Judgment Aftab Alam, J. It is an unfortunate case and it makes me sad, more so as I am unable to find a way to give any relief to the appellants. 2. The late Hanjabam Chitreshwar Sharma was a resident of Manipur. He was studying at Sir Theagaray Post Graduate College, Madras in the State of Tamil Nadu. For going to Madras he had a reservation under ticket no. 04874 in 60 Dn Kamrup Express leaving Gauhati for Madras on 16.3.1989. For some reason or the other, instead of taking the Kamrup Express, he boarded 58 Dn Kanchanjunga Express that left Gauhati for Madras on the same date. He got reservation in the running train under the same ticket bearing no. 04874. This ill fated train met with an accident at Pakur within the State of Bihar resulting in the death of several persons. Shri H.C. Sharma was one of the passengers travelling in the train whose death was caused in that railway accident. At the time of his death his age was 19 years 11 months and 15 days. The Railways paid an exgratia amount of Rs.5,000/- to the families of those who died in the accident. 3. The father and the elder brother of the deceased boy filed an application under Section 82A of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, claiming a sum of Rs.1,00,000/as compensation for the death of the boy in the Railway accident. The claim application was filed on 19.6.1989 in the court of the District Judge, Dumka who at that time was competent to entertain and dispose of claims arising under Section 82A of the Indian Railways Act, 1890. Before the appellants' claim was disposed of by the District Judge, the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 came into force and on a petition filed under Section 24 of the Act by the Railway authorities (the Opposite party in the claim case), the District Judge, by order dated 24.2.1990, transferred the case to the Railway Claims Tribunal, Mahendru Ghat, Patna. 4. On transfer to the Claims Tribunal the case was registered as R.C.P. Railway Case No. 19/PA No. 11/0/90. 5. The Claims Tribunal disposed of the case, disallowing the appellants' claim by judgment and order dated 12.9.1990. The Tribunal found and held that the deceased H.S. Sharma had died as a result of the accident 'of the train in which he was travelling as a passenger. 5. The Claims Tribunal disposed of the case, disallowing the appellants' claim by judgment and order dated 12.9.1990. The Tribunal found and held that the deceased H.S. Sharma had died as a result of the accident 'of the train in which he was travelling as a passenger. It, however, held that the appellants, namely, the father and the elder brother of the deceased were not his dependants within the meaning of Section 82C of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1890 Act') and were therefore not entitled to receive any compensation from the Railways. It is this judgment and order passed by the Claims Tribunal that comes under challenge in this appeal before this court. 6. At this stage it may be noted that Section 82C of the 1890 Act enumerated and classified persons at whose instance an application for compensation could be filed. Section 82C(i) was in the following terms: 82C: Application for Compensation. – (1) An application for compensation under Section 82A arising out of any accident of the nature specified therein may be made to the Claims Tribunal (a) by the person who has sustained the injury or suffered any loss, or (b) by any agent duly authorised by such person in this behalf, or (c) where the person is a minor, by his guardian, and (d) where death has resulted from the accident, by any dependant of the deceased. 7. The word 'dependant' occurring in clause (d) of sub-section (1), as quoted above, was defined with reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act by the following explanation at the end of Section 82C. Explanation : In this section and Section 82 HH, the word "dependant" has the meaning assigned' to 'it in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923) 8. Explanation : In this section and Section 82 HH, the word "dependant" has the meaning assigned' to 'it in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923) 8. Section 2(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act defined dependant as follows: Section 2(d) : 'Dependant' means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely : (i) A widow, a minor legitimate son, an unmarried legitimate daughter or a widowed mother, and (ii) if wholly dependant on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death a son or a daughter who has attained the age of 18 years and who is infirm; (iii) if wholly or in part dependant on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death (a) a widower, (b) a parent other than a widowed mother, (c) a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitimate daughter or a daughter legitimate or illegitimate if married and a minor or if a widowed and a minor, (d) a minor brother of an unmarried sister or a widowed sister, if a minor, (e) a widowed daughter-in-law, (f) a minor child of a predeceased son, (g) a minor child of a predeceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive (h) a paternal grandparent if no parent of the workman is alive." 9. Thus under the 1890 Act the father of a passenger whose death was caused in a railway accident could file and maintain an application for compensation only in case it was established that the father was wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the deceased passenger. 10. This being the legal position the Railway Claims Tribunal held that there was no evidence to suggest that the appellants were, wholly or in part, dependant on the earnings of the deceased Hanjabam Chitreshwar Sharma. On the contrary the admitted facts and circumstances were that the deceased was a 19 year old boy studying in college in Madras and hence the reasonable inference would be that the deceased himself was dependant upon the appellants. On this finding the tribunal rejected the appellants' claim for compensation. In view of the provisions of the 1890 Act the tribunal's order coming under appeal is quite unassailable. 