Honble MADAN, J. – This Misc. Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 11th October, 1993 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No.4, Jaipur City, Jaipur arising out of Civil Regular Appeal No. 81/92 whereby the learned appellate Court has set aside the judgment and decree dated 23.5.92 passed by the trial Court and remanded the case back to the trial Court. (2). The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal, briefly stated, are that the appellant-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction and recovery of the arrears of rent against the respondent- defendant on 18.4.74. It was inter-alia averred by the plaintiff in the suit that the Plot No. 52 is in his ownership and on the southern side of the said plot there are two shops and residential portion. Out of the two shops one shop was let out to the defendant-respondent at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month and a rent-note was duly executed by him. The tenant defaulted in payment of rent for a period of 9 months consecutively before institution of the suit. It was further contended by the plaintiff that he is a practicing lawyer and the maximum professional work he is getting from Jaipur and that he needs the disputed shop for opening the office for his legal profession and as such the plaintiff has reasonable and bonafide necessity of the premises in question. The Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short `the Act) was ameded in the year 1975 after filing the suit and consequently the appellant also took the plea of comparative hardship to the effect that in the event of a decree for eviction not being passed in his favour on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity, greater hardship would result to him. (3). The learned trial court determined the provisional rent on 13.5.76 and since the respondent had failed to deposit the same in time, his defence against the eviction was struck off by the trial court vide its order dated 22.8.78 and by which the suit was decreed on both the grounds of default and reasonable and bonafide necessity. Thereafter the trial court recorded the evidence of the parties and decreed the suit for eviction against the defendant on 9.4.85. Thereafter the trial court recorded the evidence of the parties and decreed the suit for eviction against the defendant on 9.4.85. It was held by the trial court that since the respondents had failed to tender or pay to the appellant the arrears of rent for a period of more than 5 months consequtively, he had thus committed default in payment of rent and his defence deserves to be struck off. With regard to the question of reasonable and bonafide necessity of the appellant, the trial court held that the appellant did have the bonafide necessity to occupy the disputed premises for his office purposes. On the question of comparative hard- ship, the trial court recorded a finding that greater hardship would be caused to the appellant in the event of decree for eviction being declined. Consequently the suit was decreed in favour of the appellant by the trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 23.5.92. (4) The respondent preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court vide CFA No. 75/85 alongwith an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. The appeal was allowed and the appellate court remanded the matter back to the trial court for allowing the defendant to lead evidence on the question of partial eviction. (5). The trial court after recording the evidence of the parties again decreed the appellants suit on 23.5.92 on both the grounds, as referred to above. The defendant-respondent again preferred an appeal to the appellate court vide Civil First Appeal No. 31/92. The learned A.D.J. No.5, without examining other issues quashed and set aside the judgment of the trial court vide its order dated 11.10.93 on the ground of partial eviction, as referred to above. Since the matter had been finally decreed by the learned Appellate Court notwithstanding the order of remand on the question of recording evidence by the trial court on other issues, the appellant preferred the present appeal on the grounds inter-alia ; (i) that with regard to Issue No. 14 i.e. the question of partial eviction has been considered by the trial court and specific finding has been given to the effect that since the pre- mises consists only of a single shop and the necessity was for setting up of an Advocates office on professional grounds, the decree of partial eviction could not be contemplated. In this regard the learned appellate court has observed that the trial court has not considered and examined the question of partial eviction which is conspicuously absent in the case. The impugned order dated 11th October, 1993 thus deserves to be quashed and set aside; (ii) the approximate size of the shop in dispute is 8x9 which has been admitted by the respondent in his statement dated 23.7.88. The law has been well settled by this Court as well as by other High Courts in series of judgments that the question of partial eviction of such a small shop cannot be considered at all and ; (iii) that in a judgment of far reaching consequen- ces the Division Bench of this court has settled the law on the question of artial eviction and the matter is no longer res-integra. In the order dated 2nd July, 1991 while answering the reference made by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 6.5.91 in SBCSA No. 19/92, Lal Chand vs. Shyam Lal & Ors., the learned D.B. of this Court has held as under :– ``. . . . if there is already material on record, the satisfaction of the Court as required under sub-section (2) of Section 14 can be there and it may not be necessary to frame issue and remit record for recording evidence . . . . .) (6). During the course of hearing, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant who is a practicing advocate is facing great hardship and professional difficulties in view of the inescapable bonafide