JUDGMENT 1. - Since all these matters raise identical questions of law and facts, I propose to dispose them of together by this order. 2. Facts. S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 611/95 relates to Civil Suit No. 79/93 Bankat Lal Jugal Kishore pending in the Court of learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate. Deedwana whereas 713/95 is with regard to Civil Suit No. 74/83 also pending in the Court of learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Deedwana and 712/95 relates to Misc Case No. 24/93 also pending in the above Court. In Revision Petition No. 611/95 the leamedtrial Court by its order dated 18.9.1993 disposed of two applications filed by the defendant purporting to be under section 26 of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act r /w Section 151 CPC (for short the Act). The defendant alleged that the Then market value of the property in dispute was not less than Rs. 3 lacs. The plaintiff c. i 'it to have paid Court fees accordingly and it is so held, the suit will be outside the jurisdiction of the trial Court. The learned Munsif heard both the parties and held that the valuation of the suit property was appx. Rs. 20,000/- and the plaintiff ought to have paid Court fees according to the provisions . 26-A of the of Section. 3. In Revision Petition No. 713 / 95 the plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendant and the defendant resisted the suit on several grounds. In the relief para the plaintiff made the following prayer : " fd LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk bl vk'k; dh oknh ds i{k esa o izfroknhx.k ds fo:) tkjh dh tkos fd izfroknh Lo;a vFkok vius ,tsUVksa ds ek/;e ls oknh en la[;k esa of.kZr tehu o ml ij cuh gqbZ rkehjkr ls oknh dks csn[ky ugha djs vkSj oknh ds LoNUn ,oa Lora= mi;ksx ,oa dCts esa fcuk dkuwuh izfd;k viuk;s cy tcjh ls n[ky] gLr{ksi o deh ugha djs rFkk okn izLrqr djus ds i'pkr~ o nkSjku nkok ;fn izfroknhx.k oknh dks csn[ky djus esa lQy gks tkrk gS rks oknh dks iqu% dCtk vkns'kkRed fu"ks/kkKk ds }kjk fnyok;k tkosA " 4. Without passing any separate or specific order with regarding to the objections raised by the defendants regarding inadequacy of Court fees and want of jurisdiction, the learned trial Court referred to the order passed by him in Civil Misc. Without passing any separate or specific order with regarding to the objections raised by the defendants regarding inadequacy of Court fees and want of jurisdiction, the learned trial Court referred to the order passed by him in Civil Misc. Case No. 25/93 dated 18.9.1993 and stated that since in that case the Court had passed an order that the Court had no jurisdiction, a similar order was also passed in this case. 5. That fact of the third Revision Petition namely 712/95 will depend upon the decision of the first two Revision Petitions. 6. Learned appellate Court by the impugned order set aside the order of the trial Court and by referring to the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in each case held that the plaintiff has correctly evaluated the reliefs sought by him and the Court fees was accordingly paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act. He, therefore, allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned orders of the trial Court. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a preliminary objection that no revision under section 115 CPC lies to this Court and derives support from the law laid down in Ratna Verma Raja v. Smt. Vimla, 1961 SC 1299 . The ratio in this case was laid down while interpreting Section 14 of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (14 of 1955) and Section 12(2). He also referred another ruling given in Jagmohan v. Champa Lal & Anr., 1985(1) CCC 845 , in which the law laid down in Shri Ratna Verma Raja's case was followed. He, therefore, contended that the revision petitions be dismissed on this ground alone. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, submitted that such disputes are being regularly and frequently referred to the High Courts and are being adjudicated. Number of decisions are available even of our own High Court. 10. It may be stated that the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act are paramateria with sub-section. (2) of Section 11 of our Act. Hence ordinarily the proposition laid down in Ratna Verma Raja's case will hold good for a dispute with regard to inadequacy of Court fees relating to the above Act which is agitated in the shape of a revision. (2) of Section 11 of our Act. Hence ordinarily the proposition laid down in Ratna Verma Raja's case will hold good for a dispute with regard to inadequacy of Court fees relating to the above Act which is agitated in the shape of a revision. However, the facts in the present petitions are different. By the impugned order, the learned trial Court has not only found the Court fees paid by the plaintiff inadequate but also on the valuation assessed by it found the suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. Hence, by the impugned order the question of adequacy of Court fees as well as jurisdiction has decided and since the trial Court found itself unable to hear the matters on account of pecuniary valuation, it ordered for returning the plaints to the plaintiff for presentation to the Court of competent pecuniary jurisdiction. I, therefore, cannot decline to adjudicate the matters for this reason. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the appellate order in each case on the ground that in both the suits the plaintiff directly or indirectly admitted that he was not in possession of the property. The plaintiff was, therefore, obliged to value his relief according to Cl. (a) of Section 26 of the Act. The learned trial Court very correctly approached the matter and the finding given by him was in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The learned appellate Court, therefore, erred in simplifying the matter and just stating that the plaintiff paid Court fees correctly. 12. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that the plaintiff paid Court fees according to the reliefs claimed by him. A mere perusal of the plaint in each case would reveal that the plaintiff never alleged that he is not in possession of the suit property. The plaintiff only prayed for permanent as well mandatory injunction with reference to the averments made in the plaint. 13. I have considered the arguments. Wherever a Court is called upon to examine the question of adequacy of Court fees, it must be considered with reference to the allegations as laid in the plaint and not with reference to the case as set-up by the defendants. 13. I have considered the arguments. Wherever a Court is called upon to examine the question of adequacy of Court fees, it must be considered with reference to the allegations as laid in the plaint and not with reference to the case as set-up by the defendants. For this, the substance and nature of claim of the plaintiff with reference to the averments made therein must be ascertained and then the appropriate provisions of the Act must be applied for ascertaining whether the proper Court fees has been paid or not. I have examined the plaints in both the cases. While narrating the facts of the cases, I have quoted the relief paras of the plaints. In 611 /95 also the facts are not different. The plaintiff alleged that the plaintiffs and other members of a joint family owned certain property. The disputed property has been denoted by letters A, B, C & D. The plaintiff claimed physical possession over this piece of land. According to the family settlement dated 22.8.1959, this piece of land came to the share of Shri Ganpat Lal and Smt. Ayodhya Devi W/o Shri Ganpat Lal, sold the above land to the family of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also constructed a boundary over the above plot with the permission of the Gram Panchayat in the year 1961. He, thereafter, alleged that the defendant was making efforts to grab the above land and with this object in view placed certain stones and also damaged the main door. The plaintiff, therefore, sought permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession and also for mandatory injunction asking the defendant to remove the stones and repair the damage done to the main door. From the above averments it is clear that the plaintiff only claimed relief of permanent as well as mandatory injunction claiming his own possession. A scrutiny of the whole plaint would also lead to the same conclusion. Hence, the learned appellate Court has correctly held that the plaintiff has paid Court fees in accordance w the provisions of the Act and the order of the learned trial Court was illegal and p ed with material irregularity.I, therefore, find no force in the revision petitions and they are hereby dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******