Judgment B. P. Singh, J. 1. In this batch of writ petitions the petitioners, who are the officers of the Government of Bihar, have challenged the report of the Bhagaipur riot Enquiry Commissioner, as also the action taken by the State Government against some of them on the basis of the said report. The Enquiry Commission consisted of three members, and the petitioners herein are primarily aggrieved by the findings recorded against them in the majority report of the commission. It may be noticed that the chairman of the Commission gave a dissenting report, but the majority report of the other two members of the commission has been accepted by the government of Bihar. These writ petitions along with C. WJ. C. No.5790 of 1995 were directed to be heard by a division Bench of this Court. However, after delivering judgment in C. W. J. C. No.5790 of 1995 (L. K. Advani and ors. V/s. State of Bihar and Ors.) allowing the writ petition, the Division Bench directed that these writ petitions be placed for hearing before an appropriate Bench, and be not treated as tied up along with the aforesaid C. W. J. C. No.5790 of 1995. It is stated that the Special Leave Petition preferred before the Supreme court of India against the judgment and order in C. W. J. C. No.5790 of 1995 is pending before the Supreme Court. It also appears from the order of the supreme Court dated 12-2-19% (Annexure-7) that in the Special leave Petitions preferred by the State of Bihar against the interim orders passed in the instant writ petitions, notices have been issued, and an interim order staying the impugned orders has been passed, but with a direction that the interim stay need not hold up the proceedings in the high Court. In these circumstances, these writ petitions have been placed before this Bench for disposal. 2. The main submission urged in all the writ petitions is common, namely, that if the Commission considered it necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person, or was of the opinion that the reputation of a person was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry, it ought to have given that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the enquiry and to give evidence in his defence. In some cases, it is submitted, no notice was given to the persons prejudicially affected, and in some cases notices were issued but those notices were challenged before this court, and despite an order of stay, the commission proceeded to submit its report commenting on the conduct of the concerned notices and making observations which prejudicially affect their reputation. It is submitted on behalf of such notices that the notices issued were vague, and it was impossible for the. notices to comprehend as to the nature of allegations made, against which they had to defend themselves. The notices issued were, therefore, defective in law. Other submissions have also been urged in some of the cases on behalf of the petitioners, but they shall be dealt with separately in this judgment. 3. I shall first notice the relevant facts. Communal riots broke out in and around the city of Bhagalpur on 24th october, 1989, and continued intermittently upto December 1989. Having regard to the communal disturbances, the Government of Bihar decided to constitute a Commission of Enquiry under Sec.3 of the Commissions of enquiry Act, 1952. Accordingly, a notification was issued on 8th December, 1989, appointing a single Member commission of Enquiry, and appointing sri R. N. Prasad, a retired Judge of Patna high Court as its sole member. The terms of reference of the Commission were as follows: " (a) to enquire into the facts and circumstances leading to communal disturbances in the district of Bhagalpur and adjacent areas on 24th October 1989 and thereafter; (b) to enquire into whether these disturbances were pre-planned and, if so, the elements responsible for the same; (c) to enquire whether measures taken by the District Administration to prevent and deal with the said disturbances were timely and adequate, and to fix responsibility for lapses, if any, in this regard with the said disturbances were timely and adequate, and to fix responsibilities for lapses if any, in this regard; (d) to recommend measures for preventing recurrence of such disturbances; (e) to consider such other matter reiating to these communal disturbances and make such recommendations as the commission may think it proper and necessary. " 4. The single Member Commission of Enquiry started functioning, and according to the petitioners, between 17th january, 1990 and 3rd December, 1991 it held 115 sittings and examined 126 witnesses and hundreds of documents. " 4. The single Member Commission of Enquiry started functioning, and according to the petitioners, between 17th january, 1990 and 3rd December, 1991 it held 115 sittings and examined 126 witnesses and hundreds of documents. However, the Government issued a notification dated 1st October, 1991, reconstituting the commission of Enquiry by adding two more Members, apart from the Chairman. Accordingly, sri S. Patankar, I. A. S. (Retired), and Sri s. Q. Rizvi, I. P. S. (Retired) were appointed as members of the Commission. The reconstituted Commission was to proceed from the stage already reached in the enquiry, and the documents and evidence already examined were deemed to be part of the proceeding of the commission. The commission, as originally constituted, was to submit its report within three months from the date of the notification, but the time for submission of the report was extended from time to time. It also appears that sri S. Q. Rizvi, I. P. S. (Retired) was later substituted by Sri F. Ahmad, I. P. S. (Retired), perhaps, on account of inability expressed by sri Rizvi to continue as a Member of the Commission. The reconstituted commission of Enquiry examined several witnesses, and large number of documents were also exhibited in the course of the proceeding. In fact, oral arguments commenced before the Commission, but in the meantime the validity of the notification reconstituting the Commission was challenged before this Court in C. W. J. C. No.7461 of 1991. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court by order dated 17th December, 1991, but a Special leave Petition was preferred before the supreme Court, which was finally disposed of by order dated 20th September, 1993, whereby the State of Bihar was directed to appoint two retired judges as members of the Commission, with Justice R. N. Prasad as the Chairman of the Commission. 5. It appears from the record that the three-Member Commission, as constituted by notification dated 1st October, 1991, considered the question of issuing notices to the officers of the government of Bihar whose conduct was to be enquired into, and the Commission was also of the opinion that the reputation of such officers was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. From Annexure-1 in C. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995, the order dated 27- 4-1993, it appears that two members of the commission, namely, Sri S. Patankar and Sri f. Ahmad, directed issuance of notices to seven officers under Sec.8-B of the Act, as they considered it necessary to enquire into their conduct, and were also of the opinion that their reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. The seven officers to whom notices were issued were (1) Shri Arun jha, the then D. M. , Bhagalpur; (2) Shri k. S. Dwivedi, the then S. P. , Bhagalpur; (3) Shri Kailash Chowdhary, the then o/c Sabour P. S. ; (4) Sri K. C. Dubey o/c Kotwali P. S. ; (5) Sri Ram Chandra singh, the then ASI, Jagdishpur P. S. ; (6) Sri Jagjit Singh, the then B. D. O. , sabour ; (7) Sri Ajoy Singh, the then o/c Ishakchak P. S. 6. Sri R. N. Prasad, the Chairman of the Commission however, did not agree with the opinion of the aforesaid two members, and noted in his order dated 28-4-1993 (Annexure-2 in C. W. J. C. No.5674/95) that the order issuing notices did not disclose the grounds which led the members to think that it was necessary to enquire into the conduct of the seven officers named therein, and to form an opinion that their reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. In absence of any ground or material having been given for this conclusion, he found it difficult to agree with them that it was necessary to enquiry into their conduct under Section 8-B of the commissions of Enquiry Act. He went on to observe: ". . . . . . . . . Unless I am told about the particulars of the allegations made against these officers which might have led the Hon ble Member to take recourse to this section, it is difficult for me to hold that it is necessary and expedient to make an enquiry under Sec.8-B against them as all allegations about lapses are to be enquired into by the Commission and further to hold the persons responsible for the same for answering term No. (C) of the terms of reference to the Commission. It would have been only appropriate to specify the allegations on the basis of which this enquiry is to be made so that the concerned officers could have an opportunity to put up their reference pointedly and effectively. Then, the direction to these officers to appear for being heard and for adducing evidence in their defence on 15-5-93 also does not appear to be wholesome. Instead, they should have been asked to give out the names of the witnesses whom they want to examine in their defence so that the Commission could issue processes to them to appear before it. It would be absurd to suppose that the concerned officers would be able to bring these witnesses before the Commission for their evidence without the assistance of the Commission as majority of them would be official witnesses who would be too reluctant to come at their instance. So, it is pretty certain that no useful hearing can be done on 15-5-93. " however, in view of the majority decision he directed the office to comply with the order directing issue of notices under Sec.8-B of the Act. A copy of the notice has been annexed as Annexure-3 to C. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995 and the material part of the notice reads as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . Whereas the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into your conduct and is of the opinion that your reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry; you are given an opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in your defence. A copy of the terms of reference of the Commission is enclosed. You are hereby directed to submit a list of witnesses, if any, and their present addresses, whom you desire to examine in your defence and appear before the commission at 10.30 A. M. on 27-5- 1993 in the office of the Commission of Inquiry at A-11, Anjali Apartment, Col. Mitra Compound, Boring Road, Patna-800 001. " 6-A. After issuance of notice, some of the petitioners challenged the validity of the notice issued to them. Several writ petitions were filed before this court. Sri K. C. Dubey, petitioner in c. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995, preferred c. W. J. C. No.5203 of 1993 challenging the validity of the notice issued. Similarly, Sri K. . " 6-A. After issuance of notice, some of the petitioners challenged the validity of the notice issued to them. Several writ petitions were filed before this court. Sri K. C. Dubey, petitioner in c. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995, preferred c. W. J. C. No.5203 of 1993 challenging the validity of the notice issued. Similarly, Sri K. . S. Dwivedi, petitioner in c. W. J. C. No.5952 of 1995 along with shri Arun Kumar Jha preferred c. W. J. C. No.5662 of 1993 challenging the notices issued to them. Other notices, as it appears from the report of the Commission, also preferred similar writ petitions. In the writ-petition filed by Sri K. C. Dubey this Court passed an interim order on 9-6-1993 in the following terms: "in the meantime, the operation of the notice issued under Sec.8-B of the commission of Enquiry Act (Annexure-12), impugned in this writ application, is stayed, and no further proceeding shall be taken in pursuance thereof till further orders of this Court so far as this petitioner is concerned. A similar interim order was also passed on 15-6-1993 in the writ petition filed by K. S. Dwivedi. The aforesaid writ petitions were pending before this court when the Commission submitted its report. However, it is stated at the bar that the writ petitions filed by the aforesaid petitioners were dismissed as having become infructuous, since the petitioners prayed for leave to withdraw the same as the writ petitions had become infructuous on account of the commission submitting its report. It is also significant to note that but for the aforesaid two petitions, no notice whatsoever, was issued under Sec.8-B to any other petitioner. 