JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal has been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 9.4.1992 by which the writ petition filed by the respondents was allowed on the ground that the Jaipur Development Authority has not complied with the order of this Court dated 19.3.1978 passed in writ petition No. 742/75 and having not taken the actual physical possession of the disputed property including Khasra No. 61 and 62, the respondents were restrained from taking possession of the land in question from the petitioner. 2. The facts of this appeal are that the respondent is the owner of Khasra Nos. 52, 61, 62, 52/233 and 57/234 measuring 24 Bighas 3 Biswas situated in village Chainpura Tehsil Sanganer, a notification under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was issued for acquiring the above land besides other lands. The respondent filed a writ petition No. 742/75 which was decided on 17.3.1978. Certain observations were made in the said judgment which considered by the learned Single Judge and the relevant observations considered in the writ petition are as under : "However, it is expected that the U.I.T., Jaipur, before taking possession of the land of further proceedings in the matter of land acquisition, would ensure that the disputed land is not part of that land which has been earmarked by the U.I.T. in the Master Plan prepared by the State Government for the purpose of expansion of the existing Aerodrome. It was further observed as under : "It is, however, made clear, that in case any specific notification is issued by the Central Government or steps are taken for the acquisition of this land by the Central Government for the purpose of expansion of the Aerodrome, then it would be open to the petitioner to challenge the notification and land acquisition proceedings which are the subject-matter of this writ petition on that ground by raising specific plea..... 3. It is stated that a notice was issued on 28.7.1984 by the Superintending Engineer, Jaipur Development Authority to attend the office on 3.8.1984 to sort out the difficulties coming in the way by mutual negotiation for completing the construction of road from Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg to Jagatpura Road. The respondent appeared but no final decision in the matter was taken. The respondent appeared but no final decision in the matter was taken. An objection was taken that the said land was reserved for expansion/extension of Airport in the Master Plan which is a matter within the domain of Central Government and the JDA has no jurisdiction to construct Jaipur Circle on Khasra Nos. 61 or 62 or construct the road or other ancilliary building. The Land Acquisition Officer informed the respondent that the land has been acquired and taken possession and had been handed over to the JDA on 6.5.1982. It was submitted that this factual position is wholly incorrect and the possession could not have been taken by the JDA in view of he observations in the writ petition No. 742/75. The land of Khasra Nos. 52 and 52/233 and 57/234 which is now intended to be handed over to the Housing Board was not the purpose for which the acquisition proceedings were taken in the year 1969. 4. On behalf of the respondents, it was submitted before the learned Judge that the award has become final on 17.7.1975 and has not been challenged and after filing of the writ petition No. 742/75, a suit for permanent injunction was filed and temporary injunction was also prayed and the application was dismissed on 6.5.1982. The road has already been constructed and the Jaipur circle was said to be under progress and no part of Khasra Nos. 61 and 62 fall within the area of Aerodrome extension. 5. The writ petitioner pointed out that symbolic possession has only been taken and actual physical possession remained with him which is very much evident from the documents and he was cultivating the land. According to the petitioner the acquisition proceedings initiated in 1969 have not been completed and the compensation has also not been received by him. 6. Learned Single Judge found that the appellant was to ensure that the disputed land was not part of that land which was earmarked by the U.I.T. in the Master Plan prepared by the State Government for the expansion of Aerodrome. In the reply submitted it was stated that Khasra Nos. 6. Learned Single Judge found that the appellant was to ensure that the disputed land was not part of that land which was earmarked by the U.I.T. in the Master Plan prepared by the State Government for the expansion of Aerodrome. In the reply submitted it was stated that Khasra Nos. 61 and 62 do not form part of that land which was earmarked by the U.I.T. in the master plan prepared by the State Government for the purpose of extension of the existing aerodrome but no documents or plans or proceedings were produced before the learned Single Judge. In Khasra Girdawari of Samvat year 1939-42, the name of the petitioner respondent was mentioned while in Khasra Girdawari of 2043-46, the name of U.I.T. was substituted. But since in the subsequent column the name of agriculture crop was mentioned it was observed that the JDA is not expected to cultivate the land. The Kachha houses were also existing on the land and notice dated 28.7.1984 and 21.8.1985 were issued by the appellant on the basis of which it was considered that the land is in actual physical possession of the respondent-petitioner. Reliance was placed on the decision of B.N. Ghagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1767 , wherein symbolic or paper possession was not considered enough. 