Judgment D. C. DALELA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner and the respondent were wife and husband. The petitioner had moved the learned Magistrate under S. 125 Cr. P. C. against the respondent for award of maintenance for herself and children. On the basis of a compromise, the maintenance of Rs. 100/- per month was awarded by the A. C. J. M. No. 3 Jodhpur, to petitioner and Rs. 100/- each to their children. In compliance of the order, the respondent made certain payments. Thereafter, the payments were stopped. The petitioner then moved the Magistrate under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. for issue of the warrant for levying the amount due. In the proceeding under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. , the respondent pleaded that he had divorced the petitioner and has paid the maintenance up to the period of Iddat and he is now no more liable to make any payment. The learned A. C. J. M. No. 3 overruled the plea of the respondent. The matter was then carried in revision and the learned Revisional Court of Addl. Sessions Judge allowed the revision petition of the respondent and set aside the order dated 15-4-1988 of the learned Magistrate. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner had moved this petition under S. 482, Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner only as none appeared for the respondent. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has contended that the husband-respondent has not divorced the petitioner-wife and, as such, there is no divorce, which may disentitle the petitioner from maintenance. He has further argued that the order of maintenance under S. 125, Cr. P. C. was passed prior to the promulgation of Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1986 and, as such, the order passed under S. 125, Cr. P. C. by the Magistrate remains effective even after coming into force of the Act of 1986. ( 4 ) THE question of the effect of the provisions of the Act of 1986 on the order of maintenance passed under S. 125, Cr. P. C. and whether the order passed under S. 125, Cr. P. C. by the Magistrate remains effective even after coming into force of the Act of 1986. ( 4 ) THE question of the effect of the provisions of the Act of 1986 on the order of maintenance passed under S. 125, Cr. P. C. and whether the order passed under S. 125, Cr. P. C. remains effective even after coming into force of the Act of 1986, came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in the case Abid Ali v. Mst. Raisa Begum, reported in (1988) (1) Rajasthan I. R 104. After considering the various authorities on the point and the intention with which the Act of 1986 was enacted, the Division Bench observed as under :"40. A comparative look at the provisions contained in Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure and those contained in the Act, 1986, would show that there is no saving clause provided under the Act, 1986 by which any order passed in favour of the divorced Muslim woman under S. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could bc validated or liability created on the husband in this regard could be held valid or enforceable. 41. Section 125, Cr. P. C. entitles a divorced woman to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried whereas S. 3 (1) (a) of the Act curtails her right to get maintenance till the period of Iddat. In this view of the matter, S. 125, Cr. P. C. in so far as it hail created a right to a Muslim divorced woman to get maintenance until she is remarried, has been impliedly repealed. 42. Under the Act, 1926, husband who has divorced his wife is not under obligation to pay maintenance to such wife after the period of Iddat and such wife has been given a right to claim maintenance from the persons mentioned in S. 4 of the Act, 1986 after the period of Iddat. So, responsibility is cast upon the person other than husband to pay the maintenance after the period of Iddat. Having lost her right to get maintenance from her former husband after the period of Iddat she has lost her remedy also as provided under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. to enforce her said right in case her former husband fails without sufficient cause, to comply with the order of maintenance. Having lost her right to get maintenance from her former husband after the period of Iddat she has lost her remedy also as provided under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. to enforce her said right in case her former husband fails without sufficient cause, to comply with the order of maintenance. Thus, if a divorced Muslim woman files a petition under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. which in substance is a penal provision, it will be an action without remedy. Because after the passing of 1986 Act all the applications under Ss. 125 and 127, Cr. P. C. are to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1986 as is laid down in S. 7 of the Act of 1986. 