11 marks to IInd Division Degree holders and 7 marks to IIIrd Division Degree holders, whereas, 9 marks were given to the First Division Diploma holders, 7 marks to the Second Division Diploma holders and five marks to Third Division Diploma holders and, therefore, it was attempted to establish that preference was given to Degree holders qua Diploma holders by 6 marks, 4 marks and 2 marks respectively. But again in the second supplementary counter-affidavit of the Commission, sworn by Phaujdar Singh, Section Officer, dated 30.1.1996, the Commission came out with a new version, stating that 15 marks out of 25 marks were given to all the Degree holders against academic qualification, whereas, 9 marks were given to the Diploma holders and. thus, preference of 6 marks was given to the Degree holders in accordance with the preferential clause as inserted in the advertisement. IN order to find the correct position, we adjourned the case on different dates to enable the learned counsel for the Commission to produce the record and justify their stand and establish by evidence as to whether any such marks according to the academic qualification was, in fact, awarded to the candidates and as to what was the firm stand of the Commission in implementing the preferential clause as according to the Rules and the advertisement clause inserted therein. The clear stand of the petitioners was that the Commission did not award any marks on academic qualification and prepared the select list only on the basis of the marks awarded in interview. IN our order dated 8.2.1996, the Commission was directed to produce the marks-sheets before this Court for its perusal as to whether marks were awarded on the qualification of the candidates and, further, as what marks were separately awarded in the oral test, which might have been awarded by different interview Boards constituted by the Commission. When the case was again taken up on 15.2.1996, Mr. Sahai, the learned counsel for the Commission then produced a letter dated 13.2.1996 of the Joint Secretary (Law), stating that the marks were differently given on rough sheet of papers for the academic qualification and the interview but they were destroyed after it were carried over on the marksheet. IN the situation, it was not possible to produce the different marks obtained by each candidate, awarded to them on their academic qualification and in interview. The case was again adjourned to 15.2.1996 and, thereafter, affidavits were filed on 1.3.1996 by the Members of the Commission who constituted the different Boards. Even from the affidavits, it was not pointed out as to how and in what manner the marks were separately given. The serious allegation of the petitioners has been that they were never given the marks for their academic qualification in order to give them preference. Even from the affidavits, it was not pointed out as to how and in what manner the marks were separately given. The serious allegation of the petitioners has been that they were never given the marks for their academic qualification in order to give them preference. On the other hand, members of the Board have stated that the total marks is inclusive of all. Thus, inspite of several opportunities given to the Commission, they could not place any material to establish as to in what manner the preference clause was adopted. 12. IT is strange that the Commission being a Constitutional body, has not maintained its record properly in relation to this selection, and, in fact no proper regular record was maintained in relation to this selection in so far as awarding marks to the candidates separately for their academic qualification and in interview. This gives serious doubt about the credibility and sanctity of the selection. The Commission should have produced the records and materials before us to show that they acted fairly, when serious allegations have been raised in the writ petition about the mode and manner of selection and the criteria adopted by it. On the other hand, the records placed before us demonstrates that in the garb of preference, arbitrary selection has been made giving all preference to the Diploma holders over recognised Degree holders. The facts emerging from various counter-affidavits and the stand taken by the Commission leave no room for doubt that the impugned select list was based only on the marks awarded in the interview and preferential clause was not followed by the Commission. 13. IT was vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that allocation of 75 marks out of 100 for interview was arbitrary and was purposely done to favour the Diploma holders. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Anzar Ahmad v. State of Bihar, (1993) (6) JT 168; Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454 ; A. P. State Financial Corporation v. C. M. Raju and others, JT 1994 (5) SC 481 and Ashok Somanna v. State of Karnataka, 1992 (1) SCC 28 . 14. 14. THE admitted position is that no written test was held for the selection and out of the total 100 marks, 25 marks were to be awarded for the academic qualification and 75 marks for interview. In the case of Anzar Ahmad v. State of Bihar (supra), selection for the post of Unani Medical Officers was challenged on the ground that allotment of 50% marks for interview was excessive and arbitrary. THE Patna High Court quashed the select list on the ground, inter alia, that the allocation of 50% marks for interview was unjustified and arbitrary and, therefore, the whole recruitment process was vitiated on that account. THE Apex Court set aside the judgment of the Patna High Court and held that the Commission has made the selection on the basis of interview keeping in view the academic performance and with that end in view, the allocation of 50 marks for academic performance and 50 marks for interview does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness rather by giving equal weight to academic performance, the Commission has reduced the possibility of arbitrariness. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court noticed the earlier decisions on the subject and in paragraph 13 observed as follows : These observation would indicate that the matter of weight to be attached to interview and the allocation of marks for interview vis-a-vis marks for written examination can arise when written examination as well as viva voce test are both accepted as essential features of proper selection and there also no hard and fast rule regarding the precise weight to be given to the viva voce test as against written examination, can be laid down and the said weight must vary from service to service according to the requirement of the service. THE question of weight to be attached to viva voce test would not arise where the selection is to be made on the basis of interview only. In Ashok Kumar Yadav's case (supra), this Court has held that in the case Ex-Service Officers viva-voce test may be attached relatively greater weight because the personalities of such officers being fully mature and developed, it would not be difficult to arrive at a fair assessment of their merits on the basis of searching and incisive viva voce test. In Ashok Kumar Yadav's case (supra), this Court has held that in the case Ex-Service Officers viva-voce test may be attached relatively greater weight because the personalities of such officers being fully mature and developed, it would not be difficult to arrive at a fair assessment of their merits on the basis of searching and incisive viva voce test. But at the same time, the Court felt that the allocation of 33.3% marks for viva voce test for ex-service officers and 22.2% for other candidates was excessive and that the same should not exceed 25% for ex-service officers and 12.2% for other candidates." In the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khaiid Mujib, (1981) 2 SCR 79 , the Apex Court held that in the matter of public employment, the oral interview test should not be relied upon as the exclusive test but it may be restored to only as additional supplementary test. It has further been held that allotment of 1/3 of the total marks for oral interview is mainly arbitrary and unreasonable. In the case of A Peeria Karuppan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1971) 2 SCR 430 , the Apex Court held that allotment of 75 marks out of total of 275 marks against the oral interview were on the higher side. Similarly, in the case of Miss Nishi Meghu v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, (1980) 3 SCR 1253 , allocation of 50 marks for interview out of total 150 marks was held to be excessive. Therefore, now the settled legal position is that in the matter of selection, the marks for interview or viva voce test should not be high or excessive, so that the chance of favouritism, discrimination or arbitrariness may be eliminated. However, there could not be a straight-jacket formula as to what should be the allocation of marks for interview which should not exceed more than 50% of the total marks fixed for the selection. It is entirely for the Government and the Commission to decide looking to the post for which selection is to be made, nature of selection and the requirement of service. But surely allocation of marks should not be such as giving rise to favouritism, discrimination and arbitrariness. 15. It is entirely for the Government and the Commission to decide looking to the post for which selection is to be made, nature of selection and the requirement of service. But surely allocation of marks should not be such as giving rise to favouritism, discrimination and arbitrariness. 15. IN the case in hand, the selection was for the post of Homoeopathic Medical Officers, where academic qualification, knowledge of the subject, skill and experience were the necessary requirements to be examined for the selection of the candidates which could not be ascertained by the interview alone. Interview can only assess the personality of the candidate, but so far as the professional skill and academic knowledge of the subject is concerned, the same cannot be judged in short time of 4-5 minutes at the interview. IN the case in hand, no written test was provided and as noticed above, out of 100 marks, 75 marks were allotted for interview and only 25 marks were kept for academic qualification and, therefore, the selection was to be based only on the basis of marks secured in the interview as also the academic qualification. 16. THE facts of the present case are almost identical to the case of Anzar Ahmad v. State of Bihar (supra), where also selection was to be made for the post of Unani Medical Officer and out of 100 marks, 50% marks were kept for interview and rest 50% for academic qualification which has been approved by the Supreme Court. Therefore, considering the entire nature of appointment and requirement of medical service, we are of the considered view that allotment of 75 marks for interview as against 25 marks only for the academic qualification was arbitrary. However, in the present case, there is no material whatsoever to establish as to what marks were actually awarded for the academic qualification and for interview and the Court was left to guess and grope into the darkness. The select list has been prepared only on the basis of performance of a candidate in the interview without taking into account the academic