7. Learned counsel has raised the following points in appeal before us : (a) that the award dated 17.7.1975 having not been challenged has become final. (b) that the possession of the land was taken on 6.3.82 and no part of land of Khasra Nos. 52, 61, 62, 52/533 and 57/234 was required for the purpose of expansion of aerodrome. The memo of possession Annex. R/2 was also submitted, therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is perverse. (c) That the application No. 249/81 for temporary injunction was moved in the suit filed by the petitioner but the application was dismissed on 6.5.1982, and the possession was taken on that very date. The Munsiff Court found that since the award has been passed and the respondent No. 1 has filed reference petition under section 18 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief against acquisition of the land. The Munsiff Court found that since the award has been passed and the respondent No. 1 has filed reference petition under section 18 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief against acquisition of the land. It was also observed that the respondent No. 1 had failed to prove that the land in dispute is reserved for expansion/extension of the aerodrome and, therefore, the writ petition should not have been allowed. 8. On behalf of the Jaipur Development Authority it is stated that the writ petition was barred on the principles of res judicata and Govind Ram had not come with clean hands. The actual physical possession has been taken on 6.5.1982 and part of the land in dispute has been used for construction of Jawahar Circle and the Delhi Bye-pass. 9. On behalf of Govind Ram it is stated that the policy decision was taken on 22.4.1992 and the circular dated 22.1.1996 has been issued in pursuance thereof. The policy decision was published in the newspapers on 3.11.1992 in which it was contemplated that the JDA would allot of 12% of the developed land in lieu of compensation which has not been paid and has not been received by the Khatedars. It is submitted that the land was surrendered on 2.12.1992 and a stamp paper was also executed on 9/10.12.1992 in the amicable settlement in the matter. Since, the respondents have surrendered their little and possession in terms of the conditions given in the notice of the JDA published in the Rajasthan Patrika on 3.11.1992, as such out of 24 Bighas 3 Biswas land, 12% of the land in lieu of compensation the existing land where the houses of the Khatedars for which the directions by the Town Planner have also been given should be left. A compromise has already been placed on record and was submitted even before the Board of Revenue. It is alleged that the JDA in collusion with the office bearers of the Appollo Nagar Housing Co-operative Society is neither respecting the compromise/settlement nor has allotted 12% of the developed land. The contention of the learned counsel for the JDA that the compromise has been revoked is without any basis and the documents and evidence on record. It is alleged that the JDA in collusion with the office bearers of the Appollo Nagar Housing Co-operative Society is neither respecting the compromise/settlement nor has allotted 12% of the developed land. The contention of the learned counsel for the JDA that the compromise has been revoked is without any basis and the documents and evidence on record. It is also stated that in pursuance of the observations of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 742/75 dated 19.3.1978 it was not ensured that the land in the master plan is not ear-marked for expansion of the aerodrome nor any survey was undertaken. The Khatedars were called in August 1984 and another notice for 19.8.1985 was also issued. the Fard Kabja dated 6.7.1982 is stated to be fabricated document since neither any notice was issued for survey of the land and ascertaining of location of the land nor the signature of Motbirs are alleged to be existing on it and the notice for 27.8.1984 and 19.8.1985 could have been issued. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gulab Kumari Saxena Vs. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1913/1986 , has held on 21.3.1996 that following the decision of the Apex Court in U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd., JT 1996(1) SC 354 , wherein it was held that any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. The Division Bench has held that the petitioner has no right and the land was purchased in 1970 from a person who did not have any title to it on the date of sale-deed. It was a void deed. 10. In the circular dated 22.1.1996 it was mentioned that after the award if the payment of compensation has not been made, the Khatedar can claim 12% of developed land. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Shanti Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., JT 1994(5) SC 472 , that the document regarding Fard Kabja has not been proved and cannot be taken into consideration. Reliance has been placed on the case of Sunil Kumar Jain Vs. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Shanti Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., JT 1994(5) SC 472 , that the document regarding Fard Kabja has not been proved and cannot be taken into consideration. Reliance has been placed on the case of Sunil Kumar Jain Vs. Kishan and others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1891 where it was held by the Apex Court that the agreement for sale of land does not confer any right or title and purchaser claiming to be in possession of land is not entitled to any compensation. If the agreement has been entered into subsequent to the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is not binding on the Government. On that basis, it is stated that the society has no right at all. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Smt. Sneh Prabha etc. Vs. State of U.P. and another, 1995(4) CCC 254 , where also it was held that any alienation of land after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition Similar view was taken in the case of Yadu Nadan Garg Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1995(4) CCC 258 , where it was also held that if the acquisiton is finalised and the possession is taken, the State is entitled to have the possession with absolute title free from all encumbrances. 