OM PRAKASH, J. This is a first appeal by the defendant-appellant against im pugned judgment and decree dated 10-5- passed by the Family Court, Kanpur Nagar appointing respondent- plaintiff as the guardian of Master Gagan Deep-Singh who was born from the union of the appel lant and respondent after their marraige having taken place on 3-6-1990 according to Sikh religion, which they belong to. 2. An application was made by the respondent husband under Section 10, read with Section 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act; 1890 (briefly, the Act of 1890) for secur ing custody of his son-Master Gagan Deep Singh stating that Gagan Deep was born on 14-4-1991, that his wife (appellant) left his house without any reason and started living with her parents from 20-11-1991; that the appellant filed a habeas corpus petition seeking a direction against the respondent to present the minor son in the Court and for giving him into her custody; that by the order of the High Court, the child being below five years of age was given in the custody of the appellant; and that the cus tody of the child having completed the age of five years be given to him as he being the natural guardian has preferential right to his custody. The said application was al lowed by the court below observing in the impugned order that the financial position of the respondent was much better than that of the appellant and that the respondent being a natural guardian of the minor son was entitled to the custody of the child. 3. It is this order which has been chal lenged in this appeal by the appellant. The short question for consideration ii whether the respondent is entitled to the custody of the minor son for the reason that his finan cial position is better than that of the appelllant. 4. In Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand. M. Dinshaw another, AIR 1987 SC 3 , the Court enunciated that "whenever a question arises before the Court pertaining to the custody of a minor children, the matter is to be decided not on considerations of the legal rights of parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the minor. " Can it be said that because of good financial position of the father, welfare of the minor child cannot be taken care of by the mother and that father will take more care of the welfare of the child? Financial resources may be one of the relevant factors for deciding the question as to who will be interested more in the welfare of the minor child, but that is not the sole and very vital factor to decide such a ticklish question. Besides Financial resources, so many other factors have to be considered by the Court for reaching the conclusion whether father is more interested in the welfare of the child or the mother. No doubt, welfare of the child is the paramount consideration and that is consistent to the provisions of Sec tions 7 and 17 of the Act of 1890, which indicate welfare of a minor as the sole guid ing factor, Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (for short, the Act) also provides that welfare of minor shall be paramount consideration for decid ing the guardianship. The court below while ordering custody of the minor son to the father also emphasised on the fact that after the age of five years of the minor, the father is the natural guardian under Section 6 of the Act. When welfare of minor is the main consideration, the norial rule that the father is the natural guardian is not followed. In case of girls, the mother is generally given custody irrespective of their age, because she can understand better the needs of in hibited girls. The courts in general must decide the naughty problem of custody from the point of view as to in whose hands will there be welfare of the child. The father, no doubt, has a legal right, but that right is always in subjugation to the welfare of the minor. If it is not in the interest of the minor to keep him in custody of the father, the fact of father being the natural guardian is of no consequence. The father has no ab solute right to have the custody of minor, though he may be a natural guardian of the minor. 5. If it is not in the interest of the minor to keep him in custody of the father, the fact of father being the natural guardian is of no consequence. The father has no ab solute right to have the custody of minor, though he may be a natural guardian of the minor. 5. There is case law on the point that a father being a natural guardian of a minor child, has a preferential right to the cus tody of minor. Preferential right, in my view, does not mean an absolute right of the father to the custody of minor child. Before giving custody of minor who has completed age of five years to the father the court has to ensure that welfare of the child will be taken care of best by him. Simply because in this case, the respondent father possesses better financial resources than the appellant mother, that alone is not enough to ensure greater welfare of the minor in his hands. 6. The case of the appellant is that after the marriage she was harassed by the respondent and his parents for not having broubrought dowry to their satisfaction. Simply because in this case, the respondent father possesses better financial resources than the appellant mother, that alone is not enough to ensure greater welfare of the minor in his hands. 6. The case of the appellant is that after the marriage she was harassed by the respondent and his parents for not having broubrought dowry to their satisfaction. She made an application for maintenance, which is Annexure-3 to the counter-af fidavit, filed by the respondent in this appeal stating that she was continuously harassed by the respondent and her parents on the issue of inadequate dowry; that she dis closed her mental agony to her parents; that her parents had gone to the house of the respondent to fetch the appellant; that the appellant returned with her parents from her matrimonial home, bi it she was not per mitted to take the child with herself; that after some time the respondent went to the house of his in-laws and persuaded them to send the appellant with him to matrimonial home on the assurance that she would be treated and looked after well by him without giving any further cause of complaint; that after having returned