JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.10.1995, passed by the Third Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur, in Civil Appeal No. 16-A of 1993 arising out of judgment and decree dated 13.2.1990, passed by Eighth Civil Judge. Class-II, Jabalpur, in Civil Suit No. 168-A of 1988. The connected Second Appeal No. 773 of 1995 (Smt. Motia Rani Kohli and others v. Thakur Natthu Singh) involves similar grounds. That second appeal is also disposed of by this judgment. 2. The respondent is the landlord of the House No. 630, Napier Town, Jabalpur. The appellants are his tenants of a portion of the above mentioned house. The respondent filed Civil Suit No. 168-A of 1988 against the appellants claiming that they are liable to be evicted from the portion of house occupied by them in the capacity of tenants. The portion of house was detailed by the respondent, by making it in red colour in the plaint-map. The respondent raised in his plaint the grounds covered by Sections 12 (1)(a), 12 (i)(e) and 12 (1)(h) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Hence forth, 'the Act'). 3. The respondent claimed in his plaint that he became sole owner of House No. 630, Napier Town, Gorakhpur, Jabalpur, as a consequence of auction sale in his favour in recovery of tax dues from Motiram and Sons by the Income Tax Department. The portion involved in the suit was occupied by Sardar Bhagwant Singh Bakshi as a tenant and after his death, by his successors-in-title, the present appellants. The respondent claimed that after obtaining the sale-certificate of aforesaid House No. 630. Napier Town. Gorakhpur. Jabalpur, he became the owner of the suit house. Bhagwant Singh Bakshi had admitted in previous suit between the previous landlord and himself that he had occupied the suit house in the capacity of a tenant. The respondent claimed that he became owner, and by operation of law, the landlord of the suit-house and the appellants were his tenants. 4. The respondent claimed in his plaint that he was entitled to evict the appellants on the ground covered by Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act'. The respondent claimed that he became owner, and by operation of law, the landlord of the suit-house and the appellants were his tenants. 4. The respondent claimed in his plaint that he was entitled to evict the appellants on the ground covered by Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act'. For this purpose, the respondent took the express plea that the portion occupied by the appellants was required by him bona fide for himself and for the members of his family. The respondent did not deny that he had an alternative accommodation in his possession. He however, raised a plea that the house occupied by him was not reasonably suitable for himself and the members of his family. His plea was the accommodation had only two living rooms besides kitchen, latrine and bathroom. He had two grown up sons and a daughter besides his wife. The alternative accommodation was too small for himself and the members of his family. This was the initial plea of the respondent. Subsequently, by an amendment in the plaint, as per order dated 12.10.1983, the respondent further stated that a portion of the house vacated by B.M. Sethi and another tenant is not suitable for the occupation of the respondent, because it is in the basement and remains damp and dark. It has not been let out and a servant of respondent was looking after it. It was also pleaded that this basement portion of the house is not in accord with the status of the respondent. 5. The respondent was not satisfied with this plea but took a step further to ensure the eviction of appellants by taking a further plea of eviction in the alternative. It was pleaded that the suit house was in dilapidated condition and required alterations and reconstructions which could not be done without accommodation being vacated. It was pleaded that the respondent had obtained necessary sanction for reconstruction form the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur and get prepared the plans and estimates for that purpose. He also claimed that he had necessary funds for reconstruction. 6. The respondent also raised a ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of 'the Acts as he claimed that the appellants did not pay or tender the arrears of rent within two months of service of notice of demand dated 9.7.1980. 7. The appellants raised several pleas in defence. He also claimed that he had necessary funds for reconstruction. 6. The respondent also raised a ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of 'the Acts as he claimed that the appellants did not pay or tender the arrears of rent within two months of service of notice of demand dated 9.7.1980. 7. The appellants raised several pleas in defence. They denied that the respondent alone was the owner of the House No. 630, Napier Town, Gorakhpur, Jabalpur. They pleaded that the Co owner Mandanlal Sethi a necessary party to the suit. It was also pleaded that Bhagwant Singh did not accept the respondent as his landlord, and in case, there was any admission of tenancy, it must have been obtained by fraud. It was alleged that the respondent had a vacant accommodation of six rooms. The bona fide need for residence of the respondent was denied. It was also pleaded that a portion of that house has already been vacated by B. M. Sethi and an old lady. It was pleaded that this portion of the house good enough for the respondent as it was previously occupied by Mr. B.M. Sethi, who was a man of equal status in life. It was also denied that the suit house was required for reconstruction. The other allegations made in respect of reconstruction were also denied. The appellants took further plea that they have deposited all the arrears of rent in C.C.D as per provisions of Section 13 of 'the Act' and, therefore, they be permitted to reap the benefit of Section 12(3) of the Act'. 