JUDGMENT A. K. MATHUR, C.J. - Petitioner by this petition has prayed that the respondents may be directed to refund an amount of Rs. 97,082. He has also challenged the validity of the amendment introduced by Act No. 25 of 1978 with effect from October 1, 1978. 2. Petitioner is a dealer under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, (for short, "the Act") under registration certificate No. 550. The period of assessment in question is June 1, 1968 to May 31, 1969. Petitioner was assessed to sales tax by respondent No. 1 by order dated June 30, 1972 determining the tax at Rs. 88,079. Penalties were also imposed under sections 17(3) and 43(1) of the Act amounting to Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 5,000 respectively. For not submitting the stock list, penalty of Rs. 50 was further imposed in accordance with the provisions of rule 69-A of the M.P. Sales Tax Rules, 1959. Thus the total amount inclusive of penalty was Rs. 98,759. The petitioner paid the tax amount of Rs. 68,764 along with quarterly return and thus the balance remaining in accordance with the aforesaid order was determined at Rs. 29,996. 3. Aggrieved by the order of respondent No. 1, an appeal was filed before the A.A.C., Sales Tax, who by order dated March 4, 1974, remanded the case to respondent No. 1 for fresh assessment. It was also mentioned in the order that the taxable turnover was less and as such, the order was erroneous and was set aside. Respondent No. 1 was directed to make fresh enquiry and it was also directed to quantify the penalties afresh under sections 17(3) and 43(1) of the Act. Meanwhile, aggrieved by the order of the A.A.C., Sales Tax, second appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Board of Revenue, Gwalior. The Board of Revenue, after considering the matter, held that there was no reason for making a best judgment assessment on the basis of an alleged concealment. It was found that there was no factual justification for inference that there was suppression of sales and that there was no ground for suspicion. Hence the enhancement made in the gross taxable turnover was set aside. It was found that there was no factual justification for inference that there was suppression of sales and that there was no ground for suspicion. Hence the enhancement made in the gross taxable turnover was set aside. It was directed that assessment of the petitioner to sales tax for the period under consideration should be revised on the basis of appellant's accounts both in respect of quantum of the gross and taxable turnover and its ratewise classification and that proportionate tax relief should be given to the appellant on the basis of the findings and the directions recorded in the order of the Board of Revenue. Penalty under section 17(3) was reduced to Rs. 1,000 in place of Rs. 5,000. Penalty under rule 69-A of the Rules was maintained. 4. Respondent No. 3, Commissioner of Sales Tax, being dissatisfied with the order of the Board of Revenue, moved an application under section 44(1) of the Act before the court for making a reference to the High Court, but it was rejected on April 22, 1981. It is alleged that respondent No. 1 did not abide by the directions contained in the order passed by the Board of Revenue in second appeal; the order should have been complied with within the prescribed period, but no such compliance appears to have been made. The petitioner has challenged sub-section (8) of section 18 of the Act which was introduced by Act No. 25 of 1978 with effect from October 1, 1978 to the extent that if fresh assessment has not been made within the period prescribed under section 18(8), i.e., two calendar years from the date of the order, then for any reason fresh assessment can be made under the orders of the Commissioner. This part of the provisions is challenged by the petitioner that it is ultra vires of the main section itself because unlimited power has been conferred on the Commissioner to extend the period of limitation prescribed in this section. 5. Return has been filed by the respondents who have taken the stand that after the order was passed by the Board of Revenue, the Commissioner approached the Tribunal for making a reference to the High Court, but that application was rejected. The Commissioner moved the High Court for calling a reference under sub-section (2) of section 44 of the Act. Return has been filed by the respondents who have taken the stand that after the order was passed by the Board of Revenue, the Commissioner approached the Tribunal for making a reference to the High Court, but that application was rejected. The Commissioner moved the High Court for calling a reference under sub-section (2) of section 44 of the Act. Therefore, the period of limitation should be counted from the date the High Court decides the reference. It appears that reference was called by this Court which came to be registered as M.C.C. No. 389 of 1981 and the High Court declined to interfere and rejected the application on February 4, 1982. 6. Shri Nema, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that sub-section (8) of section 18 on one hand prescribes that the order passed by the Civil Court, High Court or Supreme Court should be complied within a period of two years and if that is not complied with, then a blanket power has been conferred on the Commissioner to direct the authorities below to take necessary steps for assessment. Pending disposal of this petition, proviso (a) was introduced in sub-section (8) by Act No. 25 of 1978 with effect from October 1, 1978. It reads as under : "18. Assessment of tax. - (1) The amount of tax due from a registered dealer shall be assessed separately for each year : (8) The assessment shall be made under this section - (i) in respect of a registered dealer and a dealer referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (6), within a period of two calendar years from the end of the period for which assessment is to be made; and (ii) in respect of a dealer who has failed to apply for registration, within a period of two calendar years from the commencement of proceedings under sub-section (6); provided that - (a) where a fresh assessment has to be made to give effect to any finding or direction contained in any order under sections 38, 39 or 44 or to any order