11. On behalf of Appollo Nagar Housing Cooperative Society, Jaipur who was allowed to intervene on 6.10.1993 it is stated that Govind Ram has entered into a conspiracy with the JDA to harm the society and its members, Rajasthan Housing Board who have taken over the possession had also filed an application for impleading as party on 3.3.1989. The JDA directed the society to deposit the development charges and on 11.3.89 permitted the society to construct the boundary wall. On 25.4.1989 it was informed by the JDA that the land was not transferred to the Rajasthan Housing Board to make the payment of the price of the land handed over the Rajasthan Housing Board alongwith a list of total land so transferred by the Urban Improvement Trust and also by JDA. On 25.4.1989 it was informed by the JDA that the land was not transferred to the Rajasthan Housing Board to make the payment of the price of the land handed over the Rajasthan Housing Board alongwith a list of total land so transferred by the Urban Improvement Trust and also by JDA. It is stated that on 21.8.1974 the society entered into an agreement with Jamania, Mooliya, Ram Kishan and Govinda S/o Birdha and the said land was converted on 2.9.1985 in the scheme plan of the society approved on 9.5.1985. Mooliya expired in 1983 and his widow Manbhar is his successor. The sle-deed dated 7.11.1990 is stated to have been executed by Ram Kishan in favour of the society and sale-deed dated 22.2.1989 has been executed and registered by Jamania. The sale-deed by Manbhar is also stated to have been registered. The 3/4th of the land is mutated in the name of the society and 1/4th in the name of Govinda. The suit for specific performance against Govinda is stated to be still pending. It is stated that the possession has not been taken in acordance with law and as held in B.N. Bhagde Vs. M.D. Bhagwat and others, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1767 , the Government must take actual possession of the land. Symbolic possession as understood by judicial decisions under the Civil Procedure Code paper possession was not considered enough. Since, in the present case the actual physical possession was not taken and the society is also in continuous possession since 1974, cannot be evicted. The compensation was offered to the Khatedars in 1988 which is contrary to the provisions of Section 31 of the Act which requires the Land Acquisition Officer to deposit the amount of compensation in the court if nobody receives the sum. No action for making the payment of compensation was taken as contemplated under Rule 27 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Rules, 1957 and delay has renderd the acquisition proceedings infructuous, as has been held by Delhi High Court in Satyendra Kumar and others Vs. Union of India and others, (1994) Delhi Law Times 181. Since, the land was purchased in 1974 and was converted in 1988 and even lease-deeds have been issued in favour of members by the Additional Collector, JDA has no justification in retracting the compromise entered into. 12. Union of India and others, (1994) Delhi Law Times 181. Since, the land was purchased in 1974 and was converted in 1988 and even lease-deeds have been issued in favour of members by the Additional Collector, JDA has no justification in retracting the compromise entered into. 12. The conversion order was passed on the basis of the press notice dated 2.8.1982 which was issued on the basis of Government decision dated 1.3.1982. The circulars have been issued on 3.4.1982, 10.9.82 and 6.2.1982 and a decision was taken in the meeting by the Government dated 18.4.1982, and 18.5.1983 and lastly on 8.2.1994.12-A. Under Rule 3 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment and Regularisation of Conversion of Land for Residential and Commercial Purposes in Urban Areas) Rules, 1971 which was further amended in 1973 and 1979, the Government has permitted to regularise the constructions made before 21.8.79 even on Government land. Under Rule 10 only premium is required to be paid. 13. The compensation is claimed on the basis of the decision given in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd. , referred to above, wherein it was observed that even if no title of land is acquired, the purchaser could be entitled to step into the shoes of the owner. In Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 237 , a person acquires right of compensation of the land acquired. In the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Nathu Singh, 1982(1) SCC 647 , even if during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of contract if the land is acquired, the vendee has right to obtain compensation of the land and as such it is stated that the khatedars are not entitled for any compensation and the society alone is entitled. 14. Govinda is stated to be one of the Khatedars out of four and since rest of the three khatedars have already transferred their rights in favour of the society and have no right, since the suit is pending in the civil Court, Govind is not entitled to any compensation. 15. 14. Govinda is stated to be one of the Khatedars out of four and since rest of the three khatedars have already transferred their rights in favour of the society and have no right, since the suit is pending in the civil Court, Govind is not entitled to any compensation. 15. In order to ascertain the legal rights of the Appollo Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd., as stated above, the agreements are alleged to have been entered into in 1974 from the Khatedars while the notification under Section 4 was issued on 21.9.1969 and declaration under Section 6 was published in the Gazette on 12.4.1973. In accordance with the Apex Court, in the case of Sushil Kumar Jain Vs. State, 1995(4) SCC 147 , Mahari Vs. Rural Institution, 1995(1) SCC 5 , Gian Chand Vs. Gopala, 1995(2) SCC 528 , U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties Ltd., 1996(1) JT 354 and Premji Ratan Sheti Vs. UOI, 1994(6) JT 585 it is settled that any purchase or agreement for purchase entered into subsequent to the notification under Section 4 is void. The purchaser does not acquire any legal right and, therefore, Appollo Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. cannot claim any legal right or any benefit in those proceedings. It is also pertinent to note that the Writ Petition No. 742/75, 743/75 and 744/75 were filed in 1975 and were decided on 19.3.1978 and till then the society was not in picture. Neither the khatedars have stated of any such agreement entered into nor society has moved any application for impleading as party. 