7. As noticed earlier the reconstituted Commission had commenced hearing arguments, but in the meantime, the commission was again reconstituted pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court. It appears from the report of the Commission that Commission was reconstituted by issuance of a notification dated 20th September, 1993, and commenced hearing arguments from 25th November, 1993, and the hearing continued till October, 1994. Some of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Commissions are recalled for cross-examination by the parties. Two members of the Commission submitted their report on 11th february, 1995, while the Chairman of the Commission submitted his repon on 28-2-1995. Some of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Commissions are recalled for cross-examination by the parties. Two members of the Commission submitted their report on 11th february, 1995, while the Chairman of the Commission submitted his repon on 28-2-1995. The Government accepted the majority report of the commission and issued notices to some of the petitioners to show cause in view of the adverse findings recorded against them by the Commission. Some of the petitioners have also challenged those notices, apart from the report of the commission. 8. Mr. Kamal Nayan Choubey, counsel appearing for the petitioner in c. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995 submitted that in the impugned report, the Commission adversely commented against the conduct of the petitioner, and its finding; prejudicially affect the petitioners reputation. Though the commission had issued a defective and invalid notice to the petitioner, it proceeded to submit its report without waiting for the disposal of the writ-petition pending before the High Court in which the said notice had been challenged on several grounds. This the commission did despite the interim order of stay passed by the High Court. The mandatory provision of Sec.8-B of the Act was, therefore, breached. Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.5952 of 1995 submitted that section 8- B of the Act had not been complied with. The Commission failed to observe the statutory mandate under which it was constituted. The Commission being a creation of the statute was bound by the statute which in terms provided that if the Commission at any stage of the enquiry considered it necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person, or was of the opinion that the reputation of any person, was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry, it was under a statutory obligation to give that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the enquiry, and to produce evidence in defence. The Commission had considered it necessary, having regard to the aforesaid provision, to issue notices to seven officers of the State of Bihar including the petitioner, and such notices were in fact issued. The notice so issued to the petitioner was challenged in a writ proceeding before this court, but despite the stay order, the commission proceeded to submit its report. The notice so issued to the petitioner was challenged in a writ proceeding before this court, but despite the stay order, the commission proceeded to submit its report. Since the reconstituted Commission was to continue from the stage already reached by the Commission as earlier constituted, the notice issued under Sec.8-B must be deemed to be a notice issued by the Commission so reconstituted. If the Commission wished to proceed in the matter, it ought to have moved the High Court and got the order of stay recalled, or could have withdrawn the earlier notice and issued a fresh notice complying with the requirements of law. The material on record disclosed that the order of stay passed by the High Court was brought to the notice of the Commission, and views were expressed by the members that appropriate steps be taken to get the order vacated or recalled, yet the commission chose to proceed further in the matter, and despite the order of stay, closed the proceeding and submitted its report commenting adversely on the conduct of the petitioner. He submitted that he was not interested in pressing the argument that the Commission was guilty of contempt of Court, but contended that those paragraphs in the report which contain adverse comments touching upon the conduct, and prejudicially affecting the reputation of the petitioner, should be expunged. He referred to several decisions of the supreme Court and the High Court counsel appearing for the petitioners in c. W. J. C. Nos.9205, 7893, 7892 and 8619 of 1995 adopted the arguments advanced by Counsel in the earlier two writ petitions. Mr. Chandrashekhar, Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in c. W. J. C. No.627 of 19% also adopted the arguments earlier advanced, and submitted that in the case of the petitioner no notice at all was given, whether defective or otherwise. The petitioner had been placed under suspension in view of the adverse comments made by the Commission in its report. Similar argument has been advanced by Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.887 of 1996. The same submission has been ad-vanced in C. W. J. C. No.9017 of 1995. 9. Mr. Similar argument has been advanced by Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.887 of 1996. The same submission has been ad-vanced in C. W. J. C. No.9017 of 1995. 9. Mr. Rajeev Dhawan, Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in c. W. J. C. No.10612 of 1995 submitted that the case of this petitioner was different from the cases where a notice under Sec.8-B was issued, though defective. In the case of the petitioner, who was then the Zonal Inspector-General of Police, no notice was issued at all. The petitioner was a witness for the Commission, and he had no reason to suspect that he required protection under Sec.8-B of the Act. Moreover, he was not a part of the district administration whose actions were being investigated. He further submitted that section 8-B conferred a power coupled with a duty. The petitioner had been issued a show-cause notice which was linked with the findings recorded in the report of the Commission. He submitted that those parts of the report which adversely commented on the conduct of the petitioner and prejudicially affected his reputation ought to be expunged. The State in its counter-affidavit had admitted to have accepted the majority report, and has issued notice in a mechanical manner on the basis of the said report. Referring to paragraph Nos.23 and 24 of the counter-affidavit he submitted that the state had decided to issue show-cause notices to assess the situation. He submitted that at some stage a notice under section 8-B ought to have been issued to the petitioner, if the Commission proposed to enquire into his conduct, or was of the opinion that his reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. By following the procedure that it did, even the right of the petitioner under Sec.8-C was defeated. He further submitted that the commission did not collectively act in the consideration of evidence or, submission of the report. Continuity and collectivity were essential to the Commission. He further urged that there was nothing to support the conclusions reached by the Commission, and yet the finding recorded by the Commission has resulted in the petitioner being caught in a blaze of publicity. Continuity and collectivity were essential to the Commission. He further urged that there was nothing to support the conclusions reached by the Commission, and yet the finding recorded by the Commission has resulted in the petitioner being caught in a blaze of publicity. Referring to decisions of the Supreme Court and high Courts it was submitted that it could not be disputed that the report of the Commission constituted a public record within the meaning of Auto shankars case (1994) 6 SCC 632 . The commissions of Enquiry Act did not permit roving enquiries or fishing expedition. Sections 8-B and 8-C of the act are mandatory and are statutory rules of natural justice. Commissions of enquiry expose a person to the fierce light of publicity. The person whose reputation is at stake has a right to full defence within the meaning of the Act. Any deviation from the strict provisions would result in a denial of due process because the Commission of Enquiry proceedings are far more perilous than civil or criminal proceedings, because they result in public condemnation without trial, without appeal, and without redress. Relying upon the decisions, reported in I. L. R.1990 (1)Delhi 552, (1980) 84 C. W. N.560, AIR 1989 SC 714 and I. L. R.1981 (1) Delhi 715, he submitted that the petitioner is to be permanently at risk as long the report is a public document from which the condemnatory remarks are not expunged. As long as the condemnation sits on the public record, it shall be legitimate for the Press and media along with others to comment on it. The law of qualified privilege may result in the petitioner being condemned by the press by simply quoting from the public document. It was, therefore, submitted that it was necessary that where a record is produced in an illegal manner and contrary to law, that aspect of the record which gives rise to the fierce light of publicity with impunity to the person using the public recofd, should be expunged. 10. The Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the state in his very brief submission did not touch upon the points urged by the petitioners with regard to issuance of notice, except to say that even if the report was submitted without notice to the petitioners, the report cannot be said to be non-est. 10. The Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the state in his very brief submission did not touch upon the points urged by the petitioners with regard to issuance of notice, except to say that even if the report was submitted without notice to the petitioners, the report cannot be said to be non-est. He submitted that the report of the Commission is not binding upon the Government, and it is open to the Government to act or not to act on the basis of the report. The Government had only issued show-cause notices to the officers concerned, and so far no action had been taken; only an enquiry is being made by the Government with a view to ascertain as to what the petitioners have to say in the matter. It is only when action is taken by the government thai the petitioners may approach this Court. He further submitted that if the show-cause notices issued to the petitioners were supported by the slightest material on record, the same could not be quashed. The government had only asked for the comments of the concerned officers. The mere fact that the Government had accepted the majority report does not amount to acceptance of all its findings. The acceptance is only with a view to see that action, if any, is required to be taken. He further submitted that the findings of the Commission are not evidence in a civil or criminal proceeding and have, therefore, no value. Lastly, he submitted that even if Sec.8-B was not complied with, the petitioners are now being given an opportunity of explaining their case, and it is only for that purpose that the show-cause notices have been issued. 11. Though large number of decisions have been cited at the Bar by counsel appearing for the parties, with a view to avoid prolixity I do not wish to refer to each of them, since most of those decisions have been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in c. W. J. C. No.5790 of 1995, reported in 1996 (1) PLJR 895 : 1996 (2) BLJ 368 (Lal Krishna Advani and Ors. V. State of bihar and others ). Their Lordships considered several judgments of the supreme Court including Dr. Raghubir saran V/s. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1964 SC 1 , State of Jammu and Kashmir and ors. V. State of bihar and others ). Their Lordships considered several judgments of the supreme Court including Dr. Raghubir saran V/s. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1964 SC 1 , State of Jammu and Kashmir and ors. V/s. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and another, AIR 1967 SC 122 , Smt. Kiran Bedi and another V/s. The Committee of Inquiry and another AIR 1989 SC 714 , Sri K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy V/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1996 AP 62 and N. Manoharan V/s. