JUDGMENT - A.D. MANE, J. :---This is a writ petition filed by the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (for short, M.S.E.B.) through its Executive Engineer (Civil Construction-Maintenance) Division Nasik Road, Nasik, to challenge the order made on 24-8-1995 by the State Government directing the resumption and restoration of the land to the original owner under the 1973 Resolution. 2.The petitioner seeks the reliefs of issuance of a "Writ of Certiorari or any other directions in the nature of a Writ" to quash the order or the recommendation of the Commissioner, Nasik, dated 24-8-1995 and also the order of the Tahsildar, Pathardi, dated 4-10-1995 in execution of the order for restoration of possession of the land to the respondents No. 3 and 4. 3.The material facts are these ; The State Government - respondent No. 1 acquired agricultural lands bearing Survey No. 10 admeasuring 1 H 95 R and Survey No. 11/7 admeasuring 1 H 15 R belonging to the respondents No. 3 and 4 along with the land Survey No. 11/8 admeasuring 1 H 12 R and Survey No. 11/9 admeasuring 1 H 30 R belonging to one Dhondiba Sakhare and another for the purpose of construction of 132 K.V. Sub-Station at Pathardi Taluka Pathardi District Ahmednagar. These lands were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The possession of the lands was also given to M.S.E.B. The M.S.E.B. constructed 132 K.V. Sub-Station and tower in the area of 7 gunthas only out of the land Survey No. 10. 4.The respondents No. 3 and 4 who are original owners of the land Survey Nos. 10 and 11/7 filed their petition before the respondent No. 1 for restoration of the acquired land as according to them they have become landless and the acquired land was unutilised for number of years for the purpose for which it was acquired by the M.S.E.B. 5.The Collector, Ahmednagar, in the first place, made a preliminary inquiry for ascertaining whether the acquired land belonging to the respondents No. 3 and 4 was utilised or not for the purpose for which it was acquired within 3 years of handing over possession to M.S.E.B. On receipt of the report from the Sub-Divisional Officer, the M.S.E.B. through its Executive Engineer was requested by the letter dated 23-1-1995 to state if it has any objection for restoration of the land to the original owners. The reply was sent under the signature of the Executive Engineer on 31-1-1995 inter alia stating that the land is reserved for the construction of the quarters etc. and as and when funds are made available, the construction would be taken in hand. 6.It appears, that further inquiry was conducted and panchanama was effected by the Sub-Divisional Officer through the Tahsildar and it was found that only 7 gunthas of land Survey No. 10 was made use of by the M.S.E.B. and the rest of the land has been kept unused. Therefore, the M.S.E.B. was again requested to communicate whether it has any objection to restoration of the rest of the land to the original owners. By the letter dt. 21-3-1995 the Executive Engineer of the M.S.E.B. reiterated the future need. 7.The respondents considered the replies given by the petitioner and since the replies were found to be vague in material particulars, in exercise of the powers under the 1973 resolution, the respondent No. 1 State Government by the impugned order dated 24-8-1995 directed the Tahsildar to restore the possession of the unutilised land out of Survey Nos. 10 and 11/7 to the respondents No. 3 and 4 on the conditions as laid down in the said Resolution. 8.It appears that on 4-10-1995 intimation was given to the Executive Engineer of the M.S.E.B. that the possession of the unutilised land would be given to the respondents No. 3 and 4 on 16-10-1995 at 11 a.m. The petitioner, therefore filed this petition on 16-10-1995 to challenge the action of the State Government on two-fold grounds, firstly, that there is no law whereby the land acquired can be restored back to the original owners, and secondly that the petitioner was not given opportunity of hearing and therefore, there is breach of the principles of natural justice. 9.The respondents No. 1 and 2 filed the return on 19-12-1995. The respondents No. 3 and 4 also filed separate Civil Application No. 1775/1995 with affidavit and the rejoinder on 19-12-1995 in opposing admission of the petition. 10.On behalf of the respondent No. 1, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Sawant and on behalf of the respondents. No. 3 and 4 Mr. The respondents No. 3 and 4 also filed separate Civil Application No. 1775/1995 with affidavit and the rejoinder on 19-12-1995 in opposing admission of the petition. 10.On behalf of the respondent No. 1, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Sawant and on behalf of the respondents. No. 3 and 4 Mr. Shinde, learned Counsel, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the petition saying that the action of the respondents No. 1 and 2 is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction at the instance of the petitioner in the matter of resumption of the land under the 1973 Resolution. 11.The learned Counsel for both the parties, therefore, addressed the Court on the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents. The question, therefore, arises is whether the writ petition as filed by the petitioner M.S.E.B, is maintainable or the action of the respondents No. 1 and 2 is amenable to the writ jurisdiction either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12.In the first place it would be appropriate to refer to the Resolution dated 10-10-1973 issued by the State Government in the matter of disposal of the land after acquisition. The preamble of the Resolution reads as under : "It has been observed that sometimes lands acquired by various acquiring bodies are found to be surplus as a result of which such acquired lands cannot be utilised for the purpose for which they are acquired. In a number of cases it is also observed that lands acquired by acquiring bodies are not utilised for the purpose for which they are acquired but are utilised for some other purpose. The question of laying down a policy in regard to the disposal of such surplus acquired lands or acquired lands