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1996 DIGILAW 87 (PAT)

Panna Lal Keshri v. State Of Bihar

1996-02-07

RADHA MOHAN PRASAD

body1996
Judgment Radha Mohan Prasad, J. 1. This revision-application is directed against the Judgment and Order passed in Cr. Appeal 33/86 by 2nd Addl. Session, judge, Katihar, upholding the conviction of the petitioner under Section 16 (1) (C) of the Prevention of Food adulteration Act and affirming the sentence passed by the trial court for six months rigorous imprisonment but reducing the quantum of fine from Rs.1,000 to 300 in default of R. I for two months. 2. The petitioner was charged under Sec.16 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for having prevented the food inspector from taking a sample of wheat flour from his shop on 20-9-82 at village pothia P. S. Falka in the Distt of Katihar. 3. From the appellate court judgment it appears that the allegation in the prosecution report was that one shri K. P. Mandal, Food Inspector visited the business premises of the accused at 12.30 p. m. on 20.9.82 and gave notice under Sec.11 of the. Act to take sample of wheat flour from his shop. The accused prevented him from taking sample of the wheat flour in presence of several persons including mahabir Mandal, P. W.2. It is also stated that the complainant was a qualified sanitary Inspector of Falka block and he obtained sanction of c. M. O. Katihar for prosecution under the Act. The petitioner denied the charges and pleaded not guilty. The trial Court proceeded with the trial and held him guilty under Sec.16 (1) (c)of the Act and convicted him for the said offence and imposed sentence as already mentioned above. The petitioner being aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court filed Cr. Appeal 33/86 in the court of Sessions, Katihar, which was finally heard by the 2nd addl. Sessions Judge, Katihar who disposed of the said appeal by the impugned order 28.11.92. 4. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned judgment of conviction is fit to be set aside on the sole ground that the sanction of the prosecution is based on a report which is contradictory to the allegation made in the complaint. 4. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned judgment of conviction is fit to be set aside on the sole ground that the sanction of the prosecution is based on a report which is contradictory to the allegation made in the complaint. It is alleged that the petitioner prevented the inspector from taking the sample of wheat flour whereas the report discloses that the sample of the wheat flour was sent to the analyst for examination and the same was found adulterated. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner Is wholly unsustainable. In this regard, he refers to the original complaint and the report. In the report, Ext 2 which was sent to the A. C. M. O. for sanction it is clearly mentioned that the inspector was prevented from taking the sample and was pushed out of thus shop. Thus 1 do not find any contradiction as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that in view of the decision of this court reported in 1988 B. L. J.522, in the case of Jagarnath Shaw V/s. State of Bihar, mere refusal to give sample by the petitioner will not amount to preventing the food inspector from taking sample within the meaning of Sec.16 (1) (c) of the act. According to him, apart from refusal, there must be allegation of some overt act or any conduct on the part of the accused to show that it made difficult for the food inspector to take sample. He also submitted that, in fact no evidence was led by the prosecution to show that there was any overt act on the part of the petitioner or that he used any force to prevent the food inspector from taking the sample. 7. Learned State Counsel was not been able to show from the judgment of the trial court or of the appellate court that any such evidence was led by the prosecution to prove that there was any overt act or force used by this petitioner to prevent the food inspector from taking the sample of wheat flour. 8. In that view of the matter, I am unable to hold that the petitioner is liable for conviction under Sec.16 (1) (c) of the Act. 8. In that view of the matter, I am unable to hold that the petitioner is liable for conviction under Sec.16 (1) (c) of the Act. In fact no evidence has been pointed out to show as to how the sample was demanded by the food inspector from the petitioner and/or that he was prepared to pay the price for the same. Thus, I am constrained to hold that the alleged refusal to supply the sample without there being any allegation of overt act or force being used to prevent the food inspector from taking the sample the convict on under section 16 (1) (c) of the Act cannot be sustained. 9. Accordingly, this revision application is allowed. The impugned conviction is set aside. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, there shall be however, no order as to costs.