to the matrimonial name on the assurance of the respondent, the appellant was again ill-treated and harassed with impunity; that the appellant apprehending danger to her life managed to escape from the matrimonial home to take shelter in the wings of her parents on 20-12-1991 but without child; that the child though he was not even one year old, was not returned to the appellant by the respon dent; that the appellant then had to file a habeas corpus petition to secure custody of the minor child which was allowed by the High Court on 27-4-1992 with the observa tions that under Section 6 of the Act, mother is normally entitled to the custody of a child below five years of age; and that the child being less than one year old, the appel lant was legally entitled to the custody of the child. This Court in that judgment (Annexure 1 to the appeal) also held that "the opposite party, husband, had by force kept the child with himself and allowed the petitioner to go. She had not left the child herself. " 7. From these facts, the callousness of the respondent and his parents is well estab lished. This Court in that judgment (Annexure 1 to the appeal) also held that "the opposite party, husband, had by force kept the child with himself and allowed the petitioner to go. She had not left the child herself. " 7. From these facts, the callousness of the respondent and his parents is well estab lished. Section 6 clause (a) of the Act runs as under: "the natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minors person as well as in respect of the minors property (excluding his or her un divided interest in joint family property), are - (a) In the case of a boy or unmarried girl the father, and after him, the mother; provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother. 8. Despite the legal position that the age of the child being less than one year, the mother (appellant) was ordinarily entitled to the custody of minor, the respondent and his parents forcibly retained the custody of the child with themselves. The appellant to retrieve the minor son was forced to file the habeas corpus petition and the custody of the child which she was legally-entitled to at that stage, was restored to the appellant only through the intervention of the Court. It shows that the respondent and his parents had acted in complete disregard of law and that they have no respect for law of the land and human feelings. Then appellant claims that she is M. A. , B. Ed. and that fact has been stated by this Court in the judgment of the habeas corpus petition. The appellant also claims that she was a teacher before mar riage and that she left teaching profession only at the behest of the respondent. In view of the circumstance that the respondent acted in complete disregard of law for retaining the custody of the child who was not even one year old and the appellant having been well qualified teacher, we are of the considered view that the appellant is from the point of view of welfare of child, more suited to keep him in her custody. There is no allegation against the appellant except that she is not willing to live in the matrimonial home. There is no allegation against the appellant except that she is not willing to live in the matrimonial home. No reason has been given by the respondent against the appel lant for having stayed away from the house of in-laws. On the other hand, the conten tion of the appellant is that she was forced to leave the matrimonial home on account of staggering demand of dowry and constant harassment caused on that account by the respondent and his parents. From these (sic) facts, an inference can legitimately be drawn that the appellant was not permitted to take the custody of the child even at the stage when she was legally entitled to that, with an oblique motive of pressurising her to fulfill the lust of dowry of the respondent and his parents. The Court in these cir cumstances, will have no faith in the respon dent who is capable to resort to pressurising tactis, and, therefore, it must be held that the welfare of the minor child is not in the custody of the respondent but in the hands of the appellant with whom the child remained throughout except a brief period of five months in which the appellant was illegally deprived of the custody of the child by the respondent. 9. The scale of custody tilts more towards the appellant who being a well qualified teacher, can understand the psychology of the child better and help him shape better than the respondent, who ac cording to his own version is having a flourishing business of sweetmeet and ice cream parlour in the Metropolitan town - Kanpur Nagar, which will keep him fully engaged. The parents of the respondent can not be trusted for the welfare of the child in the backdrop of the case. 10. The court below shod have taken into consideration all these circumstances, but it has seen the case perfunctorily and was swayed by the myth that the father a natural guardian of the minor is automat ically entitled to the custody of the minor of above five years. This myth has been ex ploded and there are several authorities directing the custody of the minor to the mother giving primacy to the welfare of the minor. 11. This myth has been ex ploded and there are several authorities directing the custody of the minor to the mother giving primacy to the welfare of the minor. 