R. K. DASH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the sole appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused') has been preferred against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jaypore, passed in Sessions Case No. 79 of 1990 whereby he has been convicted under Section 302, IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case unfurled during trial is that on 25-4-1990 in the early part of evening hours there was a verbal duel between Badu Barua, the accused, and one Bunadhar Bhumia regarding distribution of meat on the occasion of 'amba Paras', a local festival. At this time, deceased Arjun Bhumia (hereinafter called 'deceased) intervened and separated them. Immediately thereafter accused rushed to his house nearby and returned back with bow and arrow and shot an arrow aiming at the deceased which struck on his left side chest as a consequence, he dropped down there with bleeding injury. The incident, according to the prosecution, had been witnessed by Bunadhar Bhumia PW 7, Budura Bhumia PW 9 and Budura Bhumia PW 10. Sania Bhumia PW 11, a post-occurrence witness, came to the spot and enquired from the deceased as to how he received the injury. To this the deceased stated that while he was trying to separate the accused and Bunadhar Bhumia, the former short the arrow which pierced on his chest. Since the incident happened in the deceased, although was alive, could not be immediately removed for giving medical aid. On the next day he was taken to Mathili Primary Health Centre where Dr. Kailash Chandra Patra PW 15 gave first aid and then referred him to the Sub-divisional Hospital, Jaypore, for better treatment since his condition was serious. Accordingly the deceased was brought to Jaypore Hospital where Dr. Kadar Nath Choudhary PW 1 admitted him as indoor patient and recorded his dying declaration, Ext. 2, in presence of Dr. Ekalabya Panigrahi PW 2. Surgery Specialist Dr. Bauri Bandhu Muni PW 3 operated the deceased and removed the arrow which had struck on his chest. A report of the incident, Ext. 8 was made at the Nathili Police Station on receipt of which Jairam Satpathy PW 13, the Officer-in-charge of the said P. S. registered a case under Section 307, IPC and proceeded with investigation. Bauri Bandhu Muni PW 3 operated the deceased and removed the arrow which had struck on his chest. A report of the incident, Ext. 8 was made at the Nathili Police Station on receipt of which Jairam Satpathy PW 13, the Officer-in-charge of the said P. S. registered a case under Section 307, IPC and proceeded with investigation. He, however, converted the case to one under Section 302, IPC since the deceased succumbed to his injuries and on completion of investigation, placed charge-sheet against the accused to stand his trial for the said offence. ( 3 ) THE accused when examined under Section 313, Cr. P. C. abjured the prosecution allegation and pleaded innocence. ( 4 ) THE prosecution, in order to bring home the charge to the accused, examined as many as 16 witnesses including the autopsy doctor and the learned Additional Sessions Judge on consideration of the evidence held the accused guilty of the charge and consequently convicted and sentenced him as hereinbefore stated. ( 5 ) THE deceased while alive, was taken to the Sub-divisional Hospital, Jaypore, and Dr. Kedarnath Choudhary PW 1 on examination found the arrow sticking to his left side chest. So he gave same first aid to the deceased and then referred to Surgical Specialist Dr. Suri Bandhu Muni PW 3, who having conducted operation removed the arrow. The injury on the left side chest, according to PW 3, was 2" x 1" up to chest cavity. The deceased ultimately breathed his last. Dr. Suresh Chandra Nayak PW 14 conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased and found one penetrating injury of 2" x 1" x 7" over the third inter-costal space of the left side chest wall. On dissection he found the left side lung being collapsed due to penetrating injury. In his opinion death was due to respiratory embarrasment and damage to left lung. The fact that the deceased died a homicidal death due to aforesaid injury has not been assailed by the defence. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the accused urged the only question that from the origin and genesis of the incident as projected by the prosecution, no offence under Section 302, IPC could be said to have been made out against the accused. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the accused urged the only question that from the origin and genesis of the incident as projected by the prosecution, no offence under Section 302, IPC could be said to have been made out against the accused. He further submitted that since during the quarrel between the accused and one Suhadhar Bhumia the deceased interferred, the accused out of anger shot the arrow at the deceased without there being any intention to cause his death and therefore, the offence squarely falls within the mischief of Section 304, Part 11, IPC. Learned counsel appearing for the State, on the other hand, supported the trial courts's judgment and contended that the accused has been rightly convicted under Section 302, IPC which needs no interference by this Court. ( 7 ) WE may straightway state here that it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that single blow inflicted by the accused resulting in the death of the injured would fall short an offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. The question whether a case comes under Section 302, IPC or falls under Section 304, Part I or Part II has to be decided on consideration of various reasons, viz. , intention of the assailant, weapon of offence used, nature of the injuries caused, location of the injuries on the deceased and other relevant consideration. The single blow inflicted by the assailant by itself is not decisive. Each case has to be judged on the facts and circumstances of that case. We may now in this connection refer to certain decided cases. ( 8 ) IN Gudar Busadh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 952 : (1972 Cri LJ 587), the accused had given a lathi blow on the head of the deceased, as a result of which he fell down and died at the spot. The same question was raised on behalf of the accused that for inflicting a single blow resulting in death of the injured, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 302, IPC. The same question was raised on behalf of the accused that for inflicting a single blow resulting in death of the injured, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 302, IPC. While not agreeing with the submissions made on behalf of the accused, their Lordships ruled that the fact of giving one blow on the head would not mitigate the offence of the accused and make him guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, because the injury on the head was deliberate and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In State of Gujarat v. Haribhai Keshavbhai Patel, 1990 SCC (Cri) 606, it was contended on behalf of the accused that since there was one stab injury, conviction of the accused could not be sustained under Section 302, IPC and therefore, it should be altered to one under Section 304, Part II, IPC. That plea found favour with the High Court. On appeal the Supreme Court held that as the accused returned to the place of occurrence with a knife in his hand and then inflicted a fatal injury on the abdomen of the deceased, which was opined by the doctor to be an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the Sessions Judge was justified in convicting the accused under Section 302, IPC and alteration of the offence to Section 304, Part II, IPC by the High Court was not justified. ( 9 ) THE views propounded in the aforesaid two decisions have been reiterated in Jaiprakash v. State (Delhi Administration), (1991) 1 SCC 32 : (1991 AIR SCW 654 ). In paragraph 18 of the judgment their Lordships observed :". . . . We may point out that we are not concerned with the intention to cause death in which case it will be a murder simpliciter unless exception is attracted. We are concerned under Clause Thirdly with the intention to cause that particular injury Which is a subjective inquiry and when once such intention is established and if the intended injury is found objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause Thirdly is attracted and it would be murder unless one of the exceptions to Section 300 is attracted. . . . . . . . . " ( 10 ) IN ), it was argued on behalf of the convict before the Supreme Court that since there was only one injury on the body of the deceased caused as a result of spear thrust, no intention could be attributed to the accused for causing his death. Repelling such contention, the Court held that the case comes within the clause 'thirdly' of Section 300, IPC and in order to prove it, the prosecution must establish :"first, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceed further and,fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. "in paragraph 13 of the judgment, their Lordships further observed :"once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under Section 300 thirdly'. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that here was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two ). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the result of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the result of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deducted that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. "considering the facts of the case and there being no evidence or explanation as to why the accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of the intestines came out of the wound and that digested food oozed out from cuts in three places and in the absence of reasonable explanation that the accused did not intend to stab on the stomach with a degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far into the body, or to indicate that his act was a regretable accident and that he intended otherwise, their Lordships were of the view that it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. ( 11 ) IN the present case as the prosecution evidence reveals, there was a wordy duel between PW 7 Sunadhar Bhumia and the accused, in course of which the deceased when intervened and tried to separate them, the accused went to his house and came back to the scene of occurrence with bow and arrow and shot the arrow at the chest of the deceased which ultimately proved fatal. In the circumstances, the acts of the accused squarely falls within the amibt of clause 'thirdly' of Section 300, IPC and the conviction of the accused under Section 302, IPC cannot be set aside. ( 12 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. ( 13 ) R. K. PATRA, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.