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1981 Madras 147, and held that in view of authoritative pronouncements of the Apex court there appeared no doubt that a Commission of enquiry appointed under the provision of the Commissions of Enquiry Act is bound to give a reasonable opportunity to the person whose conduct is sought to be enquired into, or whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected by the report or a portion thereof. The reputation of a person is a part of his fundamental right and personal liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 of the constitution of India. Having regard to the importance of such a right, section 8-B of the Act casts a mandatory duty on the Commission to give a reasonable opportunity to the person whose conduct or reputation is likely to be prejudiced by such enquiry or the findings recorded therein. Under the safeguards as provided under Sec.8-B, a person whose conduct or reputation is going to be criticised, has got a legitimate right to defend his case and cross-examine witnesses before such findings are recorded. It was also held that there cannot be any doubt that any judgment of a Court or report of a tribunal, empowered by law to adjudicate and decide matters affecting rights of parties, cannot be assailed unless law permits it to be questioned or interfered with, but expunction of irrelevant and uncalled for remarks will not amount to alteration or amendment of the report of judgment. No doubt such exercise of power may affect a judgment or order to some extent, but having regard to paramount importance of securing the ends of justice, the High Court will have no option but to exercise such power. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Raghubir saran (supra ). No doubt such exercise of power may affect a judgment or order to some extent, but having regard to paramount importance of securing the ends of justice, the High Court will have no option but to exercise such power. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Raghubir saran (supra ). The Court also held that it will not be open to urge that unless the report is accepted by the Government or action taken, findings recorded by the Commission would not cause any prejudice to the conduct or reputation of the person concerned against whom such findings are recorded. If the Commission fails to adopt the procedure, as required under Sec.8-B, a person aggrieved by the findings, to the extent they affect the conduct or reputation of such person, has a right to raise a plea that such findings are in utter disregard to the requirement of Sec.8-B of the act. It was immaterial whether the government proposed to take any action. Any adverse finding regarding the conduct or reputation of a person in a report of Commission is, therefore, sufficient to attract the provision. The court in that case held that since no notice had been issued to the petitioner in that case under Sec.8-B of the act, no action could be taken against him purely on the basis of the findings of the Commission, since those findings were recorded in violation of the statutory requirement of Sec.8-B of the Act. Those findings were to remain inoperative so far as the case of the petitioner was concerned. The Court had also found that so far as the petitions of that case was concerned, he was not in any manner even remotely connected with the subject-matter of enquiry, as admittedly no allegation whatsoever was made by the parties in their written statements against him, nor there was any evidence to show that the said petitioner was in any manner responsible for the alleged incident. 12. The law as laid down in the aforesaid judgment is binding upon us. It deals with the same report with which we are concerned in this batch of writ petitions. Even otherwise, Sec.8-B of the Act is quite clear and permits of no ambiguity. 12. The law as laid down in the aforesaid judgment is binding upon us. It deals with the same report with which we are concerned in this batch of writ petitions. Even otherwise, Sec.8-B of the Act is quite clear and permits of no ambiguity. The Commission at any stage may issue notice to a person if it considers it necessary to enquire into his conduct, or is of the opinion that the reputation of such person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. It has been held consistently that the requirement is mandatory, and that in absence of notice to the person concerned, his conduct cannot be enquired into and no finding can be recorded which is ly to prejudicially affect his reputation. The petitioners in these cases do not invoke the abstract principles of natural justice, as it is not necessary for them to do so, in view of the express statutory mandate. Sec.8-B of the Act itself incorporates a principle of natural justice. Even the Learned Advocate general appearing for the State could not controvert the settled legal position. I am, therefore, of the opinion that in cases where Sec.8-B applies, the statutory mandate of giving notice to such a person must be complied with, and in its absence any finding recorded against such a person must be expunged from the report and should not be given effect. 13. This, however, does not pro-" vide a solution to the controversy that arises in the, instant batch of writ petitions. The vexed question is as to who is the person so affected, who is required to be given notice under Sec.8-B of the Act. In my view, the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in the abstract. They must apply to given situations having regard to the cardinal principle that they are meant affirmatively to secure justice and negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. The principles of natural justice have not to be complied with as an ideal formality. They serve a purpose, and therefore their application to given situations is governed by several factors. An action is not unfair or unjust merely because principles of natural justice have not been complied with. The principles of natural justice have not to be complied with as an ideal formality. They serve a purpose, and therefore their application to given situations is governed by several factors. An action is not unfair or unjust merely because principles of natural justice have not been complied with. The act may still be shown to be just and fair, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and the statutory provisions which ensure fairness in action de hors the principles of natural justice. 14. In Nagendra Nath Bora V/s. Commissioner of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398 the Supreme Court observed: ". . . . . . . The rules of natural justice vary with-the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice and had been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived like notion, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions. " Reiterating the aforesaid principle, in State of Jammu and Kashmir and ors. V/s. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and another, AIR 1967 SC 122 , it was held that there was no such rule of natural justice which required that the respondent should be given the right to cross-examine all those persons who had sworn affidavits supporting the allegations against him. It was emphasised that the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the act under which they function, and the question whether any rules of natural justice had been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived , notions, but in the light of statutory" provisions. After considering these two decisions of the Supreme Court, a division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High court has held in Sri K. Vijaya Bhaskar reddy V/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1996 AP 62 , that these decisions do not lay down any rule that the rules of natural justice do not apply to proceedings before the Commission of Enquiry. After considering the provisions of the Act as also the procedure laid down by the Commission under Sec.8 of the Act laying down that the principles of natural justice shall be followed as a guide, Quadri, J. , speaking for the Court succinctly stated the law thus: ". . . . . . . . After considering the provisions of the Act as also the procedure laid down by the Commission under Sec.8 of the Act laying down that the principles of natural justice shall be followed as a guide, Quadri, J. , speaking for the Court succinctly stated the law thus: ". . . . . . . . It is, therefore, clear that the principles of natural justice are applicable to the proceedings before the Commission and the question of contravention of those principles has to be decided in the light of the terms of reference to the Commission, provisions of the Act, the rules made thereunder and the procedure settled by the Commission. " 15. In its report the Commission has noted the fact that the persons, who were given notices under Sec.8-B of the Act, had filed civil writ applications before this Court which had stayed the proceedings of Sec.8-B, and the aforesaid matter was pending before this Court. It was observed: "13. Sec.8-B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act empowers the Commission that at stage of inquiry if the Commission considers it necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person or is of the opinion that the reputation of person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, the commission is to give that person a reasonable opportunity of being hard in the enquiry and to give evidence in his defence. Under the powers of the said section, the Hon ble Members of the Commission, namely, Shri S. Patankar and Sri f. Ahmad ordered for the issue of notice under Sec.8-B of the Act to seven persons, named in a separate subject while dealing with Mode and Procedure of Inquiry. The persons who were given notices under Sec.8-B of the Act, have filed a civil writ application in the Hon ble High court which has stated the proceedings of section 8-B and the aforesaid matter is still stayed. However, those went to the high Court and obtained stay of the operation of the notice under Sec.8-B of the Act, cannot be permitted to take a plea of audi alteram partern in any subsequent proceeding consequential to this report, particularly when they have appeared as witnesses and the Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the District Administration cross-examined the witnesses of all other parties. " A question arises as to whether a distinction c!n be drawn between those officers whose conduct is necessarily to be enquired into having regard to the terms of reference, and other persons whose conduct in the opinion of the commission is required to be enquired into incidentally. Having regard to the terms of the reference it may be said that since the commission was required to enquire whether measures taken by the district administration to prevent and deal with the said disturbance were timely and adequate and fix responsibility for lapses, if any, it was inhereni in the terms of reference itself that the conduct of the officers of the district administration had to be enquired intq and that was sufficient notice to all concerned officers. Therefore, it was no necessary to issue another notice under section 8-B of the Act. Such notice wa to be given to them only if in the opinion of the Commission the reputation of such persons was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. So far as other, persons are concerned, who did. not form part of the district administration, and yet whose conduct was to be enquired into incidentally, a notice under Sec.8-B was mandatory in substance, the officers of the district administration had notice of the fact that their conduct was the subject-matter of enquiry, and the measures taken by them, and lapses, if any, committed by them in preventing and dealing with the disturbances was also the subject of the enquiry. They were examined as witnesses and had a right to cross-examine witnesses who appeared before the commission. There was, therefore, no need to give them another notice under section 8-B. A notice was to be given to them only if any comment was to be made by the Commission prejudicing their reputation, and not if the findings of the Commission related only to the measures taken by them to prevent and deal with the disturbances. Counsel for the petitioners, however, strongly urged that such a distinction cannot be made. Where the principles of natural justice are invoked, the case may stand on different footing, but where the statutory provisions are invoked, the statutory mandate cannot be whittled down by reference to principles of natural justice. Counsel for the petitioners, however, strongly urged that such