ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This revision is directed against the order dated 24.3.1994 passed by Shri G.L. Sutrakar. Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge. Khandwa at Burhanpur in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 12/92, whereby the lower appellate Court has reversed the order of the trial Judge refusing to grant temporary injunction under Order. 39, Rule 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure. The facts of the connected Civil Revision No. 217/94 are identical and therefore, order passed in this revision shall also govern the disposal of that revision too. 2. The facts of this revision are as follows :- (i) The defendant/applicants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction to the effect that the applicants are the legal tenants of the suit property and they cannot be evicted other by than way of decree passed for eviction in accordance with the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 1961; (ii) The applicants further prayed that the non-applicants be restrained by a decree of permanent injunction from executing the decree of possession passed in Civil Suit No. 45/62 passed by senior civil court, Jalgaon (Maharasthra) which was transferred to the Additional Distt. Judge, Burhanpur and is registered as the Transfer Case No, 45/62. (iii) It was further prayed that it be declared the that decree passed in Civil Suit No. 45/62 by the Jalgaon Court is not binding upon the applicants as they were not parties to that suit. 3. It was alleged by the applicants in their plaint that the suit shop described in the Schedule A of the plaint was given to him by way of lease by Pannalal in the year 1966. Since then, the applicants were tenants of Pannalal. It was further alleged in the plaint that suit shop was let out in the year 1966. The rent was Rs. 50/- (Rupees fifty) per month. This suit shop was let out by Pannalal to the applicants as a 'Karta' of the joint hindu family of which the non-applicants No. 1 to 8 were the members. It was further alleged that Pannalal took rent 2 to 2 1/2 years and thereafter Pannalal directed that the rent should be given to non-applicant No. 9, Devidas. After the aforesaid period, tenancy was transferred to Devidas. Subsequently, the rent was increased to Rs. It was further alleged that Pannalal took rent 2 to 2 1/2 years and thereafter Pannalal directed that the rent should be given to non-applicant No. 9, Devidas. After the aforesaid period, tenancy was transferred to Devidas. Subsequently, the rent was increased to Rs. 70/- (Rupees Seventy) per month and at the time of filing of the suit, the rent was Rs. 70/-(Rupees Seventy per month). It was alleged in the plaint that the payment of this rent is recorded in the accounts of Pannalal and Devidas. It was also alleged that at the time of letting out by Pannalal, the applicants have paid Rs. 400/-(Rupees Four Hundred) for converting the suit shop into 'Paras Kangan Stores' and for this purpose they paid Rs. 400/- which is also recorded in the accounts' books of Pannalal. The applicants further prayed that after obtaining the decree Civil Suit No. 45/62 the applicants are being shown as tresspassers and the transfer decree being executed against them by Add. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Khandwa at Burhanpur in Transfer Case No. 45/62. It was further alleged that the applicants were not a party to Civil Suit No. 45/62 and therefore they were not aware about the decree passed in that suit. It was stated further that on 6.6.1988, there was some compromise between the non-applicants No. 1 to 8 and Pannalal and the compromise decree was obtained and by virtue of that decree the applicants are being deprived of their rights in suit property as tenants and they are being evicted under the decree as tress passers without following the procedure of eviction as laid down in M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. This suit was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Class-I Burhanpur. 4. On these allegations, an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the applicants and they sought a temporary injunction to the effect that the non-applicant No. 1 to 8 be restrained from executing the decree obtained by them in the Civil Suit No. 45/62 which is registered as Transfer Case No. 45/62 in the Court of Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Khandwa at Burhanpur. The applicants filed an affidavit of the original defendant. Keshrimal in support of their claim under Order 39. Rule 1 & 2, Code of Civil Procedure. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Khandwa at Burhanpur. The applicants filed an affidavit of the original defendant. Keshrimal in support of their claim under Order 39. Rule 1 & 2, Code of Civil Procedure. They also filed certain documents in support of their claim for proving their tenancy. 5. The non-applicants No. 1 to 8 denied the claim of the applicants. It was claimed that applicants were aware about Civil Suit No. 45/62. They had objected to the execution of decree in Civil Suit No. 45/62 which was transferred to the Court of Addl. District Judge at Burhanpur. When their objections were rejected, they filed a suit. It was also claimed that there was no prima-facie case in favour of the applicants and so also the balance of convenience in their favour. It was further claimed that the applicants shall not suffer any irreparable injury, if the decree is allowed to be executed. The applicants also filed their affidavit in support of their claim. 6. The trial Court, after hearing the parties granted temporary injunction in favour of the applicants. But the lower appellate Court has reversed the order of the trial Court and rejected the application filed by the applicants under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2, Code of Civil Procedure. 7. The main question for determination is whether the applicants are entitled to temporary injunction against the execution of decree pending before the transferring Court, that is to say the Addl. Judge to the Court of District-Judge. Khandwa at Burhanpur. The order 39, Rule 1 & 2 have been amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (M.P. Amendment) Act of 1984 (No. 29/84). It became operative from the date of its publication that is to say from 14.8.1984. In this Act, the following proviso has been added to sub-section 2 of Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 provided that no such injunction shall be granted :- (a) Where no perpetual injunction could be granted in view of the provisions of Section 38 and section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (No. 47 of 1963): and any order for injunction granted in contravention of these provisions shall be void. 8. 