16. Coming to the claim of the khatedars who are alleged to have given the physical possession of the entire land on 2.12.1992, it may be observed that the possession was taken on 6.5.1982 after issue of notice to the khatedars and, therefore, the khatedars now cannot say that actual physical possession was not taken. In the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. A. Visawan (dead) by Legal representatives, JT 1996(2) SC 549 , it was observed that 'it is true that normally possession is nine times title. If that principle is extended to public acquisition, by illegal squatting, erstwhile owner has compensation as well as possession of the land by encroachment upon his erstwhile land and claim that he remained in possession. Such construction would defeat the public purposes. If that principle is extended to public acquisition, by illegal squatting, erstwhile owner has compensation as well as possession of the land by encroachment upon his erstwhile land and claim that he remained in possession. Such construction would defeat the public purposes. The Land Acquisition Officer was considered the best person to speak of the factum of taking and giving delivery of possession. Part of the land has been utilised for construction of Jawahar Circle and part of it has been utilised for Delhi Bye-pass and part of it has been allotted to Housing Board. If any person cultivated the land after taking possession, he could only be termed as trespasser and JDA is entitled to realise compensation for illegal use of such land in the case of Municipal Committee Bhatinda Vs. Land Acquisition Collector, JT 1993 (Supp.) S.C. 96 , where even possession was not taken of the land after six years, it was considered that unless notification withdrawing the acquisition is issued, the proceedings would not lapse. 17. In B.N. Bhagde Vs. M.D. Bhagwat, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1767 , referred to above, though it is stated that there is no symbolic possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure nor would possession merely on paper be enough, what the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. In the same decision it was observed that the presence of the owner or the occupant is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities. It was also observed as under : "Though it cannot be laid down as an absolute, and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case it was held on the facts and circumstances of the case that since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what particular was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. Even if the appellant (tenant) entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. Neither the Government nor the Commissioner could thereafter withdraw from the acquisition of any petition of this land." 18. The decisions relied upon by the respondents, therefore, do not assist them as it has not been shown that there was any crop at the material time and the fard kabja shows that the Tehsildar has gone on the spot and after inspection of the land has taken possession which constitutes sufficient possession. 19. In Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 Supreme Court 344 , the interpretation of the word 'Vest' was given and it was considered to be of variable import with reference to different statutes. In respect of Land Acquisition Act Section 16 & 17 provide that the property so acquired upon the happening of certain events, shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 & 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. In respect of Land Acquisition Act Section 16 & 17 provide that the property so acquired upon the happening of certain events, shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 & 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purposes or limited duration. 20. We are clear in our view that the appellant has been successful in establishing that the possession of the property was taken in 1982. In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., JT 1996(3) S.C. 60 , the procedure for taking the possession was taken into consideration and it was observed that drafting and Panchanama in the presence of Panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. The preparation of Fard Kabja, therefore, makes it clear that the possession which was taken in 1982 was sufficient in the eye of law. 21. Learned Single Judge has proceeded only on the basis that the JDA has not complied with the orders of this court dated 19.3.1978 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 742/75 and has not taken actual physical possession of the disputed property. This finding is contrary to the reply of the appellants wherein it was stated that the land in dispute was taken possession of on 6.5.1982. Not only that it was also stated that the road has been constructed and Jawahar Circle is under construction. From the record of the Land Acquisition Officer produced in this court it is evident that the notice dated 6.5.1982 was sent to the respondent which was refused to be received and, therefore, service by affixture was implemented. The possession was taken by Kabja Fard dated 6.5.1982 in the presence of Laxmi Narain. Earlier to this a notice was also issued on 2.5.1982 which was also refused to be taken and thereafter the respondents approached the Addl. Munsiff & Judicial Magistrate No. 2, where the stay was granted. The stay was vacated on 6.5.1982 and the entire action was taken by the appellant on that date. Earlier to this a notice was also issued on 2.5.1982 which was also refused to be taken and thereafter the respondents approached the Addl. Munsiff & Judicial Magistrate No. 2, where the stay was granted. The stay was vacated on 6.5.1982 and the entire action was taken by the appellant on that date. The possession to the Housing Board was also given on that every date. The petitioner was informed vide letter dated 6.9.1982 that the possession of the land has already been taken and they may take the compensation. This notice was also refused to be taken. 