a distinction cannot be made. Where the principles of natural justice are invoked, the case may stand on different footing, but where the statutory provisions are invoked, the statutory mandate cannot be whittled down by reference to principles of natural justice. The statutory protection may be narrower or wider than the protection afforded by the principles of natural justice and, therefore, there was no question of invoking the rules of natural justice, except in so far as they are incorporated in he Act itself, or in the rules made thereunder. It was, therefore, submitted that even though a respondent in invoking the principles of natural justice could not claim the right to cross-examine all those persons who had sworn affidavits supporting the allegations against him, under Sec.8-C of the Act, every person referred to in section 8-B, and with the permission of the commission, any other person whose evidence is recorded by the Commission, had a right to cross-examine a witness other than a witness produced by him, and also had a right to be represented before the Commission by a legal practitioner or by any other person, with the permission of the Commission. It was, therefore, submitted that no such distinction can be made, and every person, including persons whose official conduct was under scrutiny by the Commission, was required to be given a notice under Sec.8-B. Strong reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kiran Bedi and another V/s. The Committee of Inquiry and another, AIR 1989 SC 714 . In that case the committee was required to enquire into and record their findings on certain incidents which took place on 15th January, 1988, 21st january, 1988 and 17th February, 1988, and other incidental developments, connected therewith. The Committee was required to ascertain the facts leading to the aforesaid incidents with a view to identifying those responsible for the incidents, so that stringent action could be taken against all those responsible. Though the Committee was not appointed under the Commissions of Enquiry Act, pursuant to a direction issued by the Supreme Court, the provisions of sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6, 8, 8-A, 8-B, 8-C, 9, 10 and 10-A of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952, and the rules made under Sec.12 thereof, were made applicable to the said Committee. Though the Committee was not appointed under the Commissions of Enquiry Act, pursuant to a direction issued by the Supreme Court, the provisions of sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6, 8, 8-A, 8-B, 8-C, 9, 10 and 10-A of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952, and the rules made under Sec.12 thereof, were made applicable to the said Committee. In its interim report the Committee observed that during the course of enquiry they were required to examine the conduct of various police officers and others and particularly, as the record showed, of the. C. P. (North), Additional D. C. P. (North) etc. Smt. Kiran Bedi was deputy Commissioner of Police, North district and, therefore, the actions taken by her were also to be enquired into by the Committee. The Supreme court referred to its earlier judgment in state of Jammu and Kashmir and ors. V/s. Baksi Gulam Mohammad and another, air 1967 SC 122 , and noticed that the submission urged therein, that Section 10 applied only when the conduct of a person came to be enquired into incidentally, and not when the Committee had been set up to enquire directly into this conduct, was repelled in the following words: "if a Commission is set up to inquire directly into the conduct of person, the commission must find it necessary to inquire into that conduct and such a person would, therefore, be one covered by Sec.10. It would be strange indeed if the act provided for rights of a person whose conduct incidentally came to be enquired into but did not do so in the case of persons whose conduct has directly to be inquired into under the order setting up the commission. It would be equally strange if the Act contemplated the conduct of a person being inquired into incidentally and not directly. What can be done indirectly should obviously have been considered capable of being done directly. " Reference was also made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka V/s. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 68 ) wherein with reference to section 8-B of the Act it was held that it was undeniable that the persons whose conduct was being enquired into were exposed to the fierce light of publicity. Thereafter the Court held: ". Thereafter the Court held: ". Keeping in view the nature of the allegations made in the statement of case and the supporting affidavits filed on behalf of the various Bar associations including the Delhi High Court Bar association requirement of even Clause (b) of Sec.8-B was fulfilled inasmuch as if those allegations were proved they were likely to prejudicially affect the reputation of the two petitioners. Indeed, in view of the term of reference which contemplated taking of "stringent action" against all those responsible, even the career of the petitioners as Police Officers was likely to be affected in case an adverse finding was recorded against them. . In view of the aforesaid specific term of reference, the principle that the report of a commission of Enquiry has not force proprio vigore does not on a pragmatic approach to the consequences seem to constitute sufficient safeguard so far as the petitioners are concerned. . . . . . . . . In view of the foregoing discussion and the reasons already stated in our order dated 18th August, 1988 (reported in air 1988 SC 2251, we are of the view that the two petitioners namely, Smt. Kir an bedi and Jinder Singh clearly fell within the category of persons contemplated by section 8-B of the Act and were consequently entitled to the same treatment as has been accorded by the Committee to the persons to whom notice has been issued by it under the said section. " in view of the authoritative pronouncement of law by the Supreme court it is, therefore, not possible to make a distinction Supreme Court it is, therefore, not possible to make a distinction between those whose conduct directly comes for scrutiny under the terms of reference, and those whose conduct may be incidentally enquired into by the Commission. I must, therefore, hold that all officers whose conduct was to be enquired into in connection with the aforesaid disturbances were entitled to issuance of notices under Sec.8-B of the Act. 16. I shall now proceed to consider separately each case with a view to find whether the Commission has enquired into the conduct of any person, and whether any finding recorded by it or observations made amounts to an adverse comment on his conduct or prejudicially affects his reputation. 16. I shall now proceed to consider separately each case with a view to find whether the Commission has enquired into the conduct of any person, and whether any finding recorded by it or observations made amounts to an adverse comment on his conduct or prejudicially affects his reputation. But, before doing that I may deal with some other submissions urged by Sri K. N. Choubey in C. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995. He submitted that the reconstitution of the Commission was in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1993 SC 825 . In my view, it is not open to the petitioners to raise this contention any more, because the reconstitution of the Commission took place pursuant to the order of the supreme Court. The order of the supreme Court is binding upon this court, and no further enquiry on this aspect of the matter is warranted. He then submitted that the report submitted by the Commission despite the stay order passed by this Court is a nullity, and it also demonstrates. the bias of the members of the Commission, because the submission of the report by them despite the stay order passed by this Court amounted to a colourable exercise of power. I do not consider it necessary to record any finding on this aspect of the matter, because if the report has been submitted, the validity of the findings have now to be considered. Rather than going into the question of bias, it would be desirable to dispose of these writ petitions on merit, avoiding any observation about the conduct of the members of the Commission, all of whom are retired Judges of this Court. The next submission urged by Mr. Choubey is that the Commission did not act as a body and each member acted on his own without consultation with others. The reconstituted Commission only heard arguments, since evidence had been examined even before the second reconstitution of the Commission. From the report of the commission it appears that only some of the witnesses examined on behalf of the commission were recalled for cross-examination by the parties. It is not the case of the petitioners that the Commission did not collectively hear the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. There are, no doubt, documents to show that some procedural matters were decided by exchange of notes. It is not the case of the petitioners that the Commission did not collectively hear the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. There are, no doubt, documents to show that some procedural matters were decided by exchange of notes. To my mind that does not vitiate the proceeding of the Commission, particularly when the Commission is authorised to evolve its own procedure. It was then submitted that the report of the Commission may influence the decision in pending criminal trials, arising out of the disturbances. No doubt, adverse findings of a Commission do gain publicity, and as was observed by the supreme Court, the person condemned is exposed to the fierce light to publicity. However, the Judges who will try or are trying the criminal cases, are judicially trained to exclude that which is irrelevant and inadmissible, and consider only that which is evidence, in a case in accordance with law. The judicially trained mind of a Judge is the surest safeguard against miscarriage of justice, and the petitioners should not fear that the courts of law will not done the cases on the basis of the evidence produced before the Court, and ignoring the effect of publicity. He lastly submitted that acceptance of the majority report without giving any reasons for discarding the report of the Chairman, was arbitrary. In my view, the Government is not required to give reasons for accepting the majority report. This submission must also be rejected. 17. I shall now consider the cases of the petitioners separately. The petitioners fall in two categories. The petitioners in C. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995 and C. W. J. C. No.5952 of 1995, namely, sri Krishna Chandra Dubey and Sri krishna Swarup Dwivedi are persons to whom notices under Sec.8-B of the act were issued. They had challenged the validity of the said notices before this Court, and their grievance is that despite the stay order passed by this court the Commission proceeded to submit its report. The other category consists of petitioners in the other writ petitions to whom no notice whatsoever was sent under Sec.8-B of the Act, and yet adverse comments are said to have been made as to their conduct, as also observations which prejudicially affect their reputation. 18. Petitioner Krishna Chandra dubey at the relevant time was posted as Officer-in-charge of Kotwali Police station,. 