S. K. PHAUJDAR, J. The present respondents, Rajbali and others, filed an Original Suit No. 264 of 1980 before the Additional Munsiff, Azamgarh, for a per manent injunction against the first set of defendants. The suit was partly allowed in favour of the plaintiffs by the judgment and decree dated 31-7-1991 passed by the 12th Additional Munsiff, Azamgarh. This judgment and decree gave rise to two ap peals. Civil Appeal No. 253 of 1991 was preferred by the aggrieved plaintiffs for part dismissal of their claim while Civil Appeal No. 411 of 1991 was preferred by the present appellants for the decree that was recorded in favour of the plaintiffs. These two civil appeals were heard together by the Vth Additional District Judge, Azamgarh, who, by his judgment and decree dated 19-11-1994, allowed the civil appeal filed by the plaintiffs and decreed the whole suit against the defen dants and at the same time dismissed the appeal lodged by the defendants. Ag grieved, the defendants preferred the present two appeals challenging the find ings of the first appellate court. 2. In the appeals, the lower court record was summoned and a stay order was also granted staying operation of the decrees. The respondents had also ap peared and both sides were heard together at length and the matter is being disposed of by this judgment at the admission stage itself. 3. It was the case of the plaintiffs that they were old residents of the village in question and were cultivators. Their an cestral house stood at the point marked x in the map and they were in possession of the land marked with letters ABCD in the map as a sehan since before the abolition of Zamindari. They had their Well marked m, and had other structures for keeping cattle on its land. After abolition of Zamindari, the land marked ABCD be came their property under Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (u. P. Z. A. L. R. Act, for short ). The defendant- first set (No. 1 to 12) (present appellants) were trying to interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs although they had no right thereon. These defendants had their house towards the east and north of the land in question. The defendant- first set (No. 1 to 12) (present appellants) were trying to interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs although they had no right thereon. These defendants had their house towards the east and north of the land in question. They had illegally broken the troughs meant for the cattle and had illegally started making some constructions there on, the portion on which the constructions were made by indicated by points xi to X6 in the map. They had also raised a shop on the point indicated by letters x7 to X10 of the map and had made other con structions at XI1 to X14. Accordingly, the prayer for injunction was made for a direc tion for removal of the illegal construc tions from the land of the plaintiffs. 4. Defendant Nos. 1 to 12 came up with a written statement. According to the defendant, the suit property was having new plot 486 corresponding to old plot 1206. It was stated that during consolida tion operations, the land was recorded as Baagh Bhumidhar of the defendants. An application was filed by defendants, Raghunath and others, under Section 229 of the U. P. Z. A. L. R. Act and on 26-4- 1994 this plot 486 with an area of 790 Karl was declared as Baag Bhumidhari of Raghunath and others. The plaintiffs had full knowledges of this decision. It was asserted that old plot 1206 was in occupa tion of the ancestors of the defendats as Bhumidhar and they had planted mango and other trees and bamboo groves there on and were in possession thereof. The structures for keeping catties were also there for the cattle of the defendants only. The Well sunk by defendant Chhangur. The defendants also claimed the land with the help of Sec. 9of the UP. Z. A. L. R. Act. The Trial court framed the following issues: (1) If the plaintiff was the owner and oc cupier of the suit property ? (2) If the suit was barred by limitation? (3) If the suit was barred under the prin ciple of estoppel? (4) If the suit was under-valued? (5) If the disputed structures were liable to be demolished? (6) If the plaintiffs were entitled to any compensation and to what other reliefs the plaintiffs were entitled? 5. (2) If the suit was barred by limitation? (3) If the suit was barred under the prin ciple of estoppel? (4) If the suit was under-valued? (5) If the disputed structures were liable to be demolished? (6) If the plaintiffs were entitled to any compensation and to what other reliefs the plaintiffs were entitled? 5. The trial Court decreed the suit only for the portion marked by letters by Ka, Kha, C Ga in the plaint map (120ka-2 ). The defendants were directed to remove the structures made thereon within 3 months and were further directed not to disturb the possession of the plain tiffs in that portion of the land. The map (120 Ka-2) was to form a part of the decree. The suit for the rest of the portion of the suit land was dismissed. 6. The first appellate court decreed the suit for the whole of the suit plot as per plaint map and directed the defendants to remove the structures thereon within a month and the defendants were further directed not to interfere with the plaintiffs possession over the suit proper ty. The line drawn to denote the portion Ka, Kha, C and Ga in map (120 Ka 2) was ordered to be deleted and the map (120 Ka 2) in its original form was made part of the decree. 7. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that there was already a decision of the revenue court in favour of the defendants and without a prayer for cancellation of the order of the revenue court, the present relief could not have been granted. In this context, reliance was placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Batuk Deo Mani v. Deo Narain, 1982 Allahabad Law Jour nal 1097. It was an appeal arising from a suit before the Civil Court for permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs pos session of the said land. The defendants title to the land was earlier declared by a decree of the revenue court and, there after, the land was transferred by that defendant to another defendant. The plaintiffs had filed an application before the revenue court for setting aside the said decree and the matter was still pending. In the suit for injunction, the plaintiff had prayed for cancellation of the sale-deed between the two defendants. The plaintiffs had filed an application before the revenue court for setting aside the said decree and the matter was still pending. In the suit for injunction, the plaintiff had prayed for cancellation of the sale-deed between the two defendants. The plaintiffs contended before the civil court that the declaratory decree of the revenue court could not be read against him as he was not a party in that proceeding. It was held by the High Court that in the facts and cir cumstances, the civil court had no jurisdic tion to try the suit. It was observed that in substance, the suit although clothed as one for injunction was really a suit for declaration of the plaintiffs title to the suit land which was a matter to be decided by the revenue court. It was further observed that unless the decree of the revenue court in favour of one of the defendants was set aside, the civil court or indeed no court could hold that any other person had a right in the property contrary to the decla ration in the decree of the revenue court. It was further contended on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiff had not pleaded and proved that the land in ques tion had been a land appurtenant to their house and there was no averment, proof or finding that the land in suit was being used for the beneficial enjoyment of the house of the plaintiffs. On this point, reliance was placed on a decision in the case of Maharaj Singh, AIR 1976 SC 2602 . In this decision, the Supreme Court had examined the meaning of the expression appurtenant to building. It was observed that the larger objective of Section 9 is to settle with the former intermediary only such land as it strictly appurtenant to buildings, all the rest going to the State for implementation of the agrarian reforms policy. The large open spaces cannot be regarded as appur tenant to the terraces, stands and struc tures. What is integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination something incidental or ancillary or de pendent is implied in appurtenances. The touch-stone of appurtenance is depend ence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. The case before the Supreme Court concerned a haat. What is integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination something incidental or ancillary or de pendent is implied in appurtenances. The touch-stone of appurtenance is depend ence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. The case before the Supreme Court concerned a haat. It was held that the haat, bazar or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. Even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hatt or mela, the land is not appur tenant to the principal subject granted by Section 9, that is, the buildings. A further argument was advanced on behalf of the appellants that the trial Court had decreed the suit in part only while the lower appel late court had decreed it in full without reversing the findings of the court below and without discussing the reasons ad vanced by the trial Court. It was contended that this approach of the first appellate court was not a legal one. Reliance was placed on this point on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1995 SC 1607 . It was held herein that before reversing a finding of fact the appel late court has to bear in mind the reasons ascribed by the trial Court. The Supreme Court in giving out this opinion referred to a Privy Council decision in the case of Rani Hemant Kumari v. Maharaja Jagdindra Nath (1906) 10 Calcutta Weekly Notes 630. This view was also expressed by the Al lahabad High Court in C. M. Writ Petition No. 887 of 1995, as reported in 1995 High Court Daily Views Vol. I, at page 404. In the last mentioned judgment, it was held that whenever an appeal is heard it is the duty of the appellate court to examine the finding of the trial Court and if the findings are not correct, to deal with them. In the case before the High Court the appellate court had not looked to the reasons as signed by the trial Court and proceeded to reverse the order on his own appraisal of the materials. This approach was not sanc tioned by law as held by the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. 8. In the case before the High Court the appellate court had not looked to the reasons as signed by the trial Court and proceeded to reverse the order on his own appraisal of the materials. This approach was not sanc tioned by law as held by the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. 8. In answer to these averments, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respon dents submitted that the decision of the revenue proceedings and the judgment was not binding against them. It was con tended that the main issue between the parties was regarding the nature of the land, whether it was an abadi or not an abadi, the land being abadi the consolida tion authorities had no jurisdiction to record any order in that regard. Reference was made to Section 5, 11-A and 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (UPCH Act, for short ). Reliance was placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court, as reported in 1974 RD 5 (Thloki Nath v. Ram Gopal ). It was held herein that under the provisions of the UPCH Act, 1953, the word land has been given a particular meaning. When the holding was used for a purpose not in connection with agricultural, the High Court held that the UPCH Act would not apply to such land and the consolidation court will have no jurisdiction to decide the question of title between the parties thereto. The learned. Counsel for the respondents further sub mitted that the suit under Section 229 of the U. P. Z. A and L. R. Act was instituted by the defendants but the plaintiff was not made a party. The suit was still pending at the appellate stage before the Commis sioner. It was argued that the objection concerning bar of the present suit under Section 49 of the UPCH Act was not an issue at the trial. On the point, whether the bar of Section 49 would be applicable to the present set of fats, the learned Counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1981 SC 77 (Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another ). On the point, whether the bar of Section 49 would be applicable to the present set of fats, the learned Counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1981 SC 77 (Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and another ). In the case before the Supreme Court a decision of the High Court was impugned wherein the High Court had non-suited the appellant on the ground that after chakbandi (consolida tion proceeding) was completed under the UPCH Act the suit was barred by Section 49 of the said Act. The Supreme Court relied on an earlier judgment passed by it wherein it was observed that it was abun dantly clear that an application for muta tion on the basis of the inheritance when the cause of action arose, after the finalisation and publication of the scheme under Section 23, is not a matter in regard to which an application could be filed "under the provisions of this Act" within the meaning of clause (2) of Section 49. Thus, the other limb of Section 49. also is not attracted. The result is that the plea of bar of the civil Courts jurisdiction to inves tigate and adjudicate upon the title to the land of the plaintiff has no substance. In the case before the Supreme Court, there was a suit by co-sharer to challenge deletion of her name in joint Khewat in consolidation proceedings on the ground of fraud of a co-sharer in possession, the Supreme Court relying on the above indi cated observation, held that the suit was not barred. On the question of the main tainability of the suit, under the shadow of Section 49 of the UPCH Act. Reliance was also placed on another decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jiyawan v. Jhanghoo, 1981 RD 134. It was held herein that the land being outside the purview of the jurisdiction of the con solidation authorities, no question about the rightful claim to it could have been raised before them the bar of Section 49 of the UPCH Act could not be said to apply to any adjudication about the right or title to the land in suit by the Civil Court. In this decision, the dictum in the case of Triloki v. Ram Gopal (supra) was followed regarding the definition of the term land in the UPCH Act. This very case-law was also relied on to combat an argument ad vanced by the other side on the question of the extent of a land appurtenant to a house. The land in question was 0. 26 acres and the findings of the court below that it was a Sehan of the plaintiff was upheld. In reply to the decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaja Singhs case (supra) reliance was placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court (Luknow Bench), as reported in 1989 Allahabad Civil Journal 196. The decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Singhs case was considered in this judg ment and it was observed that the term "appurtenance" was explained by the Supreme Court in a matter between the State and an. ex-zamindar holding that haats and melas could not be regarded as land appurtenant to a building as en visaged in Section 9 of the UP Z. A. and L. R. Act. The test of appurtenance in a suit between two contending cultivators for a piece of land, however, may not be that as set out in the Supreme Court decision. The Allahabad High Court, however, relied on the Supreme Court decision to hold that the touchstone of "appurtenance" was the dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. The learned Counsel for the respondent further submitted that although a point of "beneficial enjoyment" of the suit property, no such point was raised in the first appeal. Refer ence was made to paragraph 12 of the judgment of the first appellate court. 9. The contention of the appellant on the question of decision of the revenue court on the facts of the case is not an acceptable one. It is the undisputed case of the parties that the land stood recorded at an abadi. Once it was an abadi land, the consolidation authorities had no jurisdic tion to record it as a bagh as consolidation proceedings are not to be taken for abadi lands. The case-laws cited in this regard by the learned Counsel for the respondent make it abundantly clear that the land being abadi the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to record any order in that regard. The case-laws cited in this regard by the learned Counsel for the respondent make it abundantly clear that the land being abadi the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to record any order in that regard. There was, therefore, no necessity to seek a cancellation of the order of the revenue court before going for a relief to the civil court and Section 49 of the UPCH Act was not applicable in the present set of facts so as to bar the filing of the civil suit for establishing the rights of the plaintiffs. Moreover, the revenue proceedings were taken in the absence of the present plaintiffs and the same could not have affected the rights of the plaintiffs and the judgment could not be used as res judicata for the instant trial before the civil court. 10. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiffs had not pleaded and proved that the land in ques tion had been a land appurtenant to their house and in the absence of averment or proof on this point, the suit could not have been decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. Maharaj Singhs case which was relied upon by the appellants has been clearly distinguished in the Allahabad decision to indicate that the interpretation of land appurtenant to a building given in a proceeding against an ex- landlord may not be the one for a dispute between two tenants claiming the same piece of land as appurtenant to their houses. In this case, both the parlies had laid a claim that they got the suit property by operation of Sec tion 9 of the UP. Z. A. and L. R. Act. As observed in the High Court, the touch stone of appurtenance is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. It is true that the plead ing of the plaintiff is silent in using the term "appurtenant" to building but facts have been stated to indicate clearly that the land in question was being used for the beneficial enjoyment of their building which was the real meaning of the term appurtenant to building. Two courts have found on facts that it was the plaintiff who was in possession of the land in dispute and not the defendant as pleaded in the defence. Two courts have found on facts that it was the plaintiff who was in possession of the land in dispute and not the defendant as pleaded in the defence. Thus, it may not be stated that the plea of benefit of Section 9 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act was not available to the plaintiff for lack of proper pleading. 11. A question has been raised on the acceptability of the judgment of the first appellate court on the ground that there was no discussion of the reasonings given by the trial Court and the first appellate court had simply recorded its own findings on facts without setting aside the findings of the trial Court. The case-laws that the first appellate court is required to deal with the reasonings of the trial Court re late to cases where the decree of the trial Court was reversed by the first appellate court. We are, however, confronted with situation where the decree has not been reversed but only confirmed subject to a modification that it was for the whole of the suit property. The trial Court had given its reasons for party allowing the suit and the first appellate court had also dealt with the points raised before it to give a full decree. It the present case, therefore, the absence of thorough discussion of the trial Courts reasoning did not result into miscarriage of justice. It appears from a reading of the first appellate judgment that only two points were raised by the appellant in the course of arguments. The points were (1) whether the suit-property was a land appurtenant to the house of the plaintiffs or the first set of defendants under Section 9 of the UP Z. A. and L. R. Act and (2) whether the plaintiffs could make out a case for demolition of con structions on the whole of the suit-proper ty. These two points were quite thorough ly discussed by the first appellant court and a definite finding was arrived at against the defendants on each of the points and the impugned decree was passed. The first appellate courts judg ment may not, therefore, be criticised simply for the non-discussion of the reasonings of the trial Court. 12. The problem has another facet. The first appellate courts judg ment may not, therefore, be criticised simply for the non-discussion of the reasonings of the trial Court. 12. The problem has another facet. There is a consistent finding of the factum of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property by the two courts. An injunction could have been granted on the basis of possession as well and the plaintiffs, having been able to prove their posses sion, ,ere entitled to protect it from in vasion of outsiders, the defendants in this case, and were further entitled to get removed any illegal constructions that were made on the suit-property. The decree of permanent injunction and man datory injunction may not, therefore, be interfered with. 13. Both the appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed. The judgments and decrees in the two appeals now impugned are confirmed. The parties, however, shall bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed. .