which are not utilised for the purpose for which they are acquired and are utilised for some other purpose was, therefore, engaging the attention of Government for some time past. Government is now pleased to direct that the disposal of such surplus and agricultural lands should be done in accordance with the instructions given in the following paragraphs." The instructions No. 2 (I) read as follows : "2-II Lands Acquired for Central Government or Local Authorities in whom Acquired lands Vest absolutely or automatically after Acquisition. Government is now pleased to direct that the disposal of such surplus and agricultural lands should be done in accordance with the instructions given in the following paragraphs." The instructions No. 2 (I) read as follows : "2-II Lands Acquired for Central Government or Local Authorities in whom Acquired lands Vest absolutely or automatically after Acquisition. When lands are acquired for Central Government they vest in the appropriate Government i.e. the Central Government and as such it is not legally feasible to impose any conditions for disposal of such lands even though the same might be surplus or lying unutilised. Similarly in respect of some local authorities like the Bombay Municipal Corporation which is constituted under the B.P.M. Corporations Act, 1940 there is a provision for automatic vesting of the acquired land in the concerned authorities. Consequently after the completion of acquisition proceedings acquired lands automatically vest in such local authorities, Government cannot, therefore, impose any condition in regard to the disposal of such acquired lands even though they are surplus or lying unutilised. " Similar are the instructions No. 2(II) which relate to the lands acquired for State Government. 13.The relevant instructions with which we are concerned are the instructions No. 2(III) which deal with the agricultural land acquired for Statutory Bodies and Municipalities and to quote : "2(III) Land acquired for Statutory Bodies and Municipalities in whom acquired lands do not vest automatically. (A) Government has decided that in the case of the acquiring bodies under this category, the acquired land should be utilised for the purpose for which they are acquired within the period of three years from the date of taking over possession thereof. In case, however, the acquired land or any portion thereof is not likely to be utilised for the purpose for which it is acquired within the stipulated period of three years, the acquiring body should examine the feasibility of utilising the land for some other public purpose within the same period of three years from the date of taking over possession thereof. If the acquiring body feels that the acquired land can be put to some other public purpose within the stipulated period of three years from the date of taking over possession thereof, they should make out a case for the utilisation of the land for other public purpose and accordingly submit to Government in Revenue and Forest Department in good time through the Collector concerned, proposals for the utilisation of the land for other public purpose within the same period of three years from the date of taking over possession thereof for approval. (B) If, however, such acquired land found surplus and/or unutilised and misutilised cannot be utilised for any public purpose within the stipulated period of three years from the date of taking over possession thereof, the Collector of the District concerned should take steps for resumption of the land to Government in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. On resumption of the land the Collector should take steps for restoration of such land to the original owners, perpetual lessees or the tenants having security of tenure, under the various tenancy laws in force, on payment of market value, which should not exceed double, the amount of compensation that was paid while acquiring the land subject to the ceiling limits prescribed under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961. (c) .................................................." Now, Mr. H.T. Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, argues that the acquired land is already vested in the petitioner acquiring body and therefore, the respondent has no power to resume the same and restore it to the original owners. In this context, it is submitted that the Government Resolution of 1973 is mere guidelines or the instructions having no force of law. According to him, once the land is vested in the acquiring body, the respondent State Government has no authority in law to resume the land under administrative guidelines. The learned Counsel further argued that the policy of the State Government under the 1973 Resolution is contrary to the provisions of the Article 300-A of the Constitution of India which inter alia provides that 'No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law'. It is his contention that there is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act for restoration of land once acquired to original owner. It is his contention that there is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act for restoration of land once acquired to original owner. The instructions are invalid and as such the authority below erred in exercising its powers not vested in them by law. Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel, cited some of the decided cases arising out of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act but none of these decisions deal with authority of the State Government in disposal of acquired land after acquisition. To mention, they are ; (1) (Laxmichand v. Gram Panchayat Kararia Chauraha Lashkarpur)1, A.I.R. 1995 M.P. 166, (2) (Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P.)2, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2517, (3) (Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 122 and (4) (Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hariram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School)4, 1993 (4) S.C.C. 10 . Mr. Joshi also relied on some other decided cases to show that the order passed by the Government can also be challenged by the statutory body either in a suit or by a writ petition, viz.; (1) (A.I.R. 1969 A.P. 20)5, (2) (A.I.R. 1989 Karnataka 21)6, (3) (U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi)7, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 724 and (4) (Agricultural Products Mkt. Committee, Yevatmal v. Divisional Joint registrar Co-op Society, Amravati)8, A.I.R. 1984 Bom. 269. 