M. JAGANNADHA RAO ( 1 ) THIS is a writ petition filed by the detenu questioning an order of detention dated 15. 9. 95. Alarge number of points have been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner on various dates. In between, the petitioner was on parole 2. 5. 96 to 10. 7. 96 which was extended by another 10 days and again by 2 more weeks. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel contended that there is unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation which, according to him, was submitted on 21. 10. 95, that the detaining authority alone can decide whether remarks have to be called from the sponsoring authority, that the Law department ought not to have been consulted by the detaining authority ; that there is no material on record that the detenu was intercepted by the Customs Officer at the exit gate of the arrival hall for search of the person and baggage of the detenu, that the detaining authority considered and took into account matters not relevant; that the sanction for prosecution and the complaint are contradictory and that the goods concerned, were not prohibited items. ( 3 ) WE shall deal with these points one by one. ( 4 ) THE main facts as set out in the grounds of detention are that on 5. 7. 95, detenu arrived at I. G. International Airport from Bangkok and that she had one Checked-on baggage and two hand carrying baggages. After completing immigration formalities she walked through the green channel. When she was going outside the Customs Arrival Hall, she was intercepted at the Exist gate of the Arrival Hall and, she denied carrying any contraband articles, but personal search revealed that she was carrying 3 polythene packets wrapped with transparent adhesive tape concealed in her body inside the blouse worn by her. These packets contained artificial stones in blue, red etc. An Expert was called who estimated them to weight 3466 carrats valued at Rs. 7,35,020. 00. She could not produce any documentary evidence of lawful import of these stones. Her statement was recorded on 5. 7. 95 under Section 108 of Customs Act and she claimed that the packets were given at Bangkok by one Partap, she was aw are of the contents, she was promised Rs. 10,0007. 00 for carrying them. 7,35,020. 00. She could not produce any documentary evidence of lawful import of these stones. Her statement was recorded on 5. 7. 95 under Section 108 of Customs Act and she claimed that the packets were given at Bangkok by one Partap, she was aw are of the contents, she was promised Rs. 10,0007. 00 for carrying them. She had travelled 4 times to Bangkok and Hongkong on her passport dated 11. 4. 95. She travelled abroad earlier 3 times under another passport she was arrested on 5 7 95 produced before the Court 6. 7. 95 and remanded to judicial custody on 7. 7. 95. Bail application was rejected on 7. 7. 95 and 14. 7. 95. Bail was granted on 17. 8. 95. The detention order under COFEPOSA was passed on 15. 9. 95. ( 5 ) SO far as the representation dated 21. 10. 1995 is concerned, it is stated in the reply-affidavit it of the respondents 2 and 3 (Govt. of N. C. T. and Superintendent of Tihar Jail) that it is dated 26. 10. 95 and not 21. 10. 95. It was received in the COFEPOSA branch (see p. 3) from the office of the Lt. Governor through the Principal Secretary, Home, 1. 11. 95. In between there were 2 non-working days. i. e. 28th and 29th, being Saturday and Sunday. The same day, the representation was sent to the Customs authorities for comments. The comments were received on 3. 11. 95. It was examined on the same day and file put up through Principal Secretary (Rame) when the opinon of Secretary (Law and Judicial) was obtained. The file was received on 8. 11. 95 from Secretary (Law and Judicial ). In between, 4th and 5th were Saturday and Sunday. 7th was a holiday on account of Guru Nanak birthday. The file was pout up before the Lt. Governor who considered and rejected the same. The file was received on 10. 11. 95 and a Memo, of rejection was issued on 10. 11. 95 but served on 14. 11. 95 as 11th, 12th were non-working days, because of Saturday and Sunday. We are of the view that the respondents have explained the manner in which the representation was dealt with almost day by day and that there is no unreasonable delay in the disposal of the representation. 11. 95 but served on 14. 11. 95 as 11th, 12th were non-working days, because of Saturday and Sunday. We are of the view that the respondents have explained the manner in which the representation was dealt with almost day by day and that there is no unreasonable delay in the disposal of the representation. ( 6 ) THE next contention is that it is for the detaining authority alone to call for remarks from the sponsoring authority and that nobody else in the Government, subordinate to the detaining authority, can call for remarks from the sponsoring authority. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Chittaranjan Mitra vs. Union of India 1988 (2) Recent Criminal Reports p. 526 (Delhi ). The learned Judge reasoned that the discretion in regard to calling for remarks cannot be surrendered by the detaining authority to any other official. We are unable to agree with this contention. In our opinion, there is no rule or principle that remarks of the sponsoring authority cannot be called by any other officer other than the detaining authority. If upon receiving the representation of a detenu, one has to wait till the file reaches the detaining authority even for calling for remarks, then obviously there will be more delay in the disposal of the representation. Experience shows that there are practically no instances where the detaining authority does not seek the views of the sponsoring authority and if, with a view to shorten the delay, the remarks of the sponsoring authority in relation to the points raised in the representation are called for in advance, and the representation are called for in advance, and the representation together with the remarks, is placed before the detaining authority, the detenu cannot, in our opinion, have any grievance. The procedure followed is more beneficial to him. If the calling for remarks - which is known as invariable practice, is to await the directions of the detaining authority - like the Lt. Governor, then there is bound to be delay in the file reaching him and then in his directions being carried out. We are of the view therefore that Chittaranjan Mitra s case is not correctly decided and on this point the said judgment is overruled. Governor, then there is bound to be delay in the file reaching him and then in his directions being carried out. We are of the view therefore that Chittaranjan Mitra s case is not correctly decided and on this point the said judgment is overruled. ( 7 ) THE next point is whether the fact that at some stage the opinion ofthe Law Secretary is called for, vitiate the proceedings. Reliance in this behalf is placed on the judgment ofthe Supreme Court in Harish Pahwa vs. State of UP AIR 1981 