8. The trial Court found that the respondent was co-owner of the suit house alongwith Mandanlal Sethi, and held that in the capacity of a co-owner, the respondent was legally entitled to evict the appellants as the other co-owner had not raised any objection. It was, however, held that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of Section 12(3) of 'the Act' because they had deposited the arrears of rent as per Section 13 (1) of 'the Act' and had continued to do so regularly during the pendency of the suit by 15th of each calender month. The trial Court also negatived the ground raised by the respondent under Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act'. The only ground which found favour with the trial Court was under Section 12(1)(h) of the Act'. The trial Court also negatived the ground raised by the respondent under Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act'. The only ground which found favour with the trial Court was under Section 12(1)(h) of the Act'. It was found that the respondent required the house bond fide for the purpose of re-construction, additions and alterations which could not be performed without getting the suit house vacated. Accordingly, the trial Court granted a decree of eviction from the suit house as per Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. 9. The appellants filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court and respondent too filed a cross-objection. The lower appeal Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants but allowed the cross-objection of respondent holding that the ground under Section 12(1)(c) 'the Act' has been proved in addition to Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' and accordingly, a decree was passed. 10. This appeal was admitted by this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the following substantial question of law, on 21.12.95 :- 1. Whether in view of the admission made by respondent/plaintiff to the effect that he had filed a suit for obtaining vacant possession of the alternative accommodation and that at the time of filing of the suit he was in possession of the alternative accommodation, the ground for bona fide requirement u/s 12(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is made out ? 2. Whether the Court below was justified in passing a decree u/s 12(1)(h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in view of the pleadings and evidence on record ? 11. During the course of arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants it appeared to this Court that this case involved further substantial questions of law. The Court, therefore, heard the parties on all aspects of the matter. In exercise of its powers under proviso to Section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court frames the following substantial questions of law :- 3. Whether the claim of the respondent could be said to be bona fide for the purpose of his residence when there was a plea that suit house was required bona fide for additions, alterations and reconstruction under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' and viceversa ? 4. Whether the claim of the respondent could be said to be bona fide for the purpose of his residence when there was a plea that suit house was required bona fide for additions, alterations and reconstruction under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' and viceversa ? 4. Whether the appellants could successfully assail the findings of the Court below on the basis of a subsequent event for which he had filed the amendment to show that the bona fide need had come to an end during the pendency of the appeal ? 5. Whether the amendment sought by the appellants be allowed ? 12. Firstly, the plea of eviction is under Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act'. Section 12(1)(e)(ibid) reads as under:- 12. Restrictions on eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: ............ (e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fule by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concreted. An analysis of this section may yield the following result- (i) The accommodation must be let for residential purpose. (ii) The accommodation must be required bona rule by the landlord. (iii) The requirement must be for occupation- (a) as residence for himself or any member of his family in case the landlord is owner thereof; or (b) for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. (iv) that -(a) the landlord; or (b) such person) (as the case may be) has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. It must be noticed that the condition No. 2 says that the accommodation must be required bona fide. Here, the emphasis is on both the words i.e. 'required' and 'bona fide'. 13. Now, the word "required" has been held to be stronger than the word desired'. It must be noticed that the condition No. 2 says that the accommodation must be required bona fide. Here, the emphasis is on both the words i.e. 'required' and 'bona fide'. 13. Now, the word "required" has been held to be stronger than the word desired'. It is obvious that the word 'desire' rules to the subjective side of mind likely to vary from mind to mind. However, if there is a requirement, it would ascend mere desire and would be something more than it. When this something more is added to desire to form requirement then we enter into realm of objective reality. Unexpressed desire is difficult to perceive until it is made (sic). It must come out in the open by clear expression of it or may be indicated an overt action related to the desire. On the other hand, requirement can be seen perceived because it arises from lack of paucity of a thing and the need of thing is open to be judged or perceived by senses. If there be some necessity which cannot be judged by evidence or may not be perceived by senses, then that necessity or requirement shall remain concealed from the eyes of law. Law cannot take cognizance of it. It was said centuries back by Brian C.J.:- It is common knowledge that thought of man shall not be tried for Devil itself knowcth not the thought of man. (Quoted from Winfields 'law of Tort' page 16, Eighth Edition) When the desire entombed in the mind crosses its own province to enter into the realm of requirement, certain facts come into play. Most of these facts can be objectively ascertained. 