JUDGMENT A. L. Vaidya, J.—The suit property, which is ground floor of a building, as detailed in the plaint was owned by Idol plaintiff-respondent. According to the case of the plaintiff, the said property was in occupation of the defendant-appellants on token rent of Rs, 5 per annum and the upper storey was in occupation of the Education Department. The defendants refused to pay the rent and started asserting title in themselves. Thereafter, tenancy of the defendants was terminated by serving a registered notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Notice was refused by the defendants. The suit for possession, as such, was filed. 2. The defendants contested the suit and pleaded that the suit was time barred and the plaintiff was estopped from suing by his act and conduct. On merit, case of the defendants has been that the entire building including ground floor and upper storey were in occupation of the defendants and it was further averred that the defendants have been in adverse possession of the land since Rabi 1955-56. According to them, previously Kushi Ram the father of Rajinder and Tilak Raj defendants and husband of Kamla Devi was in possession of the suit land without payment of rent. It was also alleged that after his death, the defendants were in adverse possession of the suit land. The tenancy, as pleaded by the plaintiff, has been denied. Again, it was pleaded that the plaintiff could not ask the defendants to vacate the premises as the defendants have become owners of the suit property by adverse possession for more than 12 years which was open and hostile to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The other averments were not admitted. 3. Parties were put to trial on the following issues by the trial Court : 1. Whether the defendants are tenants in the premises in dispute under the plaintiff as alleged, if so to what rate of rent and to what effect ? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff has locus standi and cause of action to file the suit ? OPP 3. Whether the defendants are in adverse possession of the premises in dispute for more than 12 years and have become owners by adverse possession ? OPD 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit by his act and conduct ? OPP 3. Whether the defendants are in adverse possession of the premises in dispute for more than 12 years and have become owners by adverse possession ? OPD 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit by his act and conduct ? OPD 6. Relief. Issues No. 1 and 2 were decided against the plaintiff while Issues No. 3 to 5 in favour of the defendants. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the defendants have become owners by way of adverse possession and they were not the tenants of the suit property and dismissed the suit. 4. The aforesaid judgment and decree were assailed in an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge (I), Kaogra at Dharamshala on various pleas, who after hearing the parties accepted the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant for possession of the first floor alongwith recovery of Rs, 15 as arrears of rent for the preceding three years. 5. The aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court have been assailed in the present appeal on various grounds. 6. Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard and the record has been minutely scrutinised. 7. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that in the present case the evidence established that the tenant had constructed a house on the land leased out in his favour and, therefore, he being owner of the house could not be evicted from the same in the manner plaintiff had selected by way of filing the present suit. It has been further submitted that the tenant could be evicted from that house constructed by him on the land leased out in his favour in due course of law. 8. The aforesaid submissions at the face of it appears to be most appealing, but when one goes through the pleadings and the evidence examined during the trial, the said submissions loses all its significance. 9. Needless to say, a party has to stand on its pleadings, and the evidence has to be appreciated in the background of the pleadings. In the present case, as referred to above, at the first instance in the written statement submitted by the defendants they pleaded that they have acquired ownership in the land by way of being in adverse possession since Rabi 1955-56. In the present case, as referred to above, at the first instance in the written statement submitted by the defendants they pleaded that they have acquired ownership in the land by way of being in adverse possession since Rabi 1955-56. Admittedly, land is not in dispute, but it is khasra number 310 upon which the alleged building was situated, which is the subject matter of the suit. There is a specific plea regarding the suit property raised by the defendants that they have become owner of the same by way of adverse possession, being more than 12 years. It Is really strange to note that so far the present case was concerned, there is absolutely no pleading of the defendants which could reflect that tenancy in the land was admitted and it was pleaded that the building in dispute was constructed by the defendants. In this view of the matter, the plea being raised on behalf of the appellants will not be available at all. 10. At this stage, Ex. PX the certified copy of the suit, filed by the present appellants against the defendants pertaining to the suit land, can be referred. This suit was filed in the year 1983. On the other hand, the present suit was filed in the year 1986. The earlier suit, the copy of which on record is Ex PX was for declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs were the tenants at Will and were in possession, as such, of the land comprised in Khasra No. 310 (subject matter of the present suit) alongwith Gair-Mumkin-Makan standing thereon constructed and owned by the plaintiffs or their predecessors and were entitled to remain as such in future as well. Permanent injunction was also asked for in the alternative. 11. It is being argued that on the basis of the pleas taken in the earlier suit, the submissions putforth on behalf of the appellants have to be considered favourably. 12. It may not be out of place to mention here that in the earlier suit plaintiffs simple declaration was that they were in occupation of Khasra Number 310 as tenants and they had constructed a building there upon and were owners of the said building. The suit as referred to above was filed in the year 1983 and the subsequent suit was filed in the year 1986. 13. The suit as referred to above was filed in the year 1983 and the subsequent suit was filed in the year 1986. 13. In the subsequent suit simple case of the defendants pleaded in the defence had been that they have acquired title by way of adverse possession of the building situated on Khasra No. 310 while in the earlier suit they were claiming tenancy on the land on which the building had been constructed by them Both the pleas have been taken independently in independent suit filed by the parties, referred to above. 