18. Petitioner Krishna Chandra dubey at the relevant time was posted as Officer-in-charge of Kotwali Police station,. Bhagalpur, while petitioner krishna Swaroop Dwivedi was posted as superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur. As would appear from Annexure-1, two members of the commission by order dated 27-4-1993 recorded their satisfaction that there were sufficient grounds to issue a notice under Sec.8-B of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952. The Commission considered it necessary to enquire into the conduct of seven officers whose names are mentioned in the order, and the commission was also of the opinion that their reputation was likely to be prejud affected by the enquiry. It was decic therefore, that these persons be give reasonable opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence in their defence. The names of the aforesaid petitioners appear in the order. The Chairman of the Commission expressed his disagreement observing that unless he was told about the particulars of the allegations made against these officers which might have led the Hon ble Members to take recourse to such action, it was difficult for him to hold that it was necessary and expedient to make an enquiry under section 8-B against them. It would be necessary to specify the allegations on the basis of which such an enquiry is to be made, so that the concerned officers may have an opportunity to put up their defence pointedly and effectively. However, in view of the opinion of the majority, he directed the office to comply with the direction given by two members in Order No.225 dated 27-4-1993. Pursuant thereto a notice was issued, which is Annexure-3. The said notice has been reproduced earlier in this judgment, and I observe, that the notice is a bald notice stating that the Commission considered by necessary to enquire into the conduct of the noticee, and was of the opinion that his reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. Opportunity was, therefore, being given to the notice of being heard in the enquiry and to produce evidence in defence. A copy of the terms of reference of the Commission was enclosed with the notice and the notice was directed to submit a list of witnesses, if any, whom he wished to examine in defence, and to appear before the Commission on 27-5-1993. A copy of the terms of reference of the Commission was enclosed with the notice and the notice was directed to submit a list of witnesses, if any, whom he wished to examine in defence, and to appear before the Commission on 27-5-1993. 19 The validity of the notice under section 8-B of the Act was challenged by the petitioners in C. W. J. C. No.5203 and 5652 of 1993. While issuing notice to the State, this Court by order dated 9-6-1993 stayed the operation of the notice issued under Sec.8-B of the act and directed that no further proceeding shall be taken in pursuance thereof till further orders of this Court, so far as the petitioners were concerned. It is not disputed that the order of stay was operational on the date on which the majority report of the Commission was submitted. Even so, the grievance of the petitioners is, that the Commission proceeded to submit its report fully aware of the fact that an order of stay was operational, though the writ petition was ultimately dismissed as having become infructuous on 3-4-1995 after the report was submitted. The petitioners have also brought on record the relevant proceedings of the Commission to show that the Members of the Commission were aware of the fact that there was an order of stay passed by the High Court. Annexure-8 series filed by the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995 show that one of the Members of the Commission, Sri S. Shamsul hasan, in his note dated 26-10-1993 observed that he did not agree that the delay in terminating the work of the commission would be a valid ground for withdrawing the notice, nor did he consider the fact that since the officers had appeared and led evidence, it would amount to fulfilment of the condition that required application of section 8-B. He further observed that the Commission could not abort a legal requirement merely of the desire to achieve an early termination. Arguments will have to be heard in full, and subject to the result of the application in regard to section 8- B, the procedure in that event has to be followed. He could not appreciate why vague notice was sent at all. Arguments will have to be heard in full, and subject to the result of the application in regard to section 8- B, the procedure in that event has to be followed. He could not appreciate why vague notice was sent at all. With so many Counsel assisting the Commission, a properly worded notice should have been sent, and in fact this notice should have been sent much earlier, when the Chairman was the solitary member of he Commission. He was, therefore, totally opposed to the withdrawal of the notice under Section 8-B of the Act, and expressed the opinion that "the matter should be pursued in the High Court and if it is held by the High Court that the notice is vague then we should send fresh notice giving adequate details to the concerned persons". Another Member of the commission Sri R. C. P. Sinha also held the view that the notice under Sec.8-B should not be withdrawn. He suggested that the State Government should be moved to take steps for speedy disposal of the writ petitions pending before the high Court. The noting of the Chairman of the Commission shows that he directed that a letter be written to the home (Special) Department to take steps for an early disposal of the writ petitions in which stay orders had been passed. In C. W. J. C. No.5952 of 1995 some more notings have been produced from which it appears that one of the members of the Commission, namely, sri R. C. P. Sinha, observed that since the notices issued under Sec.8-B had been challenged before the High Court, and the Commission was a party to the writ petition, it should appear so that the writ petitions may be disposed of. He also noticed that the letter written to the Special Secretary (Home) for taking action for an early disposal of the writ petitions bore no fruit. Reminders to the government as well as to the Advocate-General, were also of no use, and the writ petitions were still pending before the High Court in spite of the fact that the Hon ble Judge who heard the writ-petitions stayed further proceeding under Sec.8-B, had directed the cases to be placed before an appropriate Bench after vacation. Reminders to the government as well as to the Advocate-General, were also of no use, and the writ petitions were still pending before the High Court in spite of the fact that the Hon ble Judge who heard the writ-petitions stayed further proceeding under Sec.8-B, had directed the cases to be placed before an appropriate Bench after vacation. Unless the writ petitions were disposed of by the High Court, no report could be submitted in the enquiry, and this was also the view of the Hon ble Chairman. He, therefore, expressed the view that the Commission should appear through some lawyer and proper arrangement should be made for payment of his fees, etc. If this was not done, the enquiry may continue for eternity. The proceeding of the meeting of the Commission of enquiry held on 29-4-1994 discloses that it was felt by the Commission that the law officers of the Government in the High Court were not taking any interest in early disposal of the writ petitions in which stay orders had been passed in respect of notices issued under section 8-B of the Commissions of Enquiry Act. It was, therefore, suggested to engage a Senior Advocate to appear before the High Court in those writ petitions and get them listed and disposed of as early as possible. 20. The material brought on record leaves no room for doubt that the Members of Commission were aware of the pendency of the writ petitions before this Court challenging the notices under section 8-B of the Act in which stay-orders had been passed. They had also expressed their dissatisfaction about the manner in which the notices had been drafted, since the notices did not give out any particulars about the nature of allegations made against the noticees. They were also not inclined to withdraw the notices already issued, and it was observed that unless the writ petitions were disposed of, it may not be possible to conclude the enquiry. They were also not inclined to withdraw the notices already issued, and it was observed that unless the writ petitions were disposed of, it may not be possible to conclude the enquiry. A view was also expressed by at least one Member that merely because the officers had appeared and led evidence, it would not amount to fulfilment of the condition that required application of Sec.8-B. Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that in view of the stay order passed by the High Court, the Commission ought not to have proceeded further in the matter, and in any event ought not to have recorded any adverse finding as to the conduct of the notices, or made any observation which prejudicially affected their reputation. Counsel for the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995 submitted that this showed malice on the part of the Members of the Commission, and a clear case of bias was made out. On the other hand, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.5952 of 1995 submitted that the submission of its report making adverse comments on the notices may possibly raise question of contempt of Court, but he was not interested in pursuing that line of argument, because the report had been submitted and now the Court should consider the matter on merit, without going into that question. I am of the opinion that Counsel for the petitioner in C. W. J. C. No.5952 of 1995 has taken a fair stand. 21. It was urged before us that the notice issued to the petitioners was vague and did not disclose any material on the basis of which the commission was satisfied that it was necessary to issue a notice under Sec.8-B. It did not indicate the nature of allegations against the petitioners, nor did it mention any particulars of facts which would have at least enabled the notices to appreciate the nature of allegations against them, and the case which they had to meet by leading evidence in defence. Such a vague notice must be held to be invalid. 22. The submission urged on behalf of the petitioners has force. In the case of Sri K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy V/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1996 AP 62 , a similar situation arose and their Lordships upheld the objection of the petitioners. Such a vague notice must be held to be invalid. 22. The submission urged on behalf of the petitioners has force. In the case of Sri K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy V/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1996 AP 62 , a similar situation arose and their Lordships upheld the objection of the petitioners. It was held: "though these are the relevant averments in the counter-affidavit, yet from the above discussion and perusal of record it is evident that proceedings of the Commission do not refer to any material which formed the basis of requisite opinion under Sec.8-B. Indeed there is no proceeding recording the requisite opinion and directing notice pursuant thereto. When the very foundation, namely formation of opinion for issuing notice under section 8-B is lacking, it would be trifling to observe that requisite material which formed the basis for formation of opinion for purposes of issuing notice under Sec.8-B and that the statement of A. W.2 and the documentary evidence except the g. Os, which were already collected, were not reflected in the notices under Section 8-B. It follows that formation of opinion requisite for the issuance of the notices under Sec.8-B of the Act is not objective, with reference to record of the commission, and the notices issued under section 8-B (b) lack necessary particulars of material on record which was in the opinion of the Commission likely to be prejudicially affected the reputation of the petitioners. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx from the above discussion it follows that the necessary material which is likely to prejudicially affect the reputation of the petitioners, is not referred to in the notices under Sec.8-B and thus the petitioners are not told of what they have to defend and what is the material on record which they have to rebut to safeguard their interest and to save their reputation being prejudicially affected. Further, when they were given notices affording opportunity of being heard granting 15 days time, the petitioners are justified in expecting that further enquiry would not go on during that period and commenting that to collect material which would prejudice the interest of the addressees of the notices till the expiry of the specified period in the notice to participate would amount to collecting the material behind the back of the addressees of the notice and conducting the enquiry otherwise than fairly" 23. It goes without saying that if a notice is issued calling upon a person to defend himself in the proceeding, he must also be told of the allegations against which he has to defend himself. At least the material on the basis of which it was considered necessary to issue notice should be disclosed. A mere notice to appear does not meet the requirement of law. A similar view was expressed by one of us (B. P. Singh, J.) in air 1988 Patna 258 (Smt. Ambika Devi v. State of Bihar and Os. It was observed: "natural justice generally requires the person, liable to be directly affected by the proposed administrative acts, decisions or proceedings to be given adequate notice of what is proposed, so that they may be in a position to make representation on their behalf, to appear at the hearing of the enquiry, and effectively to prepare their own case and to answer the case they have to meet. The requirement of notice depends upon what kinds of interests are sought to be protected The reason for imposing an obligation to give prior notice is to afford those affected persons an opportunity to make representations and notices must be served in sufficient time to enable those representations to be made effectively. " Applying the same test to the cases in hand, I have no doubt that the bald notice issued to the petitioners under section 8-B was vague and did not disclose any material whatsoever to enable the petitioners to effectively defend themselves against the allegations made. The notice should have made it clear as to the case which the petitioners were required to meet, so that they could effectively defend themselves. This was all the more necessary in a case where more than a hundred witnesses had been examined, and it was, therefore, impossible for the petitioners even to guess as to what were the allegations which had prompted the commission to issue notice under Sec.8-B. The commission was aware of the fact that the notices were vague and was equally aware of the fact that the notices had been challenged in writ petitions filed before the High Court in which orders of stay had been passed. Since the writ petitions were pending before this court, the petitioners were justified in thinking that the matter will not be proceeded with till the disposal of the writ petitions, and under that impression they had not led any evidence before the Commission in defence, nor did they take any other action pursuant to the notice under Sec.8-B. In these facts and circumstances the petitioners are justified in complaining that they have been deprived of the valuable right and protection conferred on them by section 8-B of the Act. 24. So far as these petitioners are concerned, it cannot be disputed that the Commission itself decided to issue notice to them under Sec.8-B of the act and, therefore, it must be held that the commission was satisfied that it was necessary to enquire into their conduct, and was also of the opinion that their reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. In these circumstances, the observations made in the majority report of the Commission adversely commenting on their conduct, which also prejudicially affect their reputation, must be expunged from the report. C. W. J. C. No.5674 of 1995 25. Counsel of the petitioner in this writ petition submitted that the adverse comments made in paragraph nos.111, 112, 144, 151, 152, 160, 167, 168, 169, 562, 566, 575 and 597 should be expunged from the report. I have carefully considered the observations of the Commission made in these paragraphs, and on a careful consideration of the same I find that only in some of the paragraphs certain observations have been made which require to be expunged. In paragraph No. Ill of the report the following is to be found: ". . . . The events that followed indicated the utterly irresponsible behaviour of the district Administration, particularly, the kotwali police led by the Officer Incharge of the Kotwali thana, the Sub-Inspector of the Tatarpur thana accompanied by a large force of police officials embarked upon a massive search of the houses of muslim residences of Tatarpur mohalla ostensibly on the basis of the F. I. R. lodged by the Inspector Kotwali in RS. Case No 673 but in reality to avenge the alleged rainfall of bombs on the S. R and in ostentatious bias against the Muslims. The manner in which the search was conducted was reminiscent of the search in occupied Europe by the Nazis. Case No 673 but in reality to avenge the alleged rainfall of bombs on the S. R and in ostentatious bias against the Muslims. The manner in which the search was conducted was reminiscent of the search in occupied Europe by the Nazis. Not a single house was spared even though the cause of action for such searches in most of the cases was revengeful. Highly responsible and respectable members of muslim community who were neither involved in political nor in any ideological or religious fanaticism were subjected to the search and fascist method of assault and torture was resorted to. " in the said paragraph particular reference is made to the petitioner, who was the officer-in-charge of Kotwali police station, and it is observed that he had acted with a view to avenge the alleged rainfall of bombs on the superintendent of Police and in ostentatious bias against the Muslims. The observation made does cast a serious aspersion on the petitioner, as he has been branded as an officer with bias against the Muslims. The aforesaid observation, therefore, deserves to be expunged from the report. Similarly, in paragraph No.112 it is observed: ". . . . . . There is nothing on the record to indicate whether any Hindu was arrested that day, i. e. between 24th night and 26th morning, although at least inspector Dubey had admittedly seen the sack of Muslim business premises in shujaganj and had also been informed about the attack, arson, loot and massacre in Parwatti Chowk. It may also be interesting to state here that no F. I. R. was lodged either with regard to Shujaganj or parwatti Chowk incidents although a large number of FIRs were lodged by the police until an F. I. R.647/89 Exhibit a was lodged by Brij Kishore about the incidents of Shujaganj in Kotwali Thana and by sami Alam with regard to the incidents of parwatti (FIR No.808 ). " Here again the tenor of the observation suggests that the petitioners was partisan towards Hindus and did not arrest any Hindu on that day. These observations should also be expunged from the report. " Here again the tenor of the observation suggests that the petitioners was partisan towards Hindus and did not arrest any Hindu on that day. These observations should also be expunged from the report. Similarly, in paragraph no.144 the Commission observed as follows: "if the statement was really made by aman Sahab and heard by Dubey, then his not conveying the statement immediately to his superiors shows that he was utterly irresponsible and totally lacking in any common sense and any initiatives. He should have realised the consequences of the statement which amounted to inciting violence and should have immediately called back his superior officers and should have got Mr. Aman Zaheeruddin, salan and other at least put under house arrest or they could have been compelled by proper legal action to behave correctly. Mr. Dubey committed gross dereliction of duty and his explanation in this regard before the Commission being false indicates his desire to generate falsehood to suit communal ends ). " In this paragraph an observation is made that the petitioner committed gross dereliction of duty and his explanation in this regard before the commission being false, indicates his desire to generate falsehood to suit communal ends. This observation also suggests that the petitioner was motivated by communal design. This observation in the said passage is, therefore, expunged. So far as paragraph Nos.151, 152, 160, 166, 167, 168, 169, 562 and 566 are concerned, I do not find that there is any reference in particular to the petitioner, touching upon his conduct or any observation that may prejudicially affect his reputation. In the aforesaid paragraphs the Commission has appreciated the evidence adduced before it and given its findings. It has adversely commented on the district administration and the police without making any observation personally against the petitioner. In my view, the commission was entitled to record its findings on the basis of the evidence produced before it, and was well within its right to make observations with regard to the statements made before it by the witnesses, including the petitioner. The mere fact that it did not find the explanation offered by the petitioner in course of his deposition acceptable, and discarded the same as false, is no ground for holding that the commission adversely commented on the conduct of the petitioner or made any observation which may prejudicially affect his reputation. The mere fact that it did not find the explanation offered by the petitioner in course of his deposition acceptable, and discarded the same as false, is no ground for holding that the commission adversely commented on the conduct of the petitioner or made any observation which may prejudicially affect his reputation. In paragraph No.595 the Commission observed that adequate and exemplary action should be taken against the persons found responsible for whatever happened,. severally and collectively, and in paragraph No.597 it has in particular referred to the petitioner while observing: "dwivedi was ably assisted by K. C. Dubey and Navin Kumar who not only let loose fascism like aggression on the Muslims of Bhagalpur but were silent spectator to the loot and arson and murder in shujaganj and Parvati respectively. Had these officers taken timely step they could have not only prevented the so-called holocaust but the occurrence at Parvatti and Sujaganj could also have been avoided. " The above-quoted portion of paragraph No.597 is a very serious criticism of the conduct of the petitioner, who is said to have let loose fascism like aggression on the Muslims of Bhagalpur. In the absence of notice to the petitioner under Sec.8-B of the Act, such a comment does not appear to be justified, and the same is, accordingly, expunged. 26. Accordingly, this writ-petition is allowed to the extent that the portions of paragraph Nos.111, 112, 144 and 597 referred to above are expunged from the report. The State shall not take those observations into account for any purpose whatsoever. However, the remaining paragraphs referred to by counsel for the petitioner do not make any adverse comment, on the conduct of the petitioner personally, nor do they prejudicially affect his reputation, and, therefore, no interference is called for. C. W. J. C. No.5952 of 1995 27. The petitioner in this petition was the Superintendent of Police, bhagalpur. Counsel appearing on his behalf has drawn my attention to various paragraphs of the report and submitted that those paragraphs be expunged from the report. I find that the petitioner has not been named in paragraphs 98, 109, 114, 554, 555, 556, 570, 571, 578, 581, 584, 587 and 589 of the report. The Commission has made its observations generally about the manner in which the district administration and the police officials had acted. I find that the petitioner has not been named in paragraphs 98, 109, 114, 554, 555, 556, 570, 571, 578, 581, 584, 587 and 589 of the report. The Commission has made its observations generally about the manner in which the district administration and the police officials had acted. Even though some of the comments are adverse as against the district administration and the police, the petitioner cannot take exception to those observations, which have been made on the basis of the evidence produced before the Commission. The Commission was entitled to enquire into the matter by particular reference to the measures taken by the district administration to prevent and to deal with the said disturbances. On the basis of the evidence adduced before it, it was entitled to record its findings and make observations. No exception can, therefore, be taken to the observations made in the above passages. In paragraph No.595 the commission has only observed that adequate and exemplary action should be taken against the persons found responsible for the happenings. The following observations have been made in paragraph no.597: "we would hold Dwivedi, the then superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur, wholly responsible for whatever happened before 24th October, 1989, on 24th itself and after 24th. His communal bias was fully demonstrated not only by the manner of arresting the Muslims and by not extending adequate help to protect them and the climax was reached when the b. J. P and V. H. P. workers led by their leaders demonstrated along with the police and under the leadership of Sgt. Om Prakash protesting against the transfer of Owivedi in violation of the curfew and the Prime ministers security. Even after Dwivedi continued as S. R, he took no action against the members of the police force and Sgt. Om Prakash for the violation of the curfew and the Prima Ministers security. " The above observation imputes communal bias against the petitioner. It seriously and adversely affects his reputation and also amounts to a serious condemnation of his conduct. Th