11. On this finding the tribunal rejected the appellants' claim for compensation. In view of the provisions of the 1890 Act the tribunal's order coming under appeal is quite unassailable. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants however, submitted that the Indian Railways Act, 1890 was repealed by the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1989 Act') which came into force on July 1, 1990. Chapter XIII of the 1989 Act deals with the liability of Railway Administration for death and injury to passengers due to accidents. The 1989 Act, instead of defining 'dependant' with reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, has its own definition of dependant in Section 123(b) which reads as follows: 123(b) "dependant" means any of the following relatives of a deceased passenger, namely:- (i) the wife, husband, son and daughter, and in case the deceased passenger is unmarried or is a minor, his parent; (ii) the parent, minor brother or unmarried sister, widowed sister, widowed daughter-in-law and a minor child of a pre-deceased son, if dependant wholly or partly on the deceased passenger; (iii) a minor child of a pre-deceased daughter, if wholly dependant on the deceased passenger; (iv) the paternal grand parent wholly dependant on the deceased passenger; 12. Section 125 of the 1989 Act (corresponding to Section 82C of the 1890 Act) is as follows :- 125. Application for compensation. - (1) An application for compensation under Section 124(or Section 124-A) may be made to the Claims Tribunal- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury or suffered any loss, or (b) by any agent duly authorised by such person in this behalf, or (c) where such person is a minor, by his guardian, or (d) where death had resulted from the accident, (or the untoward incident) by any dependant of the deceased or where such a dependant is a minor, by his guardian. (2) Every application by a depel1dant for compensation under this section shall be for the benefit of every other dependant. 13. (2) Every application by a depel1dant for compensation under this section shall be for the benefit of every other dependant. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that Section 125 read with section 123(1) of the 1989 Act released he father of a passenger dying in railway accident from the condition of being dependant wholly or in part on the earning of his deceased son and under the 1989 Act a father could file and maintain a claim application regardless of his dependence or otherwise on the earnings of the deceased son. 14. Learned counsel further submitted that even though the accident had occurred on 16.6.1989 when the 1890 Act was in force, the application for compensation should have been decided in terms of the provisions of the 1989 Act because the latter Act had come into force before the order was passed by the tribunal on September 12, 1990. 15. My deepest sympathies for the appellants notwithstanding, I am unable to accept the contention raised on their behalf. This is for the simple reason that a complete answer to it is provided in the repealing and saving clauses as contained in Section 200 of the 1989 Act, which is as follows : 200. Repeal and Saving- (1) The Indian Railways Act, 1890 is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act) – (a) anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken (including any rule, notification, inspection, order or notice made or issued, or any licence, permission, authorisation or exemption granted or any document or instrument executed or any direction given or any proceedings taken or any penalty of fine imposed) under the repealed Act shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act; (b) any complaint made to the Railway Rates Tribunal under sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the repealed Act, but not disposed of before the commencement of this Act and any complaint that may be made to the said Tribunal against any act or omission of a railway administration under the repealed Act shall be heard and decided by the Tribunal constituted under this Act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of this Act. (3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal." 16. It is thus clear that the only proceedings which in term of Section 200 (2)(b) are to be governed by the provisions of the 1989 Act are those arising from complaint made to the Railway Rates Tribunal under subsection (1) of Section 41 of the 1890 Act. All other proceedings are to be governed by the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clause Act, as specifically provided under sub-section (3) of Section 200. 17. In this case the rights and liabilities, if any, accrued to the parties on 16.3.1989, the date on which the accident took place. Those rights, therefore, can be determined only in terms of the law which was in force on that date, i.e., the Indian Railways Act, 1890. The coming into force of the Railways Act, 1989 will not have any effect on the rights and liabilities, if any, that might have accrued to the parties on the date of the accident. In case the accident taking place on 16.3.1989 causing the death of H.C. Sharma had not resulted in the appellants' acquiring any right to compensation, the 1989 Act coming into force on 1.7.1990 will not vest them with that right. 18. Mr. Raman, learned counsel for the appellants in support of his submission relied upon two Supreme Court decisions in A.A. Haja Muniuddin vs. Indian Railways, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 361 and in Mithilesh Kumari vs. Prem Behari Khare, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1247. I am unable to see any application of the decisions in Haja Muniuddin's case to the present appeal. Similarly, the decision in Mithilesh Kumari's case in no way helps the appellant. In fact, the observations made there go against the submissions made by the learned counsel. 19. For the reasons stated, I find no substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants that their claim for compensation should have been decided in terms of the provisions of the 1989 Act. I thus see no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case the parties will bear their own costs.