14. In the earlier suit, stand of the present appellants was quite distinct to the stand taken in the present suit. Both stands were contradictory to each other. There is an admission of the present appellants that they were tenants of the land upon which the building was constructed. In the present suit they were claiming adverse possession for the said building which implied that the plaintiff Idol was owner of the building—as adverse possession plea is always raised against the owner and not against a stranger. In this view of the matter, plea taken in the earlier suit will not help the case of the appellants as being argued before this Court. The two pleas are contradictory to each other and its consequence has to be taken note of. There is no doubt that in an individual suit a party is at liberty to take alternative pleas which otherwise were contradictory to each other, but in the present case facts are altogether different as two—pleas have not been taken in the alternative but were distinct pleas taken in two different independent suits, This aspect of the matter has to be kept in mind while appreciating the evidence. 15. Parties have brought on record documentary as well as oral evidence. The documentary evidence consists of entries in the record of rights. 16. Ex D-6 is the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1955-56 qua the suit property- Since Rabi 1956 Khushi Ram is recorded as tenant of MAKAN OR DUKAN (house or shop) and the plaintiff was recorded owner of the said building. In the rent column the entry was LAGAN MASKOOK. This entry clearly depicted that in the year 1955-56 the building was there which was occupied by Khushi Ram as tenant. In the rent column the entry was LAGAN MASKOOK. This entry clearly depicted that in the year 1955-56 the building was there which was occupied by Khushi Ram as tenant. This entry was repeated in Ex, D-3 copy of Jamabandi for the year 1959-60. Ex D-4 is another copy of Jamabandi for the year 1963-64 wherein entry remained the same and the property under khasra number has been described as pair Mumkin Dukan or Makan The entry in the rent column also remained the same. Similar is the entry in the Jamabandi for the year 1968-69 (Ex D-3 on record). This entry continued till the recent settlement when during settlement operation entry Ex. D-2 was substituted. In this copy khasra number 310 was provided to the previous khasra number 237 and this khasra number has been described as Gair Mumkin Makan. In the column of rent the entry was Rs. 5 as annual rent. This entry is repeated in Ex. P-3 the copy of record of rights for the year 1981-82. 17. There is no dispute to the proposition that legal presumption of truth is attached to the latest entry in the record of rights. There is again a legal presumption attached to the latest entry especially when there is some variance between the previous and latest entry and in that back* ground it will be presumed that substitution in the latest entry has been correctly made. Thus there is presumption in favour of legal substitution effected in the latest record of right. 18. In the present case, the earlier rent entry has been substituted in the recent settlement as referred to above and in case this entry is to be rebutted it could be so done by examining legally competent evidence or by establishing that this substitution was made without authority. In the background of the present case substitution cannot be said to have been effected without any authority. 19. It may be pointed out at the cost of repetition that there is an admission of the present appellants in Ex. PX claiming themselves to be the tenants under the respondents of Khasra No. 310. In the background of the present case substitution cannot be said to have been effected without any authority. 19. It may be pointed out at the cost of repetition that there is an admission of the present appellants in Ex. PX claiming themselves to be the tenants under the respondents of Khasra No. 310. When the defendants themselves have admitted to be tenants in occupation of khasra No. 310, rent column even if corrected during the recent settlement it will not in any way adversely affect the plaintiffs right over the khasra number 310, There is no doubt that the evidence has come that the aforesaid rent has not been paid by the defendants, non-payment of rent will not make the defendants not to be the tenants of Khasra No 310. It is their liability to pay rent which is taken note of in determining the right of tenancy held by them, 20. The plea of adverse possession is altogether shattered by the suit filed by the defendants, as discussed above. Evidence that the defendants constructed this house on the leased property in the absence of the pleading to that effect cannot be taken note of and has to be totally ignored. 21. In the present case, the defendants were denying the tenancy and even if statutory notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has not been served upon the defendants, it will not in any way adversely affect the plaintiffs9 case, Service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is essential where parties admit relationship of landlord and tenant as pleaded by the plaintiffs, but where the alleged tenant was not admitting tenancy but was claiming adverse possession being in occupation of the property, requirement of service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not legally essential 22. The oral evidence examined by the defendants consists of DW 1 Smt. Kamla Devi, DW 2 Sohnu and DW 3 Sh. Dhwaj. DW 1 stated that her father-in-law has constructed the house about 40 years back and they were residing in the same house, I think this vejsion has to be ignored especially when it goes against the defence taken by the defendants whereby they were claiming to have acquired title by way of adverse possession. Dhwaj. DW 1 stated that her father-in-law has constructed the house about 40 years back and they were residing in the same house, I think this vejsion has to be ignored especially when it goes against the defence taken by the defendants whereby they were claiming to have acquired title by way of adverse possession. Similarly, DWs 2 and 3 have to be ignored who stated that the house in question was constructed by the fore-father of the defendants. 23. On the other hand, the oral evidence examined by the plaintiffs coupled with the documentary evidence, discussed above, proved that the plaintiffs have been successful in establishing the case against the defendants Learned Additional District Judge has come to a correct conclusion after properly appreciating the evidence and law in this particular behalf, which findings do not require any interference whatsoever. 24. No other point has been stressed 25. In view of the foregoing reasons, the present appeal fails and the judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court are maintained. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.