ORDER : 1. These two writ appeals arise out of the judgment of the learned single Judge made in Writ Petition Nos. 6855 and 6857 of 1986 on August 9, 1990. The petitioners in both the writ petitions came up with identical averments and therefore, they were considered by a common judgment by the learned single Judge. The petitioner in W.P. No. 6855 of 1986 was appointed as a Sub-Staff in the respondents/ Bank on September 22, 1980 while the petitioner in W.P. No. 6857 of 1986 was appointed as a Sub-Staff on March 3, 1978. While the former was discontinued from service with effect from October 26, 1984 the latter was discontinued from service with effect from July 8, 1983. According to the petitioner in W.P. No. 68552C of 1986 he had worked for a total number of 394 days during the period from September 22, 1980 to October 26, 1984. According to the petitioner in W.P. No. 6857 of 1986 he had worked for a total period of 400 days during the period from March 3, 1978 to July 8, 1983. The affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions proceeded on the basis that the oral termination of service ab initio was void and violative of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called "the Act"). It was further contended that the petitioners were deemed to he in continuous service from the date of the first appointment as per Section 25B of the Act. It was also contended that several juniors appointed subsequent to the date of the appointment of the petitioners were being continued in service and therefore, the discontinuance of the petitioners is illegal. On the above averments, the prayer in the writ petitions was for the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents/ Bank to absorb the petitioners as Sub-Staff with continuity of service and other attendant benefits. In the counter affidavits filed by the respondents/Bank it was contended that the petitioners were engaged as casual employees in leave vacancies as and when vacancies arose in different branches of the Bank. It was contended that the allegations required factual proof and question cannot be agitated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The remedy if any of the petitioners was to raise a dispute under the Act. It was contended that the allegations required factual proof and question cannot be agitated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The remedy if any of the petitioners was to raise a dispute under the Act. On merits the specific plea was that the petitioners were not retrenched within the meaning of Section 25G of the Act, but on account of undesirability in engaging him even on a casual basis due to his involvement in a fraud. In respect of such a disengagement of services of casual labour, the a provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act have no application at all. It was also contended that the petitioners had not put in continuous service of one year as defined u/s 25B of the Act. It was also specifically contended that the reliefs sought for by the petitioners could not be granted and there was no question of permanent absorption of the petitioners. 2. On the above pleadings, Govindasamy, J. who heard the writ petitions observed : "From the above, it is clear that the petitioners cannot even he construed as temporary employees. It is in these circumstances, the contention on the part of the respondents that the petitioners were disengaged on account of undesirability in engaging them even on casual basis due to their involvements in a fraud and that the provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H have no application cannot be said to be unsustainable". The learned Judge also found that there was no retrenchment as such and found that the petitioners had no claim to be absorbed as Sub-Staff in the respondents/Bank. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed. The Writ Appeals have been filed by the petitioners. In the Writ Appeals, a fresh ground has been raised by relying on paragraph 20.7 of the Bipartite Settlement. It is contended that there was no category as casual employees in Banks. Persons employed in leave vacancies are really temporary employees entitled to he absorbed. It was also contended that on the averments in the counter-affidavit stating that the petitioner had been terminated from service on account of undesirability and involvement in a fraud, the orders Of termination are liable to be set aside because no enquiry at all was held before such termination. 3. It was also contended that on the averments in the counter-affidavit stating that the petitioner had been terminated from service on account of undesirability and involvement in a fraud, the orders Of termination are liable to be set aside because no enquiry at all was held before such termination. 3. Inasmuch as the grounds raised in the Writ Appeals were not raised at the time of the disposal of the writ petition, the respondent/Bank has filed a common counter-affidavit in the Writ Appeals. It is contended that the appellants were engaged in a day to day basis and a panel of such employees was maintained, but it was outside the regular establishment of the Bank. Their names are not borne on the Attendance Register of the Banks. Their daily wages are paid through vouchers. There was no question of taking disciplinary action against them for their undesirability because they were only in a panel of casual employees. It is also stated that simply because they are called temporary staff in certain circulars, they could not become temporary employees as per (sic.) Paragraphs 20.7 and 20.8 of the Bipartite Settlement. Inasmuch as the respondent/Bank has filed a counter affidavit on the fresh points taken in the Writ Appeals and in as much as the appeals are pending for over 5 years, we do not propose to reject the fresh points taken in the Writ Appeals. We have heard the arguments of Mr. Prasad for the appellants and Mr. G. Venkataraman for the respondents. The following issues arise for consideration :- (1) Whether the appellants are entitled to the benefit of Paragraphs 20.7 and 20.8 of the Bipartite Settlement. (2) If the appellants are so entitled, is the respondent/Bank justified in discontinuing their service without even a written order on the ground that they were found to be undesirable and being involved in a fraud. (3) To what relief are the appellants entitled ? 