14. Now, when we add the word bona fide to requirement, we say that requirement must be genuine. It should not be spurious or feigned. The Legislature was not satisfied with the fact that a landlord should get a decree it the moment the facts establishing the requirement arc proved. It went a step further and required the Court to determine objectively that the requirement was made bona fide or in good faith. That is to say even though the requirement is there, but there should be a real desire for ejectment. It should not be spurious, feigned or its source should not be in an ulterior motive. It went a step further and required the Court to determine objectively that the requirement was made bona fide or in good faith. That is to say even though the requirement is there, but there should be a real desire for ejectment. It should not be spurious, feigned or its source should not be in an ulterior motive. For example, even if there is requirement, the motive may he to get enhanced rent. As already observed, if this desire is kept secret in the dark recesses of a person's mind, nothing can be done. On the other hand, if the overt acts of the landlord show that there is merely a requirement for eviction, but the desire for occupation is spurious or feigned, then in such a circumstance, the Court shall have no option but to hold that requirement is not bona fide. It is not necessary to cite a number of authorities on this proposition. In the case of Damodar Haridas Sharma and another v. Nandram Deviram 1960 MPLJ 925 (F.B.), the word 'genuinely' was interpreted to mean 'honestly' or 'in good faith' by the majority. The Supreme Court approved of the interpretation put by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of T.B. Sarvate v. Nemichand 1966 M.P.L.J. 26 (S.C.) Shah J. speaking for the Court stated:- We agree with the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that the word 'genuinely' used in section 4 (b) "speaks of the state of mind", means honestly or in good faith. Although the words "is required bona fide" have been added in 'the Act' instead of "genuinely requires" in the former. This change of phraseology is merely a change of form. In fact, the word "bona fide" is synonymous with "in good faith" or "genuinely or honestly". (See Babu Harisingh v. Ratanlal 1969 M.P.L.J. 662. 15. So far we have looked into Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act' in isolation to ascertain the meaning of words "bona fide" requirement of the landlord". We may tread on this path a little further to Section 17 of 'the Act'. Even if the requirement is held to be bona fide and a decree is passed by the Court, the landlord does not gel an absolute light of letting it out. We may tread on this path a little further to Section 17 of 'the Act'. Even if the requirement is held to be bona fide and a decree is passed by the Court, the landlord does not gel an absolute light of letting it out. Section 17 of 'the Act' puts an embargo on further letting for two years from the date of obtaining possession unless the Rent Controlling Authority permits the landlord to let it out. Even then the Rent Controlling Authority may ask the landlord to put the tenant back in possession. What interpretation should be given to Section 17 of 'the Act' in the context of Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act'. It is clear that even if the landlord had obtained a decree, he is not permitted to change his mind for two years unless he shows good cause to the Rent Controlling Authority. Then the evicted tenant has also a right of re-entry u/s. 12(1) and 17 (2) of 'the Act'. This shows that Legislature, in its wisdon has not trusted the landlord even after obtaining the decree. It has tried to prevent relating to a person other than the evidence tenant up-to two years of delivery of possession to the landlord in order to prevent letting out on higher rent after obtaining a decree. In view of Sec. 17 and Sec. 12(1)(e) of 'the Act' it appears to this Court that the Legislature wanted that landlords, in genuine or bona fide need only, should get a decree of eviction. Those who get a decree with ulterior motive are prevented from re-letting it for two years on their own to a person other than the evicted tenant. Even a transfer of possession which appears to be not bona fide can be undone and re-entry be ordered, if the evicted tenant makes an application u/s. 17 (2) of 'the Act'. 16. We, now examine the plea of the respondent. He has claimed in paragraph-6 of his evidence that he wanted to reconstruct his house which was in dilapidated condition. There could be no re-construction of the house unless the appellants vacated the house. It was stated that re-construction shall be made by the respondent for the residence of himself and the members of his family. Careful examination of the plaint would show that the respondent did not take such a plea. There could be no re-construction of the house unless the appellants vacated the house. It was stated that re-construction shall be made by the respondent for the residence of himself and the members of his family. Careful examination of the plaint would show that the respondent did not take such a plea. His requirement for re-construction is independent of iris bona fide requirement for his residence. His plea for requirement is definitely covered by Section 12(1)(h) of "the Act". This Court is of the view that no difficulty would arise if the respondent had approached the Court without asserting that he wanted to reconstruct the house or demolish it, provided he required the accommodation for his residence. In the case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1676 it was held that once it is proved that landlord required the house bona fide, it did not matter if he occupied the house after reconstructing or demolishing it. Therefore, we lake it that it is well established that once the bona fide requirement under Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act' is proved together with other ingredients of that section, it would not be of any consequence whether the accommodation is occupied as such or the house is reconstructed or demolished for the purpose of residence, but the landlord could not let it out within two years of obtaining possession unless conditions mentioned in Section 17 arc satisfied. 