8. It is clear from this amendment made by the legislature that if permanent injunction cannot be granted under section 38 and 41 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, no temporary injunction can be granted and if such injunction is granted it will be deemed to be void. In the opinion of this Court, the intention of Amendment Act No. 29/.84 so far as Order 39, rule 1 & 2 arc concerned is made clear by the proviso to Order 39. Rule 1 & 2 quoted above. The amendment by way of proviso covers both rules Order 39. Rule 1 & 2. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the applicants can obtain a permanent injunction restraining the non-applicant No. 1 to 8 from executing the decree. In the opinion of this Court, this section 38 of the Specific Relief Act is subject to section 41 of the Act. For the reason the language of Section 38 (1) shows that a perpetual injunction can be granted subject to other provisions contained in or referred to by this chapter. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act falls in the chapter 8 of the Specific Relief Act. 1963. Therefore, it is necessary to look into Section 41 of the Act for recording if a suit for permanent injunction can be granted. Under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act an injunction cannot be granted as per clause (b) which is being reproduced as follows: (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not sub-ordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. It is, therefore, clear from the Section that no permanent injunction can be granted to restrain a person from prosecuting a suit or a proceeding pending before a Court which is not subordinate to it. The Court of Addl. Judge to the court of District Judge. Khandwa at Burhanpur is not subordinate to Civil Judge Class-I, Burhanpur. It is a superior Court. Therefore, it is obvious that the trial Court had no power to grant a permanent injunction in respect of decree pending in the Court of Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Khandwa at Burhanpur. It is clear from the proviso quoted above that the trial court has also no jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction. Therefore, it is obvious that the trial Court had no power to grant a permanent injunction in respect of decree pending in the Court of Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Khandwa at Burhanpur. It is clear from the proviso quoted above that the trial court has also no jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction. That apart even if the amendment made under Order 39, Rule 1 &2 was not there, there is a high authority of Supreme Court for the proposition that no temporary injunction can be granted even under unamended Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Cotton Corporation of India Limited Vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and others A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1272 the Supreme. Court has laid down in paragraph 21 at page 1276 as follows:- S.41 (b) denies to the Court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court which is not subordinates to the court from which the injunction is sought. In other word, the court can still grant an injunction restating a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought. As a necessary corollary, it would follow that the Court is precluded from granting an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding a Court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction. Having decided that in view of Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act. No permanent injunction can he granted for restraining a party in filing a civil suit or prosecuting it in superior Court by a subordinate Court, the Supreme Court however, held in paragraph 10 at page 1277 Cotton Corporation of India Limited Vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and others (supra) as follows:- The Court said that an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceedings. If this be the purpose to achieve which power to grant temporary relief is conferred, it is inconceivable that where the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for because the statute bars granting such a relief ipso facto the temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted. 9. If this be the purpose to achieve which power to grant temporary relief is conferred, it is inconceivable that where the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for because the statute bars granting such a relief ipso facto the temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted. 9. The Supreme Court has held that even power under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot be exercised in such a case. In paragraph 21 at page 1281 (Cotton Corporation of India Limited Vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and others (supra) it said :- In view of the majority decision, it must be conceded that the Court can in appropriate cases grant temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent power in cases not covered by Order 39, C.P.C. But while exercising this inherent power, the Court should not overlook the statutory provision which clearly indicates that injunction to restrain initiation of proceeding cannot be granted. Section 41 (b) is one such provisions. And it must be remembered that inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked to nullify or stultify a statutory provision. 10. For the reasons aforesaid, it is not necessary to dwell any further on the other points involved in these revisions. The trial Court did not have any jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction because the Additional Judge to the Court of District judge. Khandwa at Burhanpur was not a subordinate Court to it. 11. The result is that both these revisions arc liable to be dismissed, though, for different reason then those given by the lower appellate Court. The learned counsel for (sic) applicants however, graciously conceded that the applicants are entitled to six months time from the date of passing of this order and this Court may direct that the impugned decree sought to be restrained by way of temporary injunction shall not be executed for six months from the date of passing of this order. 12. Accordingly, both these revisions are dismissed subject to the observations made in the above paragraph. There shall be no order as to costs.