A. Gumpraasad, Sole Proprietor, First Computers, Madras v. First Computers, formerly known as ‘Brilliant Computer Centre rep. by T. Neelakantan
1996-08-07
S.S.SUBRAMANI, SRINIVASAN
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. These three applications arise out of a proceedings, in which we passed an order on 10.4.1995 in O.S.A. No. 74 of 1995, which, in turn, was an appeal against an interlocutory order made during the pendency of a suit pending on the original side of this Court. 2. It is not necessary for us to set out in detail the history of the case. Suffice it to point out that Application No. 166 of 1996 is one for punishing the respondent for wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order of this Court in O.S.A. No. 74 of 1995. The content of the charge is that the direction given by us to the respondent in our judgment dated 10.4.1995 reported in 1995-2-L.W. 486 to make it clear by appropriate words whenever it makes use of the words ‘First Computers’ the purpose of its coaching classes in all the advertisement, pamphlets, etc. that it has nothing to do with the business conducted by the applicant herein. 3. We have gone through the records and heard arguments in detail. We are of the opinion that the disobedience on the part on the respondent is not wilful. Unless there is a wilful disobedience of the order of this Court, there cannot be any question of punishing the respondent for contempt. What is meant by the expression ‘wilful’ is set out in Nat. Assistance Board. v. Prisk (1954 (I) ALL. E.R. 400). Lord Goddard. C.J. said that ‘wilful’ means in the summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Acts, 1895 to 1949, ‘deliberate’, that is to say, deliberately refusing to pay, with no excuse. 4. Thus to make out a case of civil contempt, it is necessary to prove that the disobedience on the part of the respondent is deliberate and without any excuse. In this case, after going through the explanation given by the respondent, we are of the opinion that the disobedience on the part of the of the respondent is not wilful. No doubt, the respondent is highly educated and is expected to know what exactly is being done and what exactly was meant by the order of this Court. But, that by itself would not make the act of the respondent ‘wilful’. 5.
No doubt, the respondent is highly educated and is expected to know what exactly is being done and what exactly was meant by the order of this Court. But, that by itself would not make the act of the respondent ‘wilful’. 5. In Contempt Application No. 163 of 1996, the content of the charge is that the respondent is guilty of criminal contempt, having filed a false affidavit dated 4.1.1996 in this Court in C.M.P. Nos. 836 and 839 of 1996 in O.S.A. No. 74 of 1995. In the said petition, the prayers made by the respondent were for issue of a clarification of our earlier order dated 10.4.1995, referred to above and for the grant of injunction restraining the applicant herein from continuing to issue the circular complained of or issue any advertisements, notices, etc. In the affidavit filed in support of the said petition, the respondent had stated in paragraphs 6 and 8, as follows: 6. In accordance with the directions issued by this Honble Court in O.S.A. No. 74 of 1995, the petitioner has been issuing newspaper advertisements which contain the wording ‘we have no connection with a computer trading concern run by Mr. A. Guruprasad at Madras’. The petitioner has used indentical wording in the advertisements which ‘appear in television channels and cable T.V. The petitioner has not used the said wording in its informational brochures relating to the different courses conducted by the petitioner, as such informational brochures are not in the nature of advertisement material. The brochures are informative of the various courses providing details of the contents of the courses. The informational brochures are not distributed to the public at large as a means of advertisement, but are given only to the students who come for enquiry to the training centre of the petitioner and its franchisees, to enable the students to study the course content of each course and to select the specific course which suits his/her intended avocation., 8. Although the petitioner has adhered to the condition imposed by this Honble Court in newspaper advertisements since April, 1995, in the last week of December, 1995 after a lapse of about 8 months, the petitioner has received an undated circular issued by the respondent to the petitioner and to the petitioners franchises. The Circular is threatening in nature and has threatened every recipient of the circular with contempt of Court.
