Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed with a prayer for quashing the order passed by the additional Member, Board of Revenue, bihar, Patna as also the order passed by the Collector, East Champaran at motihari and the Additional Collector, east Champaran. By these orders the aforesaid authorities have declared the land held by the petitioners to be surplus land of respondent No.5 Farzand Ali. 2. The facts of this case, briefly stated, are noted below: a land ceiling case No.60 of 1982-83 was started afresh after a previous proceeding in respect of the same land, stood abated and a draft statement dated 12-10-1982 was issued in the name of tahir Ali alone. In the said draft statement the total land belonging to Tahir Ali and his two brothers Farzand Ali and Taiyab Ali were shown as 541.64 1/2 acres. The objection filed by the petitioners and said tahir Ali is that the land of other persons have been clubbed together with their land and the classification of land has been done in an arbitrary manner. Further case of the petitioners is that the land which had been transferred to third parties before 22-10-1959 as well as the land which had been sold prior to 9-9-1970 and the land which had been gifted during the period of grace to others were wrongly clubbed together with the land of the petitioners. On the basis of the said objection, a detailed hearing took place before the Additional Collector, East Champaran at Motihari. In the said hearing, partly the objection filed by the petitioners were allowed relating to classification of land and three units of class IV lands in favour of the three brothers were allowed. But in the order passed by the Additional Colluctor the deeds of gift were not accepted nor did the Additional Collector accept the transfer made to the third parties. Thereafter an appeal was filed by Farzand Ali (respondent No.5) under Sec.30 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling area and Acquisition of Surplus Land)Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act)and the petitioners also joined in the said appeal in the category of the appellants land ultimately the appellate authority on a detailed consideration of the entire matter passed an order dated 6th February, 1984 i dismissing the appeal. Thereafter a revision was filed which was also rejected by the learned Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna by order dated 7th August, 1984. 3. In this writ petition all those orders have been challenged. It appears that along with this writ petition, two other writ petitions, namely, C. W. J. C. No.4141 of 1984 and 4142 of 1984 were also filed and those two writ petitions were directed to be heard together. It appears that those two writ petitions, namely, C. W. J. C. No.4141 of 1984 and 4142 of 1984 stood dismissed for default on 17-8-1994. It also appears that applications for restoration of those two writ petitions have been filed and are pending before this Court for disposal. 4. Before the appellate authority, the case of the writ petitioners was that farzand Ali, Tahir Ali and Taiyab Ali are three brothers of whom Tahir Ali and Taiyab Ali are not party to this writ-petition. Shaukat Ah, Hashmat Ali, anwar Ali and Asghar Ali who are writ petitions No.1 to 4 here are sons of Farzand Ali and all those persons had joined in the category of the appellants before the said appellate authority. 5. The ground of appeal which was taken before the appellate authority relating to classification of land was dismissed by the appellate authority and before this Court also the said part of the judgment of the appellate authority was not assailed. What has been assailed before this Court is the question of gift given to the appellants who are writ petitioners before this Court at the time of inception of the said Act. 6. The original gift deeds were produced before the appellate authority and the appellate authority has perused the same and on perusal of the gift deeds executed by Tahir Ali, Farzand Ali and Taiyab Ali to their sons it appears that the gift deeds were executed in view of the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 5 of the said Act as originally enacted. On perusal of the gift deeds, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that on paper the gift deeds appeared to be valid as they have been executed by the land holder-appellant within the period of grace provided under sub-section (5) of Sec.5 of the said Act as originally enacted. On perusal of the gift deeds, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that on paper the gift deeds appeared to be valid as they have been executed by the land holder-appellant within the period of grace provided under sub-section (5) of Sec.5 of the said Act as originally enacted. But the appellate authority has made a detailed consideration as to whether the gift under the Mohammedan Law is valid. In considering the said fact the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that there are three essential requisites for a valid deed of gift under the Mohammedan Law. They are, namely, (a) the declaration of gift by the donor, (b) acceptance of gift expressed or implied by or on behalf of the donee and (c) delivery of possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee. The appellate authority is right in saying that the question of delivery of possession has to be ascertained on the tacts and circumstances of the individual case and the delivery of possession is a must in order to constitute valid deed of gift. In this connection, the appellate authority has considered the principles of Mohammedan Law from Mullas treatise and this Court finds that the discussion made by the appellate authority is substantially correct. In this connection this Court finds that in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Saheb V/s. Syed ismail and others reported in A. I. R.1995 SC page 1205, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that in a case of gift under the Mohammedan law, the donee should take delivery of possession of the property either actual or constructively. It is further held "in case of immovable property in the possession of the donor he should completely divest himself physically of the subject of gift. " (Paragraph 5 ). 7. It is true that in order to make a valid gift under the Mohammedan Law, it may be done orally or and the gift need not be registered also. Therefore, in the instant case the fact that the deed of gift was reduced in writing and was registered does not make the gift complete, unless and until all the three ingredients, pointed out above, are satisfied. Therefore, in the instant case the fact that the deed of gift was reduced in writing and was registered does not make the gift complete, unless and until all the three ingredients, pointed out above, are satisfied. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the donor has not divested himself of the subject-matter of gift and delivery of possession has not taken place. In mullas Mohammedan Law, 19th Edition, those three conditions have been mentioned in paragraph 149. A reference has been made to the decision in the case of Md. Abdul Ghani V/s. Fakhr jahan Begum reported in 49 Indian Appeals page 195. At page 209 of the said judgment in the case of Md. Abdul ghani (supra) the following principles have been laid down: "for a valid gift inter vivos under the mahomedan Law applicable in this case, three conditions are necessary, which their lordships consider have been correctly stated thus: " (a) manifestation of the wish to give on the part of the donor; (b) the acceptance of the donee, either impliedly or expressly; and (c) the taking of possession of the subject-matter of the gift by the donee, either actually or constructively. " (Mahomedan Law, by Syed Ameer All, 4th ed. , Vol.1. , p.41 ). " 8. The aforesaid principles have been adopted by Mullas Mohammedan law and the decision of the appellate authority by relying on the aforesak principles, has correctly appreciated the legal position. In Fyzees Outlines of mohammedan Law, 4th Edition, the same principle has been enunciated by saying in page 230 Article 44. "delivery of possession is, therefore, an essential characteristic of the Islamic law of gift for in early times and it was a clear and tangible proof that the ownership of the donor had ended and the ownership of the donee had been perfected and could not be questioned". Therefore, the taking of possession of the subject matter of the gift by the donee either actualy or constructively is necessary complete the gift. 9. About the constructive possession fyzee has further stated that in all cases of gift, delivery of physical possession is not insisted but in the case of chattels and land "actual delivery of possession is necessary". (page 237) and such gift is complete "by mutation names". 10. In view of those legal principles, the findings by the. 9. About the constructive possession fyzee has further stated that in all cases of gift, delivery of physical possession is not insisted but in the case of chattels and land "actual delivery of possession is necessary". (page 237) and such gift is complete "by mutation names". 10. In view of those legal principles, the findings by the. appellate authority that the deeds of gift are invalid are based on factual determination that the donor neither divested himself of the property gifted nor did the donee take any step towards obtaining constructive possession of the gifted properties. It has been recorded in the appellate order that the mutation was not effected even for 4-5 years after the execution of the deeds of gift. This shows that there has been no delivery of possession in favour of the donee. It also appears that before mutation, the donors have transferred the said land in whatever manner it suited them. This will also show that the deeds of gift in question are not genuine one. It appears from the appellate order itself that there are as many as 114 cases of transfers and the land involved in such transfers approximately comes to about 175 acres. This would show that the deeds of gift were not genuine and there was no delivery of possession in favour of the donees by the donor and such large scale transfers were made to defeat the purpose of the said Act. 11. The revisional authority has also mentioned the following factual circumstances in order to show nondelivery of possession of the subject-matter of gin deeds in its order dated 7th August, 1984. Those circumstances recorded in the said order are set out below: " (i) Even after the execution of the deed of gifts, the executors or even non-executors (i. e. the brothers of the executors)transferred the gifted land to third persons; (11) The donees got themselves mutated in revenue records long after the execution of the deeds of gift; (110 There is absolutely no evidence to indicate constructive possession of the gifted land by the donee. " 12. In view of the aforesaid factual aspect of the matter, this Court cannot hold that the deeds of gift in respect of the immovable property, in the facts and circumstances of the case, were complete when there has been no factual evidence of delivery of possession either actually or constructively. " 12. In view of the aforesaid factual aspect of the matter, this Court cannot hold that the deeds of gift in respect of the immovable property, in the facts and circumstances of the case, were complete when there has been no factual evidence of delivery of possession either actually or constructively. 13. Learned Counsel for the petitioners thereafter relied on the doctrine of musha in support of his contention that the deeds of gift in question are valid in the eye of law. The word musha in Mohammedan Law means an undivided part or a share. In fyzees Outlines of Mohammedan Law, 4th Edition at page 239 Article 45 it has been stated that the general rule relating to musha is laid down in Heda as follows: The gift of a part of thing which is capable of division is not valid unless the said part is divided of and separated from the property of donor but a gift of indivisible thing is valid. " 14. Therefore, relying on this principle, this Court is of the opinion that if the subject-matter of gift is divisible as it obviously is in the present case, than an undivided part cannot form the subject of gift on the principles of musha. But if it cannot be divisible, the undivided part can form the part of the subject-matter of gift on those principles. In the instant case, the properties which have been gifted are all divisible and, therefore, the doctrine of musha cannot be attracted. In this connection the observations of Privy Council in the case of Ameerunnissa Khatoon and others. Abedunnissa Khatoon, reported in 2 Indian Appeals, page 87 are very revealing. In the said decision in ameerunnisa Khatoon (supra) the Privy council has explained in page 105 of the report that when subject matter of gift are definite shares in certain zamin-daries, then nature of right in them being defined and regulated by the public Acts of the British Government and the shares were for revenue purposes distinct estates, each having a separate number in the Collectors books, the rule of Mohammedan law relating to Musha does not apply. This was the view taken by the High Court and it appears that the learned Judges of the Privy Council accepted the High courts view as correct. 15. This was the view taken by the High Court and it appears that the learned Judges of the Privy Council accepted the High courts view as correct. 15. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case the principles of musha are not attracted. Therefore, this court is of the view that following the law as laid down by the Privy Council and as elucidated in the Fyzees book, the deeds of gift in the instant case are not valid deeds of gift in the eye of law and the appellate authority was right in not accepting the same. Similarly the decision of the revisional authority in rejecting the revision-application against the said order of the appellate authority was also correct. 16. For the discussions aforesaid, this Court is unable to discern any error in the decision-making process of the authorities concerned who have comprehensively dealt with the questions of fact and law in an adequate manner. Therefore, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, this Court does not find any error on the face of the record in the decision of the appellate authority and the revisional authority and, therefore, this Court is unable to interfere in the matter. 17. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. The interim orders are all hereby vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Petition Dismissed.