JUDGMENT T.S. Doabia, J. 1. A decree for eviction has been passed against the present appellant, under section 12(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The finding recorded by the first appellate Court is that the appellant had set up a title in himself and therefore, he has committed a disqualification and has lost his right to remain in possession. As to in what manner this finding as to disclaimer has been recorded be noticed : 2. It is an admitted case that the appellant was given on rent an open piece of land. On this piece of land a small Patore/Hut was constructed by the present appellant. He applied for electric connection. In the application it has been submitted by him that he is owner of the house. Some application was also moved before the Municipal Council in which he claimed ownership of the building in question. As these above factors were taken note of while coming to the conclusion that the appellant has disclaimed the title of the landlord. It is this finding which is being challenged in this Court in this second appeal. 3. The law is well settled. The law has recognised due ownership. The ownership of land may vest in other person. Some of the judicial pronouncement in this regard be noticed as under : 4. This aspect of the matter came up for consideration of their Lordships of the Privy Council as early as in the year 1927 in Narayan Das v. Jatindra Nath, AIR 1927 PC 136, and their Lordships while pointing out distinction on the relevant law prevailing in England and this country approved the following observations of Sir Barnes Peacock in the case of Thakoor Chunder Proamanick v. Ramdhone Bhuttacharjee, (1866) 6 Suth WR 228 :- "We have not been able to find in the laws or customs of this country any traces of the existence of an absolute rule of law that whatever if affixed or built on the soil becomes a part of it, and is subjected to the same rights of property as the soil itself." 5. In a still later case, that is, Vallabhdas Naranji v. Development Officer, Bandra, (1929) 56 Ind. App. 259, AIR 1929 PC 163 the Privy Council once again referred to Sir Barnes Peacock's observations as stated above. In a still later case, that is, Vallabhdas Naranji v. Development Officer, Bandra, (1929) 56 Ind. App. 259, AIR 1929 PC 163 the Privy Council once again referred to Sir Barnes Peacock's observations as stated above. In this judgment the following observations of Couch C. J. in Narayan v. Bholagir, (1869) 6 Bom. HCAC 80, were quoted with approval: "We cannot, however, apply to the cases arising in India the doctrine of the English law as to building, viz., that they should belong to the owner of the land. The only doctrine we can apply is doctrine established in India that the Party so building on another's land should be allowed to remove the materials." 6. This legal position as enunciated above by the Privy Council was later followed by Tendolkar, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen and Tourbo Ltd., AIR 1951 Bom. 205 and was approved by the Supreme Court in Dr. K.A. Dhairyawan v. J.R. Thakur, 1959 SCR 799 , AIR 1958 SC 789 . In the latter case of Supreme Court, while considering a notification under the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, held as under :- "Upon a proper constructions of the lease there was a demise only of the land and not of the building and consequently the provisions of the Act did not apply to the contract for delivery of possession of the building. The ownership in the building was with the lessees and in which the lessors had no right while the lease subsisted. There was no absolute rule of law in India that whatever was affixed or built on the soil became part of it, and was subject to the same rights of property." 7. Yet in another case, that is, Messrs Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. D.C. Patil, AIR 1953 SC 16 , the Supreme Court recognised and upheld the above noted proposition of law that where a plot of land had been demised, the said plot can continue to belong to the lessor and the building or the superstructure raised by the lessee on that plot can belong to the latter. However, in the given facts and circumstances of that case it was held by the Supreme Court that the building too belonged to the lessor. However, in the given facts and circumstances of that case it was held by the Supreme Court that the building too belonged to the lessor. Thus it is abundantly clear from the above authoritative pronouncements that in law there can be two distinct ownerships, that is, the lessor can be the owner of the plot and the lessee can be the owner of the building raised thereon, and the matter essentially is dependent on the terms of the contract between the parties. The factum of consent or no consent by the Municipal Committee or the local authority to the construction raised by the lessee on the demised municipal land is not decisive of the matter. It is the form and the substance of the terms of lease entered into between the Municipal Committee and the lessee that have to be considered and construed to find out whether the building on the leased land belonged to the Municipal Committee or not. 8. It may be seen