17. However, the landlord in this case has specifically pleaded in paragraph 5 of the plaint as follows:- 5. That the house in suit is in a dilapidated condition and required necessary alterations and reconstruction which cannot be done without the accommodation being vacated. The plaintiff has obtained necessary sanction from the Corporation Authorities for such purpose and the plans and estimates for such reconstruction have been properly prepared and necessary funds for the purpose are available with the plaintiff. The plea of bona fide requirement given in the plaint, in the paragraph 4, is being reproduced here for the sake of convenience, as follows:- 4. That the suit house is bona fide required by the plaintiff for his residence and that of his family members. The present house in which the plaintiff resides is very small for the legitimate heeds for residence for himself and for his family members. That the suit house is bona fide required by the plaintiff for his residence and that of his family members. The present house in which the plaintiff resides is very small for the legitimate heeds for residence for himself and for his family members. The present accommodation in possession of the plaintiff consists of two living rooms besides kitchen, bath-room and latrine. The plaintiff has two grown up sons and a daughter living with him besides his wife. The present accommodation is, therefore, wholly insufficient for the needs of the plaintiff and his family members. The portion vacated by Shri B.M. Sethi and other tenant are in the basement and remain damp and dark. The basement portion is not suitable for the plaintiff i.e. why it lying vacant. It has not been let out to any one. Plaintiff has kept his servant in it. Looking to the status and the positition of the plaintiffs family the plaintiff needs the upper portions occupied by the defendants and the other tenant in the adjoining portion. 18. Now, if we study both the aforesaid grounds together, we find that respondent wanted to evict the appellants on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 12(1)(e) and Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' apart from Section 12(1)(a) thereof. The parties, the trial Judge, the lower appellate Court as well as the counsel for the parties, understood the claim of the respondent. Indeed, the trial Judge negatived the claim of the respondent, based on Section 12(1)(a) and Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act' and granted the decree only on the ground under Section 12(1)(h) thereof. It is more than possible that the respondent would have been satisfied with the decree under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' alone, had he not received the notice of the first appeal filed by the appellants. He then filed a cross-objection seeking for eviction under Section 12(1)(e) of 'the Act' and persuaded the lower appeal Court to pass a decree under Section 12(e) of 'the Act' as well. Now since the decree for eviction is under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act', we must not interpret that section in an isolated manner. We must read the other sections which arc intimately connected with Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. Now since the decree for eviction is under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act', we must not interpret that section in an isolated manner. We must read the other sections which arc intimately connected with Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. If we read Section 12(7) of 'the Act', it would be apparent that this section prohibits passing of a decree under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' unless it is proved that proposed reconstruction shall not radically alter the character of building unless public interest so require and the plans and estimates have been so made. Therefore, there is no question of demolition under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act', unless it is in public interest. Apart from that, Section 18 of 'the Act' provides for re-entry after reconstruction or alteration is over, if the tenant so opts. Thus, here again, the Legislature has taken care of the situation when a landlord may try to evict a person on this ground totally with ulterior motive. Now, a bona fide requirement for residence totally shuts the door in the face of tenant and he cannot hope to re-enter unless the Rent Controlling Authority, at the instance of landlord, exercises his powers under Section 17 of 'the Act'. On the other hand, so far as a decree under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' is concerned, if the tenant, in exercise of his option, under Section 18 of 'the Act' so demands, the door of re-entry has to be re-opened. Thus, both pleas cannot stand together. There is a heed on collision. They are mutually destructive of each other. The aims of two grounds under Section 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(h) of the Act' are different. One refers to requirement for residence of the landlord and the focal point of the other requirement is reconstruction for further letting. Therefore, both the requirements cannot be bona fide, and for this reason the respondent cannot say with head held high that his both the needs are in good faith. 19. In view of this matter, the Court has no option to say that respondent could not have pleaded bona fide requirement for residence as well as bona fide requirement for reconstruction simultaneously. Both the pleas destroy each other. It is true that under Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure alternative reliefs are permitted. 