11. At this stage the Court can venture to advert to order dated 14-10-1992 passed on the two applications dated 16-7-1992 and 2- 9-1992 moved by the respondent, which he made for seeking modifications in the order dated 24-7-1992, passed on the habeas corpus petition filed by the appellant. By these applications, the respondent sought a direction from the Court permitting the child to spend at least two days in a week with him. Both the applications were rejected by the Court by an order dated 14-10- 1992 (Annexure 2 to the appeal ). The request made by the respondent to have the company of the child for two days in a week is not unnatural. The respondent being father of the child will naturally have a desire to see the child. A child does not belong to one spouse but to both. The wel fare of the child, considering the psychology of the child, can never be ensured in the hands of one spouse. For wholesome growth of a child, a happy hole and congenial en vironment is necessary. Happy home is there where both the spouses live happily and amicably. Psychology of the child will be adversely affected if matrimonial relation ship of the parents is in turmoil. For welfare of the child, both the parents unless one of the parents is rendered unsuitable for cer tain reasons for having the company of the child, should have access to the child. Com pany of the mother for sound growth of the child is as necessary as the company of the father. Exclusive custody of one of the parents is not conducive to the welfare of the child, but it is highly detrimental and that may be directed in compulsive cir cumstances, where the circumstances of one of the parents are such that his or her access to the child is considered counter productive or dangerous. In the matter of the custody of a minor child, the solution should be such as to enable both the parents to have access to the child, until the child is capable of having intelligent preference. In the matter of the custody of a minor child, the solution should be such as to enable both the parents to have access to the child, until the child is capable of having intelligent preference. If the child is intelligent enough to under stand as to whose custody will be benefi cial to him/her, the duty of the Court is to permit both the parents to have regulated access to the child. 12. The respondent being father and being emotionally attached to his son, can not be denied the right of access to the minor; nor can that be in the interest of the minor. For the reasons stated above, the appellant would be entitled to have the cus tody of the minor son, but the respondent is permitted to visit his minor son once a week, on a day mutually convenient to the parents at the residence of his in- laws, where the plaintiff has been living. The timing and the day of visit may be fixed by the parties to their mutual convenience and that may be duly notified to each other from before, the child is visited. 13. In his counter-affidavit filed in the appeal, the respondent has stated that his income from Ice cream Parlour and sweet meat business has gone up-monthly income being about Rs. 8,000 If the respondent as he claims, is seriously interested in giving good education to the child, he may get the child admitted in any local renowned in stitution, provided he bears the entire schooling charges, but he may meet the child only once a week as aforesaid. If the appelalnt notices any objectionable thing during the meeting of the respondent with the child at her parents house, which ac cording to her is contrary to the welfare of the child, she may bring the same to the notice of the Court for suitable directions. Otherwise, the weekly meeting of the respondent with the minor will not be inter rupted by the appellant. 14. Before parting with the case, we would like to suggest that Parliament will do better, if the proviso in clause (a) of Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is suitably amended. Otherwise, the weekly meeting of the respondent with the minor will not be inter rupted by the appellant. 14. Before parting with the case, we would like to suggest that Parliament will do better, if the proviso in clause (a) of Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is suitably amended. As already pointed out the exclusive custody of one of the parents in the present days when female spouses are equally advanced, is not con ducive to the growth of the child. The words "that the custody of minor who has not com pleted the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother" in clause (a) of Section 6 are not in tune with the time. The ques tion arises as to why the mother should have custody of the minor only upto the age of five years and not beyond that. Does the minor become independent after five years of age? Can be exercise his discretion about his welfare when he becomes five years old? Certainly not. The only thing is that his expenses may grow, because upon completion of the date of five years, he needs schooling. Now-a-days, mothers in galore, who are well educated and employed, can afford to meet out full expen ses of minor and, therefore, custody of the minor ordinarily upto five years with the mother is without rationale or logic. Take, for example, a case of an I. A. S. couple: Can it be said that only the male spouse is capable of bearing the financial burden or he alone has a right to shape the future of the minor? Positive answer to this question will be wholly inconsistent to the reality and the constitutional spirit, which ab hors an invidious distinction between man and woman equally circumstanced. After five years of age, the minor cannot exercise any intelligent preference and if he is shifted from the lap of the mother to the lap of the father abruptly, his entire psychology will be adversely affected. The proviso in clause (a) should, therefore, be so amended as to enable both the parents of the minor to share his custody until he is capable of making an intelligent preference. The proviso in clause (a) should, therefore, be so amended as to enable both the parents of the minor to share his custody until he is capable of making an intelligent preference. Equal op portunity to both the parents to meet the minor and to have him in their common custody would be more conducive to the advancement and welfare of the child than keeping him in exclusive custody of the father a natural guardian and thereby depriving him of the mothers affection which he needs instinctively. 15. No reference to the books of noted psychologists is needed to understand the psychology of the minor, but it is a matter of common experience that a child cannot live happily only in the custody of the father or vice-versa and, therefore, from the point of view of welfare of the minor, it is necessary to keep the minor until he is capable of making intelligent preference, in the cus tody of both the parents. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the court below dated 10-5-1996 are set aside with costs. 17. The registrar will send one copy each of this judgment to the Secretary of Ministry of Law and Justice and to the Secretary of Law Commission, Government of India for perusal. Appeal allowed. .