14.On the other hand Mr. Sawant, learned Assistant Government Pleader, laid a great deal of emphasis on the Government Policy as per the Government Resolution of 1973. He also referred to the Land Acquisition Manual (Section 328) and Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It is argued by him that the acquired land does not vest with the petitioner automatically. There is therefore no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India when the State Government under executive powers lays down the principles for the guidance of the Departments in the matter of disposal of acquired land after acquisition. It is submitted that the Court will not interfere with a policy made by the Government in exercise of its powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It is thus submitted that the 1973 Resolution has force of law to supplement the rules made under section 56(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 15.Mr. Shinde, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 3 and 4, while supporting the argument of Mr. It is thus submitted that the 1973 Resolution has force of law to supplement the rules made under section 56(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 15.Mr. Shinde, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 3 and 4, while supporting the argument of Mr. Sawant, learned Assistant Government Pleader urged that the Court will not allow a question to be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which could be settled with the Government. According to him, the action of the State Government is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction at the instance of the State instrumentality. In this regard he relies on two decisions (1) (Allahabad Development Authority v. State of U.P.)9, 1994 Land Acquisition and Compensation Cases 134 (All-DB) and (2) (1995 All India High Court Cases 3368)10. Mr. Shinde also emphasised the meaning of the expression "public purpose" as discussed by the Apex Court in the case reported in (1995 All India High Court Cases 433)11. 15A.The acquired land is undisputedly is an agriculture land. It is clear from the Instructions No. 2(III) that the acquired land does not vest in the acquiring body automatically after acquisition., in the absence of any agreement executed for vesting of acquired land in statutory body like M.S.E.B. It is an admitted position that there was no such agreement executed by M.S.E.B. and hence, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the acquired land could have been vested in acquiring body automatically as in case of land acquired for the Central Government or the State Government as provided in Instructions No. 2(I). There is therefore no merit in the argument of Mr. Joshi, that the acquired land vested in the petitioner and as such the impugned order is illegal. 16.Instructions No. 2(III)(B) clearly provide that in case of acquired land or any portion thereof which is not likely to be used for the purpose for which it is acquired within the stipulated period of three years by the acquiring body, the Collector on examining the proposal for resumption, should take steps for the restoration of such land to the original owner. The Collector of the concerned district is, therefore, clothed with the powers of resumption. The Collector of the concerned district is, therefore, clothed with the powers of resumption. 17.Now, turning to the question of validity of the instructions, it can only be said that when there is no statutory power empowering the Executive to make rules and when such rules are made under the general executive powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution, such instructions have constitutional flavour unless such instructions conflict with any existing law or any provision of the Constitution of India. The argument of Mr. Joshi that the instructions contravene the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, I think, is misplaced in the circumstances of the case. The petitioner is the 'State instrumentality or agency' and does not enjoy any superior power or authority over the State Government. In (Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, Sehrevardi)12, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 481, P.N. Bhagwati, C.J., (as he then was) observed that: "The constitutional philosophy of a democratic socialist republic requires the Government to undertake a multitude of socio-economic operations and the Government, having regard to the practical advantages of functioning through the legal advice of a corporation embarks on myriad commercial and economic activities by resorting to the instrumentality or agency of a corporation, but this contrivance of carrying on such activities through a corporation cannot exonerate the Government from its basic obligation to respect the Fundamental Rights and not to override them. The mandate of a corporation may be adopted in order to free the Government from the inevitable constrains of re-tapism and slow motion but by doing so, the Government cannot be allowed to play truant with the basic human rights. The mandate of a corporation may be adopted in order to free the Government from the inevitable constrains of re-tapism and slow motion but by doing so, the Government cannot be allowed to play truant with the basic human rights. Otherwise, it would be the easiest thing for the Government to assign to a plurality of corporations almost every State business such as Post and Telegraph, T.V. and Radio, Rail Road and Telephones - in short every economic activity - and thereby cheat the people of India out of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to them." Quite apart it is also equally relevant to point out the view expressed by the Select Committee in its report on the Bill leading to the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, XVI of 1936, as quoted at page 882 of Commentary on the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by Omprakash Agrawal, 3rd Edition, observed : "In the new clause (4) of section 41 we have added further safeguards to enable Local Governments to ensure that the houses shall be properly built and used. Some of the opinion received upon the Bill when circulated mention possible difficulties connected with the resumption of land which is being misused. We consider that the Act gives adequate powers to Local Government to secure the resumption of land in such cases and we understand that it is usual to give the first option of repurchase to the original owner. In these circumstances we have not considered it necessary to make an amendment relating to this matter." 