Honble MUKHERJI, ACTG. C.J.– This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated September 15, 1995 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1269 of 1989. (2). The contention of the writ petitioner inter alia was to the effect that even though he was selected for appointment in 1985 alongwith several other candidates, the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation did not give him any appointment, as a result whereof he had to file a writ application before this Honble Court bearing No. 2021 of 1988, pursuant to which the Division Bench while allowing D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2021/88 by its judgment dated November 15, 1988 directed inter alia that the writ petitioner appellant should be given an appointment in the post of Conductor within a period of three months from the date of the order. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation was directed to send the letter of appointment to the writ petitioner appellant at the address mentioned in the writ petition with a copy to his learned Advocate. Pursuant to the said judgment and order of the Division Bench the writ petitioner appellant was given an appointment on March 15, 1989. Thereafter due to financial constraints the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation decided to retrench its employees who were so appointed after April 1, 1987 since they appeared to be excessive in number. Inasmuch as, the writ petitioner appellant was appointed after April 1, 1987, he was also retrenched alongwith other persons. The writ petitioner in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1269/89 prayed inter alia for a direction so as to prohibit the respondents Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and its officers from retrenching him. His contention was that he was to be treated as an appointee of the year 1985 when he was duly selected for appointment and it was due to the lapses of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation that he had to file a writ application and obtain an order on November 15, 1988 pursuant to which he was ultimately given the appointment on March 15, 1989. His contention further was that there should be a direction upon the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation to make payment of his salary and wages to him since he would not come within the purview of the scheme of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation so as to retrench its employees appoin- ted after April 1, 1987. (3). The learned Single Judge however was of the opinion that for all intents and purposes he would be deemed to have been appointed on March 15, 1989, whatsoever may be the background of his case even if he deserved an appointment by virtue of his selection in 1985 and that if the Rajasthan State Road Transport Cor- poration had in fact retrenched him treating him to be an appointee after April 1, 1987 there was no illegality whatsoever on the part of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, more so when in the High Court judgment directing his appointment as passed on November 15, 1988 there was no specific direction upon the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and its officers that his appoint- ment shall be dated back from 1985. . . . . . . . he was duly selected and appointments were made to other candidates so selected alongwith him. The contention of the writ petitioner appellant that his appointment should be considered atleast for the purpose of retrenchment to be an appointment from the year 1985 was not found to be tenable by the learned Single Judge because there was no express observa- tion made by the Honble Judge of the Division Bench while their Lordships passed the judgment on November 15, 1988. The learned Single Judge was of the view that no such direction could be prayed for or even could be issued at the present stage. That apart pursuant to the policy decision by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation taking the cut off date to be April 1, 1987 about 110 employees were retrenched along with the writ petitioner some of the retrenched persons who filed writ application impugning said retrenchment did not succeed in the writ application as filed before this Court, mainly on the ground that there was an alternative remedy available and even special appeals filed against such orders of the Single Judge stood dismissed. (4). Mr. (4). Mr. Samdariya drew our attention to the decision in Dhari Gram Panchayat vs. Saurashtra Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh and Anr. (1), for the proposition that if High Court finds any action to be malafide, it can directly interfere with the action and grant relief under Article 226 notwithstanding the remedy pursued and appealed from being incompetent or without jurisdiction. That was a case where the Labour Court found the employer Gram Panchayat not to be an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial disputes Act and found further that the reference of the dispute against the retrenchment was incompetent. Since the supreme Court was convicted that it was a case of malafide retrenchment and where the workmen were reinstated pursuant to High Courts order but again retrenched on the same day, it upheld that High Courts right of interference with the orders of retrenchment on the ground of malafides. Mr. Samdariya drew our attention to a judgment of our Court in Ayurved Chikitsak Welfare Association, Jaipur vs. State of Raj. (2), for the proposition that once an appointment is made after selection by a duly constituted selection committee, such appointment will have to be treated as a regular appointment and the appointee will have a right to be treated as substantive in service. That was a case where the State of Rajasthan treated some members of the petitioner Association who had been appointed after regular selection ad hoc appointees and the High Court took the view