19. In view of this matter, the Court has no option to say that respondent could not have pleaded bona fide requirement for residence as well as bona fide requirement for reconstruction simultaneously. Both the pleas destroy each other. It is true that under Order VII, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure alternative reliefs are permitted. It is also well established that alternative and inconsistent claims have been permitted by Courts subject to rider that law permits a Court to do so. The Court have refused to grant reliefs in case it was found that alternative pica would destroy the main plea. The Privy Council, in the case of Mahomed Buksh Khan and others v. Hosseini Bibi and others Indian Appeals (Vol. XV) page 81, laid down that where a plaintiff sues alleging that a deed purporting to be executed by him is a forgery. The Court ought not admit the inconsistent issue that whether it was executed by undue influence. In another case of Prem Raj v. The D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd. and another AIR 1968 S.C. 1355 the plaintiff filed a case that an agreement was invalid because it was obtained by undue influence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied decree on the alternative ground for specific performance of the contract for the reason that both the pleas could not stand together. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to the notice of the Court the case of K.A. Anthappai v. C. Ahammed A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1696. However, this authority is for the proposition that where the need of the landlord is for residence, it docs not matters the house simultaneously requires reconstruction or alterations. This may be so, but once the landlord takes a plea on both the counts together in a suit, he forfeits both. In this case, there was no examination of such a plea. In the Supreme Court case, in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indredaman Amratlal Sheth (supra) the plea was for bonafide residence. However, it was found that the landlord wanted to construct a new house after demolition. Therefore, it was contended by the tenant that landlord could not evict the tenant when he wanted to demolish the suit house. The Supreme Court turned down that plea. 21. However, it was found that the landlord wanted to construct a new house after demolition. Therefore, it was contended by the tenant that landlord could not evict the tenant when he wanted to demolish the suit house. The Supreme Court turned down that plea. 21. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the case of Radhey Shyam and others v. Kalyan Mal and another 1985 M.P.L.J. 112, and argued that the decision rendered in that case in complete answer to the problem raised here-in-before. The learned counsel for the respondent urged that the view of the Supreme Court decision this Court cannot examine the point as the law declared by the Supreme Court of India is binding on this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 22. The argument raised by the counsel for the respondent bears an analysis and answer from this Court, if this Court does not think in line with the learned counsel, that this case is complete answer to the problem raised. In that case the matter went up in appeal to Supreme Court under a decree under Section 12(1)(f) and (h) of 'the Act'. In that case, Shri A.K. Sen, learned counsel for the appellant, had challenged the findings of fact under Section 12(1)(f) of 'the Act', that an alternative accommodation is suitable for business purpose of the plaintiff. The Court, in paragraph 2, affirmed the finding of the Courts-below that alternative accommodation is not suitable. Thus, having held that the plaintiff bona fide required the suit-premises, the Supreme Court met the argument of Shri A.K. Sen, learned counsel for the appellant for application of Section 18 of 'the Act' as follows:- .......Though the Courts below have passed the order of eviction under Section 12(1)(f) and (h) we are of the opinion that the order of eviction is based really and substantially only under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. The fact that section 12(1)(h) is also mentioned in the orders of the Courts below does not make the order of eviction purely one under that section, for the main ground of requirement of the landlord is bona fide personal requirement for locating his proposed factory for the manufacture of gold and silver ornaments. 23. The fact that section 12(1)(h) is also mentioned in the orders of the Courts below does not make the order of eviction purely one under that section, for the main ground of requirement of the landlord is bona fide personal requirement for locating his proposed factory for the manufacture of gold and silver ornaments. 23. The Supreme Court, therefore, turned down the application under Section 18 of 'the Act' in case of a composite decree under Section 12(1)(f)and 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' on the ground that the decree is not purely under Section 12(1)(h) and the main ground for eviction was of bona fide requirement of stalling a factory. As such, the Supreme Court was deciding the question of limited nature as to application of Section 18 of a composite decree under Section 12(1)(f) and 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. The Supreme Court refused to apply Section 18 of 'the Act' to the case where decree under Section 12(1)(f) and 121 (1)(h) of 'the Act' was passed on the ground that in such cases the main ground for obtaining the decree in bona fide requirement. On the other hand, in Ramniklal's case, (supra) the ground for eviction was bona fide requirement for residence under Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) which was covered by Section 13 (1)(g) of that Act. It is clear from the pleadings, as quoted in that case:- The whole suit bunglow is very old built about 75 years ago and at present its different parts are likely to give way and collapse. Before sometime a little portion of an upper balcony had collapsed. In the circumstances, on finding it unsafe to stay in it without making additions, alterations and necessary changes, I the plaintiff, (sic) obliged to wait till I get possession of the whole bunglow. I, the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said suit bunglow vacated at present and only after the whole bunglow got overhauled