Judgment : ( 1 ) ON ordering notice of motion when this revision was sought to be admitted on 16-4-1996, it was served upon the respondent and the learned Government advocate had entered appearance on behalf of the respondent. I have heard them for admitting and disposing of this revision. ( 2 ) THIS revision was sought to be admitted to challenge the propriety and legality of the impugned order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, tuticorin in Crl. M. P. No. 2203/95 in S. C. No. 162/95 dated 14-3-1996 declining to discharge the petitioners, who are accused 2,3 and 4 regarding the case in crime No. 12/93of That tarmadam Police Station V. O. Chidambaranar District. ( 3 ) THE three petitioners herein who are accused 2 to 4 are mother and two sons living together in the same house along with the first accused by name dhrairaj with hisfamily. Among whom it was stated that the firstaccused alone was married and the rest remain as bachelors and all are being the sons of the fourth accused, the mother. The deceased by name Nobleraj is also the younger son of the fourth accused and the brother of accused 2 and 3 and he was a spend-thrift before his death. However, by availing a loan from a bank, the third petitioner-mother with the consent of the other accused helped the deceased son Nobleraj to purchase a transport van to be run for hire and entrusted it with the said Nobleraj with a view to mend his life. Even so, it was claimed that the said Nobleraj had not rectified his character. But, as a result, he used to spend all of his income derived from running the transport vehicle and also did not pay any money to the bank towards the loan obtained. On the nigh t of 15-1-1993, the said Nobleraj returned to his house and when accosted by his mother about his character and the condition that she would not pay any amount toward s the loan, there was a wordy quarrel between them, and that afterwards he left for his bed which is situated in a room in the upstairs of the said house. On the next day morning, even after a late time passed, since the Nobleraj had not come out, his mother went upstairs and found Nobleraj dead in the bed, itself and nearby an empty pesticide bottle was found. The above factum was reported to the thattarmadam police station through the Village Administrative Officer at about 4. 00 p. m. on 16-1-1993 and accordingly a case in Crime No. 12/93 under section 174, Cr. P. C. was registered. After conducting the inquest the body was sent to mortuary for post-mortem examination. On dissection of the body by the autopsy doctor, the doctor has opined that due to the pressure given to both sides of the neck, both the corner of hyoid bone of the deceased was found fractured. Further, the serological test conducted over the viscera preserved from the stomach of the deceased revealed that the consumption of poison was also one of the causes of death. That apart, the post-mortem doctor has found that both the tests of the deceased was also congested and injured. ( 4 ) ON getting the said opinion and report by the doctor and chemical examiner respectively, the case registered already was altered into one of section 302, IPC by the inspector of Police, Thattarmadam and consequently the case was investigated. The petitioners herein along with the first accused were arrested on 25-1-1993 and a voluntary confession statement given by the first accused has also been recorded by the police during investigation. After completing the investigation, the respondent police have filed the final report against these accused for the offences under Sections 34 and 302, IPC. Upon the committal order passed in the said case, the learned Principal Sessions Judge took cognizance of the above said case and furnished copies to the accused under the relevant provisions of law. On going through the contents of the said copies it appears from the case records that the petitioners who are accused 2, 3 and 4 have filed a petition in Crl. M. P. No. 2203/95 for the relief of discharge under Section 227, Cr. P. C. After hearing both sides and having looked into all the materials placed before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, the learned judge had declined to accept the prayer of the petitioners herein. M. P. No. 2203/95 for the relief of discharge under Section 227, Cr. P. C. After hearing both sides and having looked into all the materials placed before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, the learned judge had declined to accept the prayer of the petitioners herein. It was this order which is sought to be challenged for its want of legality and propriety by admitting his revision. ( 5 ) I have heard Mr. G. R. Edmund, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners herein who strenuously contended before me that the impugned order passed by the trial Court lacks legal sanctity and if at all to maintain the legal sanctity of impugned order, it must be the duty of the prosecution upon the materials placed before the Court to show that there was adequate evidence to prove the very existence on the prima facie case, and if the said duty has not been met, then the charge for the said offence ought not to have been framed. The instant case in hand is one of such type which bears no ground or material or evidence to frame a charge against these accused 2 to 4. He would contend further that the one and only evidence implicating these petitioners for the charges framed is the voluntary confession said to have been given by the first accused-Durairaj during his statement recorded under Section 161, Cr. P. C. by the police during the course of investigation. As such, at the most or the worst, if such portion of the statement can be considered by virtue of Section 30 of the indian Evidence Act, to sustain the same, there must be other grounds or materials in existence in order to render full support to the voluntary confession statement of the first accused. Therefore, placing reliance upon Section 30 of the indian Evidence Act, the finding given by the learned trial Judge could not in any way be conductive to the settled proposition of law for no other material or evidence was made available by the prosecution to get these petitioners involved. By so saying learned Counsel insisted me to admit and allow this revision and prayed for setting aside the impugned order. ( 6 ) MR. By so saying learned Counsel insisted me to admit and allow this revision and prayed for setting aside the impugned order. ( 6 ) MR. P. Kumaresan, learned Government Advocate, while conceding the legal position, probably he could not but, however, persuade me to see that the so called confession statement given by the first accused clearly implicates these three petitioners before the police, and that therefore, whether there are other attendant circumstances adverse or other materials available against these petitioners or not, can be looked into only during the time of trial and