necessity of having a professional office alongwith library at Jaipur and for this purpose he require the shop premises in dispute where he could set up his office for professional work. It was further contended by the learned counsel that since one shop is already in occupation of the respondent while the other is in occupation of the respondents son Mohd. Toshin which fact has not been disputed in the evidence on the record the bonafide necessity of the appellant to occupy the suit premises cannot be under-estimated. It was further contended by the learned counsel that since one shop is already in occupation of the respondent while the other is in occupation of the respondents son Mohd. Toshin which fact has not been disputed in the evidence on the record the bonafide necessity of the appellant to occupy the suit premises cannot be under-estimated. With regard to the question of determination of provisional rent regarding the shop premises in dispute, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that notwithstanding the fixation of the provisional rent under Section 13(4) of the Act and since the respondent had failed to tender or pay the same or deposit with the trial court, the defendant-respondents defence was rightly struck off as per Section 13(5) of the said Act. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even on the question regarding evidence on partial eviction, the suit had again been decreed by the trial Court in favour of the appellant on 25.5.92 on both the grounds. It was held by the learned appellate court that on the question of partial eviction issue had been well examined by the learned trial court and specific finding had been recorded with regard to issue No. 14 to the effect that since premises consists only of a single shop and the necessity was for an Advocates office, the question of partial eviction could not be contemplated and consequently it was held that the impugned order dated 11.10.93 passed by the trial court deserves to be quashed and set aside. In support of his contentions learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the following judgments : Narsingh Das vs. Jeth Mal (1), M/s. Prem Tent House vs. Prakash Chand Jain (2), Ram Lal & Ors. vs. Girraj & Ors. (3), Rajendra Singh vs. Suresh Chandra (4), Hanuman Das & Ors. vs. Sanwal Ram (5), Raj Kumar & Anr. vs. Mehar Chand (6), M.C. Sindhi vs. Heman Das (7), (after considering the ratio of the Apex Court in Krishna Murari Prasad vs. Mitar Singh (8). (7). In the matter of Hanuman Das & Ors. vs. Sanwal Ram (supra), the suit for eviction was filed against the tenant on two grounds viz., default in payment of arrears of rent and reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the landlord to occupy the suit premises. (7). In the matter of Hanuman Das & Ors. vs. Sanwal Ram (supra), the suit for eviction was filed against the tenant on two grounds viz., default in payment of arrears of rent and reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the landlord to occupy the suit premises. On the question of non-payment of arrears of rent it was held by this Court that since the tenant had persistently defaulted in payment of arrears of rent due from him to the landlord for a period of 6 months within the ambit of Section 13(i) (a) of the Act at the time of institution of the suit, the decree for eviction was rightly passed against the tenant. On the question of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the plaintiff-landlord to occupy the shop premises in dispute after examining the comparative hardship of both the parties, it was held by this Court that the greater hardship shall be caused to the landlord by refusing to pass the decree than by passing the same. It was further observed by this Court that even on the question of partial eviction since the subject-matter of the suit was only a single shop, it was not divisible, the question of partial eviction could not be permitted to be raised. This Court relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Rehman Jeo Wangwoo vs. Ram Chand & Ors. (9), held that when the rented premises consists of a single shop or a single room or apartment, the question of partial eviction cannot arise since either the tenant should not be evicted from that premises at all or he could not be evicted therefrom as it was not possible to evict him from a part of the shop or room, when the subject matter of tenancy is one single shop or single apartment. Hence in my humble opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court is fully applicable to the present case since out of the two shops let out to the respondent and his son both are indivisible since one is already in occupation of the son of the respondent while the other is in occupation of the respondent himself and it cannot be const- rued by any stretch of imagination that an advocate can set up his law practice by making division of one single shop which itself is indivisible and the legal profession demands setting up of an office in a dignified manner befitting to the decorum of the profession, which is not possible in the manner as suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent. (8). In the matter of M/s. Prem Tent House vs. Prakash Chand (supra), the question which had arisen for consideration of this Court was in respect of a practicing advocate of this Court who had filed an eviction suit against the tenant on the ground of his personal requirement both for his residence as well as the office. The total area of the entire premises was about 300 sq. yards. The plaintiff had already lead evidence to show that he needed a library hall, one chamber, one small room for his clerk and Junior and a space for toilet and to keep his conveyance for his office purposes. As regards the residential accommodation he had lead evidence to show that he had 3 children. It was held by this Court that once it was established that the plaintiff required the suit premises for his office and residence there was hardly any question