qualification with the result that the selection proceeded on the basis of 100% marks on interview only without taking into account the academic qualification of the candidates and therefore, the select list was based only on the performance of the candidates appearing before the Selection Board of the Commission. In any case, the selection based only on 100% marks in interview, is unreasonable and arbitrary. That apart, in the matter of selection of candidates, the Commission must faithfully follow the statutes and/or the rules of recruitment relating to the service in question. In the instant case, we have noticed that the proviso to Rule 8 which provides preference to be given to the degree holders, has not been followed. The Commission being a constitutional body, is expected not only to act fairly and reasonably, but it should also appear from its action that it has, in fact, acted fairly and reasonably. 17. CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances of the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the Commission acted in most arbitrary and unreasonable manner in making selection for the post of Homoeopathic Medical Officers. It is not expected from such a constitutional body, like the Public Service Commission to act in such a casual manner while considering the public employment. We would have had no hesitation in quashing the entire selection made by the Commission but considering the public interest and also bearing in mind that the persons already selected have been appointed and are working on their posts as Homoeopathic Medical Officers for more than two years and they could not be made party in these writ petitions, although a few of them have intervened by filing applications and have been heard, and further that fresh selection will unreasonably delay causing inconvenience to the public in general, we refrain from doing so in the larger interest. Therefore, on conclusion of the hearing, we sought information from the learned Standing Counsel as to how many posts of Homoeopathic Medical Officers are still vacant. The learned Standing Counsel filed an affidavit on behalf of the State annexing therewith a letter dated 20.5.1996, disclosing that 50 posts of Homoeopathic Medical Officers are still lying vacant, out of which 15 posts are earmarked for the female candidates. Therefore, considering all these circumstances, we are of the view that it would be equitable in the facts of the case to issue direction to the Commission to forward the names of all the petitioners to the State Government for appointment on the vacant posts of Homoeopathic Medical Officers. 18. ACCORDINGLY, we allow Writ Petition No. 10175 of 1994 (Dr. Therefore, considering all these circumstances, we are of the view that it would be equitable in the facts of the case to issue direction to the Commission to forward the names of all the petitioners to the State Government for appointment on the vacant posts of Homoeopathic Medical Officers. 18. ACCORDINGLY, we allow Writ Petition No. 10175 of 1994 (Dr. Sheo Narain and others v. State of U. P. and another) and Writ Petition No. 11438 of 1994, Dr. Kamlesh Kumar Mishra and others v. State of U. P. and others, and direct the Commission to forward the names of the petitioners involved in both the writ petitions, namely, Dr. Sheo Narain, Dr. Radhey Krishna Srivastava and Dr. Om Prakash (Writ Petition No. 10175 of 1994) ; Dr. Kamlesh Kumar Mishra, Dr. Ayodhya Prasad Pandey, Dr. Prithvi Raj Singh, Dr. Anand Prakash Pandey and Dr. Om Shanker Srivastava and the impleaded petitioners Dr. Ganesh Prasad Awasthy, Dr. Lakshmi Shanker Dubey and Dr. Markandey Singh (Writ Petition No. 11438 of 1994), to the State Government for appointment on the post of Homoeopathic Medical Officer within a period of two weeks from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. The State Government is also directed to issue letters of appointment to the aforesaid petitioners as Homoeopathic Medical Officers within two weeks from the date of receipt of such recommendation of the Commission. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however, expressed apprehension that there may be several other candidates who might have secured much higher marks in the interview before the Commission and they may subsequently claim their appointment. We make it clear that since the appointments were made in the year 1994 and only these present petitioners have challenged the selection by filing these petitions and the other candidates did not choose to challenge the selection and they never approached this Court within the reasonable time, therefore, this relief cannot now be extended to them which is being granted to these petitioners only, who were anxiously vigilant and approached this Court in time. We had to grant this relief to these petitioners only in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. NOW coming to the Writ Petition No. 7661 of 1995. We had to grant this relief to these petitioners only in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. NOW coming to the Writ Petition No. 7661 of 1995. which has been filed by the Graduate Homoeopath's Medical Association of India, we are of the view that the same is not maintainable and in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar and others v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Bharthana and another, AIR 1984 All 46 , this petition was not pressed also because one of the petitioners, besides the Association, is also a petitioner in one of the three writ petitions. Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 7661 of 1995 is dismissed as not pressed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.