43. The Act of 1986 as stated earlier, does not contain any saving clause for the right created or orders passed in favour of a Divorced Muslim Woman. However, the Act, 1986 has completely obliterated the right of such woman to get maintenance. The repeal without saving such right means that such woman had never acquired such right and in this view of the matter, the said right now cannot be enforced under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. Therefore, if a Muslim woman divorced prior to coming into force of the Act, in whose favour order of maintenance has been passed and has become final or is pending in revision or in other Court is being challenged by the husband and if such an order is held to be executable then it will be in our considered view, in complete contravention of the intention of the Legislature and will amount to frustrate the very object of the Act of 1986 for which it has been enacted. " ( 5 ) FROM the provisions of the Act of 1986 and the object with which it was enacted by the Parliament, it is clear that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to get the maintenance only up to the period of Iddat and after the period of Iddat, the divorced Muslim woman is not entitled to get the maintenance from her ex-husband. The Act of 1986 has completely obliterated the right of maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman. The Act of 1986 has completely obliterated the right of maintenance to a divorced Muslim woman. The repeal without saving such right means that such woman had never acquired such right and in this view of the matter, the said right now cannot be enforced under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. Even if an order granting maintenance had been passed in favour of a divorced Muslim woman prior to coming into force of the Act of 1986, the divorced Muslim woman is not entitled to get the maintenance allowance as allowing the maintenance in those cases would be in complete contravention of the intention of the Legislature and would amount to frustrate the very object of the Act with which it was enacted. Neither the order passed under S. 125, Cr. P. C. nor the liability already incurred earlier to the coming into force of the Act of 1986 has been saved. The inevitable conclusion is that not only the right under S. 125 (1), Cr. P. C. but also the remedy under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. is lost. In view of the matter in a case of Muslim divorced woman, the order passed under S. 125, Cr. P. C. in favour of the petitioner could not remain effective even after coming into force of the Act of 1986. Such order is also not executable under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. ( 6 ) ORAL divorce is permissible under the Mohammadan Law. A Muslim husband possesses the right to pronounce talaak orally. A person who is not able to speak, can also terminate his marriage by positive and intelligible signs. No formula is prescribed for effecting a talaq orally. It is known to all that under the Muslim law, a husband possesses arbitrary power for dissolving his marriage tie. A husband can, therefore, very well take plea that the marriage was terminated by him long long ago. It is not necessary for him to produce any evidence in support of his argument. It is known to all that under the Muslim law, a husband possesses arbitrary power for dissolving his marriage tie. A husband can, therefore, very well take plea that the marriage was terminated by him long long ago. It is not necessary for him to produce any evidence in support of his argument. In the case of Abid Ali (1988 (1) Rajasthan LR 104) (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has held that since under the Mohammadan Law, even oral divorce is permissible and if oral divorce is not held proved, the statement given by the husband will operate as declaration of divorce from the date of this statement and wife is then entitled to maintenance for a period of Iddat only as per the Act of 1986 from her husband, who has divorced her. The Division Bench of this Court has relied upon the decisions in the cases of Wahab Ali v. Qamrobi, AIR 1951 Hyd 117 : (1951 (52) Cri LJ 1299) and Chand Bi v. Bandesha, AIR 1961 Bom 121 : (1961 (1) Cri LJ 470 ). In these rulings, approved by the Division Bench of this Court, it has been held that in the maintenance proceedings initiated by a Muslim wife against her husband where the husband pleaded divorce and if the Court comes to the conclusion that plea of divorce is not proved, such a written statement does operate as the declaration of divorce by a husband and comes into operation from the moment. Therefore, a declaration by the husband in the written statement or in the counter that he had earlier divorced his wife, will itself consist a divorce and the same will he effective at least from the date of the written statement or the counter is filed in the Court. ( 7 ) IN the case in hand, the husband-respondent having filed the reply to the, application for execution of the maintenance allowance u/s. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. disclosing therein to have divorced the petitioner-wife, it must, therefore, be taken that the divorce between the two took place on the date of filing the reply. The petitioner, therefore, has been divorced by the respondent-husband and, as such, she is entitled to the maintenance up to the period of Iddat. Thus, both the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no force and deserve to be rejected. The petitioner, therefore, has been divorced by the respondent-husband and, as such, she is entitled to the maintenance up to the period of Iddat. Thus, both the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no force and deserve to be rejected. ( 8 ) I think the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has committed no error while setting aside the order of learned Magistrate passed under S. 125 (3), Cr. P. C. The petition having no force is dismissed hereby. Petition dismissed.