JUDGMENT 1. - By this revision petition filed under section 115 CPC, the defendant-petitioner has challenged the order dated 5.7.1996 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Chittorgarh by which the learned Addl. District Judge has dis,missed the appeal filed by the defendant-petitioner against the order dated 15.12.1995 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kapasan in Civil Misc. Case No. 3 of 1995. 2. The relevant facts briefly stated are that the plaintiff-non-petitioner was the I ,2nant of the defendant-petitioner in the suit premises. The suit shop was taken by the Plaintiff-non-petitioner from the defendant-petitioner on 28.2.1989 on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/-. At the relevant time, the plaintiff-non-petitioner was doing automobile repairs work in the above premises. In fact, the tenancy is not disputed. It is alleged that on 6.1.1995, when the plaintiff-non-petitioner was doing business in his shop, the defendant-petitioner tress-passed into his shop and forcibly evicted him from the suit premises and his goods were thrown out. The plaintiff-non-petitioner lodged a FIR of this incident at Police Station, I Capasan and a criminal case was also registered and investigation started. The defendant-petitioner was arrested in the above criminal case though he was later on released on bail. Thereafter, the Police made efforts for effecting a compromise between the parties but it could not succeed. The plaintiff-non-petitioner, therefore, filed a suit against the defendant-petitioner under sections 538 & 539 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as also under section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, No. XVII of 1950) in the trial Court. Along with the above suit, the plaintiff-non,petitioner also filed an application u/O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 CPC and prayed for mandatory as well as permanent injunction. 3. It may be stated that the plaintiff-non-petitioner also alleged that while taking the law in his hands, the defendant-petitioner beside evicting the plaintiff from the suit premises also damaged the northern wall. The plaintiff-non-petitioner therefore, prayed that in the special facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff-non-petitioner be put into possession in the above premises and the defendant-petitioner may be asked to repair the damaged wall. 4. The defendant-petitioner resisted the above suit on the ground that the allegations made by the plaintiff-non-petitioner were baseless, false and malicious. According to the defendant-petitioner, the plaintiff-non-petitioner himself vacated the shop and handed over its vacant possession. 4. The defendant-petitioner resisted the above suit on the ground that the allegations made by the plaintiff-non-petitioner were baseless, false and malicious. According to the defendant-petitioner, the plaintiff-non-petitioner himself vacated the shop and handed over its vacant possession. On 6.1.1995, the plaintiff came to the defendant-petitioner and requested the latter to give the above shop on rent to one Lalendra Prasad. 5. According to the defendant-petitioner, the plaintiff also stated that Lalendra Prasad was ready to pay monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. Since the defendant-petitioner was not ready, the plaintiff got enraged and in order to take revenge, this false suit was filed. 6. On receipt of this application, the learned trial Court made an enquiry. The parties produced evidence on affidavits and ultimately, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the defence story put up by the defendant-petitioner was false. He held that the defendant-petitioner forcibly evicted the plaintiff-non-petitioner from the suit premises and also threw the goods of the plaintiff lying in the shop on the road. Thus, after finding a strong prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff-non-petitioner and further taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial Court felt persuaded to grant relief in the shape of mandatory injunction by directing the defendant-petitioner to put the plaintiff into possession of the suit-premises and also repair the damaged wall. 7. I have heard Mr. S.L. Jain, the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner and Mr. Manish Shishodia, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 8. The learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner has made a very scathing attack on the findings recorded by the Courts below. He has submitted that the suit premises was definitely on rent with the plaintiff-non-petitioner but he voluntarily surrendered its possession by vacating the same on 30.12.1994. However, the plaintiff-non-petitioner was very keen that the petitioner-landlord should let out the shop to Lalendra Prasad. The defendant-petitioner could not oblige the plaintiff-non- petitioner and on account of this displeasure, the plaintiff- tenant lodged a FIR against the defendant-petitioner at the Police Station and made up a false case. 9. However, the plaintiff-non-petitioner was very keen that the petitioner-landlord should let out the shop to Lalendra Prasad. The defendant-petitioner could not oblige the plaintiff-non- petitioner and on account of this displeasure, the plaintiff- tenant lodged a FIR against the defendant-petitioner at the Police Station and made up a false case. 9. The defendant-petitioner in order to prove the falsity of the above incident, moved an application u/O. XIX, R. 2 CPC before the learned trial Court seeking permission to cross-examine the persons whose affidavits the plaintiff-non-petitioner filed but the learned trial Court did not allow the above permission. On account of the denial of this facility, the defendant-petitioner could not cross-examine the witnesses. It may be stated here that the learned trial Court relied on an overruled decision cited by the opposite party. 10. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the mother of the petitioner Smt. Phulibai was a necessary party inasmuch as the plaintiff-non-petitioner had alleged that the petitioner and his mother forcibly evicted him from the suit shop and threw away his goods. In view of the above allegation, Mst. Phulibai was a necessary party. 11. The third contention made by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner is that the suit of the plaintiff was misconstrued and was not maintainable. The plaintiff-non-petitioner filed the suit under sections 5, 38 & 39 of the Specific Relief Act whereas the suit ought to have been filed under section 6 of the Act. The plaintiff did this in order to save the Court-fees. 12. Lastly, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Courts were not alive to the settled position of law that normally injunction in mandatory form is very sparingly and in exceptional circumstances is granted. The learned counsel has cited certain rulings regarding the principles which must guide while granting injunction. He also made reference to India Cable Company v. Sumitra Chakravarti, AIR 1985 Calcutta 248 . 13. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner has submitted that there is a concurrent finding of the Courts below and normally the Court does not interfere with such findings while exercising revisional jurisdiction unless the finding is perverse, baseless or frivolous. He submitted that the plaintiff-tenant was enjoying his tenancy right in a peaceful manner and there was no reason why he should surrender the premises. He submitted that the plaintiff-tenant was enjoying his tenancy right in a peaceful manner and there was no reason why he should surrender the premises. The defendant-petitioner fabricated the story in order to cover up his illegal act. The plaintiff-tenant immediately lodged the FIR and a case was also registered. The report of the Commissioner also supports the story of the plaintiff-tenant. Even after lodging of the FIR, the police authorities made attempts to settle the matter amicably between the parties but when they did not succeed, the plaintiff filed the above suit within the duration of 10 days of the date of occurrence. The plaintiff had no alternative except to file the suit and claim ante status quo inasmuch as immediately before this occurrence happened, he was in peaceful possession and was doing his business in routine way. The defendant- petitioner took the law in his own hand and forcibly evicted him from the suit premises and also threw away his goods. According to the learned counsel, the mother of the petitioner was not a necessary party. He has maintained that the suit has been correctly framed and filed under section 5 of the Specific Relief Act. There is a well marked difference between the petition filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and the petitioner filed u /s. 5 of the Specific Relief Act. However, the case of the plaintiff squarely falls under section 5 of the Specific Relief Act because the plaintiff based his claim on possessory title. 14. Lastly, it was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner that it was a fit case in which the Courts below acted judiciously in ordering issue of mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff-non-petitioner. According to the learned counsel, nothing can be better than to put a tenant back into the premises, who had been forcibly evicted from there is total violation of the law. 15. I have considered the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. According to the learned counsel, nothing can be better than to put a tenant back into the premises, who had been forcibly evicted from there is total violation of the law. 15. I have considered the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. Regarding the correctness of the incident whether the plaintiff tenant surrendered possession or he was evicted from the suit premises forcibly by the defendant-petitioner, I need not discuss the evidence in detail because there is a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts below and after evaluating the same, I am of the opinion that the assessment made by the Courts below is very reasonable and correct and requires no interference in revisional jurisdiction. 16. Regarding the objection of necessary party, it may be stated that according to the plaintiff-tenant, the mother of the defendant petitioner was not a necessary party because when he was forcibly evicted, she was not present. The suit filed by the plaintiff was for regaining possession and for this, only the petitioner was a necessary party. Hence, the learned Courts below have not committed any error in not acceeding to the request of the defendant-petitioner. 17. Regarding institution of suit under section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, I may quote the provisions of Sections 5 & 6 of the Specific Relief Act : "Section 5. Recovery of specific immovable property.A person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 6. suit by person dispossessed of immovable property :(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property other,wise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may by suit recover possession thereof notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought : (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall, any review of any such order or decree, be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof." 18. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall, any review of any such order or decree, be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof." 18. A perusal of the above provisions of Sections 5 & 6 of the Specific Relief Act show that a suit of possessory title can be filed under section 5 of the Act and the suit of the plaintiff is decreed only if sufficient proof of possession is produced, on the basis of which presumption of title can be drawn. Under Section 6 of the Act, the Court is merely to see whether the plaintiff was in possession over the property six months prior to the date of the suit. Section 6 says nothing about the nature of possession enjoyed by the person dispossessed. Although a suit under section 6 of the Act cannot be maintained by a person who is manifestly a trespasser and whose possession is of a sort duration and has not been acquiesced in by the person entitled to possession. 19. It is settled law that a tenant who is wrongfully dispossessed by his landlord is entitled to resort to this section and file a suit for recovery on the strength of his possessory title. This view was taken in Nasib Singh v. Bajoram, AIR 1969 J & K- 9(FB) . Hence, in my opinion, the institution of suit under section 5 of the Act is perfectly in accordance with the law. I, therefore, find no substance in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. Now the last and important question which arises for determination is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the mandatory injunction in the terms as issued by the Courts below was justified. Every injunction requires to be granted with care and caution. In this respect, there is no distinction between a mandatory and other form of injunctions. By care and caution is meant that, in granting or withholding an injunction, the Court should exercise 'a judicial discretion', and weigh the amount of the substantial mischief done, or threatened to be done, to the plaintiff and compare it with that which the injunction, if granted, would inflict upon the defendant. By care and caution is meant that, in granting or withholding an injunction, the Court should exercise 'a judicial discretion', and weigh the amount of the substantial mischief done, or threatened to be done, to the plaintiff and compare it with that which the injunction, if granted, would inflict upon the defendant. The grant of injunction is purely discretionary as in the case of perpetual injunction. The person who comes to Court with a prayer for mandatory injunction must come with clean hands. A mandatory injunction is a most exceptional remedy and should be applied in cases of actual or threatened special injury, or substantial damage. 21. If we examine the facts of the present case, the blatant way in which the defendant-petitioner acted shows that he took the law in his own hands and forcibly evicted the plaintiff-non-petitioner from the suit premises. Not only this, he also threw away his goods lying in the aforesaid premises. In such circumstances, the Courts below came to the rescue of the plaintiff-tenant and ordered to restore the ante status quo. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any misuse of the discretion vested in the Courts below while granting mandatory injunction. In fact, in such cases, obligation is cast on the Courts to act speedily and grant proper relief to the persons who have been the victim of gross injustice at the hands of the unscrupulous landlord.For the above reasons, I find no force in this revision petition and it is hereby dismissed with costs.Petition dismissed. *******