18.In this context regard may be had to section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. That section empowers the State Government to make rules consistent with the provisions of the Act for guidance of its officers. Such rules can be made, altered or added with previous publication in the Official Gazette. The 1973 Resolution contains the instructions for disposal of the acquired land after acquisition. Perhaps they are in the spirit of provisions contained in section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act. There is therefore, no substance in the arguments of Mr. Joshi that instructions are mere guidelines having no force of law. The 1973 Resolution contains the instructions for disposal of the acquired land after acquisition. Perhaps they are in the spirit of provisions contained in section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act. There is therefore, no substance in the arguments of Mr. Joshi that instructions are mere guidelines having no force of law. 18A.Assuming for the sake of arguments that there is no statutory power empowering the State Government to make rules in the matter of disposal of the acquired land after acquisition and such instructions or rules are made under the general executive powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, as said above, these instructions have also constitutional flavour when they do not conflict with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as well as the Constitution of India. It may be stated that the instructions contained in the 1973 Resolution are integral part of scheme of Business rules and have therefore constitutional force to supplement the rules governing the disposal of the acquired land after acquisition. As discussed above, the petitioner failed to prove any existing fundamental or legal right to question the constitutional validity of these instructions. The instructions are thus binding on the Government. There is therefore merit in the argument of learned Counsel for the respondents that it is a policy decision of the Government and the Court will not interfere with the policy decision of the Government when it does not violate any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It is equally important to note that the Court will not exercise its powers of judicial review to interfere with the policy made by the State Government in exercise of its general executive powers which is not proved to be inconsistent or contrary to the provisions of Law or Constitution. As a matter of fact, I think, locus standi of petitioner to question validity of 1973 Resolution comes to an end if regard be had to its legal status. There is no quarrel that the petitioner is the statutory body and "State instrumentality or agency" within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution. In a given situation, the petitioner as "State instrumentality" is therefore debarred from attacking the impugned order which is in conformity with the instructions contained in the 1973 Resolution. 18B. There is no quarrel that the petitioner is the statutory body and "State instrumentality or agency" within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution. In a given situation, the petitioner as "State instrumentality" is therefore debarred from attacking the impugned order which is in conformity with the instructions contained in the 1973 Resolution. 18B. There is one more reason why, I think that the objection requires to be upheld. The action of the State Government is not amenable to writ jurisdiction not only for above reasons but also for the reason that the application of M.S.E.B. to invoke writ jurisdiction is without any substance. The object of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is for enforcement of already existing fundamental right or legal right and not for establishing such right or title. There involves no question of violation of any fundamental or legal right of M.S.E.B. especially when acquired land did not vest in it automatically. The petitioner therefore cannot be permitted to establish a right which, in reality, does not exist, in writ petition. 19.In Allahabad Development Authority v. State of U.P. and others, 1994 Land Acquisition Compensation Cases 134 Allahabad, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court declined to issue writ on a petition by the Development Authority, which is a statutory body as the Court was of the view that the question whether the land acquisition proceedings ought to or ought not to be denotified is a matter of policy in which a decision has to be taken by the State Government and it is not a matter for the Court to judge whether the Development Authority should receive a writ of mandamus to annul the action of the State Government. In that case the Court quoted the observations of the Apex Court in (Oil and Natural Gas Commission and another v. Collector of Central Excise)13, 1992 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 432 and in my opinion, these observations aptly apply to the facts of the present case and to quote: "3. This Court has on more than one occasion pointed out that Public Sector Undertakings of Central Government and the Union of India should not fight their litigation in Court by spending money on fees of Counsel, Court fees, procedural expenses and wasting public time. Courts are maintained for appropriate litigations. This Court has on more than one occasion pointed out that Public Sector Undertakings of Central Government and the Union of India should not fight their litigation in Court by spending money on fees of Counsel, Court fees, procedural expenses and wasting public time. Courts are maintained for appropriate litigations. Court's time is not to be consumed by litigations which are carried on either side at public expenses from the source. Notwithstanding these "observations repeated on a number of occasions, the present case appear to be an instance of total callousness." 