as stated in para above. I, the plaintiff can utilize it for my personal use. The defendants seem to have contested the suit that the requirement pleaded therein is one the basis of Section 13(1)(hh) of that Act. The Supreme Court settled the controversy by saying that the bona fide requirement for residence could be claimed even if plaintiff wanted to reconstruct the whole house or demolish it. The defendants seem to have contested the suit that the requirement pleaded therein is one the basis of Section 13(1)(hh) of that Act. The Supreme Court settled the controversy by saying that the bona fide requirement for residence could be claimed even if plaintiff wanted to reconstruct the whole house or demolish it. It may be noted there was no specific plea for eviction under Section 13 (1)(hh) of that Act on the part of the plaintiff. It appears to be the defence of the tenant that the pleadings of the plaintiff amounted to claim for eviction for carrying out repairs. The Supreme Court held that once it is established that there is bona fide requirement, the landlord was free to occupy it after repairing, reconstructing or even demolishing it. In this case too, the Supreme Court was not required to consider the point whether a plaintiff can plead both the grounds together and both can be held to the claimable. No such argument was ever advanced and considered in both these cases. In Radheyshyam's case, (supra), the Supreme Court summed up its conclusion and those words, according to this Court, indicate the ratio of the case at page 114:- .....We agree with Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned counsel for the respondent landlord that the order of eviction is based mainly under section 12(1)(f) of the Act and that from the mere fact that section 12(1)(h) also is added would not make the order of eviction only one under section 12(1)(h) of the Act and Section 18 of the Act will not be attracted.......... 24. It is obvious that the Supreme Court assumed that a decree under Section 12(1)(f)(in our case it would he 12(1)(e)) could be passed alongwith section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. This assumption cannot be treated as a precedent for the reason that the Court was not called upon to decide the point in issue before this Court. At best, it could be argued that it logically follows from the decision that a decree under Section 12(1)(e) or 12(1)(f) could be passed alongwith a ground under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. 25. The question, therefore, is if this Court is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Radheshyam's case, (supra). The answer to question would depend upon whether the Supreme Court declared the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 25. The question, therefore, is if this Court is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Radheshyam's case, (supra). The answer to question would depend upon whether the Supreme Court declared the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. We have to go to the theory of precedents in order to find out what is the law declared within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Now it is well established that a case is an authority for what it decides. It is not an authority for a proposition that may logically follow from it. In Radheshyam's case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, were not required to decide the question, which is being decided by this Court. No argument was advanced before the Supreme Court that the pleas under Section 12(1)(e) and Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' are totally inconsistent and cannot stand together. Nor was it pointed out to the Supreme Court that the decree of bona fide requirement for residence did not give absolute right to the landlord qua owner. He could not ordinarily let out for two years after obtaining the decree as per Section 17 of 'the Act'. The Supreme Court was not required to give its decision on the point whether both the pleas under Section 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(h) could stand together. In the case of re Hallett's Estate Knatchbull v. Hallett, (1879) 13 Ch. D. 696 at page 712. Sir George Jessel said:- First of all, what is the proper use of authorities 7 This is almost elementary, but I am bound to state it, because, as I will show presently, that use has not been made in the case on which I am going to comment. The only use of authorities, or decided cases, is the establishment of some principle which the Judge can follow out in deciding the case before him........ What is the principle involved in Radheshyam's case, (supra). The principle is that if a decree is passed under Section 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(h) of the Act', it cannot be argued the provisions of Section 18 of 'the Act' shall still apply. The principle was that is such a composite decree the bond fide requirement takes primacy over the requirement of reconstruction. The point sought to be decided by the Court was not considered. The principle was that is such a composite decree the bond fide requirement takes primacy over the requirement of reconstruction. The point sought to be decided by the Court was not considered. Now, we have authority of Supreme Court itself in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals, Ltd. and another, (1991) 4 SCC 139 wherein R.M. Sahai, J., at page 162, discussed the binding nature of a precedent, as follows:- 39. But the problem has arisen due to the conclusion in the case of Synthetic and Chemicals'. The question was if the State legislature could levy vend fee on excise duly on industrial alcohol. The bench answered the question in the negative as industrial alcohol being unfit for human consumption the State legislation was incompetent to levy any duty of excise either under Entry 51 or Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. While doing so the bench recorded the conclusion extracted earlier. It was not preceded by any discussion. No reason or rational could be found in the order. This gives rise to an important question if the conclusion is law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution or it is per incuriam and is liable to be ignored. 