of remanding the case on the question of partial eviction. It was further held that the findings of the learned District Judge in this case were assailable and binding in second appeal. Thus taking the view in its entirety, it was held by this Court that there was no necessity to remand the case on the point of partial eviction. (9). It was further held that the findings of the learned District Judge in this case were assailable and binding in second appeal. Thus taking the view in its entirety, it was held by this Court that there was no necessity to remand the case on the point of partial eviction. (9). In the matter of Krishna Murari Prasad vs. Mitar Singh (supra), the decision of the Patna High Court was assailed in Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court on the ground that the respondents had filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit premises comprising of a shop with attached varandah in which he was carrying on his business of running a restaurent. The respondent-landlord claimed eviction on the ground of his personal bonafide need of his son to start a T.V. Shop which was found proved by the trial court and the High Court had affirmed the order in Civil Revision. In Special Leave Petition, the Apex Court held that the question of indivisibility of the premises in dispute was a question of fact to be examined in each case on the basis of the evidence as to whether such a partial eviction can be made or not, its inquiry has to be made by the Court after reaching the conclusion that landlords requirement for occupation of the premises set up by him has been made out and this has got to be done by the trial court and hence the matter was remanded back to the trial Court. The Apex Court while rema- nding the case to the trial Court directed the inquiry to be made limited on this question alone. (10). The learned counsel for the respondent has controverted the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has contended at the bar that the learned Appellate Court had without examining this merits of the case had held that the mandatory provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act have not been complied with and had directed the remand of the case to the trial court on the strength of the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Krishna Murari Prasad vs. Mitar Singh (supra) with a view to afford an opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the question of partial eviction. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellate court did not decide the issue of default notwithstanding the objections of the respondent and in fact on the date of the filing of the suit there was no default of 6 months and that the suit was pre-mature. It was further contended that the issue of bonafide necessity was also not decided and that the issue of partial eviction should have been decided at the first instance by the trial court. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Krishna Murari Prasad vs. Mitar Singh (supra) it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that even if the premises comprises of one room its divisibility has to be considered and hence it was mandatory for the trial court to give a finding on partial eviction after framing the issues. On the question of partial eviction reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the following judgments : Rehman vs. Ram Chand (supra), Anand Prakash vs. Abdul Kayoom (10), Seema Sandesh vs. Smt. Gian Kaur (11), Radha Kishan vs. Naraindas (12), Riyaz Mohd. vs. Rameshwar (13). (10). I have gone through the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court as well as of this Court. On the question of partial eviction it has been held by the Apex Court that when a question has been specifically raised regarding the divisibility of the suit premises, the courts are bound to frame an issue of partial eviction and then to decide the appeal. In my considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decisions is not applicable to the present case since the matter was remanded back by the appellate court to the trial court on the issue of partial eviction and the trial court has considered this issue after recording the evidence and has recorded a positive finding in favour of the appellant that the suit premises are bonafide required by the appellant for his law practice and that the shop premises is not divisible. (11). (11). It would be pertinent to mention that the appellant who is a practicing advocate had filed a suit for eviction against the respondent on the ground of bonafide personal necessity to occupy the suit premises way back in 1974 and now it is late over 22 years and the matter is still pending at the stage of Civil Misc. Appeal and considerable hardship had resulted to the appellant who has been deprived of the suit premises to set up his law practice. Hence in my considered opinion even on the question of comparative hardship the appellant deserves to succeed since the appellant has got no other alternative premises in Jaipur and he is to travel for and on from Dausa District to Jaipur and he is unable to set up his practice in absen- ce of a proper office. It is the province of the Court to embark on an inquiry for considering the bonafide requirement of the appellant to occupy the suit premises, once it has been proved on the record on the basis of a remand by the appellate court and after evidence having been recorded by the trial court on the question of partial eviction that the bonafide need of the appellant has been well established. I am further of the opinion that the irreparable loss to which the appellant has been subjected does not deserve to be quantified in any manner, whatsoever. (11). In view of the above discussion, consequently the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court i.e. by ADJ No.2, Jaipur City, Jaipur dated 11.10.93 is quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court dated 23.5.92 is restored. No order as to costs.