SC1126. In the said decision, it was held, as a fact that the entire representation was referred to the Law department and it was not apparent why the Law Department was consulted at all. Further the observations were made in the context ofthe delay in dealing with the representation. In our view, it cannot be said that in every case, reference to the Law Department will be invalid. Whatever objections can be raised in a case where opinion is sought on purely factual issues, the same cannot be said in a case where opinion is sought on legal issues. After all, the Law Department in any Government is concerned not merely with legislation but also with the function of clarifying issues of law. It will be for the detaining authority to consider the legal opinion and then take an independent view on the facts of the case, in the light of any opinion on legal issues given. But surely, the detaining authority cannot ask the Legal department to consider, the detenu s representation and give its own opinion. In the present case, we have called for the records and checked up the same. On facts we find that the opinion of the Law Department was sought specifically only on an issue which was an issue of law raised in para 9 of the representation inregard to the interpretation of Section 14 of the Customs Act, and the Customs Valuation (Determination or price of imported goods), Rules, 1988. The reference to the Law department dated 3. 11. 95 reads: "para 9 of the representation raises an important legal issue. May please advise". After examining the legal position, the said department stated that Section 14 applies only in cases where the goods are chargeable to duty and not if the goods are alleged to be smuggled goods. The reference to the Law department dated 3. 11. 95 reads: "para 9 of the representation raises an important legal issue. May please advise". After examining the legal position, the said department stated that Section 14 applies only in cases where the goods are chargeable to duty and not if the goods are alleged to be smuggled goods. Thereafter, the detaining authority considered the representation on all points independently and rejected the same. We are therefore of the view that there is no abdication or surrender by the detaining authority to the law department of its functions relating to consideration of the representation of the defendant authority. This contention is rejected. ( 8 ) IT is also argued before us that the detention order does not say that these goods are not prohibited items but the complaint by the Customs Officer before the Criminal Court says so. It is true that as per the Manual containing the Publications of the Ministry of Commerce, Chapter XV, Part I, List B, such stones can be imported. But the rules says they can be imported against a licence or in accordance with Public Notice issued by Government in that behalf. It is stated for the respondents that the petitioner did not have any licence for import nor any other authorisation and that was the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority ( 9 ) THE next contention is that there is no "independent" material to show that the detenu was intercepted at the exit gate of the green channel. It is said that if there is any report of the Customs Officer, it was not given to the petitioner. Now, it cannot be said that there is no material before the detaining authority in this behalf. We pointed out to counsel that the very statement of the detenu under Section 108 of the Customs Act in Hindi dated 5. 9. 51, pages 24 to 30 of documents supplied, shows that there was material before the detaining authority. The Panchama also says that the Customs Officer told them so. The Panchamas were called only at the time of actual recovery. Merely because an attempt is made to retract therefrom, it does not follow that was no material. The sufficiency or otherwise of the material is not a matter which falls for consideration. The Panchama also says that the Customs Officer told them so. The Panchamas were called only at the time of actual recovery. Merely because an attempt is made to retract therefrom, it does not follow that was no material. The sufficiency or otherwise of the material is not a matter which falls for consideration. Once there is material, what inference is to be drawn therefrom is for the detaining authority. ( 10 ) IT is then argued that there was non-application of mind while passing the impugned order and that this is clear from the fact that 2 documents in respect of prosecution proceedings at p. 115, para 7 and page 116 are not in consonance with each other. In the complaint dated 5. 9. 95 filed under Section 132 and 135 (1) (a) of the Customs Act by the Air Customs Officer, it is stated in para 7 (p. 115) that the "accused was knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion/attempt at evasion of the prohibitions imposed on the import of the said precious stones and thus she committed an offence punishable under Section 135 (l) (a) of the Customs Act, 1962. Coming to page 116 of the paper book, that is an order of sanction for prosecution of the petitioner granted by the Commissioner of Customs under Section 137 (1) of the Customs Act and says that there is adequate material for sanction of prosecution. It is said that the stones worth had not declared the same before the Customs Officer and she attempted to take the same out of the arrival hall after walking through the green channel and in relation to which she was knowingly concerned in fraudulent evasion and attempt at evasion of the restrictions/prohibitions etc. ( 11 ) IT is admitted that these documents were before the detaining authority when the detention order was passed. The order says that these are among the relevant documents relied upon by the said authority. We are enable to find any contradiction between the two documents. Assuming there is some discrepancy, even so it is a matter for the detaining authority while arriving at his subjective satisfaction and it is not permissible for the Court to say that he should have come to some other conclusion. We are enable to find any contradiction between the two documents. Assuming there is some discrepancy, even so it is a matter for the detaining authority while arriving at his subjective satisfaction and it is not permissible for the Court to say that he should have come to some other conclusion. ( 12 ) LASTLY it is argued that the petitioner, even if she had committed an offence, was being tried under the Customs and penal and, if found guilty, will be adequately punished. Hence she may be let off as she has been arrested on 6. 7. 95. Now, the incident took place on 5. 7. 95, petitioner was arrested on 6. 7. 95 under the Customs Act and the order under COFEPOSA was passed on 15. 9. 95. The arrest pursuant to action taken under the Customs Act is different from the detention under the COFEPOSA. Apart from that, petitioner was on parole from 2. 5. 96 to 10. 7. 96. For all these reasons, the Cri. W. P. is dismissed.