that open land was a part of the frontage of the shop and belonged to the municipality which the landlord had taken on lease from the Municipality. As regards the municipal land the landlord was a lessee of the Municipal Committee but on construction of the building covering a portion of the municipal land the landlord became landlord and the appellant his tenant for the purposes of the Act. This view was taken by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Hari Parshad Gupta v. Jitender Kumar Kaushik, (1982) 84 PLR 150 . The Supreme Court approved this view in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Kumar Vohra, 1990 (I) PLR 187. It was held that even though there is a notification issued by the State Government exempting the lands belonging to Gurgaon Municipality from the provisions of the Act, the building does not get exempted from the provisions of the Act. The finding was that the shop in question stands mainly on the land of the landlord and a small portion is located on municipal land. Therefore, the building would be governed by the provisions of the Rent Act and the exemption accorded by the Government under section 3 of Punjab Act was not attracted to the premises. 9. The finding was that the shop in question stands mainly on the land of the landlord and a small portion is located on municipal land. Therefore, the building would be governed by the provisions of the Rent Act and the exemption accorded by the Government under section 3 of Punjab Act was not attracted to the premises. 9. The concept of the dual ownership was considered again when the land belongs to the Government and some one else raises a construction. In this regard the words "belonging to" was held to mean very much the same thing as "of the ownership of" though not necessarily "of the absolute ownership of". When a person takes a building site from the Government on a lease for 99 years and having built flats on it leases out the premises to tenants, the premises belong to him for the purposes of ejectment of tenants and are governed by the provisions of the Act. Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen and Toubro Ltd., AIR 1951 Bom. 205 , 1950 BLR 688. When building is constructed on land taken on lease from the Government it does not belong to Government but belongs to the person who constructed it. Anand Stores v. Smt. Prabhat Sharma, 1964 PLR 12. Vide notification dated 5th January, 1949, issued under the Rent Act of 1947 the Governor of Punjab had exempted all Crown properties from the provisions of the Act of 1947. The expression "Crown" has been replaced by the Adaptation of Indian Laws Order, 1950, by the expression "Government". Himachal Government property situated in Simla was held to be exempt from the provisions of the Act. The notification was held to be valid in Siri Ram Jolly v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Mahasu, Himachal Pradesh, C. R. No. 178 of 1957, decided on 1st of August, 1958, by Bhandari, C. J., of Punjab High Court. "There is no doubt that the words belonging to import a concept of ownership. They mean very much the same thing as "of the ownership of" though not necessarily "of the absolute ownership of". These words have been interpreted in cases that have arisen for determination in the English Courts under section 557. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, which provides that if salvage services are rendered by any ship "belonging to Her Majesty" no claim shall be allowed for any loss, damage, etc. These words have been interpreted in cases that have arisen for determination in the English Courts under section 557. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, which provides that if salvage services are rendered by any ship "belonging to Her Majesty" no claim shall be allowed for any loss, damage, etc. In connection with this provision, a question arose as to whether ships which were owned by private individuals but were being used by the Admiralty for its own purposes "belonged to" the Admiralty. The first of such cases was the case of the Nile, (1875) 4 A&E = 44 LJ Adm. 38. In that case the Finisterre had been chartered by the Government by a charter not demising the ship. All damage to the ship was at the risk of the owners; and it was therefore held that there was no transfer of ownership to Her Majesty. The action came up for consideration again before the Court of Appeal in, The Sarpen (1916) page 306 = 85 LJP 209. In this case the tug Simla had been requisitioned by the Admiralty; but the judgment did not proceed on the footing that it had been acquired by the Admiralty under the power of requisition, because subsequent to the date of the requisition an agreement had been arrived at between the Admiralty and the tug owners regarding the terms on which the Admiralty should use this vessel and the matter was treated by the Court as arising on the footing of an agreement for use of the Simla by the Admiralty. The terms of the agreement provided that the owners were to pay wages and health insurance of the crew as well as for all stores and necessary equipment of the vessel. They also took the risk of the sea. The Admiralty accepted war