of the Civil Court, High Court or Supreme Court, such assessment shall be made within a period of two calendar years from the date of the order containing such finding or direction or the order of the Civil Court or High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be. If for any reason such fresh assessment is not made within the specified period, the Commissioner shall take steps to ensure that assessment is made as expeditiously as possible; .........................." This proviso provides a fresh period of limitation. It says that a fresh assessment has to be made to give effect to any finding or direction contained in any order under sections 38, 39 or 44 or to any order of the civil court, High Court or Supreme Court, such assessment should be made within a period of two calendar years from the date of the order containing such finding or direction or the order of the civil court, High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be. "If for any reason such fresh assessment is not made within the specified period, then the Commissioner shall take steps to ensure that the assessment is made as expeditiously as possible." This shows that the order or direction of the court should be completed within two years from the date the order is passed and if this is not passed, then the Commissioner has been given a power to direct the authorities to expeditiously dispose of the assessment. That means that the statutory period which is prescribed has been neutralised by an executive order of the Commissioner. The question is whether the statutory period laid down by the provisions of the Act can be nullified by an executive order of the Commissioner or not. In our opinion, that cannot be permitted. When the law has ordained the period of limitation, for implementation of directions given by the court within a period of two years then there is no going from this. The period of limitation has been prescribed in the statute and that statutory provision cannot be allowed to be nullified by an executive order of the Commissioner. The power to neutralise the statutory provision by an executive order cannot be sustained. 7. Shri Seth, learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted that in sub-section (9), power has been given to the State Government that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the State Government may, by notification, extend the period of limitation for completion of the assessment proceedings in respect of any such dealer as may be specified in the notification. 7. Shri Seth, learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted that in sub-section (9), power has been given to the State Government that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the State Government may, by notification, extend the period of limitation for completion of the assessment proceedings in respect of any such dealer as may be specified in the notification. Sub-section (9) of section 18 of the Act is as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (8) where assessment proceedings in respect of any dealer relating to any year cannot be completed before the expiry of the period specified therefor in the said sub-section, the State Government may, by notification, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period for the completion of the assessment proceedings in respect of any such dealer by such further period as may be specified in the notification." Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that sub-section (9) of section 18 came up for challenge before this Court in case of Lachhmandas v. State of M.P. [1995] 98 STC 274; 1995 MPLJ 925 and this power has been upheld by this Court. In the present case, there is no challenge to this sub-section (9) of section 18. Therefore, we need not express any opinion in this respect. This Court has found that since the power has been conferred on the State Government and it is not unbridled and uncanalised, as reasons have to be recorded and those reasons can also be open to judicial scrutiny. More so when under sub-section (9), power has been conferred on the State Government then what is rational of in conferring the same power on Commissioner. Therefore, we can legitimately infer that the State Government will not exercise its power, but only in exceptional circumstances and that too by recording reasons and even the reasons can always be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the power under sub-section (9) is for a very specific purpose and the same has already been upheld by this Court. 8. It looks very anomalous that on one hand the provision confers a statutory period of limitation and in the same breath, it has been taken away by executive power. The power has already been reserved under sub-section (9) by the State Government. Hence conferring the power on the Commissioner for extending the statutory period of limitation cannot be sustained. 8. It looks very anomalous that on one hand the provision confers a statutory period of limitation and in the same breath, it has been taken away by executive power. The power has already been reserved under sub-section (9) by the State Government. Hence conferring the power on the Commissioner for extending the statutory period of limitation cannot be sustained. Therefore we strike down part of the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 18 to the extend as under : "(a) .... If for any reason such fresh assessment is not made within the specified period, the Commissioner shall take steps to ensure that assessment is made as expeditiously as possible." This part of the provision is struck down being violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. Now coming to the merit part, we do not know what steps have been taken by the State Government after the order passed by the Board of Revenue. As the reference application filed by the State Government has already been rejected, we do not know whether the order of the Commissioner has been complied within limitation or not. Since we have struck down this part of the proviso to sub-section (8)(a) of section 18 of the Act, let consequence follow therefrom. 10. Accordingly, this petition is allowed in part. No order as to costs. Security amount, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed in part.