above observation should not have been made by the Commission when it had failed to serve a valid notice on the petitioner under Sec.8-B of the Act. The above observation is, therefore, expunged from the report. The Government is directed not to take into account the aforesaid observation for any purpose whatsoever. Th above observation should not have been made by the Commission when it had failed to serve a valid notice on the petitioner under Sec.8-B of the Act. The above observation is, therefore, expunged from the report. The Government is directed not to take into account the aforesaid observation for any purpose whatsoever. So far as other paragraphs of the report are concerned, i find nothing objectionable in them. C. WJ. C. No.7144 of 1995 28. The petitioner Navin Kumar sinha at the relevant time was posted at bhagalpur as Probationary Dy. Superintendent of Police. Admittedly, no notice was issued to him under Sec.8-B of the Act. According to the petitioner certain observations have been made by the commission adversely commenting on his conduct which are contained in paragraph Nos.595 to 597 of the report. I have perused those paragraphs of the report and it appears that only in paragraph No.597 the petitioner has been named and the following finding has been recorded: "dwivedi was ably assisted by K. C. Dubey and Navin Kumar who not only let loose fascism like aggression on the Muslims of Bhagalpur, but were silent spectators to the loot and arson and murder in sujaganj and Parvatti, respectively. Had these officers taken timely step they could have not only prevented the so-called. holocaust but the occurrence at Parvatti and Sujaganj could also have been avoided. " This finding no doubt is an adverse comment on the conduct of the petitioner, and the same could not have been recorded without notice to the petitioner under Sec.8-B of the Act, calling upon him to explain his conduct in relation to the occurrence at Parvatti and Sujaganj. The said finding in the report, to the extent it relates to the petitioner, is directed to be expunged, and the respondents will not take any action against the petitioner solely on the basis of the aforesaid finding in the report. C. W. J. C. No.7892 of 1995 29. Petitioner Bhubneshwar Prasad singh was posted as an Inspector of police, Amarpur at the relevant time. C. W. J. C. No.7892 of 1995 29. Petitioner Bhubneshwar Prasad singh was posted as an Inspector of police, Amarpur at the relevant time. On the basis of the adverse findings against him recorded by the Commission in paragraph No.536 of the report, he has been asked to show cause within a week as to why action be not taken against him in paragraph No.536 of the report the Commission has observed: "on 30th October, 1989, a Muslim trader was arrested In Amarpur Bazar on the charge of possessing bomb. It has been alleged that later all the goods in his shop including bicycle tyres and tubes were loaded on a truck and taken to deoghar by the inspector of Police, Shri bhuvneshwar Singh and the local Circle officer. There these articles were sold by the two officers while at Amarpur they were said to have been looted by a mob. The Magistrate Incharge of Amarpur RS shri Triveni Singh reported this matter in writing to the Special A. D. M. cum O. S. O relief Operations. On his report Shri bhuvaneshwar Singh and the Circle Officer in Charge of Amarpur Anchal were placed under suspension, but before long shri Bhuvaneshwar Singh was reinstated. Now he (Shri B. Singh) has taken the plea that he had taken the goods from the shop for safe. custody only. However, a case has been registered. The face of the investigation and the case can be anybodys guess. " As I read paragraph No.536 of the report, the Commission has not recorded any finding and has merely narrated the facts. Indeed, the Commission has taken notice of the fact that a criminal case has been registered and has thereafter said nothing against the petitioner. In my view, no adverse comment has been made by the Commission against the conduct of the petitioner, and the Commission has only stated the facts which are on record. I fail to understand why in a mechanical manner a notice at all was issued to the petitioner by the State on the basis of the report of the Commission. In these circumstances, the notice dated 19th August, 1995 (Annexure-5) which has been issued solely on the basis of the above observation is quashed, but that will not prejudice the criminal case pending against the petitioner. C. W. J. C, No.7893 of 1995 30. In these circumstances, the notice dated 19th August, 1995 (Annexure-5) which has been issued solely on the basis of the above observation is quashed, but that will not prejudice the criminal case pending against the petitioner. C. W. J. C, No.7893 of 1995 30. Petitioner Omprakash Singh at the relevant time was posted as Seargent in Bhagalpur Police Lines. On the basis of the findings of the Commission contained in paragraph Nos.243 (2) and 597, the petitioner has been placed under suspension and a departmental proceeding has been initiated against him. Admittedly, no notice was issued to this petitioner under Sec.8-B of the act. Paragraph Nos.243 (2) refers to P. S. Case No.758 of 1989. It has been observed that the deceased who belonged to Bhikanpur was brought to Thana after he was murdered by Seargent Om prakash and others. The story of attack on magazine was concoction in defence. FIR was lodged by Bibi Shahjahan khatoon (wife of the deceased ). Witness no.2 had narrated the incident at bhikanpur in which murders had been committed by Seargent Om Prakash and others. In paragraph No.597 of the report it has been observed: "even after Dwivedi continued as s. R, he took no action against the members of the police force and Sgt. Om prakash for the violation of the curfew and the Prime Ministers security. " These observations do adversely affect the petitioner as his conduct has been commented upon, and in fact he has been named as a murderer. If such serious allegations were made against the petitioner, he was certainly entitled to a notice under Sec.8-B. Since he was not given notice under Sec.8-B, the above observations are unwarranted and are, therefore, expunged from the report. For the same reason the state government is not justified in taking any action against the petitioner solely on the basis of the observation contained in the Commissions report. Since the order, dated 27-9-95 (Annexure-9) suspending the petitioner and initiating a proceeding against him is solely on the basis of the observations contained in the aforesaid paragraphs of the report, it must be quashed, and is accordingly quashed. C. W. J. C. No.8619 of 1995 31. Petitioner Krishna Kamal Pd. Singh claims that he was a Sub Inspector of Police stationed at Mujahidpur police station in the district of Bhagalpur, and was additional officer in charge of the police station. C. W. J. C. No.8619 of 1995 31. Petitioner Krishna Kamal Pd. Singh claims that he was a Sub Inspector of Police stationed at Mujahidpur police station in the district of Bhagalpur, and was additional officer in charge of the police station. It is submitted by him that in paragraph No.598 of the report, the Commission wrongly took him to be K. K. Singh and made certain observations. On the basis of the said observations the State Government issued a notice to him on 27-8-1995 (Annexure-5) and subsequently suspended him by issuance of the order dated 29-9-1995 (Annexure-7 ). In paragraph No.598 of the report it is observed that K. K. Singh, Officer Incharge, Mujahidpur p. S. participated in the massacre of muslims of Mohalla Ishakchak. It is not necessary for me to investigate whether the said K. K. Singh mentioned in paragraph No.598 is the same person as the petitioner. What is, however, admitted is the fact that no notice was issued to the petitioner under section 8-B of the act and he had, therefore, no opportunity to defend himself against such a serious allegation. The finding in paragraph No.598 of the report is rather damaging and the petitioner has been found to have participated in the massacre of Muslims. This casts a serious aspersion on the motive of the petitioner and certainly the finding is an adverse comment on his conduct and also tends to prejudicially affect his reputation. Such a finding should not have been recorded in the absence of notice to the petitioner under Section 8-B of the Act. The aforesaid finding contained in paragraph No.598 of the report is, therefore, expunged, and the state Government is directed not to act on the basis of the said finding in paragraph No.598. 32. The notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner solely on the ground that the Commission had made adverse comments against his conduct in the aforesaid paragraph of the report. That being the sole basis for issuance of show cause and suspension of the petitioner, there appears to be no justification for the same after the said finding contained in paragraph No.598 is expunged. Accordingly, Annexures 5 and 7 are quashed. That being the sole basis for issuance of show cause and suspension of the petitioner, there appears to be no justification for the same after the said finding contained in paragraph No.598 is expunged. Accordingly, Annexures 5 and 7 are quashed. This writ petition is, therefore, allowed to the extent that the observation against the petitioner contained in the report of the Commission in paragraph No.598 is expunged and Annexures 5 and 7 are quashed. C. W. J. C. No.9017 of 1995 32-A. Petitioner Awadesh Kumar was posted as a constable. He was issued a show-cause notice dated 7-9-1995 (Annexure-2) on the basis of certain observations made by the Commission in paragraph Nos.537, 541, 550 and 599 of the report. After considering his show cause and finding it to be unsatisfactory, an order of suspension was passed on 27-9-1995. I find from a perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs of the report that the petitioner has not been named by the Commission. The commission has recorded its findings on the basis of the evidence produced before it and found that the police officers and the Constables deployed in certain areas did not perform their duties in the manner they were expected to perform and has, therefore, recommended action against such persons after identifying them. In my view the Commission was entitled to do so. The Government appears to have thereafter identified the police officers and the Constables and initiated action against them. I do not find that there is anything in the report against the petitioner, and in fact he has not been named at all. The follow-up action taken by the Government, therefore, cannot be interfered with. I, therefore, find no merit in this writ-petition, and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. C. WJ. C. No.9025 of 1995 33. Petitioner Braikishore Singh was posted as A. S. I. ,kotwali Police station, Bhagalpur, at the relevant time. On the basis of the observation made in paragraph No.188 of the report, a snow-cause notice was issued to him on 17-10-1995 (Annexure-6), and subsequently he was placed under suspension by order dated 3-10- 1995 (Annexure-5 ). On a careful perusal of paragraph No.188 of the report I do not find that any adverse comment on the conduct of the petitioner has been made. On a careful perusal of paragraph No.188 of the report I do not find that any adverse comment on the conduct of the petitioner has been made. Only the facts were discussed, and it has been noticed that he got separate from his force which joined the crowd, and could not, therefore, control the rioters. The Commission was entitled to make its observation on the subject, and no illegality was committed by the Commission in noticing the evidence on the subject and making its observation. There is nothing in paragraph No.188 of the report which deserves to be expunged. So far as the action taken by the government is concerned, though reference is made to paragraph No.188 of the report in the absence of any adverse finding against the petitioner in that paragraph, there is no justification for the initiation of the proceeding against the petitioner. That is the sole basis on which the proceeding was been initiated. Annexures 5 and 6 are, therefore, quashed, but this will not prevent the State Government from taking any action in accordance with law on the basis of any other material. This writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. C. WJ. C. No.10612 of 1995 34. Petitioner Ganga Prasad dohare was at the relevant time the regional Inspector-General of Police, and Bhagalpur district fell within his region. He was later appointed