A. B. SRIVASTAVA, J. The petitioners have filed this writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari. 2. Suit No. 248 of 1975 was filed by Smt. Azizan, after whose death, respondents No. 2 and 3 have been substituted as her legal representatives. The suit was filed with al legation that the plaintiff Smt. Azizan is bhumidhar of the plots in question and has all along been in possession. The defendants (petitioners before this Court), it was al leged, have got the impugned sale deeds erecuted fraudulently, without paying any consideration. She had no intention to transfer her land, the document was neither scribed in her presence nor the contents were read and explained, her thump impres sion on the documents is fictitious and she did not receive any consideration. Accord ingly cancellation of the sale deeds in ques tion and delivery of possession, in case it was found necessary, was sought. 3. The respondent besides contesting the plaintiffs claim on merits, and stating that she had executed the sale deeds of her own free will, also pleaded that the suit was not cognisable by the civil Court in view of the bar contained in Section 331 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. The Munsif who heard the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue accepted the plea of the petitioners, holding the suit non- cognisable, and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the Revenue Court. On ap peal preferred by the plaintiff the learned Additional District Judge however, set aside the said finding and held the suit to be cog nisable by the Civil Court. Aggrieved, this writ petition. 4. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the suit of the plaintiffs being for cancellation of a void deed and the prayer in effect being of possession over bhumidhari land, the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under Section 331 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act. The contention on be half of the respondents on the other hand, is that the relief of possession being merely an alternative relief, the suit was essentially for cancellation of a deed, which did cast a cloud on the title of the plaintiff and as such the bar under Section 331 is not attracted. 5. The contention on be half of the respondents on the other hand, is that the relief of possession being merely an alternative relief, the suit was essentially for cancellation of a deed, which did cast a cloud on the title of the plaintiff and as such the bar under Section 331 is not attracted. 5. Having considered the submission of both sides, this Court is unable to per suade itself to accept the contention of the petitioners that the suit was essentially for possession. The plaintiff specifically claimed herself to be in possession. A suit under Section 209 of the Z. A.-"and L. R. Act thus could not be filed. There also nothing to show that a suit under Section 229-B of the said Act could be filed. It is not the case of any party that the plaintiff is not recorded as bhumidhar. The State and Gaon Sabha thus recognising the title of the plaintiff, she could not bring a suit under Section 229-B. Bar of Section 331 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act would be attracted if the suit is based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained from the Revenue Court. In the instant case as on the facts apparent no relief could be obtained from the Revenue Court, the plea of the petitioners of bar to the jurisdiction of civil court be comes unsustainable. 6. Even otherwise it cannot be said that merely because major parts of the aver ments of the plaintiffs indicated the docu ments to be void, the plaintiff had no locus standi to come to seek relief of cancellation. 7. In Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad and others, A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 540, ap proving a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Padarath v. II A. DJ. Sultanpur 1989 A. W. C. 290, the Supreme Court has held that where a party prima facie proceeded on the premise that it could not ignore the sales but that the sales required to be set aside before it would be entitled to possession or other consequential reliefs, the suit could not be barred under Section 331 and the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to entertain it. 8. 8. In Dularia Devi v Janardan Singh and others A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 117 cited on behalf of the petitioners, the apex Court was considering the bar to jurisdiction of civil court in view of the provisions of Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which is much more comprehensive, which unlike Section 331 of the Z. A. Act creates almost a blanket bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court. The principles laid down therein thus do not come to the rescue of the petitioners. 9. Accordingly, as stated above, there is no scope for, the contention that the im pugned findings and order of the learned Additional District Judge suffer from error of jurisdiction, or any other vice in law. The same is not liable to be interfered with. 10. Before parting, this Court will like to observe that, this writ petition which was filed against decision on a preliminary issue in 1981, has come up for hearing after 16 years, given the system prevalent in this Court. This has resulted into stay of proceedings for about 15 years and thus adding to the dockets pending before the Court below, like in a large number of other similarly placed petitions/appeals etc. It is high time that the Court in its collective wisdom, takes cognizance of this malaise striking at the very root of the system and do something to alleviate the sufferings of mil lions of litigants. 11. The writ petition, for the reasons already stated above, is hereby dismissed. The interim order is vacated. Office is directed to promptly communicate this order to the Court below which shall enfeavour to dispose of the suit within three months from the date this order is brought to its notice. 12. No order as to costs. A. B. Srivastava, J.