40. 'Incuria' interally means 'carelessness'. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority'. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944)1 KB 718 : (1944) 2 All ER 293). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey (1962) 2 SCR 558 : A.I.R. 1962 SC 83 this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a bench extracted a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England incorporating one of the exceptions when the decision of an appellate Court is not binding. 41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusions of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law ? 41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusions of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law ? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. "A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has conic to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind" (Salmond on Juris Prudence 12th Edn.,p. 133). In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1991) 1 LB 675, 677 : (1941)2 All ER 11 the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered 'Without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority'. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gumnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 . The bench held that, precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment.' The courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1480 : (1967) 2 SCR 650 ; 20 STC 215, it was observed, 'It is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidly beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. 26. It is clear from the aforesaid quotation that a decision per incuriam or sub-silentio without argument are of no moment. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidly beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. 26. It is clear from the aforesaid quotation that a decision per incuriam or sub-silentio without argument are of no moment. If the mind was not applied to the problem by Supreme Court, then such a decision would not be binding as a precedent on that point. For the aforesaid reasons Radheshyam's case (supra), even if it be regarded as laying down the law that a composite decree can be passed under Section 12(1)(f) and 12(1)(h) of 'the Act', it is not binding on this Court because the provisions of Section 17, Section 12(7) and Section 18 of 'the Act' were not brought to the notice of the Court. Nor was this point of inconsistent pleas argued or discussed by the Supreme Court. The conclusion of this Court is otherwise supported by the observation of the Supreme Court in Ramniklal Pitamhardas Mehta's case (supra) which interpreted section 13 (1)(hh) of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) as follows, at page 1679 :- (16) The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the ease where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish premises and to erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. (hh) apply to eases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for creating a new building which is to be let out to tenants...... Thus, Radheshyam's case (supra) docs not declare the law. 27. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this Court is of the view that the plea of the respondent/landlord that he required the suit house bona fide for the residence of himself and that of the members of his family cannot stand together with the plea of the landlord that he required the suit house bona fide for reconstruction. On the contrary, the requirement of bona fide reconstruction of the suit house cannot be pleaded simultaneously with the plea of bona fide requirement for personal residence. Both the pleas are mutally destructive of each other and the very fact that they were pleaded together shows that none of them are bona fide. On the contrary, the requirement of bona fide reconstruction of the suit house cannot be pleaded simultaneously with the plea of bona fide requirement for personal residence. Both the pleas are mutally destructive of each other and the very fact that they were pleaded together shows that none of them are bona fide. They are so inconsistent that one cannot be alternative of the other. The landlord can lake only one of pleas so that is be bona fide. The moment he chooses the second with the first, both destroy each other. The Court is aware of the Order VII. Rule 7 and Order VII. Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The rules of pleadings do permit alternative and inconsistent pleadings. However, inconsistency in pleadings cannot be taken to such lengths that the very element of choice is destroyed. In the case of Smt. Indubai and another v. Jawaharlal and another AIR 1900 M.P. 80, Gulab Gupta, J. stated the principle and another AIR 1900 M.P. 80. G applied by this Court as follows, in paragraph 7, page 84:- 7......It must, however, be kept in view that though the law permits alternative relief on inconsistent allegations, it docs not permit inconsistent pleas. Pleas which are mutually distractive of each other are normally not allowed........ In the case of Kartar Singh and others v. Kanhai Singh (deceased by L. Rs.) and others, A.I.R. 1989 M.P. 328. T.N. Singh., at page 323, paragraph 5 held as follows:- 5.........Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision in the case of Prem Raj (supra), wherein the apex Court look the view that although under O.7. R.7 C.P.C. plaintiff could pray for inconsistent reliefs, he must show that the alternative plea was maintainable in law........ 28. In the opinion of this Court, this Court cannot countenance any one of the pleas for each one of them has to be bona fide. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider other grounds, as the appeal succeeds on the Question No. 3, framed by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is true that landlord had option to take one of the pleas at an early stage of the suit, but since he led evidence and obtained a decree under both, he cannot be permitted to withdraw anyone of the pleas. It is true that landlord had option to take one of the pleas at an early stage of the suit, but since he led evidence and obtained a decree under both, he cannot be permitted to withdraw anyone of the pleas. The permission shall destroy the bona fide nature of plea required under Section 12(1)(e) or Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. The judgment and decree passed by the Courts-below have to be set aside, in S.A. No. 772 of 1995. 29. In the connected Second Appeal No. 773 of 1995 the appellants were evicted under Sections 12(1)(c). 12(1)(h) and 12(1)(i) of 'the Act'. Since this Court has already held that none of the pleas under Sections 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' can give right to respondent to evict his tenant, for the reasons given earlier, it is held that the appellants in this case too, cannot be evicted under Section 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. However, no serious attempt was made by the learned counsel for the appellants to assail the decree of the Courts-below on Section 12(1)(i) of 'the Act' even when the appeal was admitted on the three questions of law framed by this Court despite the statement of the counsel for the appellants that identical questions are involved in the appeal. This Court is of the view that the respondent's plea under Section 12(1)(i) of 'the Act' does not come in conflict with any other pleadings of respondent. He can evict the appellants in this appeal on this ground. The trial Court had found that the original tenant Chanan Shall had built a suitable accommodation for himself, as staled by the respondent Natthusingh in his statement, and evidenced by Ex. P-16; and the tax assessment report, Ex. P-17. Chanan Shah did not dispute this fact that there is a house constructed in name of his wife. Chanan Shah also stated in his evidence that the plot and house did not belong to him. It was in the name of his wife. The trial Court seems to have found that die plot belonged to Chanan Shall and house was actually built by him, because of lack of explanation on the part of the witness regarding the source of income of his wife for building the house. It was in the name of his wife. The trial Court seems to have found that die plot belonged to Chanan Shall and house was actually built by him, because of lack of explanation on the part of the witness regarding the source of income of his wife for building the house. That apart, the trial Court also found that it was not disputed by Chanan Shah that his two elder sons, Indrajeet Kohli, the appellant no. 2 and Ashok Kohli the appellant No. 3 were living in separate houses, built by them. Vinod Kohli, appellant No. 4 was living with his mother. Smt. Motia Ram Kohli the appellant No. 1. In view of this, the trial Court has recorded a finding that after death of Chanan Shah, legal representatives, contenting the suit, had alternative accommodation of their own for granting a decree under Section 12(1)(i) of 'the Act'. The lower appellate Court rested its decision on much narrower ground. It has confirmed the finding of trial Court that the alternative house was actually built by Chanan Shall, which was a suitable accommodation for him and the members of Ms family; and for this reason, a decree under Section 12(1)(i) of 'the Act' as confirmed. 30. The express language of Section 12(1)(i) of 'the Act' refers to obtaining of vacant possession of allotment of suitable accommodation by the tenant. For this reason also, the accommodation built by Chanan Shall would be sufficient for decreeing the claim. The reason is that the alternative accommodation must be suitable to the tenant. The subsequent event of death of the original tenant would not give benefit of this section to the legal representative more than what Chanan Shall was entitled to. They literally step in the shoes of Chanan Shah and get the alternative accommodation as tenant. Even otherwise, it is not disputed that Smt. Motia Rani (Appellant No. 1) and Vinod Kohli (Appellant No. 4) have a new house, if it be held that the house was built by Motirani. Similarly, Indrajeet Kohli (Appellant No. 2) and Ashok Kohli (Appellant No. 3) have their separate houses. It appears that Smt. Usha Rani (Appellant No. 5) and Smt. Reena (Appellant No. 6) are married daughters, living in different house as is clear from the addresses given by them in the memo of appeal. Similarly, Indrajeet Kohli (Appellant No. 2) and Ashok Kohli (Appellant No. 3) have their separate houses. It appears that Smt. Usha Rani (Appellant No. 5) and Smt. Reena (Appellant No. 6) are married daughters, living in different house as is clear from the addresses given by them in the memo of appeal. Moreover, no the argument was advanced by the counsel for appellants regarding them. Thus, the finding regarding Section 12(1)(i) is confirmed and the Second Appeal No. 773 of 1995 is therefore, dismissed and eviction of the appellants/tenants is granted on the ground under Section 12(1)(i) of 'the Act'. The respondent shall not be entitled to any decree under Section 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' for the reasons already recorded while discussing the identical grounds raised by the respondent in the connected Second Appeal No. 772 of 1995. 31. As a result of aforesaid discussion, this Court sets aside the judgment and decree passed by the Courts-below and allow Second Appeal No. 772 of 1995. The Civil Suit No. 168-A of 1988 filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. Parties shall bear the costs borne by them throughout. However, the result of Second Appeal No. 773 of 1995 is just the opposite. The Second Appeal No. 773 of 1995 stands dismissed, as the respondent is entitled to a decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(i) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 alone and not under Section 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(h) thereof. The appellants shall pay the respondent, the cost of this appeal. Counsel's fee Rs. 750/-, (Rupees seven Hundred fifty), if certified. Appeal allowed