risk and agreed to provide coal. On the basis of these terms Swinfen-Eady L.J. held that the ship did not belong to the Admiralty. The learned Judge referred to the case of the Nile, 1875-4 A&E 449 = 44 L.J. Adm. 88 and pointed out that case would have been differently decided if there had been an actual demise of the Finisterre and if sea damage had been at the risk of the Admiralty. The learned Judge referred to the case of the Nile, 1875-4 A&E 449 = 44 L.J. Adm. 88 and pointed out that case would have been differently decided if there had been an actual demise of the Finisterre and if sea damage had been at the risk of the Admiralty. In the case before him, the learned Judge on the terms of the agreement between the parties held that the Simla could not be regarded as the King's ship, because there was no demise of the ship to the Admiralty and sea risks were on the real owner of the ship. Pickford L.J. in delivering judgment stated that he rested his judgment on the ground that sea risk was left on the owner and the dominion as well as the control of the ship were not fully with the Admiralty. Bankes L. J. observed at page 321. "..... it is therefore unnecessary to consider the cases, to several of which he have been referred, in which it has been held that for certain purposes a vessel may be considered as having a dual ownership, the ownership of what I may call actual owner, and the ownership of the temporary owner. In the present case, there is no question that the actual owners of the ship are the plaintiffs in the action. The only question is whether the requisitioning of the Simla by the Government placed her for the time being in the temporary ownership of the Government so as to constitute her a vessel belonging to His Majesty and as such it is disentitled to earn salvage." 10. He then proceeded to hold that the ship did not belong to His Majesty. The test laid down in this case was applied in a later case, Admiralty Commissioners v. Page, (1919) 1 K.B. 290, 98 LJKB 325. By this time the Merchant Shipping (Salvage) Act, 1916, had been passed, which by section 1 thereof provided that notwithstanding the provisions of section 357, Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 : "Where salvage services are rendered by any ship belonging to His Majesty and that ship is a ship specially equipped with a salvage plant or is a tug. The Admiralty shall.....be entitled to claim salvage." 11. The question for determination in this case was whether the tug Conqueror was a ship belonging to His Majesty. The Admiralty shall.....be entitled to claim salvage." 11. The question for determination in this case was whether the tug Conqueror was a ship belonging to His Majesty. The tug had been taken up under a charter party for Government service under which the owners engaged and paid the crew and found stores other than coal and worked the ship, ran the marine risks the Admiralty bearing risks of war and finding the coal. By letters passed between the Admiralty and the owners an alteration was made in the terms of the charier, the result of which was that the ship was commandeered by His Majesty, a commander holding His Majesty's commission and belonging to the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserves wearing His Majesty's uniform was in charge of the ship, the Admiralty bore all expenses of running the ship, entering articles with the crew, paying wages, buying ships stores, bearing all marine as well as war risks. Upon these facts it was held by the Court of Appeal that the tug belonged to His Majesty, Swinfen-Eady M. R. who was also a party to the Judgment in The Sarpen, observed at page 305 : "A ship taken up on these terms is effectively demised to the Crown. The owners are no longer managers of the ship, but it is managed by the Admiralty. Under these circumstances, how is it possible to hold that the owners can have any claim whatever for the salvage? They incur no expenses, run no risks. The whole of that is for the Admiralty." 12. Duke L. J. observed at p. 306 : "The effect of the transactions in this case on the part of the Crown has been to vest the vessel, at any rate for the period when the vesting and diverting occurred, absolutely and undisputedly in the Crown as a Ring's ship, with a King's officer in command, a King's crew in charge, the whole of the expenses being at the public charge through the Admiralty, and the whole of the risk at the cost of the public. I cannot conceive how in that state of facts it could be contended successfully that owners of the tug who are ultimately entitled to have the ship revested in them, can be regarded as having rendered the salvage services which were here rendered. I cannot conceive how in that state of facts it could be contended successfully that owners of the tug who are ultimately entitled to have the ship revested in them, can be regarded as having rendered the salvage services which were here rendered. The services were rendered by His Majesty's servants and his ship, which was at the risk of the State. That being so, it seems to me clear that the owners could not be entitled to the salvage here." 13. These decisions establish that there may be in relation to property a dual ownership for a limited period of time; and it would be possible to say in such cases that even a person who was not the absolute owner but had a right to ownership limited to that period was a person to whom the property belonged. No doubt these cases related to movable property, but the principle is not any different when one is dealing with immovable property. The tests as to whether for a limited period of time a temporary ownership has been created is according to the cases (1) whether there is a demise of the property, (2) whether there is full dominion and control over the property in the demise and (3) whether the risk of the property falls on the demise or the absolute owner. 