22. By letter dated 2.5.91 the Secretary UIT informed the Land Acquisition Officer that the land of Khasra Nos. 140, 141, 142 and 175 falls within the ambit of expansion area and rest of the land does not fall in that area. The map was also sent to the Land Acquisition Officer along with the letter from which we feel that the requirement and direction given in the order in writ petition No. 742/75 were to be complied with. It may also be observed that the respondents filed a civil suit that the directions given by learned Single Judge in S.B. Writ Petition No. 742/75 have not been complied with and ultimately the suit was dismissed. In TT which dismissed on 6.3.82 it was mentioned that the disputed land is not reserved for expansion of aerodrome and the petitioner failed to produce any document that it is reserved for aerodrome. This finding being known to the respondent he absented and the suit was dismissed in default. While filing the writ petition 1988 the fact of filing of civil suit was concealed. But the learned Single Judge should have taken note of the order passed and on the application under O.39 R. 1/2 by the trial court where this very question was raised and, therefore, the khatedar could not have been considered as ignorant and this has amounted to deliberate concealment of fact. The possession therefore which has been taken has to be considered as of 6.5.1982 and on that ground entertaining the writ petition after lapse of more than a decade is not justified. The appellant has clearly come with the case that no part of land was earmarked in the master plan for expansion of the existing aerodrome. The possession therefore which has been taken has to be considered as of 6.5.1982 and on that ground entertaining the writ petition after lapse of more than a decade is not justified. The appellant has clearly come with the case that no part of land was earmarked in the master plan for expansion of the existing aerodrome. The writ petitioners have also failed to prove by any document that any part of this land was meant for expansion of the existing aerodrome and observations in the writ petition decided on 19.3.1978 or in this context without any specific notification was issued by the Central Government or steps were taken for the acquisition of this land by the Central Government for the purpose of expansion of aerodrome then it would be open for the petitioner to challenge the notification and the land acquisition proceedings. So far as the acquisition by the State was concerned, the second writ petition was not maintainable at all and is barred by the principles of res judicata as held by the Apex Court in the case of G.K. Dudani Vs. S.D. Sharma and others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1455 (para 18). 23. A contention was raised on behalf of Govinda that he is entitled for compensation in terms of some alleged settlement entered into which is disputed by the appellant. This point need not be considered as we are of the opinion that the second writ petition was not maintainable and that too after lapse of a decade. 24. The notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in this case was issued on 21.8.1969 and the declaration under section 6 was issued on 12.4.1973. The award was passed on 17.5.1975. Against the award a writ petition No. 742/75 which was dismissed on 19.3.1978 with the obervations that before taking possession of the land the UTT would esure that the disputed land is not part of that land which is earmarked by UTT in the master plan prepared by the State Government for the purpose of expansion of aerodrome. It is specifically denied that no part of the disputed land is earmarked in the master plan for the purpose of expansion of the existing aerodrome and it was on that basis that the physical possession of the land was taken on 6.5.1982. The copy of the Fard Kabja was also submitted. It is specifically denied that no part of the disputed land is earmarked in the master plan for the purpose of expansion of the existing aerodrome and it was on that basis that the physical possession of the land was taken on 6.5.1982. The copy of the Fard Kabja was also submitted. In the suit filed by Appollo Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Govind Ram has been arrayed as respondent. The dispute was with regard to mutation entry and the parties were Gopal and Manbhar. The revision was dismissed but what is the ultimate fate of review or subsequent proceedings is not known. On the temporary injunction in the civil suit taking into consideration the interim order of this court in special appeal dated 16.12.1992, the status quo with regard to possession was given. The application under Order 7 Rule 11 was dismissed on 3.8.94. 25. From the perusal of various litigations, we find that in this case protrated litigation had taken place which amounts to abuse of the process of law. Earlier the writ petition having been dismissed in which the observations were made however for taking fresh proceedings if any acquisition is done by the Central Government for the acquisition for the purpose of expansion of the aerodrome which is not the case and still the writ petition was filed. If the land is once acquired for public purposes, the State is free to use the same for any other public purpose and on that ground the land which has already been acquired and vests with the State Government, the Khatedars do not acquire any legal right to challenge the acquisition proceedings which have come to an end. 26. The special appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge is quashed with a cost of Rs. 20,000/- on the respondent Khatedar.Appeal allowed. *******