This writ application has been filed challenging the retirement of the petitioners at the age of 50 and with a further prayer to give effect to the settlement dated 22.1.91 and for a direction to reinstate the petitioners and allow them to continue till the age of superannuation is reached according to the settlement. There are as many as 23 petitioners and all of them are permanent employees of the Assam Co-operative Jute Mills Ltd at Silghat which is duly owned and controlled by the State of Assam and as such the same is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and all these petitioners, it is claimed, were to retire at the age of 50. Earlier the age of retirement of the workers of the Mill was fixed at 58 years. But subsequently by virtue of a Standing Order certified by the Labour Commissioner, Assam under the provision of Industrial Employment Standing Order Act, 1946 (hereinafter called the Act), the age of superannuation was arbitrarily fixed at 50 years of age and in pursuance of the said Standing Order the petitioners were forced to retire at the age of 50 years. That thereafter a conciliatory settlement was arrived at on 12.1.91. By the settlement the age of superannuation was fixed at 55 years. But the petitioners were no reinstated and as such this writ application. 2.1 have heard Shri A. Dasgupta, learned Advocate for the petitioners and Shri PC Deka, learned Advocate for the respondents. Section 4 of the Act of 1946 provides the conditions for certification of Standing Orders. It inter alia, provides as follows: (i) Provision is to be made therein for every matters set out in the Schedule which is applicable to the industrial establishment; and (ii) The Standing Orders are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of this Act. 3. The law is that the terms of the employment specified in the Standing Order is preferred other to corresponding terms in contract of service. While adjudging the fairness or reasonableness of any Standing Order, the Certifying Officer should consider the social interest in the claims of employer and the social interest in the demands of workmen. Where a Standing Order certified by the Certifying Officer contends a clause relating to superannuation not provided by the Schedule of the Act nor by the model Standing Order, such certification cannot be a valid certification. Where a Standing Order certified by the Certifying Officer contends a clause relating to superannuation not provided by the Schedule of the Act nor by the model Standing Order, such certification cannot be a valid certification. In the Schedule the following matter as to be provides in the Standing Orders under this Act: "1. Classification of workmen, e.g., whether permanent, temporary, apprentices, probationers, or badlis. 2. Manner of intimating to workmen periods and hours of work holidays, paydays and wage rates. 3. Shift working. 4. Attendance and late coming. 5. Conditions of, procedure in applying for, and the authority which may grant leave holidays. 6. Requirement to enter premises by certain gates, and liability to search. 7. Closing and reopening of sections of the industrial establishment, temporary stoppages of work and the rights and liabilities of the employer and workmen arising therefrom. 8. Termination of employment, and the notice thereof to be given by employer and workmen. 9. Suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and acts or omissions which constitute misconduct. 10. Means or redress for wrokmen against unfair treatment or wrongful exactions by the employer or his agents or servants. 11. Any other matter which may be prescribed." 4. So a bare perusal of the 11 items will show that the age of superannuation cannot be provided in the Standing Orders. No doubt certified Standing Orders are statutory prescribed the conditions of service shall be deemed to be incorporated in the contract of employment of each employee, that is, employer if any rule framed by company read with Standing Orders absolute or invalid discretion on the employer to allow or disallow a rightful claim of the employees, that would be unfair and unreasonable as also arbitrary subject to test of Article 14. If a Standing Order is not fair or reasonable, this Court in exercise of its power to declare ineffective and in far possible. If the Certifying Officer finds that some of the provisions of the Standing Orders relate to matter which are included in Schedule or finds that some of the provisions are unreasonable and it is his duty to refuse to certify the same. If the Certifying Officer finds that some of the provisions of the Standing Orders relate to matter which are included in Schedule or finds that some of the provisions are unreasonable and it is his duty to refuse to certify the same. The Parliament has laid this mandatory duty of the Certifying Officer which he must discharge in a fair and in a quasi judicial manner (see 1977 LIC 575 (All) (Air Gases Mazdoor Sangh & others vs. Indian Air Gases Ltd, Varanasi & others) relying on AIR 1963 SC 439 . On this background let us have a look at the pleadings in the instant case. 5. Clause 23 of the Standing Order which is Annexure A to the writ application rovides as follows : "23. Superannuation : Every worker shall retire from service on completing the age of 50 years, extension for a maximum of 5 years may be given at the discretion of the Management, provided the employee is certified by a registered Medical Practioner as desires such extension of service period." 6. In paragrahs 4, 5 and 6 it is states as follows : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 7. In paragraph 9 it is stated as follows : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 8. In paragraph 12 it is stated as follows : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 9. In paragraph 15 it is stated as follows : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 10. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed wherein the relevant paragraphs are paragraphs 7 and 9 are quoted below : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 11. Shri Dasgupta in support of his contention submits that the Standing Order regarding superannuation is not fair and reasonable relying on the following decisions: (i) AIR 1984 SC 505 (M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut & others) wherein in paragraph 12 the Apex Court has laid down the law as follows : "12. The days of laissez faire when industrial relation was governed by the harsh weighed law of hire and fire, the management was the supreme master, the relationship being referable to contract between unequals and the action of the management treated almost sacrosant. The developing nations of social justice and the expanding horizon of socio economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the unequal partner in the industry namely, those who invest blood and flesh against those who bring in capital. The developing nations of social justice and the expanding horizon of socio economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the unequal partner in the industry namely, those who invest blood and flesh against those who bring in capital. Moving from the days when whim of the employer were supreme lex, the Act took a modest step to compel by statute the employer to prescribe minimum conditions of service subject to which employment is given. The Act was enacted as its long title shows to require employees in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them. The movement was from status to contract, the contract being not left to be negotiated by two unequal persons but statutorily imposed. If this socially beneficial Act was enacted for ameliorating the conditions of the weaker partner, conditions of service prescribed thereunder must receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment underlying the Act and defeat the mischief." 