14. Applying these principles to the case of a lease of land together with the building for a limited period of time- particularly a period as long as 99 years - it appears that if the lease demises the land with the building and confer on the transferee full dominion and control over the property, the transferee taking the risk of the property, then for that limited period, the lessee is the owner of the property and the property can be said to belong to him. Ownership is nothing more than a bundle of rights in relation to property. The aggregate of rights constitutes absolute ownership. It may be that during a stated period some of these rights are vested in one person and some in others. In the case of a lessor and a lessee such as are considered above the lessee has the right of reversion which of course is not tangible immovable property but an intangible thing. It may be that during a stated period some of these rights are vested in one person and some in others. In the case of a lessor and a lessee such as are considered above the lessee has the right of reversion which of course is not tangible immovable property but an intangible thing. He has also a right of re-entry under the terms of the lease and he has further a right by covenant to claim the building upon termination of the lease or upon its determination in any other manner provided by the lease. With regard to all other rights in property, there vest completely in the lessee for the limited period of time. It seems clear that it is the lessee who is under the circumstances the owner qua at any rate those to whom he has let or sublet such premises. It is consistent with dual ownership that qua the lessee it may be that the lessor is the owner of the property : and in any proceedings between the lessor and the lessee it would be possible to say that the premises belonged to the lessor and not to the lessee. Laxmipat Singhania v. Larsen and Toubro Ltd., AIR 1951 Bom. 205 . 15. In the present case, the position is no different. What was pleaded was that present appellant built only a small patore or a hut. He claimed ownership of this. It is not the case of the respondent landlord that this construction in which ownership right was claimed was ever constructed by the respondent/landlord. If the concept of the dual ownership is given effect to then, the appellant would be well within his right to contend that he was owner of the building. If he had made an application to the Board claiming ownership then it cannot be said that he has disclaimed the title of the landlord. 16. If this be the position then the judgment and decree passed by the Court below cannot be sustained. There would be no disclaimer. It is made clear that nothing is being said in this judgment regarding the bona fide need. The landlord has not filed cross appeal. It be seen that regarding this, the matter was not dealt with. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that vis-a-vis the ground available under section 12(1)(h) the appellate Court has not addressed itself. It is made clear that nothing is being said in this judgment regarding the bona fide need. The landlord has not filed cross appeal. It be seen that regarding this, the matter was not dealt with. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that vis-a-vis the ground available under section 12(1)(h) the appellate Court has not addressed itself. This is appears to be incorrect. It is apparent from the para 8 of the judgment that first appellate Court has affirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court. No cross appeal has been preferred in this case. No doubt a party would be within its right to support the judgment and on other grounds also, even if, appeal is not preferred. However, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case it would be just and proper to leave the respondent/landlord to take fresh proceedings vis-a-vis this ground. This litigation is pending since 1986. In the meantime there must have been change in the circumstances also. All these factors can be brought to the notice of the Court if fresh litigation is initiated. The counsel for the appellant also submits that in case, such a suit is filed then objections on the ground that some pleas were taken in this suit shall not stand in his way. If any other ground becomes available to the landlord, he would be at liberty to take benefit of the same. This appeal is accordingly allowed. There would be no order as to costs.