The Circular is threatening in nature and has threatened every recipient of the circular with contempt of Court. The circular states that the petitioner has failed to comply with the directions of this Honble Court and that ‘the law will take its inexorable course’ The Circular is issued by the respondent only to harass of the petitioner and obstruct the business of the petitioner. The respondent has with deliberate ulterior motives issued the Circular to the ‘petitioners franchisees, who are not parties to the proceedings, with the sole object of spreading disinformation and causing harm to the reputation and goodwill enjoyed by the petitioner and also to bring an end to the petitioners legitimate business activities. If the respondent is bona fide aggrieved, he ought to have approached the petitioner or this Honble Court and not indulge in issuing threatening circulars. The conduct of the respondent is obvious.’ 6. It is argued vehemently that the statements contained in the two paragraphs, were clearly false to the knowledge of the respondent and even at that time, the respondent was not complying with the directions given by this Court in regard to the advertisements made Outside the State of Tamil Nadu. An explanation is given by the respondent that it was under the bona fide impression that the direction given by us in our order was only with regard to inclusion of such an endorsement in the advertisements made inside the State of Tamil Nadu and not outside the State. In the context of the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that the explanation is genuine and the respondent was under the bona fide impression to that effect. Thus, it is an erroneous impression and later, the respondent having corrected itself pursuant to our orders passed on those petitions, it is not possible for us to come to the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of criminal contempt. 7. Reliance is placed on the order passed by us in the said petitions, in which we have rejected the contentions of the respondent and observed that the wording used by the respondent in the advertisements and the way in which it is printed in the said advertisements, did not comply with the direction given by us in the judgment in the O.S. Appeal. On that footing, we refused to grant the injunction prayed for by the respondent herein.
On that footing, we refused to grant the injunction prayed for by the respondent herein. That will not however make the respondent guilty of contempt. We had no doubt then said that the respondent had not fully complied with the direction given by us. The question before us as at present is, whether the respondent is guilty of criminal contempt. It is argued by the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the statement made by him is not false, in the sense, that he had included the endorsement in the advertisement inside the State of Tamil Nadu. No doubt, the statement does not represent the full truth, but the bona fide impression of the respondent at that time was that is was sufficient if it had introduced the said endorsement in the advertisements within the State. In such circumstances, we are unable to come to the conclution that the respondent had deliberately made a false statement in the affidavit, referred to above and it is guilty of criminal contempt. 8. The application in C.M.P. No. 4941 of 1996 is for conducting on enquiry into the offences under section 193, 199 and 200, Indian Penal Code, committed by the respondent with respect to the sworn affidavit dated 4.1.1996 filed in this Court in C.M.P. Nos. 838 and 839 of 1996 in O.S.A. No. 74 of 1995. We have already pointed out that it is not possible for us to hold conclusively that the respondent was guilty of filing a false affidavit and the statement contained in the said affidavit was false to his knowledge. We have already pointed out that it was based on a wrong understanding of the order made by this Court. 9. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Santokh Singh v. Ishar Mussin ( AIR 1973 SC 2190 ) that every incorrect of false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution and the court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. It was also held by the Supreme Court that the Court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge of vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. 10.
It was also held by the Supreme Court that the Court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge of vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. 10. Learned counsel for the applicant referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Karunakaran v. V. Eachara Warrier ( AIR 1978 SC 290 ). The Court said that whether. suo moto , or on an application by a party under S. 340(I) Cr.P.C., a court having been already seized of a matter may be tentatively of opinion that further action against some party or witness may be necessary in the interest of justice. Under that section, the reasons recorded in the principal case, in which a false statement has been made, have a great bearing and indeed action is taken having regard to the overall opinion formed by the court in the earlier proceedings. 11. In Har Gobind v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1979 SC 1760 ), the Supreme Court held that for a prosecution under section 456, Code of Criminal Procedure, it was incumbent on the court filing the complaint regarding offence referred to in s. 495(c) to record a clear finding regarding the exact offence which was committed by the party to the proceeding. In the absence of such a finding, the court filing the complaint cannot be supported in law. 12. In K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India ( AIR 1992 SC 1831 ), the Court said that the mere fact that a deponent has made contradictory statements at two different stages in a judicial proceeding, is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution for perjury under section 193, I.P.C., but it must be established that deponent has intentionally given a false statement in any stage of the ‘judicial proceeding’ or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding. Further such a prosecution fo r perjury should be taken only if it is expedient in the interest of justice. 13. We are of the opinion that the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in the afore mentioned decisions, are not satisfied in the case on hand. We must also place on record that the respondent has expressed an unconditional apology in the affidavit filed by it in these proceedings.
13. We are of the opinion that the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in the afore mentioned decisions, are not satisfied in the case on hand. We must also place on record that the respondent has expressed an unconditional apology in the affidavit filed by it in these proceedings. Learned senior counsel for the respondent also reiterated the same in the beginning of his arguments by stating that his client is tendering unconditional apology. The representative of the respondent, viz. , Thiru T. Neelakandan, is present in court and he has also tendered unconditional apology in open court orally and we have hereby recorded the same. 14. In the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that no case is made out either for punishing the respondent for contempt or for directing action under section 340 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, all these petitions are dismissed.