that it is too premature for the Court at this stage to look into every details of the same and explanation from the prosecution and by adverting the said views, the learned Government Advocate would justify the impugned order passed by the Court below. ( 7 ) IN the context of the above rival positions, the only question that arises for consideration at present is, whether the impugned order passed by the Court below is vitiated with any illegality or impropriety deservent the interference by this Court. While dealing with the scope of inherent powers to be exercised for quashing any proceedings pending before the Court. The Supreme Court in r. P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, has rules in the following manner as one of the grounds to be taken for framing the relevant charges. "where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Courts inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Courts inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. " ( 8 ) ADVERTING to Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, which the Court below has relied upon while passing the impugned order, I would like to quote the observation made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Pragasam vs. State by Inspector of Police. "it is true that under Section 30 of the Evidence Act when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. But, there should be substantive evidence before the confession of a co-accused can be used to set at rest any doubt. Conviction based on confession of co-accused alone is illegal. Such confession can be used only for lending reassurance of other substantive evidence. The statement given by an accused involving himself in the crime and also implicating third person cannot be proved legally in the Court. It will be conflicting with Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. If such evidence or conferring cannot be proved, then the occasion for utilising that statement against another person does not arise. The result is that reliance of such statement against another person while framing charge does not arise". ( 9 ) SECTION 30 of the Indian Evidence Act runs like this: "when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession". Thus, it is seen from the section itself, the whole legal exercise by virtue of this section of law, depends upon the proving of confession before a Court which makes it into an admissible one in order to implicate the other accused provided the confession given by such person has to be established with full strength of the other materials pertaining to the attendant circumstances. It would mean directly mere confession alone will not be adequate or sufficient to implicate other persons. It is incumbent that there are other materials also which would render support or substantiate the case of the confession. However, it is subject to the standard of proving as contemplated by law. If this is the position, one cannot forget the nature of the statement alleged to have been given by one of the co-accused and that too before a police officer during the course of investigation and that the said statement i directly hit by Section 161 of the code of Criminal Procedure. Particularly, the statement given by any one of the accused and recorded by the police officer during the course of investigation cannot at all be relied upon by the prosecution, but subject to the limitations provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act to be used for the purpose of contradicting the accused. ( 10 ) THE Court below had given its categorical finding that the one and only evidence available against these petitioners is the so-called confession statement given by the other accused before the police officer during the course of investigation and not at any other point of time. If this is being the admitted circumstances, in the context of no other materials placed by the prosecution to render support, it is quite unsafe to frame a charge against petitioners solely upon the basis of a confession made by one of the co-accused viz. , the first accused implicating his own mother and two other accused. ( 11 ) ON the consideration of the factual aspects of the instant case also, it gives a great doubt in my mind whether the claim of the first accused in the alleged confession statement is true. It is patent that he has implicated the present petitioners with some motive. ( 11 ) ON the consideration of the factual aspects of the instant case also, it gives a great doubt in my mind whether the claim of the first accused in the alleged confession statement is true. It is patent that he has implicated the present petitioners with some motive. It is quite unnatural for the mother in this part of the, country to administer poison to her own son who is sup posed to be a spend-thrift and that it is quite unbelievable for a mother to indulge in such a heinous crime against his own blood at any cost. It is common always for a mother to save her blood either son or daughter at any cost irrespective of their conduct whether illegal, unlawful or otherwise. But no mother would be dare enough to poison her own son for paltry and simple reason, and that secondly the non-examination of the wife of the first accused by the police during the investigation gives a great doubt for the foolproof investigation done by the police. On having looked into and perused the entire case records, I find that there is absolutely no materials placed by the prosecution to implicate these petitioners except the confession statement by the first accused and that too has become vulnerable for the reasons stated above, and above all there are no other materials at least the prompting adverse attendant circumstances. The Court below has failed to look into the said aspect while adverting the case held in shankar alias Cowri Shankar. ( 12 ) HAVING regard to the gamut of the whole case with reference to its entire case records, rival contentions and the factual aspects of the case, I am fully satisfied to hold that the Court below while passing the impugned order has virtually failed to observe the legal suggests of the law and that for the said reasoning the impugned order passed is vitiated with every illegality and impropriety and that therefore, it is liable to be set aside. ( 13 ) IN the result, for all the foregoing reasons, the revision is admitted and stands allowed. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the learned principal Sessions Judge in Crl. M. P. No. 2203/95 in S. CNo. 162/95 dated 14-3-1996 is hereby set aside and the petitioners viz. , accused 2 to 4 are hereby discharged. Consequently, Crl. M. P. Nos. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the learned principal Sessions Judge in Crl. M. P. No. 2203/95 in S. CNo. 162/95 dated 14-3-1996 is hereby set aside and the petitioners viz. , accused 2 to 4 are hereby discharged. Consequently, Crl. M. P. Nos. 1163 and 1164/96 are dismissed.