that such treatment as an ad hoc appo- intee was arbitrary and unjustified. It was asserted by the learned Advocate for the respondents by citing the decision in The State of Haryana vs. Subhash Chandra Marwaha and Ors (3), that the mere fact that the candidates name appeared in the list of selected candidates does not entitle him to be appointed. The competitive examination is for the purpose of showing that the particular candidate is eligible for consideration. Selection for appointment comes later. It is open to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made from the list of the selected candidates. The only restraint put on the power of the Government to make appointments from amongst the list of selected candidates is that the government shall not travel out side the list and that the government shall not depart from the ranking given in the list. The only restraint put on the power of the Government to make appointments from amongst the list of selected candidates is that the government shall not travel out side the list and that the government shall not depart from the ranking given in the list. Thus by appointing the first few amongst many in the list the government does not infringe any requirements of law and no legitimate grievance can be made by the remaining persons in the list who were not ultimately given appointment though there were still vacancies. The unfilled posts do not warrant issue of mandamus to an authority. It was also held in this decision in the context of Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules as adopted by Haryana that the government is competent to fix a higher score for selection than one required for mere eligibility. The learned Advocate for the respondents placed before us the decision in Jetandra Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (4), for the proposition that a person selected by the Service Selection Board for direct appoint- ment has got no unfettered right to be appointed on the basis of the recommendation made by the Board. Even for persons selected by Public Service Commission such persons have no right to be appointed and no mandamus lies. The decision in Ex. Capt. K.C. Arora & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (5), which lays down the proposition that acquired rights could not be taken away with retrospective effect by way of amendment in respect of war service benefits has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Popatbhai Ramjibhai Moghariya & Ors. vs. District Judge, Surendranagar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (5), which lays down the proposition that acquired rights could not be taken away with retrospective effect by way of amendment in respect of war service benefits has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Popatbhai Ramjibhai Moghariya & Ors. vs. District Judge, Surendranagar and Ors. (6), it was held by a Single Judge of Gujarat High Court that where there was a preparation of a select list for appointment and there was later on a denial of appointment on the ground of the candidate becoming over age by the time his turn came for appointment though he was within the prescribed age limit on the date of interview as well as on the date when the select list was prepared, it was held that the candidate was entitled to the appointment and the appointing authority was also under an obligation to inform the candidate before getting him by passed so that he could take appropriate steps either by challenging the decision or try to find out a job elsewhere and if there be an appointment of a candidate junior to him, the said candidate so by passed was held to be entitled to appointment with retrospective effect and also back wages for the period from the date of actual appointment of a person junior to him. Mr. Samdariya in ultimate analysis submitted that even if appropriate and adequate prayers were not made in the earlier writ petition by the learned Advocate concerned, that might not prejudicially affect his client for ascertainment of his position who was for all intents and purposes an appointee of 1985. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on a deci- sion of this Court in Dr. S.S. Bhandawat vs. State of Rajasthan (7), where it was held that even if a concession is made by the learned counsel for the petitioner before a court or before a statutory authority, it is no ground to deny him his right to present the writ petition on the ground of erroneous view of law since any concession in the matter of law would not in any way affect his legal right. We do not think that any concession was in fact really made by the learned Advocate but then the learned Judges of the Division Bench in their own wisdom did not indicate that the writ petitioner was entitled to be treated as in service as of 1985 employee. The learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the legal position that for all intents and purposes he was to be treated as a person employed on March 15, 1989 pursu- ant to a judgment pronounced by the Court on November 15, 1988. We understand that the writ petitioner appellant has not yet been a victim of the retrenchment order and even if there was a decision to get him retrenched the said order has not been given effect to by virtue of the interim orders passed by the learned Single Judge. Even if he has been so retrenched by a memo bearing No. F-10/Mu./Yata/P- 2/93/1697 dated February 8, 1993 issued by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur the retrenched employees have been called back into service. In that view of the matter atleast for the purpose of retrenchment the writ petitioner may be entitled to be treated as an appointee of 1985. Since he had already been retrenched, he should enjoy the protection in this perspective so as to be called back into service forthwith though without any consequential benefits. With these observations, the present special appeal stands disposed of.