12. In paragraph 13 the Supreme Court pointed out that the power to prescribe conditions of service is not unilateral but the workman has right to object and to be heard and a statutory authority, namely, Certifying Officer have to certify the same. In the instant case before the Standing Order was made and certified reducing the age of superannuation, the workers were not heard. So, it directly runs counter to the decision of the Apex Court. 13. The next case is AIR 1973 SC 1227 (The Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co India (P) Ltd vs. The Management & others) wherein the Supreme Court pointed that "In construing the provision of a welfare legislation, Courts should adopt beneficial rule of construction. As far as reasonably possible construction furthering the policy and object of the Act and more beneficial to the empoyees has to be preferred. As far as reasonably possible construction furthering the policy and object of the Act and more beneficial to the empoyees has to be preferred. Act intended to improve and safeguard the service conditions of an employee should be liberally interpreted, according to its plain words and without doing violance to the language used by the legislature." (iii) AIR 1970 Orissa 126 (Saroj Kumar Ghosh vs. Chairman, Orissa State Electricity Board) wherein a Division Bench of the Court has pointed out in paragraph 11 relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 1471 and AIR 1960 SC 665 , it laid down the law as follows : "If this is the basis, there is no room for upholding the provision for superannuation. We must, therefore, hold that the provisions contained in clause 32 of the Standing Orders, as extracted above, was without the authority of law. The Certifying Officer did not perform his job properly and overlooked the mandate of the statute and certified it though such a provision was not certifiable under section 4 of the Act. The fact that the workmen did not challenge such a provision cannot add enforceability to such a provision without jurisdiction. We, therefore, conclude that there was no valid Standing Order applicable to the workmen of the Cuttack Electric Supply Co Ltd which made any provision for superannuation." The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court pointed out that superannuation is an event which conies more or so in an automatic process. An age is fixed in reaching of which the holder of an office is required to go out of an office. With the lapse of time the even automatically comes, both the parties more (sic) end of the matter long before and it is an event which cannot be resisted by them if the Rule is to be followed. Superannuation as pointed out by the Apex Court in AIR 1960 SC 1471, (R and H District Electric Supply Company vs. State of UP) does not come within the definition of termination. Superannuation is an important condition of service and is not liable to be changed lightly. Superannuation as pointed out by the Apex Court in AIR 1960 SC 1471, (R and H District Electric Supply Company vs. State of UP) does not come within the definition of termination. Superannuation is an important condition of service and is not liable to be changed lightly. (iv) 1970 (20) FLR 243 (Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Ltd and Associated Cement Companies Ltd) wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that where the topics to be included in the Standing Order of a company do not fall under any of the item in the Schedule to the Act the extension of the Standing Order to such topics would be entirely without jurisdiction and such Standing Orders could not therefore be framed. Even the Supreme Court further pointed out that even if this point was not taken before the Certifying Officer or before the appellate authority such action being without jurisdiction would be a complete nullity. So this completely answer the question raised in the present case. On the other hand on behalf of the respondent reliance is placed in (1994) 6 SCC 145 (Rampukar Singh & others vs. Heavy Engineering Corporation & others) and it is argued that a settlement under section 12 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act is binding on all workmen whether members of the union or not. Even if this contention is accepted the petitioners cannot be retired at the age of 50 relying on the Standing Order. Accordingly I hold that direction given to the petitioners for superannuation on the basis of the Standing Order is not sustainable inasmuch as, that is a nullity as pointed out by the Apex Court. Accordingly a writ of Mandamus is issued commanding the opposite party/respondents to take back all the petitioners in service and allow them to continue to the age of 55 years as agreed to by the settlement. All the orders of superannuation of the workmen even though given effect to at the age of 50 on the basis of clause 23 of the Standing Order shall stand quashed and the petitioners shall be taken back in service and treated them to be in service till they attained the age of 55 years. All the monetory benefits shall be given to the petitioners. This shall be done within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of this order. 13. All the monetory benefits shall be given to the petitioners. This shall be done within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of this order. 13. 1978 Labour Industrial Cases 1560 (Central Workshop Karmachari Sangh, Kanpur vs. Industrial Tribunal I, 7th Stratchy Road, Allahabad & others). This is a case from Allahabad High Court, wherein the Allahabad High Court in paragraph 8 has pointed out as follows : "The present day tendency is to fix the age of superannuation of workmen by Industrial Laws generally at 60 years unless evidence is produced to show that the work of a particular class of employee is arduous or hazardous on account of which the workmen lose efficiency earlier in age. See Jeewan Law Ltd vs. Workmen ( AIR 1972 SC 1210 : 1972 Lab 1C 654). In the absence of any evidence or finding that the work which the work charged employees performed was arduous or hazardous in nature it was unreasonable for the appellate authority to interfere with the certified Standing Orders prescribing the age of superannuation at 60 years." In the instant case there is absolutely no material to show that there was any justification for reducing the age of superannuation as done any clause 23. It is absolutely unreasonable and unfair. Accordingly the writ application is allowed. As the poor workmen were dragged to the Court I order to payment of costs of Rs.500/-.