20.Now coming to the authorities upon which reliance is placed by Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel, as said above, none of these authorities would help the petitioner in support of the relief asked for. Two principles are obtainable from those authorities to which there would be no quarrel. In case of enhancement of compensation by reference Court if the Government does not file appeal the local authority can file an appeal against the Award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 724. The principles of natural justice are applicable to administrative bodies apart from judicial or quasi judicial authorities 1993(4) S.C.C. 10 . I fail to understand how these principles can help the petitioner on the material points discussed above. 21.Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel, no doubt cited the decision in A.I.R. 1969 A.P. 21 wherein it is observed that the State Government is not strictly called judicial or quasi judicial authority but even then before passing an order in favour of a party or against a party he should be given chance to make the representation. Similarly in A.I.R. 1984 Bom. 269 right to file writ petition to challenge order passed under section 43 of the Agriculture Produce Market Committee Act by the Divisional Joint Registrar was upheld in favour of the Market Committee constituted under the said Act. I think that none of these principles can apply to the point involved in this petition. 22.Lastly Mr. Joshi invited my attention to the decision in Laxmichand and others v. Gram Panchayat Kararia Chauraha Lashkarpur and others, A.I.R. 1995 M.P. 166 wherein dropping of the proceedings on the request of the party for whom the land was acquired by the Land Acquisition Officer was challenged and subsequently proceedings were received by the officer. It was held that it was not invalid. It was held that it was not invalid. In that case it was also observed that after passing the award major portion was taken in possession of but failure to take possession of portion of the land does not revert land to the owner. I think that this case is distinguishable on facts and no assistance can be had to support any of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 23.It may be stated that the contention that the impugned order suffers from non-observance of the principles of natural justice is also misconceived in law. As observed earlier there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The correspondence upon which reliance is placed by the respondent No. 1 clearly show that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to give its say. Nevertheless in the given situation it can be safely said that the principle of natural justice or holding of an inquiry is unwarranted. The Court has recognised that the rule of audi alterem partem can be excluded where having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose of the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions, fairness in action does not demand its application and even warrants its exclusion. In conclusion keeping in mind the well accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine when it is discloses no substance. 24.Lastly it is not out of place to mention that though the petition is styled as one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India but not only the reliefs but the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner is on the basis that this is a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. I have already pointed out that the action of the State Government is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. Even in case of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the facts and circumstances no interference to the impugned order is also called for. The Collector is the competent authority to exercise powers under the 1973 Resolution. The petitioner has also failed to make out a case. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to have suffered from any legal infirmity. The conditions for restoration of the land to the original owner have been fulfilled. The Collector is the competent authority to exercise powers under the 1973 Resolution. The petitioner has also failed to make out a case. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to have suffered from any legal infirmity. The conditions for restoration of the land to the original owner have been fulfilled. There is one more circumstance which cannot escape notice of.. Nowhere in the petition the petitioner has come out with the case to invalidate the 1973 Resolution. It is only when the respondent No. 1 relied on 1973 Resolution that the arguments were advanced on behalf of the petitioner about its validity. That shows that the petitioner has not even bothered to consider the power of the State Government in the matter of resumption and restoration of the land acquired after acquisition. Moreover, the High Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court on the administrative decision. Therefore it cannot interfere with the impugned order in the absence of illegality, unconstitutionality or want of jurisdiction or mala fides. Therefore, the order of restoration warrants no interference. Thus I reached to the conclusion that the preliminary objection must be upheld. 25.In the result, the writ petition is dismissed in limine. No order as to costs. Certified copy is expedited. 26.On the request of Mr. Joshi, the operation of this order is stayed for two weeks. No doubt Mr. Shinde learned Counsel for the respondents No. 3 and 4 strongly objected to it. Petition dismissed.