SATYABRATA SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated January 8, 1992 passed by Paritosh Mukherjce, J. , whereby and where under the said learned Court, allowed the writ application filed by the writ-petitioner-respondent. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are members of the security staff of Indian Institute of Management. Admittedly, on or about August 21, 1990, the Board of Directors of Indian Institute of Management adopted a resolution which reads thus :"the Board agreed in principle to the proposed revision in the pay scales of the security guards in IIT Delhi/kharagpur, particularly in the context of the need to improve security, subject to Government approval being obtained before the revised scales are implemented. " ( 3 ) THE petitioners' contention before the learned Trial Judge appears to be that despite the fact that the said resolution was taken on August 21, 1990, no steps therefor have been taken by the respondents. Before the learned Trial Judge an affidavit-in-opposition had been filed by the management, but at the time of hearing of the said writ application, it is apparent, that the appellant was not represented. The learned Trial Judge without assigning any reason whatsoever disposed of the writ application directing the respondent to implement the aforementioned resolution within a period of one month from the date of communication thereof and further directed that the respondents and each one of them including the management to see that appropriate pay scale to the writ petitioners in the instant joint writ petition be given, as the Security Guards and Head Security Guards of I. I. T. Kharagpur and Delhi, used to draw, in terms of the said resolution dated August 21, 1990. Such scale of pay should be given from the date of Resolution dated August 21, 1990 and in accordance with law. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised two contentions in support of this appeal. The learned Counsel firstly submitted that the Indian Institute of Management is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised two contentions in support of this appeal. The learned Counsel firstly submitted that the Indian Institute of Management is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He (sic.) further submitted that the learned trial Judge appears to have committed an error in so far as his Lordship's notice was not drawn to the letter dated August 4, 1991 issued by the Government of India as contained in Annexure 'a' to the writ application in terms whereof Board's proposal for revision in the pay scale of the security staff was rejected. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners respondent has, however, submitted that the said letters appear to have been issued by way of an after-thought. The learned Counsel contends that although directions have been issued upon all the respondents including Union of India, no appeal has been preferred by Union of India. It was further submitted that in any event that as Indian Institute of Management is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it can implement its own resolution and in that view of the matter, no approval of Union of India was required to be obtained. The learned Counsel further submits 5 that in any event, the writ-petitioners-respondents were entitled to the same scales of pay as were being paid to the security staff of I. I. T. Delhi and Kharagpur in view of the principle laid down under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel in support of the aforementioned submissions had relied upon the decisions of Supreme Court of India in Jacob M. Puthuparambi and Ors. v. Kerala Water Authority and Ors. reported in (1991-II-LLJ-65) and in Randhir Singh v. Union of India reported in (1982-I-LLJ-344) and in Food Corpn. Workers' Union v. Food Corpn. of India and Ors. reported in 1990 II CLR 581. ( 6 ) THE learned Trial Judge, as would appear from the impugned judgment itself, has proceeded on the basis that there had been no opposition to the prayers made by the writ-petitioners. The learned Trial Judge neither considered the statement made in the affidavit-in-opposition nor His Lordship's attention was drawn to the same by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ-petitioners. The learned Trial Judge neither considered the statement made in the affidavit-in-opposition nor His Lordship's attention was drawn to the same by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ-petitioners. This is not for the appeal Court to consider as to whether Union of India was right or was at all required to grant the approval in question or not. In the writ application the writ-petitioners-respondents had merely prayed for implementation of the Board's resolution. The submissions made before us were not advanced before the learned Trial Judge. It is one thing to say that the appellant being statutory authority is bound to implement its own resolution but it is another thing to say that the petitioners are entitled to equal pay for equal work in terms of the provisions contained in Article 39 (d) of the Constitution of India. The resolution adopted by the Board clearly suggests that the same could be implemented only upon receipt of the approval of the Government of India. It did not get the said approval. It was not, therefore, possible for the appellants to implement the resolution at all. As indicated hereinbefore, the writ petitioners-respondents prayer before the learned Trial Judge was a direction upon the respondents to implement the said resolution. The said resolution has to be implemented as a whole and not at all. In fact even the learned Trial Judge, as indicated hereinbefore, has directed the implementation oi the resolution by the respondents. The said resolution in view of the aforementioned letter of the Central Government dated August 4, 1991, as contained in annexure 'a' to the affidavit-in-opposition, could not have implemented at all. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the writ-petitioner-respondents that the appellant being an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India was not required to refer to the matter to the Central Government appears to be self-contradictory. If that was the stand, the question of impleading Union of India as a party did not arise; even no writ application could have been filed as against the management asking it to implement its own resolution. The writ-petitioners, therefore, themselves proceeded on the basis that such a resolution could be adopted only upon obtaining the approval of Union of India. The writ-petitioners, therefore, themselves proceeded on the basis that such a resolution could be adopted only upon obtaining the approval of Union of India. If apart from such resolution the writ-petitioners were entitled to a revision in the scale of pay on the basis of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, they ought to have made out a case therefor by placing requisite materials on records. It is also interesting to note that while advancing the aforementioned argument, the learned Counsel for the writ-petitioners-respondents in the same breath submits that the order dated August 4, 1991 was an afterthought. Such submissions in view of our observations hereinbefore are (sic.) self contradictory. It is now well-known in view of various decisions of the Supreme Court of India that direction by the Court upon the respondents to pay a revised scale of pay on the basis of doctrine of equal pay for equal work depends upon various factors - such factors being qualification, experience, nature of duties, responsibilities and other relevant factors. There has been no adjudication by the learned Trial Judge that the duties performed by the writ-petitioners are equal to those of the duties per- formed by the security staff of I. I. T. Delhi and I. I. T. Kharagpur. In absence of such a plea having been raised before the learned Trial Judge, in our opinion, it is not permissible for them to raise the said plea in this appeal for the first time. The decision in Food Corporation's case (supra) arose out of different fact situation. In that case, the question was as to whether different wage structures could be applied in respect of the workmen employed at different regions. It is not the case of the writ-petitioners-respondents that Indian Institute of Management and the Indian Institute of Technology belong to the same organisation. It is not disputed that the appellant is a registered Society. In Jacob v. Kerala Water Supply Authority and Ors. (supra) the Supreme Court was concerned with a matter of regulation. In that case there existed a statutory rule for regularisation. The said decision had been distinguished by the Supreme Court of India itself in later cases. In fact the Supreme Court in its latest pronouncement reported in clearly held that no appointment can be given by way of such regularisation. In that case there existed a statutory rule for regularisation. The said decision had been distinguished by the Supreme Court of India itself in later cases. In fact the Supreme Court in its latest pronouncement reported in clearly held that no appointment can be given by way of such regularisation. This Bench also recently have considered this aspect of the matter in various cases. Randhir Singh's case (supra) again was based on equal pay for equal work. The said decision has also subsequently been distinguished by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has clearly held that whether a person can be granted such pay of scale or not would depend upon various factors. This aspect of the matter has been considered in AIR 1980 S. C. 19, and recently by a Full Bench of Patna High Court reported in 1995 (1) PLJR 123 . However, it is not necessary for us to consider the matter any further in view of the fact that apparently such a case has not been made out before the learned Trial Judge. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated January 8, 1992 is set aside and the matter is remitted to an appropriate Bench for consideration in accordance with law. There will, however, be no order as to costs. ( 8 ) THE question as to whether the appellant is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is left open. Satya Narayan Chakraborty, J. I agree.