as director-General of Police, Bihar, but it is submitted that on account of certain observations made in the report, he has been transferred to another post. Counsel appearing on his behalf drew my attention to certain passages in the report which, according to him, adversely commented on the conduct of the petitioner, and the observations contained therein prejudicially affected his reputation. I have carefully considered the passages appearing in the report. In paragraph No.98 there is only reference to high-ranking officials of the administration, one of whom is reported to have said that he will convert this (Bhagalpur) into Karbala, and the other is reported to have said that bhagalpur will be converted into meerut. The petitioner has not been named in the said paragraph. In paragraph Nos.113, 554, 556, 570 and 581 there are certain observations against the district police and the district administration. The petitioner has not been named in the said paragraph. In paragraph Nos.113, 554, 556, 570 and 581 there are certain observations against the district police and the district administration. The Commission has no doubt commented on the ineffectiveness of the police, but the petitioner has not been named in these paragraphs, and in my view the Commission was entitled to make its observations as it has done. In paragraph No.587 there is only an observation by the Commission that the petitioner ought to have made enquiries after he came to know that there was a demonstration on the arrival of the Prime Minister and breach of the Prime Ministers security regulation. That should have promoted him to make intensive inquiry into the matter and to take steps against such police personnel who participated in the demonstration and allowed the breach of curfew and the Prime ministers security regulation. I find nothing objectionable in paragraph No.587 of the report, because the comment made is based on the statement of d. G. P. as a witness that though he was informed that there was some sort of demonstration on the arrival of the prime Minister, he was not informed whether the police mean were involved. The comment made by the Commission cannot be objected to. However, in paragraph No.597 the Commission has made an observation which does seriously prejudice the reputation of the petitioner. The Commission has observed: "dohre, particularly was responsible as much as Dwivedi because he was all the time moving around the city. His communal bias was apparent from the famous incident during Moharram when he said that he would make Bhagalpur another karbala for which the District Magistrate of bhagalpur had to seek apology". Counsel rightly submitted that it is not known on what basis the said comment has been made because in paragraph No.98 of the report the commission has not named the official said to have made the objectionable statement. However, in the above quoted portion of paragraph No.597 me Commission observed mat his communal bias was apparent from the famous incident during Moharram when he said that he would make bhagalpur another Karbala. The charge of communalism against such a senior officer of the Police does not appear to be justified, when no notice was issued to him under Sec.8-B of the Act. The charge of communalism against such a senior officer of the Police does not appear to be justified, when no notice was issued to him under Sec.8-B of the Act. The insinuation is not only an adverse comment on his conduct, but prejudicially affects his reputation. The aforesaid observation in paragraph No.597 deserves to be expunged from the report and is, accordingly, expunged. On the basis of the said observation the government shall not take any action against the petitioner. So far as the remaining passages are concerned, I find nothing objectionable in them justifying their exjunction. The writ-petition is allowed only to the extent indicated above. C. W. J. C. No.10652 of 1995 35 Petitioner Prahlad Kumar was at the relevant time Dy. S. P. , Law and order, Bhagalpur. On 21-8-1995 a show-cause notice was issued to him on the basis of certain observations made by the Commission in paragraph Nos.545 and 598 of the report. The relevant paragraph is only paragraph No.545, because in paragraph No.598 he has only been named as an officer responsible for not taking adequate steps, presumable on the basis of the finding recorded in paragraph No.545. In paragraph No.545 the Commission has discussed an incident which took place on 30th October, 1989, and it appears that the petitioner had accompanied two ministers of State to village Tamauni. While they were there a mob from bishrampur moved menacingly towards the village. The two Ministers jumped in their car and sped away leaving Dehind the petitioner, who was still looking for trie dead bodies, in the paddy fields. When he realised that he had been left behind, he also jumped in his jeep and drove towards Kajraili Police station. He found the two Ministers waiting for him on the road leading to nathnagar. The Commission has commented on the act of bravery on the part of the Minister and the Dy. S. P. and observed that all of them came back to Bhagalpur thanking God that their lives had been saved by fleeing in time. I fail to understand what objection can be taken to the aforesaid passage appearing at paragraph No.545 of the report. The aforesaid passage only recounts an event that took place on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Commission. I fail to understand what objection can be taken to the aforesaid passage appearing at paragraph No.545 of the report. The aforesaid passage only recounts an event that took place on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Commission. At the same time the Commission has noted the fact that a mob had moved menacingly towards the village and the petitioner was left behind, while others fled away. These are facts which came to the notice of the Commission and it has referred to them in its report. No objection can be taken to the observations contained in the said paragraph. The state Government has on me basis of the said observation, issued notice to the petitioner to show cause. I direct the State Government that before taking any action, the State Government will keep in mind all the relevant circumstances. There is no justification for expunging paragraph No.545 from the report. The State Government will consider the representation made by the petitioner in response to the show cause notice on the basis of material available to it, as there is nothing for or against the petitioner in paragraph No.545 of the report. This writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid direction. C. WJ. C. No.627 of 1996 36. In this writ petition the petitioner is Sheodas Singh, who was at the relevant time officer-in-charge of tatarpur police station. On the basis of the findings recorded by the Commission in paragraph Nos.160 and 598 of the majority report the Government took a decision on 24-8-1995 to take appropriate action against the officers concerned and, therefore, issued show cause to them asking for their explanation. A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, and the Government decision was communicated to the petitioner on 6-9-1995 through the Superintendent of Police, Supaul. He was granted only three days time to submit his show cause. The petitioner asked for more time. However, the petitioner made a representation directly to the chief Minister of Bihar and endorsed a copy of that representation to the Chief secretary, Bihar, D. G. P. , Bihar Superintendent of Police, General Secretary, bihar Police Association, Leaders of opposition in the Bihar Legislature ana Parliament, and two former Prime ministers. The petitioner asked for more time. However, the petitioner made a representation directly to the chief Minister of Bihar and endorsed a copy of that representation to the Chief secretary, Bihar, D. G. P. , Bihar Superintendent of Police, General Secretary, bihar Police Association, Leaders of opposition in the Bihar Legislature ana Parliament, and two former Prime ministers. In view of the fact that the petitioner had made a direct representation to the Chief Minister, and under the relevant rules such a representation should have been forwarded through the Superintendent of Police, he was placed under suspension by order dated 27-9-1995. I find no reason to quash the said order of suspension. However, it appears that the petitioner was also suspended in the departmental proceeding by order dated 79-9-1995. The show cause issued to the petitioner and the order of suspension proceed on the basis that certain adverse findings had been recorded against him in the report of the Commission, and reference is made in paragraph No.160 of the report. 37. In paragraph No.160 of the report the Commission has dealt with the Second incident of bombing at tatarpur Chowk. In that connection the commission has observed that the identification by two police officers, namely, Dubey and Sheodutt could not be accepted in the light of the evidence of the Superintendent of Police himself. The name Sheodutt appears to be a mistake for Shepdas, me petitioner. There is nothing in the report touching upon the conduct of the petitioner or reflecting on his reputation. His identification of the concerned miscreants has not been accepted by the Commission. The Commission was fully within its right to consider the evidence of the petitioner for what it was worth, and to record its finding. There is no reason, therefore, to expunge any part of the report so far as they relate to the petitioner. However, the order of suspension appears to have been issued in a mechanical manner without correctly appreciating the import of paragraph No.160 of the report. In paragraph No.598, no doubt, the petitioner has been named by the Commissien as one of the officers responsible, but that must be on the basis of what is found in paragraph No.160 of the report. In paragraph No.598, no doubt, the petitioner has been named by the Commissien as one of the officers responsible, but that must be on the basis of what is found in paragraph No.160 of the report. By itself paragraph No.160 of the report does not indict the petitioner, and all that can be said is that the Commission did not accept the identification of the culprits by the petitioner. In these circumstances, the order of suspension dated 29-9-1995 is not justified and the same is, accordingly, quashed. This, however, will not prevent the State from taking action against the petitioner, if there is any other material for taking such action. This writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. C. W. J. C. No.887 of 1996 38. Petitioner Narendra Kumar was A. S. I. of Police posted at Nathnagar Police Station. In his case as well the Government took a decision to issue a show cause-vide Annexure-2 dated 25-8-1995 on the basis of certain findings recorded by the Commission in paragraph Nos.540 and 598 of the report. The petitioner was thereafter placed under suspension by issuance of annexure-7 dated 27-9-1995. In his case as well it appears that the order of suspension has been mechanically passed without appreciating the import of the finding in paragraph No.540 of the report. Paragraph No.540 of the report is quoted below: "while the mob was still at work, a. S. I, of Police Shri Narendra Singh sent a constable to fetch B. D. O. Nathnagar (A Bihar Administrative Service Officer) who was passing nearby with 2/4 DAP Force. The B. D. O. came near Bhatoria but did not enter the village. Me returned at 2.30 p. M. without disturbing the attackers. Some of the attackers who had run away at the sight of the arrival of B. D. O. with more Police force now came back and pulled down even the remaining houses of the Muslims. No wall was left intact. " it will appear from the said paragraph that so far as the petitioner is concerned, he had sought the help of b. D. O. , Nainmagar who was passing nearby with armed force. It. was actually the B. D. O. who did not take any action, with the result that considerable, damage was caused to the properties of the Muslims. It. was actually the B. D. O. who did not take any action, with the result that considerable, damage was caused to the properties of the Muslims. In these circumstances, the order of suspension (Annexure-7)is quashed and the State Government is directed to reconsider the matter. If it finds any other material to proceed against the petitioner, it will be open to the State Government to do so. This writ-petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. All the writ-petitions are, accordingly, disposed of. Order Accordingly.