4. Taking up the first question we would like to extract Paragraphs 20.7 and 20.8 of the Bipartite Settlement. They are as follows :- "20.7 In supeirsession of paragraph 21.20 and sub clause (c) of paragraph 23. (3) To what relief are the appellants entitled ? 4. Taking up the first question we would like to extract Paragraphs 20.7 and 20.8 of the Bipartite Settlement. They are as follows :- "20.7 In supeirsession of paragraph 21.20 and sub clause (c) of paragraph 23. 1 5 of the Desai Award "Temporary Employee" will mean a workman who has been appointed for a limited period for work which is of an essentially temporary nature or who is employed temporarily as an additional workman in connection with a temporary increase in work of a permanent nature and includes a workman other than a permanent workman who is appointed in temporary vacancy caused by the absence of a particular permanent workman". "20.8 A temporary workman may also be appointed to fill a permanent vacancy provided that such temporary appointment shall not exceed a period of three months during which the bank shall make arrangements for filling up the vacancy permanently. If such a temporary workman is eventually selected for filling up the vacancy, the period of such temporary employment will be taken into account as part of his probationary period". We have also referred to the counter-affidavit of the respondent/Bank on the applicability of the above Bipartite settlement. The counter affidavit itself says that in certain Circulars the appellants have been called as temporary Sub-Staff, but they would have it, that the Bipartite Settlement will not apply. We are unable to accept the contention of the respondent/Bank. A perusal of Paragraph 20.7 clearly shows that a temporary employee who is employed temporarily as an additional workman in connection with the temporary increase in work of a permanent nature and includes a workman who is appointed to a temporary vacancy caused by the absence of a particular permanent workman. In this case, the plea of both the parties is that the appellants had been engaged in leave vacancies over a period of years. No doubt, the actual number of days worked by each of the appellants is a matter in dispute. The fact that they had been engaged in leave vacancies is accepted. Therefore under Paragraph 20.7, these employees are only temporary employees. All such temporary employees do have a status and they are kept in a separate panel. They are absorbed in permanent vacancies as and when such an occasion arises. The fact that they had been engaged in leave vacancies is accepted. Therefore under Paragraph 20.7, these employees are only temporary employees. All such temporary employees do have a status and they are kept in a separate panel. They are absorbed in permanent vacancies as and when such an occasion arises. Therefore, the first question is answered in favour of the appellants. 5. The second question is, whether the respondent/Bank can terminate the service of such employees on an allegation of misconduct, without holding an enquiry. In other words, is the discontinuance of the appellant innocuous in nature or as a result of an allegation of misconduct against them. It is clearly seen from the counter affidavit of the respondent/Bank that but for the misconduct alleged against them they could have been absorbed in permanent vacancies like many other temporary employees referred to in the affidavits of the petitioners. Therefore, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the termination of service even though oral, was definitely due to an allegation of misconduct and therefore, punitive in nature. In fact, on this question the counter-affidavit of the respondent/Bank puts an end to any controversy and we quote the following sentences in the counter-affidavit : "... but on account of undesirability in engaging him even on casual basis due to his involvement in a fraud". In fact, it is for this very reason, the respondent/Bank says that the petitioners cannot claim any seniority or parity with those juniors who had been absorbed in the Bank. We do not therefore, propose to refer to various decisions on this aspect because the issue is concluded by the Bank's statement in the counter-affidavit. A careful reading of the affidavit and counter-affidavit as well as paragraph 20.7 of the Bipartite Settlement leads to the following conclusions :- Employees who come within the said Paragraph 20.7 of the Bipartite Settlement are temporary employees and the Bank has to maintain a panel of such employees for eventual absorption in permanent vacancies, as and when such vacancies arise in the order of seniority. This is the one and only way by which the Banks can safeguard the rights of such temporary employees without offending the Rules of fairpaly and justice. This is the one and only way by which the Banks can safeguard the rights of such temporary employees without offending the Rules of fairpaly and justice. If the Bank has any grievance against any member of the panel on the ground on misconduct or other disqualifications, the proper course is to give an opportunity to that member of the panel and pass an order in accordance with law giving appropriate findings for their conclusion. So long as this is not done the members in the panel will automatically get absorbed in permanent vacancies in the order of seniority. A Nationalised Bank has to maintain this minimum requirements of law as against their employees by whatever name they call them, casual, contingent or temporary. They have to set an example to other employers in the matter of avoiding arbitrariness and maintaining fair play. We therefore, hold that the discontinuance of the service of the appellants was by way of punishment and consequentially we hold that any such termination cannot be undertaken without a proper enquiry and without giving due opportunity to the appellants. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on certain decisions relating to termination of service of temporary employees and power of the Court to lift the veil and see whether the termination was innocuous or by way of punishment. For instance, T.R. Balaji Vs. The Management of Indian Bank and Another, and The Indian Bank v. C. V. Reddy (Writ Appeal No. 825 of 1991 dated October 31, 1995) are some of the decisions relating to this category. We have already held that on the facts of the present case it has been conclusively proved that the termination of the service of the appellants was by way of punishment. On the other hand, Mr. N. G. R. Prasad learned counsel for the appellants, relied on decisions in Jarnail Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. 1986 XI LLJ 268 (SC) and State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. V. 20 Kausahal Kishore Shukla (Judgments Today, 1991 (1) S.C. 108). These two decisions also lay down the same principles of law. Namely, that in respect of temporary Government servants, they cannot be terminated from their services in accordance with the Rules by an innocuous order without casting stigma on the employee. V. 20 Kausahal Kishore Shukla (Judgments Today, 1991 (1) S.C. 108). These two decisions also lay down the same principles of law. Namely, that in respect of temporary Government servants, they cannot be terminated from their services in accordance with the Rules by an innocuous order without casting stigma on the employee. We do not think that it is necessary to go into these decisions because of the clear and categoric conclusion that we have already arrived at. 7. We now come to the last issue relating to the nature of the relief that can be granted to the appellants/petitioners. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, U. P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra 1994 XI LLJ 977 (SC). That case relates only to regularisation of service and may be relevant because of the prayer sought for in the writ petitions. In that case certain persons were engaged to clear certain backlog of work and the period of engagement ranged from one to two years. Ultimately, the engagement was discontinued. The Supreme Court held as follows :- at p 978 "We are unable to uphold the order of the High Court. There were no sanctioned posts in existence to which they could be said to have been appointed. The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is difficult to envisage for them, the status of workmen on the analogy of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, importing the incidents of completion of 240 days' work. The legal consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are entirely different from what, by way of implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy. The completion of 240 days' work does not, under that law import the right to regularisation. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service". We therefore, deny the prayer sought for by the appellants in their writ petitions. But there is no impediment in granting a different and lesser form of relief when such relief is justified on the facts and circumstances of the case. It merely imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service". We therefore, deny the prayer sought for by the appellants in their writ petitions. But there is no impediment in granting a different and lesser form of relief when such relief is justified on the facts and circumstances of the case. In this connection reference may also he made to an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in The President, Srirangam Co-Operative Urban Bank Limited, v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai & another (W.A. No. 183 of 1996 dated March 15, 1996, since reported in 1996 W.L.R. 455). In that case, the parties had approached the Labour Court and the High Court had to consider the correctness of the award of the Labour Court. The issue raised in that case related only to Section 25F of the Act. In this case, we do not have the benefit of a fact finding authority to go into the question of the applicability of Section 25F of the Act. All the same, the relief granted by a Division Bench of this Court, is of assistance in disposing of the present writ Appeals. The Division Bench had denied the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service, backwages and other attendant benefits. On the other hand, they directed reinstatement of the workman as Daily wage workman. However, there was a direction to give the increase in the daily wages as per the current rates prescribed by the Banks. The Division Bench also directed payment of arrears of wages at the very same rate paid on the date of termination excluding Sundays and Bank Holidays. Adopting the said ratio laid down by the Division Bench and on the findings rendered by us as above, we allow the Writ Appeals and set aside the order passed in both the writ petitions and allow the writ petitions in the following terms : (1) Both the writ petitioners shall be reinstated in service as daily wage workmen coming under Paragraph 20.7 of the Bipartite Settlement. (2) Both the petitioners shall be paid the arrears of wages from the date of their respective termination at the rate of daily wages payable during the respective periods. (3) On reinstatement the petitioners shall be paid at the rates paid by Banks in respect of such employees, on the date of reinstatement. 8. (2) Both the petitioners shall be paid the arrears of wages from the date of their respective termination at the rate of daily wages payable during the respective periods. (3) On reinstatement the petitioners shall be paid at the rates paid by Banks in respect of such employees, on the date of reinstatement. 8. The Writ Appeals are allowed in the above terms. There will however, be no order as to costs.