- The petitioners have filed this writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari. 2. Suit No. 248 of 1975 was filed by Smt. Azizan, after whose death, respondents No. 2 and 3 have been substituted as her legal representatives. The suit was filed with al legation that the plaintiff Smt. Azizan is bhumidhar of the plots in question and has all along been in possession. The defendants (petitioners before this Court), it was al leged, have got the impugned sale deeds erecuted fraudulently, without paying any consideration. The suit was filed with al legation that the plaintiff Smt. Azizan is bhumidhar of the plots in question and has all along been in possession. The defendants (petitioners before this Court), it was al leged, have got the impugned sale deeds erecuted fraudulently, without paying any consideration. She had no intention to transfer her land, the document was neither scribed in her presence nor the contents were read and explained, her thump impres sion on the documents is fictitious and she did not receive any consideration. Accord ingly cancellation of the sale deeds in ques tion and delivery of possession, in case it was found necessary, was sought. 3. The respondent besides contesting the plaintiffs claim on merits, and stating that she had executed the sale deeds of her own free will, also pleaded that the suit was not cognisable by the civil Court in view of the bar contained in Section 331 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. The Munsif who heard the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue accepted the plea of the petitioners, holding the suit non- cognisable, and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the Revenue Court. On ap peal preferred by the plaintiff the learned Additional District Judge however, set aside the said finding and held the suit to be cog nisable by the Civil Court. Aggrieved, this writ petition. 4. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the suit of the plaintiffs being for cancellation of a void deed and the prayer in effect being of possession over bhumidhari land, the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under Section 331 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act. The contention on be half of the respondents on the other hand, is that the relief of possession being merely an alternative relief, the suit was essentially for cancellation of a deed, which did cast a cloud on the title of the plaintiff and as such the bar under Section 331 is not attracted. 5. Having considered the submission of both sides, this Court is unable to per suade itself to accept the contention of the petitioners that the suit was essentially for possession. The plaintiff specifically claimed herself to be in possession. A suit under Section 209 of the Z. A.-"and L. R. Act thus could not be filed. 5. Having considered the submission of both sides, this Court is unable to per suade itself to accept the contention of the petitioners that the suit was essentially for possession. The plaintiff specifically claimed herself to be in possession. A suit under Section 209 of the Z. A.-"and L. R. Act thus could not be filed. There also nothing to show that a suit under Section 229-B of the said Act could be filed. It is not the case of any party that the plaintiff is not recorded as bhumidhar. The State and Gaon Sabha thus recognising the title of the plaintiff, she could not bring a suit under Section 229-B. Bar of Section 331 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act would be attracted if the suit is based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained from the Revenue Court. In the instant case as on the facts apparent no relief could be obtained from the Revenue Court, the plea of the petitioners of bar to the jurisdiction of civil court be comes unsustainable. 6. Even otherwise it cannot be said that merely because major parts of the aver ments of the plaintiffs indicated the docu ments to be void, the plaintiff had no locus standi to come to seek relief of cancellation. 7. In Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad and others, A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 540, ap proving a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Padarath v. II A. DJ. Sultanpur 1989 A. W. C. 290, the Supreme Court has held that where a party prima facie proceeded on the premise that it could not ignore the sales but that the sales required to be set aside before it would be entitled to possession or other consequential reliefs, the suit could not be barred under Section 331 and the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to entertain it. 8. In Dularia Devi v Janardan Singh and others A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 117 cited on behalf of the petitioners, the apex Court was considering the bar to jurisdiction of civil court in view of the provisions of Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which is much more comprehensive, which unlike Section 331 of the Z. A. Act creates almost a blanket bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court. The principles laid down therein thus do not come to the rescue of the petitioners. 9. Accordingly, as stated above, there is no scope for, the contention that the im pugned findings and order of the learned Additional District Judge suffer from error of jurisdiction, or any other vice in law. The same is not liable to be interfered with. 10. Before parting, this Court will like to observe that, this writ petition which was filed against decision on a preliminary issue in 1981, has come up for hearing after 16 years, given the system prevalent in this Court. This has resulted into stay of proceedings for about 15 years and thus adding to the dockets pending before the Court below, like in a large number of other similarly placed petitions/appeals etc. It is high time that the Court in its collective wisdom, takes cognizance of this malaise striking at the very root of the system and do something to alleviate the sufferings of mil lions of litigants. 11. The writ petition, for the reasons already stated above, is hereby dismissed. The interim order is vacated. Office is directed to promptly communicate this order to the Court below which shall enfeavour to dispose of the suit within three months from the date this order is brought to its notice. 12. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .